福至心灵：幸运感知对消费行为的影响及其理论解释

寻求幸运的行为从古至今广泛存在于人类生活的方方面面,幸运感知如何影响消费行为的理论成果为消费研究领域做出了重要贡献。通过系统回顾相关文献发现,个体的幸运感知会对冒险行为、独特性寻求、传染效应、特定事物的态度和幸运消费产生影响。归因理论、人格特质理论、认知启动理论、反事实思维、社会比较理论、控制感理论和启发式决策可以用于解释幸运感知对消费行为的影响。未来研究应深化幸运感知影响消费行为的作用机制并拓展边界条件及其双向结果。     

Hazards mean luck: Counterfactual thinking in reports of dangerous situations and careless behavior

It has been shown (Teigen, 1995) that experiences of "luck" in daily life are dependent upon the existence a worse and close hypothetical (counterfactual) outcome, rather than upon a positive evaluation of what actually happened. The present investigation focuses on the inverse relationship, namely whether a situation with a negative outcome close at hand will be perceived as lucky. To test this hypothesis, students were asked to describe dangerous situations (Experiment 1) and examples of careless behavior (Experiment 3) from their own lives, which subsequently were rated by the actors and by peer groups for good and bad luck, attractiveness, and for closeness and attractiveness of the counterfactual outcome. Dangerous situations and episodes involving careless behavior were generally regarded as more lucky than unlucky. Furthermore, degree of good luck was positively correlated with degree of dangerousness and with degree of carelessness. Luck was related to closeness, aversiveness, and (in Experiment 2) to estimated probability of the counterfactual outcome. It is concluded that luck is primarily determined by negative outcomes that did not happen, and thus a frequent by-product of risk taking and risk exposure.     

How good is good luck? The role of counterfactual thinking in the perception of lucky and unlucky events

Spontaneous references to ‘luck’ (e.g. in the mass media) frequently occur in connection with narrow escapes from accidents. The hypothesis that lucky events are not always positive, to the same degree as unlucky events are negative, was tested by asking Norwegian and Polish students to describe incidents of good and bad luck from their own lives, These stories were subsequently evaluated by the narrators and by a group of judges. Ratings showed unlucky events to be uniformly negative whereas lucky events varied widely in attractiveness. Both were characterized by the idea that the outcome could easily have been a dramatically different one. In a parallel set of studies, pleasant and unpleasant experiences from students' everyday life were collected (without specific reference to luck) and evaluated along the same dimensions. The results confirm that unlucky and unpleasant events have more in common than lucky and pleasant ones. Pleasant and unpleasant events can be imagined to have opposite alternative outcomes, but these are felt with less immediacy than in the case of luck. It is concluded that luck attributions typically occur in situations that could easily have taken a worse turn. How lucky depends upon how easily and how much worse.     

Luck,envy and gratitude: It could have been different

Previous studies have shown that people feel lucky in situations that could easily have turned into something worse. The present investigation was designed to focus more closely on the comparative aspect of luck, using a linguistic approach (Study 1 and 2) as well as self-reports of perceived luck accompanying selected emotional episodes (Study 3). The participants in Study 1 were asked to comment upon the difference between describing a state of affairs as “lucky” vs. “good”. The term “lucky“ was frequently seen to imply a comparison process, sometimes expressing gratitude (“It is lucky I have a family”) and at other times envy (“it is lucky you have a job”). This was confirmed in Study 2 where statements about self and other being lucky or unlucky were rated for implying comparison, gratitude, envy, concern, and impression of speaker. In Study 3, 60 students described situations in which they had felt grateful towards other people as well as towards “life in general”. Questionnaire answers revealed that they also had felt very lucky and had been thinking “it could have been different”. They also produced recollections of envy, which were rated to imply others' good luck and own bad luck, which could easily have been interchanged (“it could have been merdquo;). It is concluded that counterfactual thoughts are decisive for the experiences of luck, gratitude, and envy.     

The affective regulation of cognitive priming

Semantic and affective priming are classic effects observed in cognitive and social psychology, respectively. The authors discovered that affect regulates such priming effects. In Experiment 1, positive and negative moods were induced before one of three priming tasks; evaluation, categorization, or lexical decision. As predicted, positive affect led to both affective priming (evaluation task) and semantic priming (category and lexical decision tasks). However, negative affect inhibited such effects. In Experiment 2, participants in their natural affective state completed the same priming tasks as in Experiment 1. As expected, affective priming (evaluation task) and category priming (categorization and lexical decision tasks) were observed in such resting affective states. Hence, the authors conclude that negative affect inhibits semantic and affective priming. These results support recent theoretical models, which suggest that positive affect promotes associations among strong and weak concepts, and that negative affect impairs such associations (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Kuhl, 2000).     

Doing unto future selves as you would do unto others: psychological distance and decision making

Four experiments showed that the decisions people make for future selves and other people are similar to each other and different from their decisions for present selves. Experiments involved decisions to drink a disgusting liquid for scientific purposes (Experiment 1), tutor peers during exam week (Experiment 2), receive e-mails for charity (Experiment 3), and defer a lottery prize for a larger one (Experiment 4). These findings seemed to be at least partially rooted in the tendency for decisions regarding the ongoing, present self to be uniquely influenced by internal subjective experience. Specifically, these effects emerged for real, but not hypothetical, decisions. Also, they were mitigated by manipulations that altered participants' attention to present or future subjective experience. In addition, when participants' subjective experience primarily involved empathy for others (Experiment 3), their decisions on behalf of present selves were more generous than their decisions for future selves and others. Applications are discussed.     

Good luck and bad luck: how to tell the difference

Good luck implies comparison with a worse counterfactual outcome, whereas bad luck implies upward comparisons. People will accordingly describe themselves as particularly lucky after recollecting situations where they avoided something negative, and as particularly unlucky after recollecting episodes in which they missed something positive (Study 1). Upward and downward comparisons can be created by the way a situation develops, and are accentuated by the way a story is told. Good luck stories typically change for the better only in the last stage, whereas bad luck stories show a more steady downward progression (Study 2). This is also reflected in phrases believed to be characteristic of good luck versus bad luck stories, with good luck stories involving surprise and reference to close counterfactuals, whereas bad luck stories focus on initial normal events (Study 3). Good and bad luck imply different orders of events (negative–positive versus positive–negative), so by rearranging the narrative sequence, the same set of outcomes can form the basis for a good luck story as well as a bad luck story (Study 4). The final experiment (Study 5) shows that negative outcome expectations are typical for chance‐determined and uncontrolled situations. Under such circumstances, factual outcomes do not have to be exceptionally good to be considered as lucky. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli

Findings from three experiments suggest that participants’ automatic evaluations of subliminally presented objects influenced how they interpreted subsequent, unrelated objects. Participants defined homographs (Experiment 1), categorized objects and people (Experiment 2), and made person judgments (Experiment 3) that all could be disambiguated in either a positive or negative way. Participants’ responses to the ambiguous targets were evaluatively consistent with their automatic evaluations of preceding, semantically unrelated objects. The findings suggest that one’s automatic evaluations can influence deliberate judgments of subsequent stimuli, even when the only shared dimension between the initially evaluated objects and the judged objects is an evaluative one. The implications of these findings are discussed with regard to possible mechanisms of evaluative priming as well as previous research concerning evaluative priming effects on social judgment.     

The belief in a just world and immanent justice reasoning in adults

Deciding that negative experiences are punishment for prior misdeeds, even when plausible causal links are missing, is immanent justice (IJ) reasoning (Piaget, 1932/1965). Three studies examined a just world theory analysis of IJ reasoning in adults (Lerner, 1980). Studies 1 and 2 varied the valence of a target person's behavior prior to them experiencing an unrelated negative (car accident, Study 1) or positive (lottery win, Study 2) outcome. Participants viewed the outcomes as the result of prior behavior most when they fit deservingness expectations (good person won the lottery, bad person injured in automobile accident), suggesting that just world concerns influenced IJ reasoning. The lottery-winning finding (Study 2) also extends IJ reasoning to positive experiences. A third study found that a manipulation of just world threat in one context (prolonged or ended suffering of an HIV victim) influenced IJ responses in a subsequent unrelated context (automobile accident scenario).     

Luck and the Domain of Distributive Justice

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Who am I and who are you? Priming and the influence of self versus other focused attention

Recent research has demonstrated that primes can affect self-perceptions, and that subsequent behavior is typically in line with these changed self-perceptions. However, a wide range of other priming effects have been documented, including changes in person perception, motivation, and so forth. The conditions under which a given prime affects the self as opposed to creating one of these other outcomes remains unclear. The present research seeks to offer insight into this question by examining attentional factors as one determinant of whether the self or another target will be biased by a prime. Across two studies, manipulating attention to the self (or an irrelevant target) immediately following a prime produced assimilation in behavior (Experiment 1) and self-perceptions (Experiment 2) when participants thought about themselves, but not an irrelevant target. In addition, when participants thought about an unrelated target, perceptions of this target, but not the self, were changed (Experiment 2).     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

Cultural Stereotypes and the Self: A Closer Examination of Implicit Self-Stereotyping

Recent research and theory on implicit self-stereotyping suggests that individuals nonconsciously incorporate stereotypes about their social groups into the self-concept; however, evidence as to whether this holds true for negative stereotypes remains limited. Using a subliminal priming measure, the current research found that women (Experiment 1) and White Americans (Experiment 2) implicitly associated the self with in-group stereotypic traits but not out-group stereotypic traits. Of importance, both groups implicitly self-stereotyped on negative in-group traits to a similar extent as they did on positive in-group traits. Moreover, exploratory analysis showed that the degree to which White Americans associated positive, but not negative, in-group stereotypes with the self was related to higher self-esteem. Implications of implicit self-stereotyping on self-esteem and stereotype-consistent behavior are discussed.     

Transfer effects in implicit memory and consumer choice

Two experiments investigated transfer effects in implicit memory and consumer choice, using a preference judgement task. Experiment 1 examined whether it is possible to obtain priming for unfamiliar food labels. Additionally, it investigated whether the experience of seeing a brand name with a particular product type would benefit subsequent processing of the brand name when linked with a different product type. Experiment 2 examined whether changes in modality between study and test would affect priming for unfamiliar brand names. Both questions are theoretically important, as well as pertaining to practical concerns in the consumer choice literature. Experiment 1 demonstrated significant priming for unfamiliar food labels, and established that priming was unaffected by changing the product type with which the brand name was associated. In Experiment 2, priming on both auditory and visual versions of the preference judgement task was reduced by changes in modality. The results and implications are discussed in relation to consumer choice and current theories of implicit memory. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The eyes and ears of status: how status colors perceptual judgment

To those with high status, abundance is granted. Moving beyond the multitude of objective benefits, the authors explore how status, once conferred, colors the perceptual world people inhabit. In four experiments, participants' status state influenced their judgments of status-relevant features in their environment. Participants in a state of high status reported hearing applause (Experiment 1) and seeing facial expressions (Experiment 2), in reaction to their performance, as louder and more favorable. In addition, expectations of how others will respond--expectations stemming from one's current status state--accounted for this effect (Experiment 3). Finally, differences in judgments between participants experiencing high versus low status were observed only when the target of the evaluation was the self (Experiment 4). These results advance scholars' understanding of the psychological experience of status and contribute to the growing literature on the dominant influence psychological states have on people's judgments of their social world.     

"It Could Be Us!": Cognitive and Social Psychological Factors in UK National Lottery Play

This study examines the cognitive and social psychological factors underlying UK National Lottery play. A total of 384 respondents were asked about their own lottery playing behaviours, their knowledge of lottery odds and their beliefs about the role of skill, chance, luck and optimism in lottery play. Using hypothetical scenarios, respondents were also asked to rate the likelihood of winning the lottery jackpot (matching all six numbers) with number combinations reflecting different levels of apparent randomness, previous matches, near misses and prize size manipulations. Frequency of lottery play was found to be positively correlated with age, income, Instants scratchcard play, gambling on horse/greyhound racing, the football pools, and bingo as well as with beliefs about skill, luck and optimism. Frequency of lottery play was negatively correlated with general education and estimate of relative win likelihoods based on the perceived randomness of number combinations. Planned contrasts revealed that compared to individual (non‐syndicate) players, syndicate lottery players played more regularly and gambled more on the football pools. Results are discussed in the light of current cognitive theories surrounding the misperception of probability and their relation to lottery play and in the need for future models to recognise the social factors inherent in syndicate‐based lottery participation.     

On the experience of self-relevant feedback: How self-concept organization influences affective responses and self-evaluations

We evaluated how self-concepts are represented in memory, testing predictions about how self-relevant feedback influences mood and self-evaluation. Specifically, we view the self as comprised of multiple self-aspects (e.g., daughter, sorority sister), each associated with specific attributes (e.g., shy, philanthropy). Study 1 showed that priming a self-aspect increased the accessibility of attributes idiosyncratically associated with the activated self-aspect. In Studies 2 and 3, positive or negative self-relevant feedback was provided to observe how affect and self-evaluations are mediated by self-concept representation. Study 2 demonstrated that changes in mood were accounted for by how feedback impacted evaluations of the currently activated self-aspect. Moreover, evaluations of other self-aspects shifted as they shared more attributes with the self-aspect implicated by feedback. In Study 3, feedback about an attribute also influenced affect, with stronger mood change revealed for attributes associated with a greater proportion of self-aspects. This work demonstrates that affective experiences resulting from self-relevant feedback are not determined by one’s self-concept representation in its entirety, but rather, by the impact of that feedback on activated self-aspects.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self-serving judgments about winning the lottery

Although myths and stereotypes about lottery winners tend to be negative (e.g., winners become extravagant), people continue to spend billions of dollars buying lottery tickets in the hope of winning. The authors applied findings from the self-enhancement literature to understand this paradox. Eighty college students received class credit for their participation, in which they read a scenario that asked them to imagine that they, or a target other, had won a lottery. Participants' responses to a 34-item questionnaire displayed a self-serving bias, such that changes to the self were expected to be more positive than changes to the other. For several items, this effect was moderated by the participant's gender. The present research indicates that the pervasive tendency to display self-serving biases can apply to future-oriented processing, an under-researched topic.