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Jesse R. Steinberg 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,62(3):123-133
Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then
consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction,
could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not
our creator. 相似文献
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William C. Lane 《Theology & Science》2013,11(3):261-278
Leibniz said that the universe, if God-created, would exist at a unique, conjoint, physical maximum: Of all possible worlds, it would be richest in phenomena, but its richness would arise from the simplest physical laws and initial conditions. Using concepts of “variety” and algorithmic informational complexity, Leibniz' claim can be reframed as a testable theory. This theory predicts that the laws and conditions of the actual universe should be simpler, and the universe richer in phenomena, than the presence of observers would require. Tegmark has shown that inhabitants of an infinite multiverse would likely observe simple laws and conditions, but also phenomenal richness just great enough to explain their existence. Empirical observations fit the claim of divine choice better than the claim of an infinite multiverse. The future of the universe, including its future information-processing capacity, is predicted to be endless. 相似文献
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Philip Percival 《Synthese》2013,190(18):4261-4291
The question as to whether some objects are possible worlds that have an initial segment in common, i.e. so that their fusion is a temporal tree whose branches are possible worlds, arises both for those who hold that our universe has the structure of a temporal tree and for those who hold that what there is includes concrete universes of every possible variety. The notion of “possible world” employed in the question is seen to be the notion of an object of a kind such that objects of that kind play a certain theoretical role. Lewis’s discussion of the question is thereby clarified but is nevertheless inadequate; his negative answer is correct but even from his combinatorialist viewpoint the rationale he provides for this answer is misguided. I explain why the combinatorialist advocate of concrete plenitude should hold that no object is a tree of possible worlds. Then I explain that for a different reason the nomic essentialist advocate of concrete plenitude should hold this much too. 相似文献
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Francesco Berto 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(3):313-334
We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are
originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some
such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory
should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In
Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories. 相似文献
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Wojciech Krysztofiak 《Husserl Studies》1991,8(3):205-220
I would like to thank Charles W. Harvey from the University of Central Arkansas and Leon Gumaski from the University of Toru in Poland for a number of useful criticisms of an earlier version of this paper. 相似文献