Attitude-behaviour relationship: Attitude relevance and behaviour relevance

In a 2 × 2 experiment, the influence of attitude relevance and behaviour relevance on attitude-behaviour relationship was examined. The highest attitude-behaviour correlation was found in the situation where no external factor made relevant neither attitude nor behaviour, while the lowest correlation was found in the situation where both attitude and behaviour were made relevant.     

Mechanisms and constitutive relevance

This paper will examine the nature of mechanisms and the distinction between the relevant and irrelevant parts involved in a mechanism’s operation. I first consider Craver’s account of this distinction in his book on the nature of mechanisms, and explain some problems. I then offer a novel account of the distinction that appeals to some resources from Mackie’s theory of causation. I end by explaining how this account enables us to better understand what mechanisms are and their various features.     

Premissary relevance

Premissary relevance is a property of arguments understood as speech act complexes. It is explicable in terms of the idea of a premise's lending support to a conclusion. Premissary relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set which authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition which is true— that is to say, which can be justified. The study of the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes may contribute to the task of identifying authoritative warrants.     

Apocalyptic relevance

In their book, Relevance, Sperber and Wilson make an important contribution towards constructing a credible theory of this unforthcoming notion. All is not clear sailing, however. If it is accepted as a condition on the adequacy of any account of relevance that it not be derivable either that nothing is relevant to anything or that everything is relevant to everything, it can be shown that Sperber and Wilson come close to violating the condition.     

Causal relevance and Nonreductive physicalism

It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our intuitive conception of degrees of causal relevance. However, I argue that the account requires large-scale miraculous coincidence for there to be causally relevant mental properties. I also argue that the same problem arises for two apparently very different accounts of causal relevance. I suggest that this result does not show that these accounts, on appropriate readings, are false. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that we have reason to believe that irreducible mental properties are causally irrelevant. Moreover, given that there is at leastprima facie evidence that mental properties can be causally relevant, my conclusion casts doubt on nonreductive physicalist theories of mental properties.     

Statistical relevance and explanatory classification

Numerous philosophers, among them Carl G. Hempel and Wesley C. Salmon, have attempted to explicate the notion of explanatory relevance in terms of the statistical relevance of various properties of an individual to the explanandum property itself (or what is here called narrow statistical relevance). This approach seems plausible if one assumes that to explain an occurrence is to show that it was to be expected or to exhibit its degree of expectability and the factors which influence its expectability. But considerations of narrow statistical relevance do not provide an adequate basis for explanatory classification, and the aforementioned views of explanation are accordingly mistaken. Explanatory classification must provide at least a partial account of the nature of a thing, and such an account will generally go beyond what is required as a basis for correct expectation.     

Ravens (Corvus corax) are indifferent to the gains of conspecific recipients or human partners in experimental tasks

Although cooperative behaviours are common in animals, the cognitive processes underpinning such behaviours are very likely to differ between species. In humans, other-regarding preferences have been proposed to sustain long-term cooperation between individuals. The extent to which such psychological capacities exist in other animals is still under investigation. Five hand-reared ravens were first tested in an experiment where they could provide food to a conspecific at no cost to themselves. We offered them two behavioural options that provided identical amounts of food to the actor and where one of the two options additionally delivered a reward to a recipient. Subsequently, we made the ravens play a no-cost cooperation game with an experimenter. The experimenter had the same options as the animals and matched the ravens’ choices, making the prosocial choice the more profitable option. In both conditions, ravens were indifferent to the effects of their choices and hence failed to help conspecifics and to cooperate with the experimenter. While our negative results should be interpreted with care, overall, our findings suggest that the ravens had no understanding of the consequences of their actions for a potential recipient. This study adds to several others that have used a similar set-up and have reported negative results on other-regarding preferences in animals.     

Notions of relevance

Conclusion In his paper Leblanc seeks to supplant traditional forms of semantic theory with truth-value analyses. I have tried, here, to extend the scope, if not the limits, of his results. But now, in closing, I wish to register some reservations about his notion of relevance.Leblanc eschews the customary semantic analysis of intensional languages — the so-called possible worlds semantics — as making metaphysical virtue out of logical necessity. And so he would replace such accounts with truth-value analyses. But, alas, these theories are seen to have only limited application. Either all the atoms of a language must be evaluated by the functions in W in a truth-value W, , R, or the functions must be indexed. Because I share Leblanc's opinion that it ought to be that only the atoms of a theory are linguistically pertinent to it, I opt for the second alternative. Here, of course, things work out all right. But, as Leblanc notes, indexing the functions is equivalent to doing semantics in the usual way. In either case, new parameters are required for the evaluation of theories. So more than just the truth-values of a theory's atoms is relevant.My concern is with natural languages. It has long been recognized — though only more recently well articulated⁴ — that an adequate semantic analysis of such languages, with their indexical and intensional features, must relativize the notion of truth to various indices, viz., aspects of the contexts of utterance of sentences. It is clear that the truth-value of If your feet hurt, then it may rain tomorrow depends on more than just the truth-values of its atoms: the speaker, hearer, place, and time of utterance of the sentence are at least to be included among the extra-linguistic features required for an evaluation of the sentence. Such indices thus provide various realizations of the notion of a possible world, and they are all relevant.My thanks to Hugues Leblanc for help in constructing this reply.