On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limited

We examine outcome satisfaction in situations in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons. Building on classical and modern social psychological theories, we argue that when reacting to these arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Extending the literature on cognitive busyness, we therefore predict that people should be more satisfied with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is strongly—as opposed to weakly—limited. Findings across several different experimental paradigms support our predictions. Taken together, our findings shed light on the psychological processes underlying the intriguing interplay between egoism- and fairness-based considerations when evaluating outcomes, as well as on more general preference and adjustment processes.     

Fairness,Self‐Interest,and Cooperation in a Real‐Life Conflict1

Effects of procedural fairness and self‐interest on cooperation vs. hardness in an urban planning conflict were examined in a questionnaire study. The self‐interest perspective posits that people seek to maximize their outcomes and, therefore, cooperate only when they can gain advantages or avoid disadvantages by doing so, while fairness models of cooperation view cooperative actions as based mainly on justice motives. The data give strong support for the fairness hypothesis, showing that self‐interest accounts only for hard strategies, whereas justice motives explain a considerable part of cooperation. The impact of the results on further research on social conflicts and their settlement, as well as the elaboration of models of fairness in the social psychology of conflicts are discussed.     

社会距离与分配差距对儿童有利不公平厌恶的影响

选取60名8-10岁儿童,采用迫选式独裁者游戏,考察个体与博弈对象的社会距离以及分配差距对儿童有利不公平厌恶的影响。结果发现：（1）在有利不公平条件下,与博弈对象社会距离越近,儿童对不公平分配提议的拒绝率越高;（2）分配差距越大,儿童对不公平分配提议的拒绝率越高;（3）社会距离和分配差距交互作用显著,在中等分配差距条件下,儿童对不公平分配提议拒绝率的社会距离效应最为明显。结果表明,社会距离和分配差距对儿童有利不公平厌恶有显著影响,在中度分配差距下社会距离具有更加明显的调节作用。     

社会距离与分配差距对儿童有利不公平厌恶的影响

选取60名8-10岁儿童,采用迫选式独裁者游戏,考察个体与博弈对象的社会距离以及分配差距对儿童有利不公平厌恶的影响。结果发现：（1）在有利不公平条件下,与博弈对象社会距离越近,儿童对不公平分配提议的拒绝率越高;（2）分配差距越大,儿童对不公平分配提议的拒绝率越高;（3）社会距离和分配差距交互作用显著,在中等分配差距条件下,儿童对不公平分配提议拒绝率的社会距离效应最为明显。结果表明,社会距离和分配差距对儿童有利不公平厌恶有显著影响,在中度分配差距下社会距离具有更加明显的调节作用。     

When does anger evoke self‐interest and fairness motives? The moderating effects of perceived responsibility for needs

Research has repeatedly demonstrated that anger evokes both self‐interest and fairness motives, but it is unclear what factors determine the evocation of these motives. We examined the idea that the type of relationship, indexed by the perceived responsibility for a partner's needs, moderates the effect of anger on self‐interest and fairness motives by constructing the following hypotheses: Participants will be motivated to protect their self‐interests when they feel anger toward an other who they perceive has the responsibility for needs, while this will not be the case when they feel anger toward an other who they do not perceive has a responsibility for needs (Hypothesis 1), and participants will be motivated to restore fairness regardless of whether the target of anger has a responsibility for needs or not (Hypothesis 2). The Japanese participants in this study rated their anger experiences in terms of the intensity of angry feelings, the perception of responsibility of the other for their own needs, the closeness of the relationship prior to the experience of anger, and the motives that were evoked. Regression analysis supported both hypotheses, implying that concerns related to self‐interest in close relationships reflect the desire for the maintenance of these relationships.     

Performance‐based pay is fair,particularly when I perform better: differential fairness perceptions of allocators and recipients

We examined in two experiments the impact of the roles that people enact (allocator or recipient) and performance attributions (talent or effort) on fairness perceptions of pay systems (performance‐based pay or job‐based pay). To test the relative effects of the roles that people enact, in the control conditions, participants were asked to evaluate the fairness of both allocation norms from ‘behind a veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971 ). As hypothesized, the results consistently demonstrate that whereas recipients were biased in their fairness perceptions, allocators tended to be non‐biased in their fairness perceptions. The self‐interest bias among recipients was particularly strong when talent rather than effort attributions were imposed on them. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children discard a resource to avoid inequity

Elucidating how inequity aversion (a tendency to dislike and correct unequal outcomes) functions as one develops is important to understanding more complex fairness considerations in adulthood. Although previous research has demonstrated that adults and children reduce inequity, it is unclear if people are actually responding negatively to inequity or if people dislike others getting more than them (motivated by social comparison) and like to share maximal resources, especially with those who have few resources (motivated by social welfare preferences). In order to evaluate if children are truly averse to inequity, we had 3- to 8-year-old children distribute resources to 3rd parties and found that 6- to 8-year-old children would rather throw a resource in the trash than distribute unequally, suggesting that concerns with equity can trump concerns with maximal sharing. We also demonstrated that children's reactions were not based on wanting to avoid upsetting the recipients or based on a preference for visual symmetry and that children will even throw away a resource that could have gone to themselves in order to avoid inequity. These results demonstrate the existence of inequity aversion in children, provide a new method for studying inequity aversion specifically, and suggest the need for new models to explain why inequity aversion may have evolved.     

认知资源对4～6岁儿童不公平厌恶的影响

目的:探究幼儿不公平厌恶是自动化反应还是理性行为。方法:采用最后通牒博弈游戏变式和认知资源消耗任务,考察104名4~6岁儿童的不公平厌恶。结果:(1)4~6岁儿童的不利不公平厌恶随年龄发展增多;有利不公平厌恶出现较晚,表现较少;二者发展不平衡;(2)4~6岁儿童的不公平厌恶是依赖于认知资源的理性行为;(3)4~6岁儿童不利不公平厌恶受认知资源影响更大;认知资源不足导致5岁儿童不公平厌恶行为减少更多。结论:4~6岁儿童的不公平厌恶是依赖于认知资源的理性行为。     

Inequity aversion in human adults: testing behavioural criteria from comparative cognition

Inequity aversion refers to an attempt to reduce a perceived discrepancy between one’s own input and output ratio (i.e. ratio between work invested and rewards obtained) and that of others. It has been proposed that inequity aversion might also play a role in the decision-making process of other animals. One issue, however, is that while studies in comparative cognition define clear behavioural criteria for an inequity aversion effect in animals, studies conducted on humans rely on an implicit definition of the concept involving assumptions for which there is yet no experimental evidence. In particular, the basis of inequity aversion is assumed to be a social comparison process that is further motivated by fairness concerns. Based on the studies on non-human animals, we tested whether inequity aversion in adult humans will satisfy the behavioural criteria for these assumptions. Although humans showed a decrease in working for a lower-value reward when working alone (non-social effect), this effect was enhanced when a partner was present (social effect) suggesting that their inequity aversion might be based on a social comparison process. Additionally, our tests ruled out the possibility that selfish motives underlie the subjects’ decisions, which raises the possibility that fairness concerns might have been the primary motive. Our results thus show that human behaviour satisfies two criteria imposed by the definition of inequity aversion. A similar pattern is shown in other species, suggesting that the same or similar processes might influence economic decision-making in both humans and non-human animals.     

The salience of the self in responses to inequity

Previous research has shown that people strive to conform with the standards of significant others in distributive justice. The present research was concerned with the role of attention to the self in the same paradigm. If people are motivated to personally evaluate their own behavior as fair, then self-focus should result in heightened attempts to redress an overpayment inequity. After the subject's criterion of a fair wage was assessed, they were paid either that amount or double it. Orthogonal to this manipulation, subjects were either made objectively self-aware (OSA) or not, by the presence or absence of a mirror. Consistent with the hypothesis, overpaid OSA subjects did more work, but of a poorer quality, than overpaid not-OSA subjects. This was taken as evidence of more zealous attempts to restore a sense of equity, implicating a greater personal need to eliminate the injustice when the discrepancy between pay level and a personal standard of fairness was made more prominent to the self.     

Exaggerated Positivity in Self‐Evaluation: A Social Neuroscience Approach to Reconciling the Role of Self‐esteem Protection and Cognitive Bias

Recent neuroscience research provides new insight into why people tend to view themselves through rose‐colored glasses and suggests a different approach for improving self‐insight. Rose‐colored glasses (sometimes referred to as positive illusions, positivity bias, self‐serving bias, self‐enhancement, or overconfidence) are a pervasive characteristic of self‐evaluation. While it is intuitive to think about rose‐colored glasses as a self‐esteem protection tactic, research has shown that people tend to exaggerate their positive attributes even when self‐esteem is not at stake. This raises questions about the relation of the exaggerated positivity used to protect self‐esteem to the exaggerated positivity seen in other circumstances. Are people using a consistent thought pattern to overemphasize their positive attributes which generalizes across situations regardless of whether self‐esteem is at stake? Or is there something different about the way people go about overemphasizing their positive attributes when coping with a threat to self‐esteem? Recent neuroscience research supports the latter: inducing the need for self‐esteem protection changes the neural profile underlying exaggerated positivity. When self‐esteem is threatened, exaggerated positivity in self‐evaluation engages orbitofrontal cortex and a functional network of increased basal ganglia activation and decreased middle frontal gyrus activation. In contrast, exaggerated positivity arising in the absence of self‐esteem threat tends to reduce orbitofrontal cortex activation and its functional connectivity with the temporal, occipital, and frontal lobes. This discovery suggests that not all rose‐colored glasses are created equally and, therefore, curtailing them may require different interventions depending on whether self‐esteem protection is their underlying driving force.     

Social comparison mediates chimpanzees’ responses to loss,not frustration

Why do chimpanzees react when their partner gets a better deal than them? Do they note the inequity or do their responses reflect frustration in response to unattainable rewards? To tease apart inequity and contrast, we tested chimpanzees in a series of conditions that created loss through individual contrast, through inequity, or by both. Chimpanzees were tested in four social and two individual conditions in which they received food rewards in return for exchanging tokens with an experimenter. In conditions designed to create individual contrast, after completing an exchange, the chimpanzees were given a relatively less-preferred reward than the one they were previously shown. The chimpanzees’ willingness to accept the less-preferred rewards was independent of previously offered foods in both the social and individual conditions. In conditions that created frustration through inequity, subjects were given a less-preferred reward than the one received by their partner, but not in relation to the reward they were previously offered. In a social context, females were more likely to refuse to participate when they received a less-preferred reward than their partner (disadvantageous inequity), than when they received a more-preferred reward (advantageous inequity). Specifically, the females’ refusals were typified by refusals to exchange tokens rather than refusals to accept food rewards. Males showed no difference in their responses to inequity or individual contrast. These results support previous evidence that some chimpanzees’ responses to inequity are mediated more strongly by what others receive than by frustration effects.     

人际冲突中失望的个人效应及冲突类型的调节作用

通过两个计算机情景模拟实验, 分别采用“保证游戏”与“最后通牒博弈”范式, 考察了人际冲突中失望的个体对于威胁评价与冲突行为的影响。在此基础上进一步探讨了冲突类型对人际冲突中失望个人效应的调节作用。结果发现：(1)失望个体相比无情绪个体的威胁评价更高, 冲突行为更多。(2)冲突类型影响处于失望状态的个体的威胁评价, 即价值观冲突中失望个体的威胁评价要高于利益冲突中失望个体的威胁评价; 但是冲突类型并不影响失望个体的冲突行为。     

Effects of gain—loss frames on satisfaction with self–other outcome-differences

This research concerned satisfaction with outcome-differences (advantageous inequity, equity, or disadvantageous inequity) as a function of the individual's gain or loss frame, other's gain or loss frame, the cooperative or noncooperative nature of the relationship, and their interactions. After reading a scenario, subjects rated on a satisfaction-dissatisfaction scale a series of outcome-pairs providing themselves and another party with outcomes. Consistent with Equity Theory, results showed that gain framed individuals found equity more pleasing than advantageous inequity, which in turn was preferred over disadvantageous inequity, but only when the decision making context was coopera- tive rather than noncooperative. In a noncooperative context, gain framed individuals were as pleased with equity as with advantageous inequity. Contrary to Equity Theory, but consistent with Prospect Theory, loss framed individuals were relatively insensitive to outcome-differences and the nature of the relationship. Results finally suggested that advantageous inequity was preferred less when the other party had a loss rather than gain frame, albeit only under cooperative circumstances.     

Negative Intergroup Contact and Radical Right‐Wing Voting: The Moderating Roles of Personal and Collective Self‐Efficacy

This study examines whether negative contact with immigrants promotes voting for radical right‐wing parties, to what extent this relationship can be explained by feelings of outgroup threat, and whether this relationship depends on perceived personal and collective self‐efficacy. Hypotheses were tested among 630 native Dutch respondents, mainly living in multicultural neighborhoods. The results show that negative contact with immigrants is associated with feelings of personal (egocentric) and group (sociotropic) threat, and both these feelings, in turn, are associated with radical right‐wing voting. However, negative intergroup contact is less strongly related to egocentric threat when individuals feel able to personally address negative situations with other people (personal self‐efficacy). Furthermore, the findings suggest that negative intergroup contact is less strongly related to sociotropic threat when individuals believe that people in their neighborhood are able to collectively address some negative situations (collective self‐efficacy).     

The boundaries of minimization as a technique for improving affect: good for the goose but not for the gander?

Research on minimization as a coping strategy suggests that it alleviates negative affect following threats. In contrast, research on minimization as a support‐giving strategy suggests that it does more harm than good. Does this mean that minimization works when it is self‐generated, but does not when it is offered by others? The present study examined the effect of self‐ and externally‐ generated minimizations on people with high and low self‐esteem following a self‐threat. Results suggest that externally‐generated minimizations do not alleviate negative affect when they occur before the recipient has had time to cope. Discussion centers around the implications of these findings for past research, as well as distinctions between how people with low versus high self‐esteem cope with negative events.     

Brief Report: Physician Narcissism,Ego Threats,and Confidence in the Face of Uncertainty

Although adequate self‐esteem is essential for psychological health, people with high but fragile self‐esteem have been shown to exhibit defensive, often aggressive behavior when their self‐esteem is threatened. We measured physician narcissism (as a proxy for high but fragile self‐esteem) and used a subtle manipulation to examine how physicians who varied in levels of narcissism responded to an ego threat. We found that physicians high in narcissism, as compared with those lower in narcissism, were more likely to respond to ego threat by attempting to bolster their self‐image. Concerned about self‐image, physicians in this situation may be insufficiently receptive to new information and instead attempt to justify initial opinions.     

Self‐Protective Altruism

Prosocial behavior accentuates the tension between two conflicting human motivations, self‐interest and belongingness. Responding to the needs of others may compromise self‐interest. Acting callously, however, may lead to social disproval. These antagonistic responses are existentially meaningful as belongingness and self‐esteem have been found to regulate death anxiety. In this paper I critically examine three possible hypotheses concerning the tension between egotism and prosociality from a terror management perspective. The first hypothesis, the carpe diem hypothesis, suggests that when death is salient egotistic self‐interest overrides other‐oriented responses. The second hypothesis, the norm salience hypothesis, suggests that when death is salient people will respond according to the momentarily accessible social norm. The third hypothesis, the self‐protective altruism hypothesis, argues that when the prosocial cause reminds people of their fragile, mortal nature people will turn away from helping when death is salient, but when the prosocial cause is benign death salience will increase prosocial responding.