The Fork in the Road

This article conducts a normative evaluation of Operation Iraqi Freedom undertaken in 2003 by employing principles of prudence to enquire whether the use of force could be described as an action by a responsible great power. Along with relating the principles of prudence to the concept of great power responsibility, it highlights two pillars of prudent decision-making: circumspection and awareness of one's limits. This normative framework is then utilised to evaluate the invasion of Iraq from the perspective of these specific aspects of prudence. The conclusion shows that on the basis of this normative yardstick, it is not possible to classify Operation Iraqi Freedom as a prudent action by a responsible great power.     

精神自由与心灵自由——庄子与萨特自由精神之比较

庄子和萨特虽然都不约而同地呼唤自由,但他们关于自由的理念却是有很大的区别的。庄子的精神自由是消极的,萨特的心灵自由是积极的。庄子认为要想实现自由理想,就要顺任自然、“洗心去欲”;萨特则认为“人命定是自由”,实现自由理想,就是要让人认识到自己是自由的,勇于自我选择、自我造就、自我实现。     

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Nightmares and Sleep Disturbance in Iraq War Veterans: A Feasible and Promising Treatment Combination

A substantial proportion of returnees from the Iraq war have significant psychological symptoms related to war zone exposure, including high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), nightmares, and sleep disturbances. This pilot investigation examined the feasibility and efficacy of a promising cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT) for nightmares, Imagery Rehearsal, combined with CBT for insomnia. Seven veterans completed treatment and showed promising pre-post effects regarding nightmare frequency, sleep quality, and PTSD. This report further examined the content of participants' nightmares, changes made during treatment, and potentially important modifying variables of treatment outcome. Those with redeployment fears, guilt due to perpetration issues, or traumatic brain injuries may receive some but not full benefits of the treatment.     

The search for freedom in extreme sports: A phenomenological exploration

Participation in extreme sports is continuing to grow, yet there is still little understanding of participant motivations in such sports. The purpose of this paper is to report on one aspect of motivation in extreme sports, the search for freedom. The study utilized a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology. Fifteen international extreme sport participants who participated in sports such as BASE jumping, big wave surfing, extreme mountaineering, extreme skiing, rope free climbing and waterfall kayaking were interviewed about their experience of participating in an extreme sport. Results reveal six elements of freedom: freedom from constraints, freedom as movement, freedom as letting go of the need for control, freedom as the release of fear, freedom as being at one, and finally freedom as choice and responsibility. The findings reveal that motivations in extreme sport do not simply mirror traditional images of risk taking and adrenaline and that motivations in extreme sports also include an exploration of the ways in which humans seek fundamental human values.     

Freedom – the abyssal ground of Freudian psychoanalysis

Freedom is an a priori condition for the way in which Freudian psychoanalysis thematizes the development, the structure and the dynamics of our psychic life; the human psyche is essentially constituted by freedom. What this really means is that psychoanalysis lacks a foundation or ground – both as a psychological science and as a kind of clinical treatment. Freedom is the abyssal ground of psychoanalysis.     

The Indetermination of Reason and the Roleof the Will in Aquinas's Accountof Human Freedom

Thomas Aquinas argues that human choices are made by the will and reason working together. It is easy to misinterpret his argument and suppose that the reason alone works out what should be done while the will simply ratifies this. Instead Aquinas believes that in practical matters the reason is often undetermined since it arrives at many simultaneous conclusions. This is the often unacknowledged heart of Aquinas's account of freedom. All these simultaneous rational conclusions derive from the objective circumstances of the world; each one could give rise to a different rationally justified course of action; yet only one can be acted upon. The reason cannot decide between them. It is the will that accepts and affirms one of these conclusions and gives force to the reasonableness of one course of action. This is why a choice is always rational and personally willed – which is what makes it free. The indetermination of reason is what allows the future to be open-ended for the deliberating agent; it allows past and present to be interpreted in different ways, each of which has its own coherence and rationality. In this way Aquinas's account of human freedom avoids both an irrational voluntarism and a deterministic intellectualism     

Yes,we have no bananas: Consumer responses to restoration of freedom

When stockouts restrict consumers' freedoms, two independent responses can occur: product desirability, or a reactance-based increase in the desire for the unavailable option, and source negativity, or general frustration with the source of the restriction. In four studies, we provide a novel investigation of consumer responses to stockout-restoration and examine how these two forces combine to affect consumer responses after freedoms are restored. To do so, we investigate two moderators that influence the activation and strength of product desirability and source negativity, respectively: trait reactance and attributions. While all consumers experience source negativity in response to stockouts, only consumers high in reactance experience product desirability, leading to differential responses to stockout-restoration. Compared to an in-stock condition, high reactance consumers respond positively to stockout-restoration, while low reactance consumers respond negatively to stockout-restoration, in terms of store and product evaluations and store choice. However, when high reactants attribute a stockout to the store, thereby increasing source negativity relative to product desirability, they respond negatively to stockout-restoration.     

So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean

In this paper I give considerable attention to Richard Rorty's attempt to make plausible a conception of non-rational semantic and cultural change - change which Rorty insists on describing as identical with progress - in order to show the extent to which this attempt is compromised from the start by an unjustifiably narrow and inconsistent view of reason. The point of this immanent critique is not just to make Rorty's view of non-rational change look bad. It is meant to do more justice to his claim that intellectual and moral progress is inseparable from speaking and acting differently by incorporating this claim into a philosophically enlarged picture of reason. So the value of taking Rorty's claims about change seriously lies less in showing the shortcomings of his conception of reason than it does in bringing a sense of urgency to the need to renew the project begun by Kant, Hegel, and German Idealism - the project of conceiving reason as an agency of change by reinterpreting reason in terms of self-determining freedom.     

对康德的道德形而上学基础的追问及存在论意义上的超越

康德的道德哲学与其政治哲学是逻辑一致的,康德认为正义的优先性在于人先天的自由,而自由的主体坚持正义和遵从道德,则在于人的实践理性自身具有的善良意志,康德就这样通过自由、实践理性、善良意志等概念为道德奠定了基础。然而它仍然是先验的、空洞的,唯有从道德是人存在的方式这一存在论的根基处入手,才能理解道德并使其获得自身存在的坚实根基。     

浅谈美国自由文化的具体体现

美国人崇尚自由民主,自美国独立以来近三百年时间里一直贯彻自由民主思想,并以此作为执政理念。本文将从美国人日常生活、自由创词、接纳外来词汇三方面,结合美国历史来分析美国自由文化,并从中吸取优点,发展中国文化。     

Reply to Dews,and a plea for Schelling

The discussion is a response to Dews on the question of how Schelling's Freiheitsschrift should be interpreted. It falls into two halves, the first defending my interpretation, and the second expanding on the case that Dews makes for the unavoidability of metaphysics in the theory of human freedom, with which I am in full agreement. The main criticism that Dews makes of my reading is that the argument I attribute to Schelling concerning the metaphysical significance of evil rests on Kantian assumptions regarding the existence of pure practical reason, which Schelling rejects. I argue that, though certainly matters are more complicated than my earlier discussion made them seem, Schelling remains sufficiently close to Kant for the argument I attribute to avoid inconsistency. In the second half I raise what I claim to be a neglected but important question: Why is the legacy of classical German philosophy not regarded as significant for contemporary discussion of human freedom? My answer in brief is that the concept of freedom has undergone a profound contraction. In this context I also try to define more precisely what is distinctive of Schelling's view of human freedom.     

The metaphysics of human freedom: from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift

Schelling’s 1809 Freiheitsschrift (Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom), perhaps his most widely read work, presents considerable difficulties of understanding. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the work in relation to Kant. My focus is on the relation in each case of their theory of human freedom to their general metaphysics, a relation which both regard as essential. The argument of the paper is in sum that Schelling may be viewed as addressing and resolving a problem which faces Kant’s theory of freedom and transcendental idealism, deriving from the challenge posed by Spinozism. One major innovation in Schelling’s theory of human freedom is his claim that it presupposes the reality of evil. I argue that Schelling’s thesis concerning evil also provides a key to the new and highly original metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift. The relation of Schelling’s theory of freedom to his general metaphysics is therefore complex, for it goes in two directions: the metaphysics are not simply presupposed by the theory of freedom but are also in part derived from it. These new metaphysics also, I argue, allow Schelling to resolve a problem which his own earlier Spinozistic system had left unresolved.     

The correlates of religion and state: an introduction

ABSTRACT

This volume examines the Religion and State Round 3 (RAS3) dataset which includes information of State Religion Policy (SRP) for 183 countries and self-governing territories between 1990 and 2014. This collection includes a general discussion of the dataset but most of the contributions take these data and use them to analyse the intersections between SRP and a wide range of phenomena including civil wars, terrorism, international conflict, attitudes towards religion and state, constitutional promises of religious freedom, and religious mobilisation. While this volume constitutes the formal primary presentation and analysis of the RAS3 dataset, it is intended to be the beginning of an ongoing discussion.     

Accueil des personnes âgées en EHPAD : entre liberté et sécurité. Ambivalence mais non ambiguïté du discours juridique

The aging population and ever-increasing host of seniors in institutions concerned lawyer. The law, in fact, ensures everyone in both exercise fundamental freedoms but also ensures compliance with security. This ambivalence is not without problems to care professionals.     

军事心理学研究

著名军事心理学家Driskell和Olmstedt(1989)曾话:"可能没有任何组织或机构会像军队那样与心理学科的成熟和发展有着如此紧密的联系."Edgar M. Johnson(1991)也讲过这样一句话:"军事心理学只有把焦点集中于军事应用上,它才真正是独一无二的学科."     

Belief,quasi-belief,and obsessive-compulsive disorder

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) poses a puzzle about beliefs: Those with OCD experience anxiety and motivation suggesting that they believe something, even though they may profess not to believe that very thing. OCD also poses a puzzle about free will, since persons with OCD often describe their behavior as compelled, though it is unclear how it is compelled. This paper argues that at least some cases of OCD are best described as being driven by “quasi-beliefs” which have some, but not all, of the functional properties of beliefs. (A brief discussion contrasts these quasi-beliefs with the “aliefs” recently posited by Tamar Gendler.) An alternative to the quasi-belief account of OCD is the claim is that OCD can be explained in terms of ordinary beliefs that simply have irrational contents. The paper argues that the quasi-belief account of OCD fits the empirical details of the disorder better than alternative accounts.     

Not Always Enslaved,Yet Not Quite Free: Philosophical Challenges from the Underside of the New World

This article is the keynote address of the University of the West Indies at Cave Hill, Barbados, philosophy symposium in celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the British outlawing the Atlantic Slave Trade. The paper explores questions of enslavement and freedom through challenges of philosophical anthropology, philosophy of social change, and metacritical reflections posed by African Diasporic or Africana philosophy. Such challenges include the relevance and legitimacy of philosophical reflection to the lives of racialized slaves and concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for an understanding of the “face” of political life and the importance of the concept of “home” for a cogent theory of freedom.