Mimicry and Investigative Interviewing: Using Deliberate Mimicry to Elicit Information and Cues to Deceit

We examined the effect of deliberate mimicry on eliciting (accurate) information and cues to deceit. Mimicry is considered to facilitate cooperation and compliance in truth tellers, whereas liars are constrained to provide detail. We therefore expected truth tellers to be more detailed than liars, particularly after being mimicked. A total of 165 participants told the truth or lied about a meeting they attended. During the interview, an interviewer mimicked half of the participants. Truth tellers were more detailed than liars, but only in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Truth tellers also gave more accurate units of information than liars, and the difference was most pronounced in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Mimicry as a tool for eliciting information and cues to deceit fits well with the emerging ‘interviewing to detect deception’ literature, particularly in the ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ approach. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Detecting concealed information about person recognition

We examined a common, but understudied phenomenon: Assessing interviewees' truthfulness when they attempt to conceal their knowledge about another person. We argue that this should be mentally taxing because truthful answers are activated automatically, and hence, need to be suppressed when liars conceal their knowledge. Participants were shown three photographs of three females, only one of whom was known by the participants. The participants were asked questions about each female depicted in the photograph. Truth tellers were instructed to give the correct answers when discussing the female they know whereas liars were asked to conceal their knowledge about this female. Independent observer ratings revealed that liars appeared to be thinking the hardest when discussing the female they know, whereas truth tellers appeared to be thinking the hardest when discussing the females they did not know. Truth tellers looked the most at the photographs of the unknown females, whereas liars' gaze did not differ across photographs. Finally, liars' answers about the female they know contained substantial truthful elements. In summary, truth tellers' and liars' responses differed substantially and those different responses are valuable cues to detect deceit. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Processes underlying deception: an empirical analysis of truth and lies when manipulating the stakes

The aim of the present experiment was to examine to what extent participants experience attempted control, cognitive load and arousal when they lie and tell the truth under lower‐stakes and higher‐stakes conditions. We expected both differences and similarities between truth tellers and liars. We expected that participants would experience these processes to a higher degree when they lied compared to when they told the truth (differences), but we also expected that both liars and truth tellers would be keen to make a convincing impression; and that raising the stakes would affect liars and truth tellers in a similar way (similarities). A total of 128 participants lied and told the truth during an interview (lying and truth telling was counterbalanced). Stakes were manipulated by informing half of the participants that their interviews would be recorded on videotape and would be analysed and evaluated by police officers. The predictions were supported. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using unexpected questions to elicit information and cues to deceit in interpreter‐based interviews

We examined whether speech‐related differences between truth tellers and liars are more profound when answering unexpected questions than when answering expected questions. We also examined whether the presence of an interpreter affected these results. In the experiment, 204 participants from the United States (Hispanic participants only), Russia, and the Republic of Korea were interviewed in their native language by a native‐speaking interviewer or by a British interviewer through an interpreter. Truth tellers discussed a trip that they had made during the last 12 months; liars fabricated a story about such a trip. The key dependent variables were the amount of information provided and the proportion of all statements that were complications. The proportion of complications distinguished truth tellers from liars better when answering unexpected than expected questions, but only in interpreter‐absent interviews. The number of details provided did not differ between truth tellers and liars or between interpreter‐absent and interpreter‐present interviews.     

Automated verbal credibility assessment of intentions: The model statement technique and predictive modeling

Recently, verbal credibility assessment has been extended to the detection of deceptive intentions, the use of a model statement, and predictive modeling. The current investigation combines these 3 elements to detect deceptive intentions on a large scale. Participants read a model statement and wrote a truthful or deceptive statement about their planned weekend activities (Experiment 1). With the use of linguistic features for machine learning, more than 80% of the participants were classified correctly. Exploratory analyses suggested that liars included more person and location references than truth‐tellers. Experiment 2 examined whether these findings replicated on independent‐sample data. The classification accuracies remained well above chance level but dropped to 63%. Experiment 2 corroborated the finding that liars' statements are richer in location and person references than truth‐tellers' statements. Together, these findings suggest that liars may over‐prepare their statements. Predictive modeling shows promise as an automated veracity assessment approach but needs validation on independent data.     

Using the Verifiability lie Detection Approach in an Insurance Claim Setting

In this experiment, we tested the verifiability approach in an insurance claim setting. Core of the verifiability approach is that truth tellers give more details that can be verified than liars. Fifty undergraduate students took part, who produced true and false insurance claim statements related to theft, loss, or damage. These statements were coded in terms of verifiability (the number of details that could be checked by an investigator) and witness factors (friends, police, other officials and CCTV cameras). Truth tellers provided more verifiable details than liars and liars provided more unverifiable details than truth tellers. In addition, truth tellers (versus liars) more frequently informed their friends about the incident or referred to CCTV footage of the incident. The potential and limitations of using the verifiability approach in insurance settings are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective interviewing of suspects

When people are interviewed about possible wrongdoing that has been committed in groups, they typically are interviewed separately. Yet, in several settings it would be more intuitive and convenient to interview suspects together. Importantly, such collective interviews could yield verbal cues to deception. This is the first deception experiment to investigate collective interviewing. Twenty-one pairs of truth tellers and 22 pairs of liars were interviewed pair-wise about having had lunch together in a restaurant. Given that truth tellers adopt a “tell it all” strategy in the interviews while, in contrast, liars prefer to keep their stories simple, we predicted that pairs of truth tellers would (i) interrupt and (ii) correct each other more, and would (iii) add more information to each other's answers than pairs of liars. The results supported these hypotheses. Theory-driven interventions to elicit more cues to deception through simultaneous interviewing are discussed.     

Using the model statement to elicit verbal differences between truth tellers and liars amongst Arab interviewees: A partial replication of Leal,Vrij, Deeb,and Jupe (2018)

Leal, Vrij, Deeb, and Jupe (2018) found—with British participants—that a model statement elicited (a) more information and (b) a cue to deceit: After exposure to a model statement, liars reported significantly more peripheral information than truth tellers. We sought to replicate these findings with Arabs living in Israel. Truth tellers and liars reported a stand‐out event that they had (truth tellers) or pretended to have (liars) experienced in the last 2 years. Half of the participants were given a model statement in the second phase of the interview. Replicating Leal et al. (2018a), (a) truth tellers reported more core details than liars initially and (b) a model statement resulted in more additional core and peripheral details in the second phase of the interview. Unlike in Leal et al. (2018a), a model statement did not have a differential effect on truth tellers in the current experiment.     

Drawing on Liars' Lack of Cognitive Flexibility: Detecting Deception Through Varying Report Modes

The present experiment examined the role of cognitive flexibility in the consistency of truth tellers' and liars' reports. We expected liars to be less flexible (less able to report an experience in different ways) and hence less consistent than truth tellers when asked to describe an event in different ways (e.g. verbally and pictorially). In the experiment, truth tellers entered a room and performed several tasks, whereas liars did not enter the room or perform the tasks but attempted to convince an interviewer that they did. Truth tellers and liars were interviewed twice about the room and tasks, and were asked to express their answers either the same way on both interviews (e.g. verbally then again verbally) or in different ways (e.g. verbally then pictorially). In support of the cognitive flexibility hypothesis, liars' reports were less consistent than truth tellers' reports, particularly when reporting in different ways across interviews. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of question expectedness and experience on lying about intentions

In recent years researchers have started to focus on lying about intentions (Granhag, 2010). In the present experiment participants were interviewed about their forthcoming trip. We tested the hypothesis that liars (N=43) compared to truth tellers (N=43) would give fewer details to unexpected questions about planning, transportation and the core event, but an equal amount or more detail to expected questions about the purpose of the trip. We also tested the hypothesis that participants who had previously experienced the intention (i.e., they had made such a trip before) would give more detail than those who had never experienced the intended action. The unexpected question hypothesis was supported, whereas the previous experience effect only emerged in interactions. The benefit of using different types of questions for lie detection purposes is discussed.     

Counter‐Interrogation Strategies when Anticipating Questions on Intentions

The present experimental study adds to the emerging line of psycholegal research focusing on true and false intentions. It is the first to examine mock suspects' (N = 120) counter‐interrogation strategies in investigative interviews in which they anticipate questions on their intentions. As planning is an inherent part of many intentions, mock suspects were, in addition to questions on their intentions, asked a set of questions that pertained to the planning phase in which they formed their intentions. Besides ratings of the anticipation and difficulty of the questions, participants were asked to provide their principal strategy for being perceived as truthful. Both truth tellers and liars perceived the questions on the planning phase as significantly more unanticipated than the questions on their intentions. Furthermore, liars perceived the questions on the planning phase as more difficult to answer than did truth tellers. Liars and truth tellers differed with respect to their principal strategy employed for being perceived as truthful. Liars' most commonly used strategy was to stick to the cover story, whereas truth tellers' most common strategy was to be honest. The results are discussed in relation to the unanticipated questions approach and psychological concepts such as the illusion of transparency. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are you for real? Exploring language use and unexpected process questions within the detection of identity deception

The current study was to test whether reality monitoring and language use could distinguish identity liars from truth tellers when answering outcome questions and unexpected process questions. Truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 30) discussed their identity in a recruitment interview. No differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in the details they provided. In terms of language use, liars used more positive language than truth tellers, whereas truth tellers used more cognitive process words than liars. However, neither were more pronounced when asking process questions. Overall, process questions elicited more cognitive process and cause words than outcome questions. Therefore, process questions may be able to contribute to the cognitive load approach. The findings suggest that reality monitoring may not be diagnostic when applied to identity deception. We discuss the language use differences in relation to impression management theory.     

Promising to tell the truth makes 8‐ to 16‐year‐olds more honest

Techniques commonly used to increase truth‐telling in most North American jurisdiction courts include requiring witnesses to discuss the morality of truth‐ and lie‐telling and to promise to tell the truth prior to testifying. While promising to tell the truth successfully decreases younger children's lie‐telling, the influence of discussing the morality of honesty and promising to tell the truth on adolescents' statements has remained unexamined. In Experiment 1, 108 youngsters, aged 8–16 years, were left alone in the room and asked not to peek at the answers to a test. The majority of participants peeked at the test answers and then lied about their transgression. More importantly, participants were eight times more likely to change their response from a lie to the truth after promising to tell the truth. Experiment 2 confirmed that the results of Experiment 1 were not solely due to repeated questioning or the moral discussion of truth‐ and lie‐telling. These results suggest that, while promising to tell the truth influences the truth‐telling behaviors of adolescents, a moral discussion of truth and lies does not. Legal implications are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Suspects' consistency in statements concerning two events when different question formats are used

Lie detection research has typically focused on reports about a single event. However, in many forensic and security contexts, suspects are likely to report on several events, some of them may be untruthful. This presents interviewers with the challenge of detecting which reports are true and which are not. Varying question format in a second interview, we examined differences in liars' and truth‐tellers' statement consistency about two events. One hundred and fifty participants viewed a meeting in which a noncritical and a critical event were discussed. Truth‐tellers were instructed to be honest in their reports about both events, whereas liars had to lie about the critical event. In the first interview, all participants provided a free recall account. In a second interview, participants either gave another free recall account or responded to specific questions presented sequentially (concerning one event at a time) or nonsequentially (concerning both events simultaneously). Liars' accounts featured fewer repetitions than truth‐tellers for both events, particularly in response to questions presented in nonsequential order. The implications for the use of this question format are discussed.     

Expect the Unexpected? Variations in Question Type Elicit Cues to Deception in Joint Interviewer Contexts

We examined the effect of (i) a second interviewer's demeanour and (ii) asking expected and unexpected questions on cues to deception. We predicted that liars compared with truth tellers would provide more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second interviewer is supportive. Liars prepare answers for expected questions, and a supportive interviewer will encourage them to provide more detail. By definition, liars have not prepared answers for unexpected questions, and their answers to such questions will be less detailed. Participants (N = 168) appeared before two interviewers: The first asked all the questions, and the second remained silent. The second interviewer exhibited either a supportive or a neutral demeanour. As predicted, liars provided more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second interviewer was supportive. In conclusion, a supportive second interviewer elicits cues to deceit. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.