Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two experiments provide evidence for collective preferences and team reasoning. In lifelike vignettes (Experiment 1) and abstract games (Experiment 2) with certain structural properties, most players preferred team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually rational players should choose equilibrium strategies. These findings suggest that team reasoning predicts strategy choices more powerfully than orthodox game theory in some games.     

Rapid decisions from experience

In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.     

Egocentric framing — One way people may fail in a switch dilemma: Evidence from excessive lane switching

To study switching behavior, an experiment mimicking the state of a driver on the road was conducted. In each trial participants were given a chance to switch lanes. Despite the fact that lane switching had no sound rational basis, participants often switched lanes when the speed of driving in their lane on the previous trial was relatively slow. That tendency was discerned even when switching behavior had been sparsely reinforced, and was especially marked in almost a third of the participants, who manifested it consistently. The findings illustrate a type of behavior occurring in various contexts (e.g., stocks held in a portfolio, conduct pertinent for residual life expectancy, supermarket queues). We argue that this behavior may be due to a fallacy reminiscent of that arising in the well-known “envelopes problem”, in which each of two players holds a sum of money of which she knows nothing about except that it is either half or twice the amount held by the other player. Players may be paradoxically tempted to exchange assets, since an exchange fallaciously appears to always yield an expected value greater than whatever is regarded as the player's present assets. We argue that the fallacy is due to egocentrically framing the problem as if the “amount I have” is definite, albeit unspecified, and shows that framing the paradox acentrically instead eliminates the incentive to exchange assets. A possible psychological source for the human disposition to frame problems in a way that inflates expected gain is discussed. Finally, a heuristic meant to avert the source of the fallacy is proposed.     

The roles of emotion management and perspective taking in individuals’ conflict management styles and disposition to forgive

This study aimed to link two fields of research: conflict management and forgiveness. Adult participants (n = 122) and a validating sample of significant others (n = 122) completed measures of disposition to forgive, conflict style, emotion management, and perspective taking; and multi-dimensional models of their relationships were tested. Disposition to forgive was most consistently associated with problem solving and yielding conflict styles. Greater perspective taking was associated with greater forgiveness, and greater problem solving and yielding conflict styles, as well as with lesser fighting style; and perspective taking fully or partially mediated the relationship between ability to repair emotions and dispositions to forgive and problem solve during conflict. Significant other reports confirmed most of the findings based on self-report.     

Sex differences in recollective experience for olfactory and verbal information

We examined recollective experience as a function of sex for olfactory and verbal information. In the first study, men and women studied a set of highly familiar odors with incidental or intentional encoding instructions. In the second study, participants were presented with a number of sentences. At recognition, participants indicated whether their positive response was based on conscious recollection (remembering), a feeling of familiarity (knowing), or guessing. The results indicated that recollection was higher among women than men, and that familiarity-based recognition was equally large across sex for both types of information.The finding that the sex-related experiential difference disappeared when controlling for verbal proficiency suggests that sex-related differences in activating verbal information play an important role for sex differences in recollective experience.     

Perceptual simulation in conceptual combination: Evidence from property generation

In three experiments, participants received nouns or noun phrases for objects and verbally generated their properties (“feature listing”). Several sources of evidence indicated that participants constructed perceptual simulations to generate properties for the noun phrases during conceptual combination. First, the production of object properties for noun phrases depended on occlusion, with unoccluded properties being generated more often than occluded properties. Because a perceptual variable affected conceptual combination, perceptual simulations appeared central to combining the concepts for modifiers and head nouns. Second, neutral participants produced the same distributions of properties as participants instructed to describe images, suggesting that the conceptual representations used by neutral participants were similar to the mental images used by imagery participants. Furthermore, the property distributions for neutral and imagery participants differed from those for participants instructed to produce word associations. Third, participants produced large amounts of information about background situations associated with the object cues, suggesting that the simulations used to generate properties were situated. The experiments ruled out alternative explanations that simulation effects occur only for familiar noun phrases associated with perceptual memories and that rules associated with modifiers produce occlusion effects. A process model of the property generation task grounded in simulation mechanisms is presented. The possibility of integrating the simulation account of conceptual combination with traditional accounts and well-established findings is explored.     

The use of recognition information and additional cues in inferences from memory

Goldstein and Gigerenzer's (2002) "Recognition Heuristic" (RH) was tested for its empirical validity in an experimental paradigm with induced recognition of objects. RH claims that upon inferring which of two objects (e.g., cities) scores higher on a criterion (e.g., city size), a recognized object will be chosen over an unrecognized one, if the recognition is a valid predictor of the criterion without considering additional object information. Trying to avoid potential shortcomings of former studies, we (a) used the city population task, (b) provided additional cue information only for recognized cities, and (c) had participants draw inferences from memory. Participants learned city names and additional information about some cities. They also learned that recognition and the additional information were valid predictors of the criterion "city size". In a subsequent decision phase, the additional information about the cities in memory strongly affected the inferences, suggesting that recognition information is clearly integrated into judgments, but by no means in a non-compensatory fashion that would dominate every other cue.     

A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience

While accounts of “aesthetic” experience inspire art study and drive its cognitive goals the current modeling of art perception, based on the analytic tradition emphasizing successful assimilation of art information, is unable to truly address this phenomenon, leaving us without means of accounting for disruption and fundamental change—either perceptual or self-referential—as well as epiphany and insight, within the experience of art; and no means of addressing ’art’s ability to mark and change lives. To address this, we introduce a five-stage model of art-perception, organized around initial disruption and subsequent meta-cognitive reflection and self-transformation, which allows for this needed discussion of perceptual and conceptual change, and a connection of art-viewing to viewer personality. Based on this, we consider belletristic accounts of aesthetic experience, and discuss the inter-relation of emotional, cognitive and appraisal factors that may be important for objective research.     

How choice ecology influences search in decisions from experience

Research into human decision-making has often sidestepped the question of search despite its importance across a wide range of domains such as search for food, mates, allies, visual targets or information. Recently, research on decisions from experience has made progress in finding out how individual characteristics shape search for information. Surprisingly little is known, however, about how the properties of the choice ecology shape people's search. To fill this void, we analyzed how two key ecological properties influence search effort: domain of choice (gains vs. losses) and experienced variance (variance vs. no variance). Many people search longer when facing the prospect of losses relative to gains. Moreover, most people search more in options in which they experience variance relative to options they experience as invariant. We conclude that two factors that have been identified as important determinants of choice also influence search of information.     

Individual differences in Sternberg’s memory scanning task

This study provides a new perspective on both the cognitive processes actually implemented and the effect of a simple experimental control - the recall constraint - in Sternberg’s memory scanning task. These findings were highlighted by adopting a new approach based on the comparison of qualitative and quantitative results.The analysis of individual processing, on 72 adults, each participating in one of two experimental conditions (with or without sequence recall), highlighted a large variability in quantitative results as well as qualitative procedures. Based on the participants’ retrospective verbalisations, two categories of strategies were identified: (1) the procedures used to memorize the sequence of digits, and (2) the procedures used to compare this sequence with the test digit, which includes strategies for coding the items and processes for searching them in memory. The analysis of the strategies shows that their frequencies of use depend not only on the experimental condition, but also on the participants, the level of task difficulty and the interaction between participants and level of difficulty. This variability questions the accuracy of Sternberg’s mean model. Furthermore, this approach suggests some answers to the old debate concerning the exhaustive search pattern for the yes response. Indeed, our results show three types of strategies that can be identified according to the different models of search suggested in the literature. The “exhaustive” search, that would only be involved in the recall condition and only for some of the participants, the “self-terminating” search and the “immediate” strategy, which can be identified with a model of parallel search with limited resources. Thus our study suggests that the different search models are appropriate but depend on both the specific experimental conditions and participant’s strategy. Our results should help to improve the interpretation of data collected with this paradigm in cognitive and neuroscientific studies of memory.     

Heterogeneous inhibition processes involved in different facets of self-reported impulsivity: evidence from a community sample

Whiteside and Lynam (Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R. (2001). The Five Factor Model and impulsivity: Using a structural model of personality to understand impulsivity. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 669-689) clarified the multifaceted nature of impulsivity by identifying four distinct facets of self-reported impulsive behaviors: urgency, (lack of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance, and sensation seeking. Building on work by Bechara and Van der Linden (Bechara, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2005). Decision-making and impulse control after frontal lobe injuries. Current Opinion in Neurology, 18, 734-739), the main objective of this study was to investigate the hypothesis that perseverance and urgency map onto the two distinct inhibitory functions distinguished by Friedman and Miyake (Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference control functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 101-135): prepotent response inhibition and resistance to proactive interference. Participants (N = 126) completed the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale and three tasks: a recent-negatives task to assess proactive interference in working memory, and two Go/No-Go tasks at different paces, the slower of which also assessed task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). Consistent with the hypothesis, TUTs were positively correlated with lack of perseverance, and multiple regressions revealed that urgency was specifically related to errors in prepotent response inhibition, and lack of perseverance to errors due to difficulties overcoming proactive interference.     

Forecasting from ignorance: the use and usefulness of recognition in lay predictions of sports events

Whereas previous studies on how people make forecasts of sports events focused primarily on experts, we examined how laypeople do this task. In particular, we (a) tested the recognition heuristic [Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109, 75-90], which requires partial ignorance, against four alternative mechanisms in describing laypeople's forecasts for the European Soccer Championships 2004; (b) evaluated how well recognition predicted the outcomes of the matches compared to direct indicators of team strength (e.g., past performance, rankings); and (c) studied the less-is-more effect--the phenomenon that knowing less leads to more correct forecasts than knowing more--which can occur when the recognition heuristic is used. Two groups of participants (laypeople, experts) made forecasts for the first-round matches of the tournament. Of the five candidate mechanisms, the recognition heuristic predicted laypeople's forecasts best: when applicable, it accounted for 90% of the forecasts. The recognition heuristic correctly predicted the actual winner of the matches substantially better than chance but did not achieve the accuracy of direct indicators of team strength. The experts made more correct forecasts than the laypeople. Moreover, we found no benefit of ignorance among the group of laypeople, although the conditions for a less-is-more effect specified by Goldstein and Gigerenzer were fulfilled.     

Automatic sequential response priming and intentional response preparation in choice reaction tasks: Evidence from response repetition and response cuing

This study examined the interaction of response repetition and response cuing in a finger cuing task with a short and a long cue-stimulus interval (CSI). We observed shorter reaction times (RTs) with increasing CSI and a substantial response repetition benefit. However, this benefit was abolished at the long CSI, suggesting that response cuing neutralized the repetition effect. According to additive-factors logic, the observed interaction suggests that both repetition and cuing exert their influence on a common processing stage, which we identify as the response selection stage. We argue that cuing and repetition effects are expressions of distinct mental operations: cuing is based on intentional response code activation, whereas repetition is based on sequential, automatic response code priming. Cue-based intentional code activation starts slowly and increases with CSI, but sequential response priming is independent of CSI, explaining why cuing abolishes the response repetition benefit at the long CSI.     

Instance-based learning: integrating sampling and repeated decisions from experience

In decisions from experience, there are 2 experimental paradigms: sampling and repeated-choice. In the sampling paradigm, participants sample between 2 options as many times as they want (i.e., the stopping point is variable), observe the outcome with no real consequences each time, and finally select 1 of the 2 options that cause them to earn or lose money. In the repeated-choice paradigm, participants select 1 of the 2 options for a fixed number of times and receive immediate outcome feedback that affects their earnings. These 2 experimental paradigms have been studied independently, and different cognitive processes have often been assumed to take place in each, as represented in widely diverse computational models. We demonstrate that behavior in these 2 paradigms relies upon common cognitive processes proposed by the instance-based learning theory (IBLT; Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003) and that the stopping point is the only difference between the 2 paradigms. A single cognitive model based on IBLT (with an added stopping point rule in the sampling paradigm) captures human choices and predicts the sequence of choice selections across both paradigms. We integrate the paradigms through quantitative model comparison, where IBLT outperforms the best models created for each paradigm separately. We discuss the implications for the psychology of decision making.