Eye gaze cannot be ignored (but neither can arrows)

Recent studies have tried to shed light on the automaticity of attentional shifts triggered by gaze and arrows with mixed results. In the present research, we aimed at testing a strong definition of resistance to suppression for orienting of attention elicited by these two cues. In five experiments, participants were informed with 100% certainty about the future location of a target they had to react to by presentation of either a direction word at the beginning of each trial or instructions at the beginning of each block. Gaze and arrows were presented before the target as uninformative distractors irrelevant for the task. The results showed similar patterns for gaze and arrows-namely, an interference effect when the distractors were incongruent with the upcoming target location. This suggests that the orienting of attention mediated by gaze and arrows can be considered as strongly automatic.     

Task preparation based on precues versus memory: Precues lead to superior performance with two tasks but not with four tasks

There is considerable evidence that task switching proceeds more efficiently with preparation based on explicit precues than on the basis of a learned sequence of tasks. However, this evidence stems almost exclusively from experiments in which participants switched between only two tasks. In two experiments stronger preparation effects with explicit precues compared to memory-based preparation was replicated with two tasks. With four tasks, however, preparation based on memory was at least as efficient as preparation based on precues. A third experiment ruled out the possibility that this latter finding was due to increased difficulty of cue processing with two-dimensional cues. These findings question the generalisability of observations regarding preparation effects that are based on two-task situations. It is suggested that one crucial factor regarding the relative efficiency of precue-based and memory-based preparation pertains to the fact that with two tasks, the relevant task can be determined by knowing only the previous task and whether a switch is required or not. This is not possible with four tasks that require a more elaborated task representation at the outset, which in turn may be more apt to support memory-based preparation.     

More than a surprise: The bivalency effect in task switching

When switching tasks, if stimuli are presented that contain features that cue two of the tasks in the set (i.e., bivalent stimuli), performance slowing is observed on all tasks. This generalized slowing extends to tasks in the set which have no features in common with the bivalent stimulus and is referred to as the bivalency effect. In previous work, the bivalency effect was invoked by presenting occasionally occurring bivalent stimuli; therefore, the possibility that the generalized slowing is simply due to surprise (as opposed to bivalency) has not yet been discounted. This question was addressed in two task switching experiments where the occasionally occurring stimuli were either bivalent (bivalent version) or merely surprising (surprising version). The results confirmed that the generalized slowing was much greater in the bivalent version of both experiments, demonstrating that the magnitude of this effect is greater than can be accounted for by simple surprise. This set of results confirms that slowing task execution when encountering bivalent stimuli may be fundamental for efficient task switching, as adaptive tuning of response style may serve to prepare the cognitive system for possible future high conflict trials.     

Between-task competition for intentions and actions

People can switch quickly and flexibly from one task to another, but suffer the effects of between-task competition when they do so: After switching, they tend to be distracted by irrelevant stimulus information and hampered by incorrect actions associated with recently performed tasks. This competition results in performance costs of switching, as well as a bias against switching when there is choice over which task to perform, particularly when switching from a difficult task to an easier one. Two experiments investigated the locus of these between-task competition effects in voluntary task switching. Participants switched between an easy location classification and a harder shape classification, making two responses on each trial: the first to register their task choice, the second to perform the chosen task on a subsequently presented stimulus. The results indicated that participants chose to perform the difficult shape task more often than the easier location task, evidence that between-task competition affects intentions that are expressed independently of task-specific actions. The bias was stronger in participants with faster choice speed, suggesting that these influences are relatively automatic. Moreover, even though participants had unlimited time to choose and prepare a task before stimulus presentation, their subsequent performance was nonetheless sensitive to persisting effects of between-task competition. Altogether these results indicate the pervasive influence of between-task competition, which affects both the expression of global task intentions and the production of task-specific actions.     

Losing control in front of a fearful face: The effect of emotional information on cognitive control

How is our cognitive control system modulated by emotional information, especially fearful stimuli? An intuitive hypothesis is that fearful stimuli would enhance cognitive control so that people could switch from the ongoing task to emergent events more quickly to secure themselves. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of emotional information on the shift function of cognitive control by using the task-cueing procedure, in which face images were presented as cues. With the gender of faces indicating which task to do, we manipulated the emotional valence of faces (neutral vs. fearful), finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues than in the trials containing neutral cues (Experiment 1). This effect was not caused by enlarging task-set interference (Experiment 2), nor by slowing down cue encoding (Experiment 3). Contrary to the intuitive hypothesis, our results suggested that the endogenous task-set reconfiguration process was impaired when fearful faces were presented. We speculated that the benefit of decreasing cognitive flexibility in face of fearful stimuli is to speed up response in a dangerous environment, and this accelerating response is achieved by suppressing the goal-directed system to permit the fast, automatic stimulus-driven system to govern behaviours.     

Reward enhances backward inhibition in task switching

Recently, effects of reward incentives on interference-induced cognitive adjustments have drawn much attention. It has been demonstrated that reward can reduce or eliminate switch costs which occurred when alternating between different tasks. However, it still remains a question how reward affects inhibitory processes underlying task switching. The present study examined this issue by combining a task-switching paradigm with performance-contingent reward. Results showed that the inhibitory processes were modulated by reward, with n-2 repetition costs incremented after reward delivery. Data suggest that reward-triggered reduction or elimination of switch costs may reflect enhancing inhibitory processes which are motivated by reward signals and targeted at the irrelevant task set. These findings shed new light on the role of reward in cognitive control.     

Rethinking volitional control over task choice in multitask environments: Use of a stimulus set selection strategy in voluntary task switching

Under conditions of volitional control in multitask environments, subjects may engage in a variety of strategies to guide task selection. The current research examines whether subjects may sometimes use a top-down control strategy of selecting a task-irrelevant stimulus dimension, such as location, to guide task selection. We term this approach a stimulus set selection strategy. Using a voluntary task switching procedure, subjects voluntarily switched between categorizing letter and number stimuli that appeared in two, four, or eight possible target locations. Effects of stimulus availability, manipulated by varying the stimulus onset asynchrony between the two target stimuli, and location repetition were analysed to assess the use of a stimulus set selection strategy. Considered across position condition, Experiment 1 showed effects of both stimulus availability and location repetition on task choice suggesting that only in the 2-position condition, where selection based on location always results in a target at the selected location, subjects may have been using a stimulus set selection strategy on some trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings in a visually more cluttered environment. These results indicate that, contrary to current models of task selection in voluntary task switching, the top-down control of task selection may occur in the absence of the formation of an intention to perform a particular task.     

Unconscious activation of task sets

Using an explicit task cuing paradigm, we tested whether masked cues can trigger task-set activation, which would suggest that unconsciously presented stimuli can impact cognitive control processes. Based on a critical assessment of previous findings on the priming of task-set activation, we present two experiments with a new method to approach this subject. Instead of using a prime, we varied the visibility of the cue. These cues either directly signaled particular tasks in Experiment 1, or certain task transitions (i.e., task repetitions or switches) in Experiment 2. While both masked task and transition cues affected task choice, only task cues affected the speed of task performance. This observation suggests that task-specific stimulus–response rules can be activated only by masked cues that are uniquely associated with a particular task. Taken together, these results demonstrate that unconsciously presented stimuli have the power to activate corresponding task sets.     

Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Whether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime. When the SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long (84 ms), primes congruent with the task set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition (36 ms), no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the conscious decision.     

Across-task long-term priming: Interaction of task readiness and automatic retrieval

When humans carry out actions in response to external stimulation, they acquire associations between the stimulus and the action it triggered. When the same stimulus is used in two different tasks, the retrieval of associations compiled in the competing task hampers current performance. Previous research suggests that this across-task priming depends on the task set for the preceding task remaining active across the switch of tasks and, thus, competing with the activations needed for the new task. We present two experiments investigating this notion. Participants switched between two semantic classification tasks. In Experiment 1, participants switched between short runs of the two tasks. Across-task priming was observed on switch and repeat trials. In Experiment 2, participants switched between longer runs of the two tasks. Across-task priming was markedly reduced on repeat trials. The data suggest that whether or not across-task priming affects behaviour after the switch trial depends, amongst others, on whether the task set necessary for the previous task spills into the repeat trials. The implications of these findings for mechanisms of cognitive and mnemonic control are discussed.     

Differential effects of aging on processes underlying task switching

In this study, we used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to examine the effects of aging on processes underlying task switching. The response time data revealed an age-related increase in mixing costs before controlling for general slowing and no effect of aging on switching costs. In the cue-locked epoch, the ERP data revealed little effect of age on the parietal P3 related to cue encoding, an age-related decrease in parietal activity related to cue retrieval, and an age-related increase in the amplitude of the parietal and frontal activity related to task set configuration and rule mapping. In the target-locked epoch, there was differential neural recruitment in younger and older adults in response to task mixing. These data are consistent with the idea that older adults may not fully implement task set before onset of the target stimulus.     

Age-Related Changes in Executive Function: An Event-Related Potential (ERP) Investigation of Task-Switching

ABSTRACT

Older adults have difficulty when executive control must be brought on line to coordinate ongoing behavior. To assess age-related alterations in executive processing, task-switching performance and event-related potential (ERP) activity were compared in young and older adults on switch, post-switch, pre-switch, and no-switch trials, ordered in demand for executive processes from greatest to least. In stimulus-locked averages for young adults, only switch trials elicited fronto-central P3 components, indicative of task-set attentional reallocation, whereas in older adults, three of the four trial types evinced frontal potentials. In response-locked averages, the amplitude of a medial frontal negativity (MFN), a component reflecting conflict monitoring and detection, increased as a function of executive demands in the ERPs of the young but not those of the older adults. These data suggest altered executive processing in older adults resulting in persistent recruitment of prefrontal processes for conditions that do not require them in the young.     

Hemispheric asymmetries and cognitive flexibility: an ERP and sLORETA study

Although functional cerebral asymmetries (FCAs) affect all cognitive domains, their modulation of the efficacy of specific executive functions is largely unexplored. In the present study, we used a lateralized version of the task switching paradigm to investigate the relevance of hemispheric asymmetries for cognitive control processes. Words were tachistoscopically presented in the left (LVF) and right visual half field (RVF). Participants had to categorise the words either based on their initial letters, or according to their word type. On half of the trials the task changed (switch trials) whereas on the other half it stayed the same (repeat trials). ERPs were recorded and the neural sources of the ERPs were reconstructed using standardised low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA). In the word type task, participants were faster on repeat trials when stimuli were presented in the RVF. In contrast, in the initial letter task participants were faster on repeat trials and in general more accurate after stimulus presentation in the LVF. In both tasks, no hemispheric asymmetries in reaction times were observed on switch trials. On the electrophysiological level, we observed a left lateralization of the N1 that was mediated by activation in the left extrastriate cortex as well as a greater positivity of the P3b after stimulus presentation in the RVF compared to the LVF that was mediated by activation in the superior parietal cortex. These results show that FCAs affect the neurophysiological correlates of executive functions related to task switching. The relation of neurophysiological and behavioural asymmetries is mediated by task complexity, with more complex tasks leading to more interhemispheric interaction and smaller left-right differences in behavioural measures. These findings reveal that FCAs are an important modulator of executive functions related to cognitive flexibility.     

A computational model of fractionated conflict-control mechanisms in task-switching

A feature of human cognition is the ability to monitor and adjust one's own behavior under changing circumstances. A dynamic balance between controlled and rapid responding is needed to adapt to a fluctuating environment. We suggest that cognitive control may include, among other things, two distinct processes. Incongruent stimuli may drive top-down facilitation of task-relevant responses to bias performance toward exploitation vs. exploration. Task or response switches may generally slow responses to bias toward accuracy vs. speed and exploration vs. exploitation. Behavioral results from a task switching study demonstrate these two distinct processes as revealed by higher-order sequential effects. A computational model implements the two conflict-control mechanisms, which allow it to capture many complex and novel sequential effects. Lesion studies with the model demonstrate that the model is unable to capture these effects without the conflict-control loops and show how each monitoring component modulates cognitive control. The results suggest numerous testable predictions regarding the neural substrates of cognitive control.     

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what can be seen from where

Visual perspective taking research has established that chimpanzees recognize what others can or cannot see in the presence of occluding barriers. Less is known about chimpanzees’ appreciation of what they themselves can or cannot see in similar situations. Additionally, it is unclear whether chimpanzees must rely on others’ gaze cues to solve such tasks or whether they have a more general appreciation of what can be seen from where. Hence, we investigated chimpanzees’ ability to anticipate what they would or would not be able to see from different visual perspectives. Food was hidden among arrays of open containers, with different containers providing visual access from unique viewing perspectives. Chimpanzees immediately adopted the correct perspective for each container type. Follow-up experiments showed that they were not simply moving to align themselves with visible openings. Our study thus suggests that chimpanzees have good visual perspective taking abilities with regard to themselves as well as others, and that both likely reflect a more general knowledge, at least implicit, of what can be seen from where.

Using finite mixture of GLMs to explore variability in children's flexibility in a task-switching paradigm

The present study illustrates the usefulness of finite mixture of generalized linear models (GLMs) to examine variability in cognitive strategies during childhood. More precisely, it addresses this variability in set-shifting situations where task-goal updating is endogenously driven. In a task-switching paradigm 5–6-year-olds had to switch between color- and shape-matching rules as a function of a predetermined, predictable task sequence. A finite mixture of GLMs was fitted to explore individual differences in performance. The statistical model revealed five response profiles, defined by accuracy and response times. These response profiles likely correspond to different cognitive strategies with varying efficiency and differential relations to working memory capacity (assessed by backward digit span). These results illustrate the heuristic value of statistical modeling to reveal the behavioral and cognitive variability in the temporal dynamics of children's cognitive functioning.     

Guiding Decision Makers' Eye Movements with (Un)Predictable Object Locations

We propose a new approach for guiding eye movements by controlling the predictability of object locations. We hypothesize that when a high (low) relevance object has a predictable location, observers are more (less) likely to fixate it compared with objects in unpredictable locations. We tested this hypothesis in three decision‐making studies, manipulating the location of a product label in an unpredictable, a predictable, and a mixed visual environment. In Study 1 and Study 2, we find that participants are less likely to fixate a low and medium relevance label in a predictable location, and in Study 3, we find that participants are more likely to fixate a high relevance label in a predictable location. Our findings suggest that predictable locations increase while unpredictable locations decrease top‐down control. The approach can be used to increase or decrease eye movements towards specific information depending on the goals of the choice architect. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Threats may be negative promises (but warnings are more than negative tips)

In everyday situations conditional promises, threats, tips, and warnings are commonplace. Previous research has reported disruption to eye movements during reading when conditional promises are produced by someone who does not have control over the conditional outcome event, but no such disruption for the processing of conditional tips. In the present paper, we examine how readers process conditional threats and warnings. We compare one account which views conditional threats and warnings simply as promises and tips with negative outcomes, with an alternative account which highlights their broader pragmatic differences. In an eye-tracking experiment we find evidence suggesting that, in processing terms, while threats operate like negative promises, warnings are more than negative tips.     

The imbibing idiot bias: Consuming alcohol can be hazardous to your (perceived) intelligence

Alcohol consumption and cognitive impairment frequently co-occur. We propose that the relationship is so familiar that exposure to alcohol cues primes expectations of cognitive impairment. Across five studies, we find that in the absence of any evidence of reduced cognitive performance, people who hold an alcoholic beverage are perceived to be less intelligent than those who do not, a mistake we term the imbibing idiot bias. In fact, merely priming observers with alcohol cues causes them to judge targets who hold no beverage at all as less intelligent. The bias is not driven by a belief that less intelligent people are more likely to consume alcohol. We find that the bias may be costly in professional settings. Job candidates who ordered wine during an interview held over dinner were viewed as less intelligent and less hireable than candidates who ordered soda. However, prospective candidates believe that ordering wine rather than soda will help them appear more intelligent.