Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

When are moods most likely to influence consumers' product preferences? The role of mood focus and perceived relevance of moods

This program of research examined the hypothesis that moods are most likely to be used as a source of information in making evaluations and choices when consumers both focus on their moods (i.e., acknowledge and pay attention to their feelings) and perceive that moods are a relevant source of information for forming judgments. Support for this prediction was obtained when the relevance of moods was examined by manipulating relevance instructions, varying advertising cues, and manipulating product type. Further, the boundary conditions under which the combination of mood focus and perceived relevance is most influential on product preferences are identified.     

On the Ease of (Dis)believing: The Role of Accessibility Experiences in Credibility Judgments

Credibility judgments are common and consequential in many applied settings. Although much research has addressed human observers' ability to discriminate true and deceptive statements, less is known about the psychological processes involved in such judgments. Here, it is proposed that the process of mustering evidence for or against credibility is reflected in a feeling‐based form (ease‐of‐retrieval) and that such feelings can be used as a basis for credibility judgments. The results of an experiment show, as predicted, that the perceived ease with which participants could identify clues strongly influenced credibility judgments. Ironically, mustering more clues in support of a truthful account lowered credibility judgments; in contrast, mustering more clues in support of a deceptive account increased credibility judgments. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because participants relied on a feeling‐based as opposed to content‐based judgment strategy. Practical implications are discussed, and theoretical issues regarding the process of credibility judgment are raised. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Group Influence Is More or Less Likely: The Case of Moral Judgments

We investigated whether group influence can change judgments even for high-consensus (i.e., unambiguous) moral norms. We found that participants often matched the judgment of the other current group members even when this moral judgment was normatively incorrect (nonstandard), and this occurred more for more ambiguous issues. Moreover, this social influence on public judgments was generally followed by private agreement and re-interpreting general values to be consistent with those judgements. We also found that participants who experienced a fit between their regulatory focus and their feelings of power (i.e., promotion/high power; prevention/low power) were less influenced by the group.     

STUDY CHOICE WITH DIFFICULT-TO-READ TEXT

Results from this experimental study indicate that naïve theories of intelligence do not play a significant role in the formation of students’ judgments of learning (JOL) or students’ study choices when reading text that is difficult to process. Students’ JOL tended to be fairly accurate indicators of performance on a comprehension assessment, but these judgments were not used as a basis for students’ study choices. The evidence from this study suggests that students’ self-efficacy beliefs in reading may serve as a basis for such choices.     

The Influence of Self-Ratings versus Peer Ratings on Supervisors'' Performance Judgments

This study investigated the extent to which supervisors use feedback from outside sources in making performance judgments. A simulation was conducted in which participants with organizational supervisory experience made an initial performance judgment about a profiled employee. Participants then received additional information that was discrepant from their initial judgment (positive or negative) from one of two sources (the profiled employee himself or one of his peers). The direction of the discrepant information and its source interacted in determining final ratings, such that, participants were more likely to use discrepant information to alter their performance judgments in a consistent direction when the source was a peer than when the source was the employee himself. Furthermore, participants' opinions about the usefulness of peer information for performance judgments moderated this interaction. Specifically, participants who believed that information from an employee's peers was useful, were more likely to use discrepant information provided by a peer when making final performance judgments than were participants who did not believe that information from an employee's peers was useful.     

The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control

The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (“noetic feeling”) occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action.     

When thoughts don’t feel like they used to: Changing feelings of subjective ease in judgments of the past

Thinking about the past is critical to everyday experiences, but people are not unbiased when doing so. Feelings of subjective ease that accompany generating reasons for known or alternative outcomes influence hindsight bias. But people do not always make decisions immediately after thinking about issues. Three experiments demonstrated that generating versus reading earlier generated reasons has markedly different effects on judgments, with theoretical and practical implications. Inevitability judgments were consistent with feelings of ease when generating reasons, but with numbers of reasons (content) when later reading those reasons. Experiments 2 and 3 also found that feelings of ease can be reconstructed if people reconsider their feelings when initially generating reasons. Discussion centers on the operation of subjective ease and its role in understanding judgment and decision making.     

The contribution of judgment scale to the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon: How evaluating others can exaggerate over- (and under-) confidence

The unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon occurs when low performers tend to overestimate their performance on a task, whereas high performers judge their performance more accurately (and sometimes underestimate it). In previous research, this phenomenon has been observed for a variety of cognitive tasks and judgment scales. However, the role of judgment scale in producing the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon has not been systematically investigated. Thus, we present four studies in which all participants judged their performance on both a relative scale (percentile rank) and an absolute scale (number correct). The studies included a variety of performance tasks (general knowledge questions, math problems, introductory psychology questions, and logic questions) and test formats (multiple-choice, recall). Across all tasks and formats, the percentile-rank judgments were less accurate than the absolute judgments, particularly for low and high performers. Furthermore, in Studies 1–3, the absolute judgments were highly accurate, even when the percentile-rank judgments were not. Thus, differences in the accuracy of percentile-rank judgments across skill levels do not always represent differences in self-awareness, but rather they may arise from difficulties that performers have at evaluating how well others are performing. Most importantly, the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon on a relative scale does not guarantee inaccurate self-evaluations of absolute performance.     

Felt dispensability in groups of coactors: The effects of shared responsibility and explicit anonymity on cognitive effort

The study reported here tests the effects of explicit anonymity and shared responsibility on cognitive effort. In Experiment 1, ninety-nine undergraduate students participated in a multiattribute judgment task, and math models of their judgments were constructed. Results showed that students who believed the responsibility for the judgment task was shared by 15 others used less complex judgment strategies than single judges or judges working in pairs. Results also showed that the effect of explicit anonymity on cognitive effort was quite small. In Experiment 2, students performed the job evaluation task and responded to questionnaire items measuring attitudes toward the task. Responses to these items showed that students who shared responsibility for the judgment task with 15 others felt more dispensable than students working alone or students working in pairs. Together these data show that feelings of dispensability can be the primary cause of social loafing in some situations and that feeling necessary can motivate effort in spite of anonymity.     

The Content of Emotional Thoughts

Abstract

In this paper I examine Peter Goldie's theory of emotional thoughts and feelings, offered in his recent book The Emotions and subsequent articles. Goldie argues that emotional thoughts cannot be assimilated to belief or judgment, together with some added-on phenomenological component, and on this point I agree with him. However, he also argues that emotionally-laden thoughts, thoughts had, as he puts it, ‘with feeling,’ in part differ from unemotional thoughts in their content. The thought ‘the gorilla is dangerous’ when thought with an emotional feeling of fear differs in its content from the thought ‘the gorilla is dangerous’ when thought without actually feeling fear. I argue that Goldie offers no good reason to think that the difference between emotional and unemotional thoughts is found in their contents. In fact, the analogies Goldie presents to help make his case actually suggest that the contribution feelings make to the distinctive role played by emotional thoughts consists solely in their influencing the way we think emotional thoughts. However, this position is consistent with Goldie's broader point: that theories which treat emotional feelings as phenomenological afterthoughts should be rejected.     

The Logic of Feeling

The contribution of the feelings‐as‐information hypothesis to our understanding of the role of affect in judgment and decision making is discussed. Basic principles and regularities in how affective feelings guide judgments and decisions are then identified. Based on these principles and regularities, it is argued that the role of feelings in judgment and decision making may be more adaptive than has been assumed in most academic circles. This adaptivity transpires (a) in the variety of goal‐relevant signals that feelings convey, (b) the flexibility with which feelings are interpreted, (c) the judgmental properties of feelings, and (d) the selectivity with which feelings are invoked. It is speculated that affective feelings may tap into a separate system of judgment and decision making with its unique strengths and weaknesses.     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

人类的判断为什么不精确：进化论和脑科学的解释

人类的判断并非十分精确,而且人类还无法清醒认识到自己判断并不准。进化心理学理论认为看似不精确的判断最小化了人类付出的生存代价,从而使个体具有更大的收益,在竞争资源中具有适应优势;而脑科学领域运用fMRI、TMS等技术发现了前额叶的某些区域与判断的精确性有关。未来的研究有待结合进化发展心理学的角度、进化适应的现实解释性角度和认知神经科学发现临床应用的角度展开。     

Eliminating recency with self‐review: the case of auditors' ‘going concern’ judgments

This paper examines the use of self‐review to debias recency. Recency is found in the ‘going concern’ judgments of staff auditors, but is successfully eliminated by the auditor's use of a simple self‐review technique that would be extremely easy to implement in audit practice. Auditors who self‐review are also less inclined to make audit report choices that are inconsistent with their going concern judgments. These results are important because the judgments of staff auditors often determine the type and extent of documentation in audit workpapers and serve as preliminary inputs for senior auditors' judgments and choices. If staff auditors' judgments are affected by recency, the impact of this bias may be impounded in the ultimate judgments and choices of senior auditors. Since biased judgments can expose auditors to significant costs involving extended audit procedures, legal liability and diminished reputation, simple debiasing techniques that reduce this exposure are valuable. The paper also explores some future research needs and other important issues concerning judgment debiasing in applied professional settings. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social identity threat and consumer preferences

Although marketers often link brands with an aspect of consumer social identity, the current research demonstrates that such brand-identity linkages may sometimes have negative consequences. Consumers motivated to protect and maintain feelings of individual self-worth alter their product evaluations and choices to avoid a threatened aspect of their own social identity. Whereas those low in collective self-esteem (CSE) tend to exhibit such identity avoidance effects, those high in CSE maintain associations with an identity-linked brand even when that social identity is threatened. Moreover, when the consumer feels positively about the self via self-affirmation, the effect among low CSE consumers is mitigated. Finally, it is demonstrated that differences in the use of identity as a resource underlie the effects.     

When do children overestimate their knowledge of unfamiliar targets?

We report four investigations in which 5 to 7 year olds judged whether or not they knew familiar- and unfamiliar-named targets. Under some conditions judgments were made in relation to performance on a relevant task, e.g., children judged whether they knew the picture they had picked from a set was the target. Under other conditions, children judged their state of knowledge not in relation to performance, e.g., they answered "Do you know who (target) is?" Under both types of condition, children nearly always made correct "know" judgments when targets were familiar. Correct "don't know" judgments about unfamiliar targets were relatively common when judgments were not made in relation to performance on a task (average scores 80-90% correct), but were less frequent when knowledge was judged in relation to performance on a task (average scores 40-70% correct). Knowledge judged in relation to performance was overestimated even when children did not choose the picture they thought might be the target before making their judgment, when the pictures were face-down, and when children predicted performance on a task not yet present. It seems that although children can make relatively accurate judgments of their own knowledge states, they tend to overestimate their competence when assessing their knowledge in relation to performance on a task. We discuss why this might be.     

In the Aftermath of Invalidation: Shaping Judgment Rules on Learning That Previous Information Was Invalid

This study explores whether and how judgment procedures used in evaluating product information are modified after consumers have found that information they had received in the past was invalid. It shows that, following exposure to invalidating messages, respondents tend to switch their dominant mode of processing. In particular, those who focused on the source in making a judgment prior to invalidation (i.e., those using simple processing) switch to a more complex processing of the product information. In contrast, those who previously relied on product information simplify their processing and consider information they have about the source in making judgments. The results are consistent with a cognitive resource explanation that attributes switch in processing mode to the enhanced cognitive demands imposed by attempts to cope with the invalidation.     

Context affects feeling-of-knowing accuracy in younger and older adults

In feeling of knowing (FOK) studies, participants predict subsequent recognition memory performance on items that were initially encoded but that cannot presently be recalled. Research suggests that FOK judgment magnitude may be influenced by the total amount, or quantity, of contextual information retrieved related to the unrecalled target (e.g., Koriat, 1993). The present study examined the contribution of quality of that information to episodic FOK judgments. In addition, we tested whether the episodic FOK deficit demonstrated by older adults could be reduced by encouraging retrieval of contextual information relevant to the target. Three experiments demonstrated that quality of the retrieved partial information influenced FOK judgments in both older and younger adults; however, the manifestation of that influence was age dependent. The results also indicated that older adults required explicit retrieval of contextual information before making FOK judgments in order to make accurate FOK predictions. The results suggest that FOK accuracy may be partially determined by search processes triggered when participants are queried for contextual information.