Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: inferential deficit or experimental artifact?

Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study-test trials using both strategies, participants' predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study-test trials--they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the strategy effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation--noncompliance with strategy instructions--was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.     

Why do people rideshare? An experimental study

Enabled by mobile technologies and fueled by the economic downturn, ridesharing has emerged in recent years as a private transportation facet of the shared economy. Our study investigates the motives for participation in situated ridesharing. We propose a theoretical model that includes economic benefits, time benefits, transportation anxiety, trust, and reciprocity either as direct antecedents of ridesharing participation intention, or mediated through attitude towards ridesharing. We conduct a scenario-based survey, with 300 participants. Our findings indicate that, in situations where transportation anxiety is high (e.g. construction on the road), if people can trust the ridesharing service providers and participants, in the presence of economic and time benefits, they will have a strong intention to participate in ridesharing.     

How do students improve their value-based learning with task experience?

When learning items that vary in reward, students improve their scores (i.e., earned reward) with task experience. In four experiments, we examined whether such improvements arise from better selective encoding of items that would earn more (vs. less) reward. Participants studied and recalled words across multiple study-test trials. On each trial, 12 words were slated with different values (typically from 1 to 12), and participants earned the point value assigned to a given word if it was correctly recalled. In all experiments, participants earned more points across the first two trials. In Experiment 1, participants either self-paced their study or had experimenter-paced study and in Experiment 2, some participants were penalised for each second spent during study. Improvements in points earned were related to increases in overall recall but not to selective encoding. In Experiment 3, some participants were given value-emphasised instructions, yet they did not demonstrate selective encoding. In Experiment 4, we used a larger range of point values, but selective encoding still did not account for the improvement in point scores across lists. These results suggest that metacognitively-driven selective encoding is not necessary to observe improvements in value-based learning.     

How well do elderly people cope with uncertainty in a learning task?

The relation between age, task complexity and learning performance in a Multiple Cue Probability Learning task was studied by systematically varying the level of uncertainty present in the task, keeping constant the direction of relationships. Four age groups were constituted: young adults (mean age = 21), middle-aged adults (45), elderly people (69) and very elderly people (81). Five uncertainty levels were considered: predictability = 0.96, 0.80, 0.64, 0.48, and 0.32. All relationships involved were direct ones. A strong effect of uncertainty on 'control', a measure of the subject's consistency with respect to a linear model, was found. This effect was essentially a linear one. To each decrement in predictability of the task corresponded an equal decrement in participants' level of control. This level of decrement was the same, regardless of the age of the participant. It can be concluded that elderly people cope with uncertainty in probability learning tasks as well as young adults.     

Working memory deficit in children with mathematical difficulties: a general or specific deficit?

This study examined whether children with mathematical difficulties (MDs) or comorbid mathematical and reading difficulties have a working memory deficit and whether the hypothesized working memory deficit includes the whole working memory system or only specific components. In the study, 31 10-year-olds with MDs and 37 10-year-olds with both mathematical and reading difficulties were compared with 47 age-matched and 50 younger controls (9-year-olds) on a number of working memory tasks. Compared with the age-matched controls, both groups of children with MDs performed worse on tasks tapping the central executive (e.g., visual matrix span) and the phonological loop (e.g., word span). More important, the MD group performed worse than the younger controls on the counting span task, whereas the group with comorbid mathematical and reading difficulties performed worse on the counting span task and the visual matrix span task. These findings provide support for the assumption that children with MDs have a working memory deficit. More specifically, children with MDs have a central executive deficit connected to concurrent processing and storage of numerical and visual information.     

Method factors associated with assessment of child behavior: Fact or artifact?

A sample of 64 phobic children between the ages of 6 and 16, with their general population matched controls, were rated by parents on the Louisville Behavior Check List and Louisville Fear Survey and by teachers on the School Behavior Check List. The analysis of ratings by factor analysis revealed three instrument factors while a multiple discriminant analysis elicited a multidimensional phobic trait that crossed observers, situations, and instruments. The results are discussed in terms of the implications for multivariant analysis of behavior change as well as for classification of psychopathological disorders of childhood. The thesis is advanced that instrument factors elicited by factor analysis in psychotherapy change studies are statistical artifacts and that a multiple discriminant analysis is a more appropriate technique for the study of change as well as for classification.This study is one aspect of a psychotherapy research project on phobic children which was supported in part by National Institute of Mental Health Grant No. MH 13219.     

On the limits of advance preparation for a task switch: do people prepare all the task some of the time or some of the task all the time?

This study investigated the nature of advance preparation for a task switch, testing 2 key assumptions of R. De Jong's (2000) failure-to-engage theory: (a) Task-switch preparation is all-or-none, and (b) preparation failures stem from nonutilization of available control capabilities. In 3 experiments, switch costs varied dramatically across individual stimulus-response (S-R) pairs of the tasks-virtually absent for 1 pair but large for others. These findings indicate that, across trials, task preparation was not all-or-none but, rather, consistently partial (full preparation for some S-R pairs but not others). In other words, people do not prepare all of the task some of the time, they prepare some of the task all of the time. Experiments 2 and 3 produced substantial switch costs even though time deadlines provided strong incentives for optimal advance preparation. Thus, there was no evidence that people have a latent capability to fully prepare for a task switch.     

Why do people with an anxiety disorder utilize more nonmental health care than those without?

OBJECTIVE: It is unclear why nonmental healthcare utilization is greater among those with psychological problems. The authors examined healthcare utilization in HMO patients to determine whether greater utilization in anxiety disorder (AD) patients was explained by anxiety symptoms (increasing sensitivity to physical symptoms) or comorbid illness (causing greater need for services). DESIGN: Patients were randomly selected from the database of a multi-specialty practice and 1,041 completed a survey assessing psychological symptoms, health behaviors, and demographics. Anxiety symptoms were assessed by questionnaire and the presence of an AD was determined from the medical chart. Healthcare encounters and medication use were abstracted from medical charts and HMO claims data. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Healthcare utilization. RESULTS: Both AD and anxiety symptoms predicted utilization, but symptoms were not associated with utilization in a model that also included AD. Comorbid illness was significantly associated with utilization independent of AD and somewhat reduced the strength of the AD-utilization association. The results were replicated in comparison of those with any psychiatric disorder to those without. CONCLUSION: Among those with AD, greater utilization is not explained by anxiety symptoms but is partly explained by greater comorbid illness. Further study is needed to understand excess healthcare utilization among AD patients.     

Induction with uncertain categories: When do people consider the category alternatives?

These three experiments examined how people make property inferences about exemplars whose category membership is uncertain. Participants were shown two categories and a novel exemplar with a feature that indicated that the exemplar was more likely to belong to one category (target) than to the other (nontarget). Participants then made categorization decisions and property inferences about the novel exemplar. In some conditions, property inferences could be made only by considering both target and nontarget categories. In other conditions, predictions could be based on both categories or on the target category alone. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Murphy & Ross, 1994, 2005), we found that many people made predictions based only on consideration of the target category. However, the prevalence of such single-category reasoning was greatly reduced by highlighting the costs of neglecting nontarget alternatives and by asking for inferences before categorization decisions. The results suggest that previous work may have exaggerated the prevalence of single-category reasoning and that people may be more flexible in their use of multiple categories in property inference than has been previously recognized.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for people's assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologists), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices as defined by education were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for peoples' assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologisis), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices, as defined by education, were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Why do people disagree with a statement they do not understand? Relations between comprehension and evaluation of a simple assertion

This article presents the results of a quasi-experimental study that examined the relation between the metacomprehension (i.e., understand/do not understand) and evaluative (i.e., agree/disagree) response to a simple one-sentence statement to compare the relative timing in which these two responses are generated in the course of sentence processing. In the study, participants were asked to provide metacomprehension and evaluative judgements to simple one-sentence assertions, and their response times were measured. Two of the main findings are: first, the response time for the evaluative judgement is faster than the response time for the metacomprehension judgement and, second, the faster response time of the evaluative judgement relative to the metacomprehension judgement is more pronounced either when they are not sure about whether they understand a statement or when they feel they do not understand a statement. The findings are analysed in relation to a multiple constraint satisfaction model of sentence comprehension to generate a possible processing model of a simple one-sentence assertion underlying the generation of metacomprehension and evaluative responses.     

Dual-task interference with equal task emphasis: graded capacity sharing or central postponement?

Most studies using the psychological refractory period (PRP) design suggest that dual-task performance is limited by a central bottleneck. Because subjects are usually told to emphasize Task 1, however, the bottleneck might reflect a strategic choice rather than a structural limitation. To evaluate the possibility that central operations can proceed in parallel, albeit with capacity limitations, we conducted two dual-task experiments with equal task emphasis. In both experiments, subjects tended to either group responses together or respond to one task well before the other. In addition, stimulus-response compatibility effects were roughly constant across stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). At the short SOA, compatibility effects also carried over onto response times for the other task. This pattern of results is difficult to reconcile with the possibility that subjects share capacity roughly equally between simultaneous central operations. However, this pattern is consistent with the existence of a structural central bottleneck.     

Distributional reaction time properties in the Eriksen task: marked differences or hidden similarities with the Simon task?

In conflict tasks, the irrelevant stimulus attribute needs to be suppressed for the correct response to be produced. In the Simon task, earlier researchers have proposed that this suppression is the reason that, after an initial increase, the interference effect decreases for longer RTs, as reflected by late, negative-going delta plots. This view has been challenged by observations of positive-going delta plots, even for long RTs, in other conflict tasks, despite a similar necessity for suppression. For late negative-going delta plots to be interpreted as reflecting suppression, a necessary, although maybe not sufficient, condition is that similar patterns should be observed for other conflict tasks. We reasoned that a similar suppression could be present, but hidden, in the Eriksen flanker task. By recording and analyzing electromyograms of the muscles involved in response execution, we could compute delta plots separately for trials that elicited a subthreshold incorrect response activation (partial error). Late negative-going delta plots were observable on partial-error trials, although they were weaker than for the Simon task, reducing the impact of this inversion on the overall distribution. We further showed that this pattern is modulated by time pressure. Those results indicate that mechanisms leading to negative-going delta plots, similar to those observed in the Simon task, are also at play in the Eriksen task. The link between negative-going delta plots and executive online control is discussed.     

How do people judge risks: Availability heuristic, affect heuristic, or both?

How does the public reckon which risks to be concerned about? The availability heuristic and the affect heuristic are key accounts of how laypeople judge risks. Yet, these two accounts have never been systematically tested against each other, nor have their predictive powers been examined across different measures of the public's risk perception. In two studies, we gauged risk perception in student samples by employing three measures (frequency, value of a statistical life, and perceived risk) and by using a homogeneous (cancer) and a classic set of heterogeneous causes of death. Based on these judgments of risk, we tested precise models of the availability heuristic and the affect heuristic and different definitions of availability and affect. Overall, availability-by-recall, a heuristic that exploits people's direct experience of occurrences of risks in their social network, conformed to people's responses best. We also found direct experience to carry a high degree of ecological validity (and one that clearly surpasses that of affective information). However, the relative impact of affective information (as compared to availability) proved more pronounced in value-of-a-statistical-life and perceived-risk judgments than in risk-frequency judgments. Encounters with risks in the media, in contrast, played a negligible role in people's judgments. Going beyond the assumption of exclusive reliance on either availability or affect, we also found evidence for mechanisms that combine both, either sequentially or in a composite fashion. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications of our results, including how to foster people's risk calibration and the success of education campaigns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

What do people do with porn? Qualitative research into the comsumption,use, and experience of pornography and other sexually explicit media

This article reviews qualitative research into the consumption of pornography and other sexually explicit media emerging from a range of subject areas. Taking a critique of quantitative methods and a focus on measuring sexual effects and attitudes as a starting point, it considers the proposition that qualitative work is more suited to an examination of the complex social, cultural, and political constructions of sexuality. Examining studies into the way men, women, and young people see, experience, and use explicit media texts, the article identifies the key findings that have emerged. Qualitative work shows that sexually explicit media texts are experienced and understood in a variety of ways and evoke strong and often contradictory reactions, not all of which are represented in public debates about pornography. These texts function in a range of different ways, depending on context; as a source of knowledge, a resource for intimate practices, a site for identity construction, and an occasion for performing gender and sexuality. The article reviews these studies and their findings, identifying what they suggest about directions for future research, both in terms of developing methodology and refining approaches to sexuality and media consumption.     

Principled ideology or racism: Why do modern racists oppose race-based social justice programs?

People who score high on modern racism scales consistently oppose reparations for race-based social injustices. Scholars debate whether this opposition reflects racism [e.g., Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2005). Over thirty years later: A contemporary look at symbolic racism. In M.P Zanna, (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 37 (pp. 95-150). San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press] or a principled conservative ideology [e.g., Sniderman, P. M., & Tetlock, P. E. (1986). Symbolic racism: Problems of motive attribution in political analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 42, 129-150]. We tested these competing hypotheses by examining support for government reparations for adult survivors of childhood abuse. We manipulated whether the survivors were of European or Aboriginal heritage. Consistent with a racism hypothesis, high modern racists indicated less support for reparations when the survivors were of Aboriginal heritage than when the survivors were of European heritage. Interestingly, low modern racists supported reparations more for Aboriginal Canadian than European Canadian survivors. We discuss three explanations of the responses of low modern racists.     

How do people solve the "weather prediction" task?: individual variability in strategies for probabilistic category learning

Probabilistic category learning is often assumed to be an incrementally learned cognitive skill, dependent on nondeclarative memory systems. One paradigm in particular, the weather prediction task, has been used in over half a dozen neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies to date. Because of the growing interest in using this task and others like it as behavioral tools for studying the cognitive neuroscience of cognitive skill learning, it becomes especially important to understand how subjects solve this kind of task and whether all subjects learn it in the same way. We present here new experimental and theoretical analyses of the weather prediction task that indicate that there are at least three different strategies that describe how subjects learn this task. (1) An optimal multi-cue strategy, in which they respond to each pattern on the basis of associations of all four cues with each outcome; (2) a one-cue strategy, in which they respond on the basis of presence or absence of a single cue, disregarding all other cues; or (3) a singleton strategy, in which they learn only about the four patterns that have only one cue present and all others absent. This variability in how subjects approach this task may have important implications for interpreting how different brain regions are involved in probabilistic category learning.     

The insistence of vision: Why do people look at a salient stimulus when it signals target absence?

Researchers and practitioners across many fields would benefit from the ability to predict human search time in complex visual displays. However, a missing element in our ability to predict search time is our ability to quantify the exogenous attraction of visual objects in terms of their impact on search time. The current work represents an initial step in this direction. We present two experiments using a quadrant search task to investigate how exogenous and endogenous factors influence human visual search. In Experiment 1, we measure the oculomotor capture—or the tendency of a stimulus to elicit a saccade—of a salient quadrant under conditions in which the salient quadrant does not predict target location. Despite the irrelevance of quadrant salience, we find that subjects persist in making saccades towards the salient quadrant at above-chance levels. We then present a Bayesian-based ideal performer model that predicts search time and oculomotor capture when the salient quadrant never contains the search target. Experiment 2 tested the predictions of the ideal performer model and revealed human performance to be in close correspondence with the model. We conclude that, in our speeded search task, the influence of an exogenous attractor on saccades can be quantified in terms of search time costs and, when these costs are considered, both search time and search behaviour reflect a boundedly optimal adaptation to the cost structure of the environment.     

Parental involvement with adolescents' education: do daughters or sons get more help?

This research examined whether parents were involved differently with the education of their adolescent daughters and sons. The investigation used data from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), which collected information from approximately 25,000 eighth-grade students. Several types of parental involvement were analyzed for gender differences, including school discussion, parent-school connection, parental expectations, parental attendance at school events, and three measures of parental supervision (checking homework, limiting television watching, and limiting going out with friends). The results showed that, net of students' grades, tests scores, and educational aspirations, parents helped daughters in some ways and sons in other ways. Generally, daughters experienced more parental involvement with their education than did sons. The findings are discussed in terms of parents' traditional socialization practices versus a shift in parental treatment in response to social trends.