Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

THE REVOLUTIONARY VISION OF WILLIAM BLAKE

It was William Blake's insight that the Christian churches, by inverting the Incarnation and the dialectical vision of Paul, have repressed the body, divided God from creation, substituted judgment for grace, and repudiated imagination, compassion, and the original apocalyptic faith of early Christianity. Blake's prophetic poetry thus contributes to the renewal of Christian ethics by a process of subversion and negation of Christian moral, ecclesiastical, and theological traditions, which are recognized precisely as inversions of Jesus, and therefore as instances of the forms of evil that God-in-Christ overcomes through Incarnation, reversing the Fall. Blake's great epic poems, particularly Milton (1804–08) and Jerusalem (1804–20), embody his heterodox representation of the final coincidence of Christ and Satan through which, at last, all things are made new.     

Kazimierz Dabrowski's Theory of Positive Disintegration and the American Humanistic Psychology

The author discusses the differences and similarities between Dabrowski's theory of positive disintegration and the theories of the American Humanistic psychologists. All are personality growth theories; however, the philosophical assumptions underlying the theories differ. The Humanistic psychologists subscribe to eudaimonistic ethics of self-fulfillment and happiness, whereas Dabrowski follows the Existentialists and stresses the dignity of human beings. He stresses the suffering associated with the attainment of higher levels of spiritual development. Underlying these different views on the nature of human existence may be differing assumptions about the metaphysics of evil. Theologians have discussed the metaphysics of evil since the early days of the church as the problem of theodicy. This article suggests that the American Humanistic psychologists and Dabrowski implicitly followed different theodicies. This could account for the resistance to Dabrowksi's theory in North America.     

Eschatology After Nietzsche: Apollonian,Dionysian or Pauline?

Ancient and (post)modern versions of the Greek two-world metaphysics – in both its Platonic (Apollonian) and Hegelian (Dionysian) variations – are explored and contrasted with the Pauline two-age eschatology. This eschatology is shown to be further removed from and more subversive of the metaphysical and epistemological dualisms of modernity than is postmodernism. Reformed federal theology and its biblical theology movement provide a resource for the recovery of the christological and eschatological tension in Pauline theology, enabling Christian theology to reintegrate revelation within the history of redemption and to articulate an eschatology of the pilgrim community.     

On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno

In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies.     

Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do Nothing about Nothingness

Often a source of concern to commentators about the adequacy of Barth's theology is his treatment of evil, in particular Church Dogmatics III/3 §50 with its depiction of evil as das Nichtige (the nothingness). Against the impression that Barth has little time in his systematic theology for doing justice to evil it is worth attempting a reading that indicates the importance of this section and what it seems that Barth is doing with it. Das Nichtige belongs to a conflictual and dramatic account, and talk of its, for Barth, 'absurd'existence' belongs there. The dramatic flavour of this discussion further impresses that there is more to be said about 'Barth on evil' than any focus on the paradoxical and negative language used to depict it could express – this 'more' should come specifically through ethics.     

A RANDOMNESS‐BASED THEODICY FOR EVOLUTIONARY EVILS

We develop and knit together several theodicies in order to find a more complete picture of why certain forms of (nonhuman) animal suffering might be permitted by a perfect being. We focus on an especially potent form of the problem of evil, which arises from considering why a perfectly good, wise, and powerful God might use evolutionary mechanisms that predictably result in so much animal suffering and loss of life. There are many existing theodicies on the market, and although they offer helpful resources, we combine and further develop several proposals to produce a composite theodicy that avoids certain shortcomings of the individual theodicies. An important element of our project is locating a role for randomness in cosmic and biological evolution. In particular, we show how randomness might enhance or enable certain goods, including everlasting goods, at the risk of temporary evils.     

The anxious believer: Macaulay’s prescient theodicy

Recent feminists have critiqued G.W. Leibniz’s Theodicy for its effort to justify God’s role in undeserved human suffering over natural and moral evil. These critiques suggest that theodicies which focus on evil as suffering alone obfuscate how to thematize evil, and so they conclude that theodicies should be rejected and replaced with a secularized notion of evil that is inextricably tied to the experiences of the victim. This paper argues that the political philosophy found in the writings of Catherine Macaulay (1731–1791) can serve as a support to Leibniz’s larger claims and can also offer a more concrete, situated notion of evil that escapes the contemporary feminist critique. Macaulay’s work on natural and moral political evil, especially, will be presented as an early modern precursor to feminism, which defends divine perfection and a pre-established harmony in the face of political evil. I then identify three unique theodicical arguments in Macaulay’s work: the pragmatically beneficial defense, the eschatalogical defense, and the redemptive defense.     

Loose Connections and Liberal Theology: Blurring the Boundaries in Two Church‐Based Communities of Spiritual Practice

We used a mixed methods approach—including ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and a survey—to study two innovative Christian contemplative worship services housed in a mainline Protestant congregation in a midwestern city. These services employed boundary‐blurring practices designed to attract the “de‐churched”—those who had been involved in a Christian congregation in the past but who had at some point disengaged from organized religion. Though attracting some formerly de‐churched participants, these services were far more successful in attracting several other constituencies united by their liberal theology and by a preference for loose connections. We argue that these worship services are best understood as thriving communities of sustained spiritual practice where contemplative rituals sacralize both theistic and extra‐theistic, Christian and non‐Christian, symbols and beliefs.     

How a Modest Fideism may Constrain Theistic Commitments: Exploring an Alternative to Classical Theism

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Second thoughts on the alleged failure of free will theodicies

In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno.     

Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.     

Pardoning Puritanism: Community, Character, and Forgiveness in the Work of Richard Baxter

The English Puritan Richard Baxter (1615–1691) developed an account of forgiveness that resonates with twentieth-century virtue ethics. He understood forgiveness as one component of a larger disposition of character developed in community as human beings recognize themselves as sinful creatures engaged in complex relationships of dependency and responsibility, with both God and one another. In the midst of these relationships, persons experience divine and human forgiveness and discover opportunities to practice forgiveness in return. Baxter thus negotiated a distinctive relationship between Christian hope for reconciliation and more stereotypical Puritan emphases on punishment, civil order, and justice. At the same time that recent moral reflection allows us to raise questions about some features of Baxter's argument (such as his treatment of anger), his work provides important resources for correlating dispositions with concrete obligations, establishing a place for forgiveness in the public realm, and counterbalancing the modern emphasis on individual rights.     

Absolute idealism and the problem of evil

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - The problem of evil is regularly regarded as posing a serious threat to theistic belief. However, contemporary philosophers of religion have...     

Renegotiating Aquinas

While Roman Catholic feminist ethicists typically endorse moral realism and crosscultural standards of justice, they also have been influenced by the postmodern interrogation of abstract reason and moral universalism. As theologians writing after the Second Vatican Council, they are increasingly sensitive to the communal and ecclesial dimensions of morality and of Christian ethics, and to the integral relation of Christian faith and ethics. This essay will consider two approaches to Catholic feminist ethics that differ in the relative weight they give to constructive work for social justice (realist gender justice ethics), or to the grounding of ethics in prayer and mysticism (postmodern gendered faith ethics). Using critical feminist reappropriations of the theology and ethics of Aquinas as examples, this essay will argue that the two approaches are overlapping and interdependent.     

Trauma and Grace: Psychology and Theology in Conversation

This paper explores the contours of a conversation between recent developments in trauma theory and Christian systematic theology. Toward this end, I examine three levels of theological discourse in a linear progression and responses based on the work of some trauma theorists: (a) twentieth century conceptualizations of divine revelation using the metaphor of a “bridge,” (b) configurations of evil, sin, redemption, and theodicies, and (c) the use of sacraments and iconography as vehicles of solidarity and flourishing. As a burgeoning area of inquiry in academic circles, trauma theory both resists and is in need of the discipline of theology. I conclude that trauma theory and theology are not antithetical disciplines, and a consideration of both brings greater insights than the disciplines considered alone.     

Recognition and Social Justice: A Roman Catholic View of Christian Bioethics of Long-Term Care and Community Service

Contemporary Christian ethics encounters the challenge to communicategenuinely Christian normative orientations within the scientificdebate in such a way as to render these orientations comprehensible,and to maintain or enhance their plausibility even for non-Christians.This essay, therefore, proceeds from a biblical motif, takesup certain themes from the Christian tradition (in particularthe idea of social justice), and connects both with a compellingcontemporary approach to ethics by secular moral philosophy,i.e. with Axel Honneth's reception of Hegel, as based on Hegel'stheory of recognition. As a first step, elements of an ethicsof recognition are developed on the basis of an anthropologicalrecourse to the conditions of intersubjective encounters. Theseconditions are then brought to bear on the idea of social justice,as developed in the social-Catholic tradition, and as systematicallyexplored in the Pastoral Letter of the United States Conferenceof Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice For All (1986). Proceedingfrom this basis, aspects of a Christian ethics of communityservice with regard to long-term care can be defined.     

Axiology,Realism, and the Problem of Evil*

Discussions of the problem of evil presuppose and appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those assumptions. I argue that certain theories of value are consistent with theistic answers to the argument from evil and that several other well‐known theories of value, such as hedonism, are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with theism. Although moral realism is the subject of lively debate in contemporary philosophy, almost all standard discussions of the problem of evil presuppose the truth of moral realism. I explain the implications of several nonrealist theories of value for the problem of evil and argue that, if nonrealism is true, then we need to rethink and re‐frame the entire discussion about the problem of evil.     

Moral antitheodicy: prospects and problems

Proponents of the view which I call ‘moral antitheodicy’ call for the theistic discourse of theodicy to be abandoned, because, they claim, all theodicies involve some form of moral impropriety. Three arguments in support of this view are examined: the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences. After discussing the merits of each argument individually, I attempt to show that they all must presuppose what they are intended to establish, namely, that the set of premises advanced in any given theodicy will be untenable. I conclude by discussing what uses there might be for the moral critique of theodicy, if it cannot be used to ground a global rejection of theodical practice.     

The Theodicy of Austin Farrer

This article seeks to place the theodicy of the Anglican theologian Austin Farrer, as expressed in Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (1962), within the context of philosophical and theological approaches to the so-called “problem of evil”. Farrer's work is initially contrasted with the theodicies of John Hick and Richard Swinburne. This comparison reveals some of the rationalist and foundationalist moral assumptions of modern philosophical theodicy of which Hick and Swinburne are representatives. By contrast, it is argued that Farrer's approach is thoroughly theological and begins not with a pre-conceived ethics, but with God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Farrer is thus deemed to have much in common with pre-Enlightenment thinkers such as Augustine and Aquinas. Although Farrer's theodicy is seen to be theological (rather than a philosophical attempt at a resolution of the modern “problem of evil”), it is argued that he resists trends in recent theological approaches to theodicy that claim that God is passible (for example, the work of Jürgen Moltmann). This article defends divine impassibility and argues that, although Farrer's later “metaphysical personalism” implies that God may be personal to the point that he could be said to suffer, his Augustinian notion of the nature of evil as privatio boni strongly implies impassibility. This Farrer is seen to avoid two anthropomorphic approaches to theodicy: one that judges God by the standards of a foundational secular morality, and the other that ascribes certain “personal” emotions to the divine. This article defends Farrer's theological approach to theodicy and his emphasis on ecclesiology and soteriology. However, the lack of a convincing and thorough dogmatic theology is seen to render his theodicy uncompelling. Despite this weakness, it is argued that Farrer's work points theodicy towards a theological encounter with particular narratives of evil and suffering and away from the consideration of a single “problem of evil” by means of “rational”, philosophical enquiry.