Place versus response as the basis of spatial errors made by young infants

Nine-month-old infants search successfully for an object which they have seen hidden in one position, but they frequently continue to search for it there after observing it being hidden in a new position. This error can be explained in terms either of egocentric response perseveration or of perseveration to a particular place in space. In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, 80 infants were presented with a problem consisting of several different conditions which separated response, position on a table, and absolute spatial position as factors leading to errors in search for hidden objects. The results strongly support the egocentric response hypothesis. The reason for this response perseveration strategy is discussed in terms of the lack of active experience of spatial displacements among 9-month-old infants.     

Object-based warping: an illusory distortion of space within objects

Visual objects are high-level primitives that are fundamental to numerous perceptual functions, such as guidance of attention. We report that objects warp visual perception of space in such a way that spatial distances within objects appear to be larger than spatial distances in ground regions. When two dots were placed inside a rectangular object, they appeared farther apart from one another than two dots with identical spacing outside of the object. To investigate whether this effect was object based, we measured the distortion while manipulating the structure surrounding the dots. Object displays were constructed with a single object, multiple objects, a partially occluded object, and an illusory object. Nonobject displays were constructed to be comparable to object displays in low-level visual attributes. In all cases, the object displays resulted in a more powerful distortion of spatial perception than comparable non-object-based displays. These results suggest that perception of space within objects is warped.     

The way the ball bounces: visual and auditory perception of elasticity and control of the bounce pass

Human observers may perceive not only spatial and temporal dimensions of the environment, but also dynamic physical properties that are useful for the control of behavior. A study is presented in which visual and auditory perception of elasticity in bouncing objects, which was specified by kinematic (spatiotemporal) patterns of object motion, were examined. In experiment 1, observers could perceive the elasticity of a bouncing ball and were able to regulate the impulse applied to the ball in a bounce pass. In experiments 2 and 3, it was demonstrated that visual perception of elasticity was based on relative height information, when it was available, and on the duration of a single period under other conditions. Observers did not make effective use of velocity information. In experiment 4, visual and auditory period information were compared and equivalent performance in both modalities was found. The results are interpreted as support for the view that dynamic properties of environmental events are perceived by means of kinematic information.     

A theory of visual interpolation in object perception

We describe a new theory explaining the perception of partly occluded objects and illusory figures, from both static and kinematic information, in a unified framework. Three ideas guide our approach. First, perception of partly occluded objects, perception of illusory figures, and some other object perception phenomena derive from a single boundary interpolation process. These phenomena differ only in respects that are not part of the unit formation process, such as the depth placement of units formed. Second, unit formation from static and kinematic information can be treated in the same general framework. Third, spatial and spatiotemporal discontinuities in the boundaries of optically projected areas are fundamental to the unit formation process. Consistent with these ideas, we develop a detailed theory of unit formation that accounts for most cases of boundary perception in the absence of local physical specification. According to this theory, discontinuities in the first derivative of projected edges are initiating conditions for unit formation. A formal notion of relatability is defined, specifying which physically given edges leading into discontinuities can be connected to others by interpolated edges. Intuitively, relatability requires that two edges be connectable by a smooth, monotonic curve. The roots of the discontinuity and relatability notions in ecological constraints on object perception are discussed. Finally, we elaborate our approach by discussing related issues, some new phenomena, connections to other approaches, and issues for future research.     

Independent processing of parts and of their spatial organization in complex visual objects

A visual search experiment using synthetic three-dimensional objects is reported. The target shared its constituent parts, the spatial organization of its parts, or both with the distractors displayed with it. Sharing of parts and sharing of spatial organization both negatively affected visual search performance, and these effects were strictly additive. These findings support theories of complex visual object perception that assume a parsing of the stimulus into its higher-order constituents (volumetric parts or visible surfaces). The additivity of the effects demonstrates that information on parts and information on spatial organization are processed independently in visual search.     

On internal object relations

This paper gives an account of the author's attempts to come to terms with the concept of internal object relations, and to find an appropriate theoretical place for it within non-Kleinian mainstream theory. It is proposed that the internal object be regarded as a structure in the nonexperimental realm, being built up during development on the basis of the child's subjective perceptual and fantasy experiences. The internal objects in turn influence perception, thought, fantasy, current object relations, and transference. From the point of view of the clinician, the concepts of internal object and of internal object relation act as useful organizing constructs for both analyst and patient. Finally, the suggestion is made that internal objects can be regarded as the source of internal "presences" with which the person constantly unconsciously interacts.     

Physical imagery: kinematic versus dynamic models.

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.     

View-invariant object category learning, recognition, and search: how spatial and object attention are coordinated using surface-based attentional shrouds

How does the brain learn to recognize an object from multiple viewpoints while scanning a scene with eye movements? How does the brain avoid the problem of erroneously classifying parts of different objects together? How are attention and eye movements intelligently coordinated to facilitate object learning? A neural model provides a unified mechanistic explanation of how spatial and object attention work together to search a scene and learn what is in it. The ARTSCAN model predicts how an object's surface representation generates a form-fitting distribution of spatial attention, or "attentional shroud". All surface representations dynamically compete for spatial attention to form a shroud. The winning shroud persists during active scanning of the object. The shroud maintains sustained activity of an emerging view-invariant category representation while multiple view-specific category representations are learned and are linked through associative learning to the view-invariant object category. The shroud also helps to restrict scanning eye movements to salient features on the attended object. Object attention plays a role in controlling and stabilizing the learning of view-specific object categories. Spatial attention hereby coordinates the deployment of object attention during object category learning. Shroud collapse releases a reset signal that inhibits the active view-invariant category in the What cortical processing stream. Then a new shroud, corresponding to a different object, forms in the Where cortical processing stream, and search using attention shifts and eye movements continues to learn new objects throughout a scene. The model mechanistically clarifies basic properties of attention shifts (engage, move, disengage) and inhibition of return. It simulates human reaction time data about object-based spatial attention shifts, and learns with 98.1% accuracy and a compression of 430 on a letter database whose letters vary in size, position, and orientation. The model provides a powerful framework for unifying many data about spatial and object attention, and their interactions during perception, cognition, and action.     

Scene perception: Detecting and judging objects undergoing relational violations

Five classes of relations between an object and its setting can characterize the organization of objects into real-world scenes. The relations are (1) Interposition (objects interrupt their background), (2) Support (objects tend to rest on surfaces), (3) Probability (objects tend to be found in some scenes but not others), (4) Position (given an object is probable in a scene, it often is found in some positions and not others), and (5) familiar Size (objects have a limited set of size relations with other objects). In two experiments subjects viewed brief (150 msec) presentations of slides of scenes in which an object in a cued location in the scene was either in a normal relation to its background or violated from one to three of the relations. Such objects appear to (1) have the background pass through them, (2) float in air, (3) be unlikely in that particular scene, (4) be in an inappropriate position, and (5) be too large or too small relative to the other objects in the scene. In Experiment I, subjects attempted to determine whether the cued object corresponded to a target object which had been specified in advance by name. With the exception of the Interposition violation, violation costs were incurred in that the detection of objects undergoing violations was less accurate and slower than when those same objects were in normal relations to their setting. However, the detection of objects in normal relations to their setting (innocent bystanders) was unaffected by the presence of another object undergoing a violation in that same setting. This indicates that the violation costs were incurred not because of an unsuccessful elicitation of a frame or schema for the scene but because properly formed frames interfered with (or did not facilitate) the perceptibility of objects undergoing violations. As the number of violations increased, target detectability generally decreased. Thus, the relations were accessed from the results of a single fixation and were available sufficiently early during the time course of scene perception to affect the perception of the objects in the scene. Contrary to expectations from a bottom-up account of scene perception, violations of the pervasive physical relations of Support and Interposition were not more disruptive on object detection than the semantic violations of Probability, Position and Size. These are termed semantic because they require access to the referential meaning of the object. In Experiment II, subjects attempted to detect the presence of the violations themselves. Violations of the semantic relations were detected more accurately than violations of Interposition and at least as accurately as violations of Support. As the number of violations increased, the detectability of the incongruities between an object and its setting increased. These results provide converging evidence that semantic relations can be accessed from the results of a single fixation. In both experiments information about Position was accessed at least as quickly as information on Probability. Thus in Experiment I, the interference that resulted from placing a fire hydrant in a kitchen was not greater than the interference from placing it on top of a mail ? in a street scene. Similarly, violations of Probability in Experiment II were not more detectable than violations of Position. Thus, the semantic relations which were accessed included information about the detailed interactions among the objects—information which is more specific than what can be inferred from the general setting. Access to the semantic relations among the entities in a scene is not deferred until the completion of spatial and depth processing and object identification. Instead, an object's semantic relations are accessed simultaneously with its physical relations as well as with its own identification.     

Facelikeness matters: A parametric multipart object set to understand the role of spatial configuration in visual recognition

There is a view that faces and objects are processed by different brain mechanisms. Different factors may modulate the extent to which face mechanisms are used for objects. To distinguish these factors, we present a new parametric multipart three-dimensional object set that provides researchers with a rich degree of control of important features for visual recognition such as individual parts and the spatial configuration of those parts. All other properties being equal, we demonstrate that perceived facelikeness in terms of spatial configuration facilitated performance at matching individual exemplars of the new object set across viewpoint changes (Experiment 1). Importantly, facelikeness did not affect perceptual discriminability (Experiment 2) or similarity (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that perceptual resemblance to faces based on spatial configuration of parts is important for visual recognition even after equating physical and perceptual similarity. Furthermore, the large parametrically controlled object set and the standardized procedures to generate additional exemplars will provide the research community with invaluable tools to further understand visual recognition and visual learning.     

Object manipulability affects children’s and adults’ conceptual processing

Research on kinds of concepts indicates that children use perceptual and functional information differently to form natural and artifact concepts. Beyond object domain, object manipulability appears to be a decisive factor in adult conceptual processing. Thus, the effect of object manipulability on conceptual processing was tested in 5- and 7-year-olds and adults using a picture matching task. Reaction times for identifying conceptual relations on the basis of perceptual similarity (e.g., jacket-coat) and contextual/functional information (e.g., jacket-hanger) were analyzed according to object manipulability and domain. Both children and adults were faster to identify contextual/functional relations for manipulable than for nonmanipulable objects. Conversely, they were faster to identify perceptual similarity relations for nonmanipulable than for manipulable objects, particularly for natural concepts. Results reveal an early distinction between concepts of manipulable and nonmanipulable objects. Implications for further research on concept formation and for embodied views of concepts are discussed.     

多身份追踪中基于表情特征的分组效应

探讨了表情因素作为身份特征对多身份追踪中分组效应的影响。采用多身份追踪范式, 8个客体为表情图片(正性、负性、中性)其中4个为目标, 对45名被试进行了有无眉毛线索对追踪表现影响的测查。实验条件分别为：目标表情与非目标表情完全不相同组(4水平, 简称分组)、目标表情与非目标表情都由两种相同数量的表情混合组成(3水平, 简称配对)与基线组(8个客体表情相同)。发现分组水平的成绩显著优于基线组, 配对水平的成绩显著低于基线组, 并表现出了负性表情的追踪优势; 另外, 有无眉毛线索对追踪表现无显著影响。这一结果说明多身份追踪中存在基于表情特征的分组效应, 负性表情的分组知觉高于正性表情。     

Space-based and object-based capacity limitations in visual search

Space-based accounts of visual attention assume that we select a limited spatial region independent of the number of objects it contains. In contrast, object-based accounts suggest that we select objects independent of their location. We investigated the boundary conditions on the selection modes of attention in a series of tachistoscopic visual search tasks, where the nature of capacity limitations on search was examined. Observers had to search for a horizontally oriented target ellipse among differently oriented distractor ellipses. Across four experiments, we orthogonally manipulated target-distractor (TD) similarity and distractor-distractor (DD) similarity. Each experiment consisted of a two-way design: Firstly, with a central cue, we indicated the spatial extent of the relevant search area. Secondly, we varied the number and spatial proximity of items in the display. Performance could be accounted for in terms of capacity limited object-based attention, assuming also that the spatial proximity of items enhances performance when there is high DD-similarity (and grouping). In addition, the cueing effect interacted with spatial proximity when DD-similarity was high, suggesting that grouping was influenced by attention. We propose that any capacity limits on visual search are due to object-based attention, and that the formation of perceptual objects and object groups is also subject to attentional modulation.     

Ape metaphysics: object individuation without language

Developmental research suggests that whereas very young infants individuate objects purely on spatiotemporal grounds, from (at latest) around 1 year of age children are capable of individuating objects according to the kind they belong to and the properties they instantiate. As the latter ability has been found to correlate with language, some have speculated whether it might be essentially language dependent and therefore uniquely human. Existing studies with non-human primates seem to speak against this hypothesis, but fail to present conclusive evidence due to methodological shortcomings. In the present experiments we set out to test non-linguistic object individuation in three great ape species with a refined manual search methodology. Experiment 1 tested for spatiotemporal object individuation: Subjects saw 1 or 2 objects simultaneously being placed inside a box in which they could reach, and then in both conditions only found 1 object. After retrieval of the 1 object, subjects reached again significantly more often when they had seen 2 than when they had seen 1 object. Experiment 2 tested for object individuation according to property/kind information only: Subjects saw 1 object being placed inside the box, and then either found that object (expected) or an object of a different kind (unexpected). Analogously to Experiment 1, after retrieval of the 1 object, subjects reached again significantly more often in the unexpected than in the expected condition. These results thus confirm previous findings suggesting that individuating objects according to their property/kind is neither uniquely human nor essentially language dependent. It remains to be seen, however, whether this kind of object individuation requires sortal concepts as human linguistic thinkers use them, or whether some simpler form of tracking properties is sufficient.     

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT1

Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non‐mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by what one is directly aware of or by representational content are instances of what Gilbert Harman has called “mental paint” ( Block, 1990 ; Harman, 1990 ). The claim of this paper is that empirical facts about attention point in the direction of mental paint. The argument starts with the claim (later modified) that when one moves one's attention around a scene while keeping one's eyes fixed, the phenomenology of perception can change in ways that do not reflect which qualities of objects one is directly aware of or the way the world is represented to be. These changes in the phenomenology of perception cannot be accounted for in terms of awareness of or representation of the focus of attention because they manifest themselves in experience as differences in apparent contrast, apparent color saturation, apparent size, apparent speed, apparent time of occurrence and other appearances. There is a way of coping with these phenomena in terms of vague contents, but vague contents cannot save direct realism or representationism because the kind of vagueness required clashes wth the phenomenology itself.     

Functional influences on orienting a reference frame

Spatial relational terms like above are defined with respect to a reference frame. Reference frames are imposed on reference objects and define the space in which to search for a located object. Reference frames have a number of parameters that must be set during spatial term assignment, including origin, scale, and orientation. Previous research has shown that a functional relationship between objects in the scene influences the selection of a reference frame (Carlson-Radvansky & Radvansky, 1996). However, because this work operated at the level of the reference frame, generalizing across various spatial terms, it is unclear how function had its influence. One possibility is that function influences how the parameters of a reference frame are set. Consistent with this idea, Carlson-Radvansky, Covey, and Lattanzi (1999) showed an influence of function on where the origin of a reference frame was imposed. The present paper demonstrates that function also influences how the orientation of the axes of a reference frame is set. The implications for setting multiple parameters of a reference frame are discussed.     

Do infants reach for perceived objects? A reply to Stiles-Davis

Stiles-Davis proposes that the infants in our experiments (Hofsten & Spelke, 1985) did not reach for perceived objects in order to manipulate them, but rather touched perceived surfaces in order to explore their boundaries. Her commentary raises questions about infants' perception of the boundaries, the unity, and the manipulability of objects. More deeply, it raises the question of what an object is for an infant. We consider each of these questions in turn, in light of our own findings and those of other studies of object-directed reaching, object perception, and the object concept. We suggest that young infants organize the visual world into entities that are bounded, unitary, and manipulable and that infants endow those entities with the core properties of physical objects.     

3-d interpolation in object perception: evidence from an objective performance paradigm

Object perception requires interpolation processes that connect visible regions despite spatial gaps. Some research has suggested that interpolation may be a 3-D process, but objective performance data and evidence about the conditions leading to interpolation are needed. The authors developed an objective performance paradigm for testing 3-D interpolation and tested a new theory of 3-D contour interpolation, termed 3-D relatability. The theory indicates for a given edge which orientations and positions of other edges in space may be connected to it by interpolation. Results of 5 experiments showed that processing of orientation relations in 3-D relatable displays was superior to processing in 3-D nonrelatable displays and that these effects depended on object formation. 3-D interpolation and 3-D relatabilty are discussed in terms of their implications for computational and neural models of object perception, which have typically been based on 2-D-orientation-sensitive units.     

3-D vision and figure-ground separation by visual cortex

A neural network theory of three-dimensional (3-D) vision, called FACADE theory, is described. The theory proposes a solution of the classical figure-ground problem for biological vision. It does so by suggesting how boundary representations and surface representations are formed within a boundary contour system (BCS) and a feature contour system (FCS). The BCS and FCS interact reciprocally to form 3-D boundary and surface representations that are mutually consistent. Their interactions generate 3-D percepts wherein occluding and occluded object parts are separated, completed, and grouped. The theory clarifies how preattentive processes of 3-D perception and figure-ground separation interact reciprocally with attentive processes of spatial localization, object recognition, and visual search. A new theory of stereopsis is proposed that predicts how cells sensitive to multiple spatial frequencies, disparities, and orientations are combined by context-sensitive filtering, competition, and cooperation to form coherent BCS boundary segmentations. Several factors contribute to figure-ground pop-out, including: boundary contrast between spatially contiguous boundaries, whether due to scenic differences in luminance, color, spatial frequency, or disparity-partially ordered interactions from larger spatial scales and disparities to smaller scales and disparities; and surface filling-in restricted to regions surrounded by a connected boundary. Phenomena such as 3-D pop-out from a 2-D picture, Da Vinci stereopsis, 3-D neon color spreading, completion of partially occluded objects, and figure-ground reversals are analyzed. The BCS and FCS subsystems model aspects of how the two parvocellular cortical processing streams that join the lateral geniculate nucleus to prestriate cortical area V4 interact to generate a multiplexed representation of Form-And-Color-And-DEpth, orfacade, within area V4. Area V4 is suggested to support figure-ground separation and to interact with cortical mechanisms of spatial attention, attentive object learning, and visual search. Adaptive resonance theory (ART) mechanisms model aspects of how prestriate visual cortex interacts reciprocally with a visual object recognition system in inferotemporal (IT) cortex for purposes of attentive object learning and categorization. Object attention mechanisms of the What cortical processing stream through IT cortex are distinguished from spatial attention mechanisms of the Where cortical processing stream through parietal cortex. Parvocellular BCS and FCS signals interact with the model What stream. Parvocellular FCS and magnocellular motion BCS signals interact with the model Where stream. Reciprocal interactions between these visual, What, and Where mechanisms are used to discuss data about visual search and saccadic eye movements, including fast search of conjunctive targets, search of 3-D surfaces, selective search of like-colored targets, attentive tracking of multielement groupings, and recursive search of simultaneously presented targets.