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1.
Dimitris Platchias 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):31-46
According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan,
Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press,
Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose
for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual
redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not a property of one’s experience but an externally constituted property of the
perceived physical object. In this sense, qualia are out there, in the external world. Here, I argue that the main representationalist
arguments to this effect, if successful, establish no more than a symmetrical supervenience relation between representational
content and qualia, and that a supervenience relation alone (albeit symmetrical) doesn’t suffice for identity. This supervenience
thesis between qualia and representational content leaves open the question as to the essential nature of qualia.
相似文献
Dimitris PlatchiasEmail: |
2.
Nathan Stemmer 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(2):315-327
Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s
theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according
to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role
in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues
such as mental causation, the nature of qualia, supervenience of the mental, or multiple realizability, presume the existence
of, or at least attribute a positive role to, mental entities. The probable correctness of Quine’s theory therefore suggests
that all these publications are worthless and reading them is a waste of time just as reading studies about how crystal spheres
can move planets is considered nowadays a waste of time.
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Nathan StemmerEmail: |
3.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):105-107
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying
himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands
the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
相似文献
Dan Cavedon-TaylorEmail: |
4.
Hans Muller 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):109-112
I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world
with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according
to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these
options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously
been recognized.
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Hans MullerEmail: |
5.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |
6.
Mark Siebel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):417-426
In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and
then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate
of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of
mental events.
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Mark SiebelEmail: |
7.
Brendan O’Sullivan 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):531-544
In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments
that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property
dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist
is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property
dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin
mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance
and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to
save.
相似文献
Brendan O’SullivanEmail: |
8.
Hannah Ginsborg 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):65-77
I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction
requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience.
I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the
association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates
considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought
and judgment.
相似文献
Hannah GinsborgEmail: |
9.
Kantian non-conceptualism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):41-64
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true,
then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct
from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially
non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual
content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
相似文献
Robert HannaEmail: |
10.
Matteo Morganti 《Axiomathes》2009,19(1):73-85
In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly
enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical
purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing
features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject
them.
相似文献
Matteo MorgantiEmail: |
11.
Brendan Larvor 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(3):393-407
This article canvasses five senses in which one might introduce an historical element into the philosophy of mathematics:
1. The temporal dimension of logic; 2. Explanatory Appeal to Context rather than to General Principles; 3. Heraclitean Flux;
4. All history is the History of Thought; and 5. History is Non-Judgmental. It concludes by adapting Bernard Williams’ distinction
between ‘history of philosophy’ and ‘history of ideas’ to argue that the philosophy of mathematics is unavoidably historical,
but need not and must not merge with historiography.
相似文献
Brendan LarvorEmail: |
12.
Dorothée Legrand 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):67-87
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that
one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other
hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness
of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree,
however about which modes of givenness are involved.
相似文献
Dorothée LegrandEmail: URL: http://dorotheelegrand.googlepages.com |
13.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
相似文献
Erin EakerEmail: |
14.
Evan Selinger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):301-308
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence.
I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology
for empirical scientific research.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |
15.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has a long history of supporting research to enhance the scientific understanding
of and effective interventions for a range of problems associated with children’s exposure to violence. Recently, funded research
has improved our understanding of the nature and consequences of children’s exposure to violence. This article describes an
NIH initiative for research on children’s exposure to violence, examples of projects supported by the initiative, and emerging
research topics for this important scientific area.
相似文献
LeShawndra N. PriceEmail: |
16.
Paul Coates 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):445-462
This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational
account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information
about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment,
so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other
kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially
involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The
navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences
are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central
explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging
the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that
perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential
stage in visual processing.
相似文献
Paul CoatesEmail: |
17.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
18.
Glen A. Hoffmann 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):161-170
According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition
that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2)
it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by
conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to
pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth,
reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion
is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.
相似文献
Glen A. HoffmannEmail: |
19.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |
20.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
相似文献
Yujin NagasawaEmail: |