Letter search does not affect semantic priming in a probe naming task

The normally robust semantic priming effect observed in lexical decision is usually reduced to the point of being absent, when a letter search has to be performed on the prime. It has been argued that semantic activation is thus not an automatic process but rather cognitively controlled and therefore adaptable to task demands. We examined the effects of letter search priming on pronunciation times and found a reliable semantic priming effect, following letter search that was not affected at all relative to a standard condition, where participants silently read the prime. Thus the nature of the prime task did not seem to affect the processing mode employed, semantic access occurred even though attention was focused on surface properties of the prime.     

Time course of the Simon effect in pointing movements for horizontal, vertical, and acoustic stimuli: evidence for a common mechanism

In the Simon effect, responses to a non-spatial attribute are faster when the irrelevant spatial position of the stimulus corresponds to the position of the response. It was suggested that there are two distinct mechanisms involved in the Simon effect. In the visuomotor Simon effect, the stimulus transiently activates the corresponding response which results in a decaying Simon effect function (i.e., the Simon effect decreases in slower reaction time [RT]-bins). In contrast, the cognitive Simon effect arises from a conflict between stimulus and response codes and is associated with a stable Simon effect function (i.e., the Simon effect is the same in fast and slow RT-bins). We recorded RTs and motor parameters of pointing movements in a Simon paradigm. Consistent with the previous research, the time course of the Simon effect in RTs was stable with vertical visual and horizontal acoustic stimuli (cognitive Simon tasks), but decreased with horizontal visual stimuli (visuomotor Simon task). In contrast, the Simon effect in motor parameters decreased across RT-bins in all conditions, supporting the idea that only a single, common mechanism underlies the Simon effect.     

Picture recognition without picture identification: a method for assessing the role of perceptual information in familiarity-based picture recognition

The present study examined the claim that unidentifiable test-pictures are processed and recognized on a perceptual, as opposed to a conceptual, level. Using an extension of the recognition without identification paradigm (e.g., Cleary, A. M. & Greene, R. L. (2000). Recognition without identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1063-1069; Peynircioglu, Z. F. (1990). A feeling-of-recognition without identification. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 493-500), it was observed that when test-pictures were unidentifiable during a masked perceptual identification task, old-new discrimination occurred when the study-list consisted of pictures (Experiments 1-3), but not when the study-list consisted of picture names (Experiment 2) or when picture exemplars served as test-cues (Experiment 3). Results provide converging evidence that a study-test perceptual match is needed for the episodic recognition of unidentified test-pictures. Implications for the present paradigm as a tool for examining the role of perceptual information in recognition-familiarity are discussed.     

Position-item associations play a role in the acquisition of order knowledge in an implicit serial reaction time task

Knowledge of sequential regularities plays a key role in forms of explicit and implicit memory, such as working memory and motor skills. Despite important advances in the study of sequence knowledge in the past century, the theoretical development of implicit and explicit memory has occurred separately. Unlike the literature on implicit sequence learning, the explicit learning literature differentiates between 2 forms of representation of serial structure, chaining (C is the item following B in the sequence A-B-C-D) and ordinal position knowledge (C is the 3rd item). In 3 experiments, we demonstrate that these 2 forms of sequence knowledge can be acquired in implicit sequence learning. In Experiment 1, 2 trained sequences were recombined at transfer such that the strength of (a) associations between serial positions and sequence elements as well as (b) associations between successive sequence elements could be estimated. In Experiment 2, we compared sequence elements placed at the trained versus untrained serial position. Experiment 3 reduced cues that can be used to determine the start of a sequence within the stream of trials. Our results suggest that the discussion held in explicit memory research about different forms of representation of sequences knowledge also is relevant for implicit sequence learning.     

Navigating through abstract decision spaces: Evaluating the role of state generalization in a dynamic decision-making task

Research on dynamic decision-making tasks, in which the payoffs associated with each choice vary with participants’ recent choice history, shows that humans have difficulty making long-term optimal choices in the presence of attractive immediate rewards. However, a number of recent studies have shown that simple cues providing information about the underlying state of the task environment may facilitate optimal responding. In this study, we examined the mechanism by which this state knowledge influences choice behavior. We examined the possibility that participants use state information in conjunction with changing payoffs to extrapolate payoffs in future states. We found support for this hypothesis in an experiment in which generalizations based on this state information worked to the benefit or detriment of task performance, depending on the task’s payoff structure.     

Glimpses of a one-speed mind: Focus-switching and search for verbal and visual, and easy and difficult items in working memory

We investigated focus-switching and search rates in an N-Back task for stimuli presumably encoded either in a phonological/semantic or an abstract-visual format. Experiment 1 used Chinese characters and tested Chinese speakers and non-Chinese speakers; character frequency and visual complexity were also manipulated. Experiment 2 presented Chinese characters and English words to non-Chinese English speakers. Effects of focus-switching on accuracy were larger for abstract-visual stimuli and for more difficult stimuli; effects on RT were larger for abstract-visual stimuli, but there was no effect of difficulty, with the exception of the most difficult stimulus set in Experiment 1. Search slopes outside the focus of attention did not covary with either type of code or item difficulty. The decline in accuracy over set-size was stronger for the items coded in abstract-visual format. This suggests that item availability is sensitive to robustness of the memory representations, but item accessibility is not. The data fit well with a model of STM in which a fixed number of ‘slots’ are searched at a constant rate, regardless of the slot’s contents.     

Evidence for abstract response codes: Ear-hand correspondence effects in a three-choice reaction-time task

A three-choice reaction-time task was used to investigate the source-of-stimulation effect, that is, the tendency for subjects to react faster and more accurately to a stimulus if the spatial locations of the stimulus and the response correspond than if they do not. Auditory stimuli varied on dimensions of tonal frequency and spatial location, although only the former was relevant for response selection. Responses were found to be faster for the conditions in which stimulus location and response location corresponded than for those in which they did not, but stimulus location had no effect on differences between the two hands with bimanual responses. These results support the hypothesis that the source-of-stimulation effect is due to response plans which interact at a level prior to the programming of the motor response.     

Coloring only a single letter does not eliminate color-word interference in a vocal-response Stroop task: automaticity revealed

The presence of an interference effect in naming the print color of color words (J. R. Stroop, 1935) suggests that responses associated with the irrelevant-word dimension of the display are activated involuntarily. In the present study, the author examined the conditions under which coloring a single letter in a word reduced interference in vocal responding (D. Kahneman & A. Henik, 1981) or eliminated it in manual responding (D. Besner, J. A. Stolz, & C. Boutilier, 1997). In Experiment 1, color-word interference was significant under vocal responding for the Besner et al. displays. In Experiment 2, the author replicated the Kahneman and Henik effect with the Besner et al. stimuli. The results of Experiment 3 showed that semantic effects are not eliminated by coloring only a single letter. Coloring a single letter does not prevent the activation of the irrelevant-word dimension of the colored color word.     

The role of meaning in inflection: why the past tense does not require a rule

How do we produce the past tenses of verbs? For the last 20 years this question has been the focal domain for conflicting theories of language, knowledge representation, and cognitive processing. On one side of the debate have been similarity-based or single-route approaches that propose that all past tenses are formed simply through phonological analogies to existing past tenses stored in memory. On the other side of the debate are rule-based or dual-route approaches which agree that phonological analogy is important for producing irregular past tenses (e.g., think-->thought), but argue that regular past tenses (e.g., walk-->walked) are generated via a +ed rule and that a principled account of regular inflection can only be given by recourse to explicit rules. This debate has become a crucial battleground for arguments concerning the necessity and importance of abstract mental rules, embracing not only language processing, but also the of nature cognition itself. However, in centering on the roles of phonological similarity and rules, the past tense debate has largely ignored the possible role of semantics in determining inflection. This paper presents five studies that demonstrate a striking and decisive role of semantic similarity in inflection. In fact, semantic factors appear to be more important in inflection than the grammatical considerations put forward by the dual-route account. Further, these new findings provide a new way of discriminating between the claims of single-route (similarity-based) and dual-route (rule-based) approaches. It appears that inflection is carried out through analogical reminding based on semantic and phonological similarity and that a rule-based route is not necessary to account for past tense inflection.     

Evidence for the automatic processing of prelexical codes in an orthographic but not a phonological task

The automatic activation of phonological and orthographic information in auditory and visual word processing was examined using a task-set procedure. Participants engaged in a phonological task (i.e., determining whether the letter “a” in a word sounded like /e/ or /æ/) or an orthographic task (i.e., determining whether the sound /s/ in a word was spelled with an “s” or a “c”). Participants were cued regarding which task to perform simultaneously with, or 750 ms before, a clear or degraded target. The stimulus clarity effect (i.e., clear words responded to faster than degraded words) was absorbed into the time that it took participants to identify the task on the basis of the cue in a simultaneous cue–target as compared to a delayed cue–target condition, but only for the orthographic task. These data are consistent with the claim that prelexical processing occurs in a capacity-free manner upon stimulus presentation when participants are trying to extract orthographic codes from words presented in the visual and auditory modalities. Such affirmative data were not obtained when participants attempted to extract phonological codes from words, since here the effects of stimulus clarity and cue delay were additive.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

New strings for old: The role of similarity processing in an incidental learning task

This paper reports three experiments that examine the role of similarity processing in McGeorge and Burton's (1990) incidental learning task. In the experiments subjects performed a distractor task involving four-digit number strings, all of which conformed to a simple hidden rule. They were then given a forced-choice memory test in which they were presented with pairs of strings and were led to believe that one string of each pair had appeared in the prior learning phase. Although this was not the case, one string of each pair did conform to the hidden rule. Experiment 1 showed that, as in the McGeorge and Burton study, subjects were significantly more likely to select test strings that conformed to the hidden rule. However, additional analyses suggested that rather than having implicitly abstracted the rule, subjects may have been selecting strings that were in some way similar to those seen during the learning phase. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to try to separate out effects due to similarity from those due to implicit rule abstraction. It was found that the results were more consistent with a similarity-based model than implicit rule abstraction per se.     

Distraction and action slips in an everyday task: Evidence for a dynamic representation of task context

We report here a novel and counterintuitive effect of distraction on routine sequential action. The effect, predicted by a recent computational model of sequential behavior, relates to the tendency for a momentary distraction, such as a brief interruption, to lead to subsequent slips of action. The specific prediction is that errors should be more likely following a distraction occurring toward the middle of a subtask sequence than following a distraction occurring at the end of a subtask. This was tested and confirmed in an experiment involving repeated performance of an everyday task (coffee making) under conditions involving frequent interruption. The observed effect provides differential support for existing models of sequential behavior and offers a highly constraining benchmark for future theories.     

Bonobos and orangutans,but not chimpanzees,flexibly plan for the future in a token-exchange task

Non-human animals, including great apes, have been suggested to share some of the skills for planning that humans commonly exhibit. A crucial difference between human and non-human planning may relate to the diversity of domains and needs in which this skill is expressed. Although great apes can save tools for future use, there is little evidence yet that they can also do so in other contexts. To investigate this question further, we presented the apes with a planning token-exchange task that differed from standard tool-use tasks. Additionally, we manipulated the future outcome of the task to investigate planning flexibility. In the Exchange condition, subjects had to collect, save and transport tokens because they would need them 30 min later to exchange them for food with a human, i.e., “bring-back” response. In the Release condition, the collection and transport of tokens were not needed as no exchange took place after 30 min. Out of 13 subjects, eight solved the task at least once in the Exchange condition, with chimpanzees appearing less successful than the other species. Importantly, three individuals showed a clear differential response between conditions by producing more “bring-back” responses in the Exchange than in the Release conditions. Those bonobo and orangutan individuals hence adapted their planning behavior according to changing needs (i.e., they brought tokens back significantly more often when they would need them). Bonobos and orangutans, unlike chimpanzees, planned outside the context of tool-use, thus challenging the idea that planning in these species is purely domain-specific.     

Video reminders in a representational change task: memory for cues but not beliefs or statements

Two experiments investigated the effect of video reminders on 3-year-olds' performance in a representational change task. In Experiment 1, children in a video support condition viewed videotapes of their initial incorrect statements about a misleading container prior to being asked to report their initial belief. Children in a control condition viewed an irrelevant videotape. Despite reporting what they had said on the videotape, children in the video support condition typically failed the representational change task. Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1 and also revealed that a video reminder failed to increase the likelihood that children would correctly report what they had said about the object. Results are discussed in terms of the processes whereby mnemonic cues might affect performance on tasks assessing theory of mind.     

The need for central resources in answering questions in different domains: Folk psychology,biology, and economics

This study examined whether, when lay people reason about everyday domains, they do so in a slow, serial, deliberate process or using an automatic, effortless, associative process, and whether there are differences in this respect between content domains. The cognitive resources used by lay persons in reasoning about everyday domains were investigated using a dual task methodology. Fifty-eight adult participants answered computer-administered questions on folk biology (ToB), folk economics (ToE), and folk psychology, where the latter included questions requiring participants to infer an emotion from a verbally presented situation (ToP) and false-belief tasks (ToM). Each domain was tested with questionnaires at two levels of difficulty. Half the participants concurrently performed the 2-back task. Cognitive load reduced accuracy on the main task for ToM tasks (especially for second-order false-belief items) but not for the other domains. Performing the main tasks reduces accuracy and increases latencies on the secondary task for all domains. These findings suggest that the appropriate generalisation does not relate to content domains (such as folk psychology vs. folk biology), but rather to the nature of the task under consideration. For ToE, ToB, and ToP, the relevant inference questions appear to be processed mainly by the associative systems in LTM, and the process is not affected by a concurrent secondary task. For ToM, the response generation processing occurs in the analytic subsystem, and is therefore affected by cognitive load. Further, the more difficult set of questions impaired the secondary task more than the simpler set, in every domain and in terms of both accuracy and latency. This suggests that the processing involved in the associative system consumes domain-general resources too.     

Language disorders as a window on universal grammar: an abstract theory of agreement for IP, DP, and V-PP

A new concept of Agreement (AGR) has been represented as a Formal Feature that can appear in a wide range of different configurations (Chomsky, 1998). A case study from language disorders supports and extends this abstract concept. The child shows no agreement in Inflectional Phrase me can and Determiner Phrase them eyes. We then extend the notion of AGR to include verb-Prepositional Phrase relations, where the child also systematically avoids certain prepositions (go beach). The analysis is supported by intuitional data from compounds (sweep with broom --> broom-swept). We also define a systematic notion of Possible deficit as a premature fixation of functional items which normally require additional Phi-features. The notion of Maximization of Formal Features then emerges as a significant feature of learnability from both a normal and disordered perspective.     

Trapped in a tight spot: Scaling effects occur when,according to the action-specific account,they should not,and fail to occur when they should

The action-specific account of perception claims that what we see is perceptually scaled according to our action capacity. However, it has been argued that this account relies on an overly confirmatory research strategy—predicting the presence of, and then finding, an effect (Firestone & Scholl, 2014). A comprehensive approach should also test disconfirmatory predictions, in which no effect is expected. In two experiments, we tested one such prediction based on the action-specific account, namely that scaling effects should occur only when participants intend to act (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005). All participants wore asymmetric gloves in which one glove was padded with extra material, so that one hand was wider than the other. Participants visually estimated the width of apertures. The action-specific account predicts that the apertures should be estimated as being narrower for the wider hand, but only when participants intend to act. We found this scaling effect when it should not have occurred (Exp. 1, for participants who did not intend to act), as well as no effect when it should have occurred (Exp. 2, for participants who intended to act but were given a cover story for the visibility and position of their hands). Thus, the cover story used in Experiment 2 eliminated the scaling effect found in Experiment 1. We suggest that the scaling effect observed in Experiment 1 likely resulted from demand characteristics associated with using a salient, unexplained manipulation (e.g., telling people which hand to use to do the task). Our results suggest that the action-specific account lacks predictive power.     

Transfer, control, and automatic processing in a complex motor task: an examination of bounce juggling

The authors evaluated the hypothesis that controlled and automatic processes are opposite ends of a continuum of learning (e.g., R. M. Shiffrin & W. Schneider, 1977) vs. an alternative, concurrent emergence hypothesis (e.g., J. M. Bebko et al., 2003; G. Logan, 1989). The authors also measured potential positive transfer effects of learning from one motor task to another. Four experienced cascade jugglers and 5 novices learned to bounce juggle, practicing regularly for 5 weeks. The experienced jugglers showed positive transfer of learning, maintaining a lead of approximately 6-10 days over the novices, even as both groups automatized the new skill. Measures of automatic and controlled processing were positively correlated, indicating that those processes emerge concurrently. The authors present a model in which controlled and automatic processes emerge orthogonally.     

Visual guidance for hand advance but not hand withdrawal in a reach-to-eat task in adult humans: reaching is a composite movement

Many animal species use reaching for food to place in the mouth (reach-to-eat) with a hand, and it may be a primitive movement. Although researchers (I. Q. Whishaw, 2005; A. N. Iwaniuk & I. Q. Whishaw, 2000; M. Gentiluci, I. Toni, S. Chieffi, & G. Pavesi, 1994) have described visual guidance of reaching in both normal and brain-injured human and nonhuman primates, researchers have not described the contribution of vision during advance of the limb to grasp food and during withdrawal of the limb with food to the mouth. To evaluate visual contributions, the authors monitored eye movements in young adults as they reached for food with and without vision. Participants visually engaged the target prior to the 1st hand movement and disengaged it as the food was grasped. Visual occlusion slowed limb advance and altered digit shaping but did not affect withdrawal. The dependence on visual control of advance but not withdrawal suggests that the reach-to-eat movement is a composite of 2 basic movements under visual and tactile/proprioceptive guidance, respectively.