The bivalency effect: evidence for flexible adjustment of cognitive control

When bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with features for two different tasks) appear occasionally, performance is slower on subsequent univalent stimuli. This "bivalency effect" reflects an adjustment of cognitive control arising from the more demanding context created by bivalent stimuli. So far, it has been investigated only on task switch trials, but not on task repetition trials. Here, we used a paradigm with predictable switches and repetitions on three tasks, with bivalent stimuli occasionally occurring on one task. In three experiments, we found a substantial bivalency effect for all trials with at least one source of conflict. However, this effect was reduced for the repetition trials sharing no features with bivalent stimuli, that is, for those without conflict. This confirms that the bivalency effect reflects an adjustment of cognitive control. The news is that this adjustment of cognitive control is sensitive to the presence of conflict, but neither to its amount nor to its source.     

The hippocampus: hub of brain network communication for memory

A complex brain network, centered on the hippocampus, supports episodic memories throughout their lifetimes. Classically, upon memory encoding during active behavior, hippocampal activity is dominated by theta oscillations (6-10Hz). During inactivity, hippocampal neurons burst synchronously, constituting sharp waves, which can propagate to other structures, theoretically supporting memory consolidation. This 'two-stage' model has been updated by new data from high-density electrophysiological recordings in animals that shed light on how information is encoded and exchanged between hippocampus, neocortex and subcortical structures such as the striatum. Cell assemblies (tightly related groups of cells) discharge together and synchronize across brain structures orchestrated by theta, sharp waves and slow oscillations, to encode information. This evolving dynamical schema is key to extending our understanding of memory processes.     

Strategic regulation of cognitive control by emotional salience: A neural network model

We present a neural network model of stimulus processing, which uses a mechanism of adaptive attentional control to regulate the moment to moment deployment of attention according to both the demands of the current task, and the demands of emotionally salient information. This mechanism allows negative emotional information to reduce cognitive control to aid in the detection of threats, which produces a momentary withdrawal from the current task set to allow unbiased processing of available information. The combination of cognitive and emotional regulation of task set allows this model to address inter-trial aspects of emotional interference in colour naming. In particular, we focus on the nature of the emotional interference in colour naming (McKenna & Sharma, 2004) as well as in word reading (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004) and show how this form of interference is functionally distinct from the classic Stroop effect. Our model addresses a range of findings in colour naming and word reading tasks and is informed by recent neuroimaging data concerning the interaction between the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices. The model is used to explore the interface between cognition and emotion with a series of predictions, including a qualitative distinction between state and trait forms of anxiety.     

Aging in cognitive control of social processing: evidence from the attention network test

ABSTRACT

Aging seems to be associated with impairment of attentional network functioning. It is not known whether social information can modulate this age-related decline. We used three variants of Attention Network test to examine the age-related decline of attentional effects in response to stimuli with and without social-cognitive content. Three groups of younger, middle-aged, and older participants performed the ANT, using fish, drawings, or photographs of faces looking to the left or right as target and flanker stimuli. The results showed that both executive attention and alerting were more resistant to the age-related decline with social stimuli and that orienting attention scores showed a progressive increase with age in the presence of this kind of stimuli. These findings underline the importance of social information in modulating and contrasting the age-related decline and support the status of human faces as a special class of visual stimuli for the human attentional systems.     

Meta-analytic evidence for a superordinate cognitive control network subserving diverse executive functions

Classic cognitive theory conceptualizes executive functions as involving multiple specific domains, including initiation, inhibition, working memory, flexibility, planning, and vigilance. Lesion and neuroimaging experiments over the past two decades have suggested that both common and unique processes contribute to executive functions during higher cognition. It has been suggested that a superordinate fronto–cingulo–parietal network supporting cognitive control may also underlie a range of distinct executive functions. To test this hypothesis in the largest sample to date, we used quantitative meta-analytic methods to analyze 193 functional neuroimaging studies of 2,832 healthy individuals, ages 18–60, in which performance on executive function measures was contrasted with an active control condition. A common pattern of activation was observed in the prefrontal, dorsal anterior cingulate, and parietal cortices across executive function domains, supporting the idea that executive functions are supported by a superordinate cognitive control network. However, domain-specific analyses showed some variation in the recruitment of anterior prefrontal cortex, anterior and midcingulate regions, and unique subcortical regions such as the basal ganglia and cerebellum. These results are consistent with the existence of a superordinate cognitive control network in the brain, involving dorsolateral prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and parietal cortices, that supports a broad range of executive functions.     

Adding fear to conflict: A general purpose cognitive control network is modulated by trait anxiety

Studies of cognitive control show that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are involved in the detection and resolution of cognitive conflict. However, the neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying emotional interference effects are less consistent. We used fMRI during emotional and nonemotional versions of a facial Stroop task to investigate the effects of emotional stimuli on cognitive control. In the full group there was limited evidence that different prefrontal circuits manage conflict arising from emotional and nonemotional distractors. However, individual differences in trait anxiety affected both behavioral performance and neural activity during the emotional task. Relative to low-anxiety (LA) subjects, high-anxiety (HA) subjects showed greater amygdala activity to task-relevant emotional information and impaired performance and greater conflict-related activity in the dACC when emotional content was task-irrelevant. Only LA subjects activated rostral ACC during the emotional task. This is consistent with cognitive models of individual differences that hypothesize deficient control of task-irrelevant emotional information in HA subjects. Additional behavioral and fMRI results from this study may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals .org/content/supplemental.     

The acquisition of robust and flexible cognitive skills

The authors introduce a model of skill acquisition that incorporates elements of both traditional models and models based on embedded cognition by striking a balance between top-down and bottom-up control. A knowledge representation is used in which pre- and postconditions are attached to actions. This model captures improved performance due to learning not only in terms of shorter solution times and lower error rates during the task but also in an increased flexibility to solve similar problems and robustness against unexpected events. In 3 experiments using a complex aviation task, the authors contrasted instructions that explicitly stated pre- and postconditions with conventional instructions that did not. The instructions with pre- and postconditions led to better and more robust performance than other instructions, especially on problems that required transfer. The parameters of the model were estimated to obtain a quantitative fit of the results of Experiment 1, which was then successfully used to predict the results of Experiments 2 and 3.     

COGNET: A national network for cognitive science

A planning committee funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation has agreed in principle on a draft proposal for the establishment of a national network of computers for research in cognitive science. The main ideas of the proposal are discussed in this paper.     

Evidence for a cognitive control network for goal-directed attention in simple sustained attention

The deterioration of performance over time is characteristic for sustained attention tasks. This so-called “performance decrement” is measured by the increase of reaction time (RT) over time. Some behavioural and neurobiological mechanisms of this phenomenon are not yet fully understood. Behaviourally, we examined the increase of RT over time and the inter-individual differences of this performance decrement. On the neurophysiological level, we investigated the task-relevant brain areas where neural activity was modulated by RT and searched for brain areas involved in good performance (i.e. participants with no or moderate performance decrement) as compared to poor performance (i.e. participants with a steep performance decrement). For this purpose, 20 healthy, young subjects performed a carefully designed task for simple sustained attention, namely a low-demanding version of the Rapid Visual Information Processing task. We employed a rapid event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) design. The behavioural results showed a significant increase of RT over time in the whole group, and also revealed that some participants were not as prone to the performance decrement as others. The latter was statistically significant comparing good versus poor performers. Moreover, high BOLD-responses were linked to longer RTs in a task-relevant bilateral fronto-cingulate-insular-parietal network. Among these regions, good performance was associated with significantly higher RT-BOLD correlations in the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). We concluded that the task-relevant bilateral fronto-cingulate-insular-parietal network was a cognitive control network responsible for goal-directed attention. The pre-SMA in particular might be associated with the performance decrement insofar that good performers could sustain activity in this brain region in order to monitor performance declines and adjust behavioural output.     

The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model for decision time in cognitive tasks: An example of control of nonlinear network dynamics

The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) model for human decision-making has been successfully applied to account for response accuracy and response time (RT) data in recent two-choice decision models. A variant of the OU model is shown to arise from the response dynamics of a nonlinear network consisting of randomly connected neural processing units. When feedback control of the network is effected by the stimulus onset, the average network response is an autocorrelated random signal satisfying the stochastic differential equation for the OU process. An alternative, more general, stimulus detection procedure is proposed which involves the use of an adaptive Kalman filter process to track any temporal change in autoregressive parameters. The predicted decision time distributions suggest that both the OU and the Kalman filter processes can serve as alternative models for RT data in experimental tasks. Received: 15 October 1998 / Accepted: 27 May 1999     

Context-specific adjustment of cognitive control: Transfer of adaptive control sets

Cognitive control protects processing of relevant information from interference by irrelevant information. The level of this processing selectivity can be flexibly adjusted to different control demands (e.g., frequency of conflict) associated with a certain context, leading to the formation of specific context–control associations. In the present study we investigated the robustness and transferability of the acquired context–control demands to new situations. In three experiments, we used a version of the context-specific proportion congruence (CSPC) paradigm, in which each context (e.g., location) is associated with a specific conflict frequency, determining high and low control demands. In a learning phase, associations between context and control demands were established. In a subsequent transfer block, stimulus–response mappings, whole task sets, or context–control demands changed. Results showed an impressive robustness of context–control associations, as context-specific adjustments of control from the learning phase were virtually unaffected by new stimuli and tasks in the transfer block. Only a change of the context–control demand eliminated the context-specific adjustment of control. These findings suggest that context–control associations that have proven to be adaptive in the past are continuously applied despite major changes in the task structure as long as the context–control associations remain the same.     

Consciousness and cognitive control

The implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. It seems that we exert control over our behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. Recent research suggests, however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. Here we give a brief review of this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest some lines of future research. Specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked either because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. While the former type of control seems to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously registered events that call for control.     

Religion and cognitive control: An event-coding approach

Religion is playing an important role in our lives, be it from a personal perspective as member of a particular congregation or as an agnostic living among believers. What impact has religion on our decision-making and action? Two kinds of impact have been considered: religious goals are likely to constrain and color our behavior, but religion may also strengthen cognitive control in a more generic sense. While evidence supports both considerations, it remains a mystery how that works, that is, which mechanisms underlie the impact of religion on our decisions and action control. Here I suggest a preliminary mechanistic model accounting for this impact. It is based on the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), a general theory of human perception, attention, and action control, and the assumptions that goals are represented in a distributed fashion (as selection criteria) and that their impact is moderated by metacontrol, the current control style that varies between persistence and flexibility. The model is parsimonious (i.e., not religion-specific) and mechanistically transparent, and thus provides a solid basis for more systematic experimentation and theorizing.     

Anxiety and cognitive performance: attentional control theory

Attentional control theory is an approach to anxiety and cognition representing a major development of Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory. It is assumed that anxiety impairs efficient functioning of the goal-directed attentional system and increases the extent to which processing is influenced by the stimulus-driven attentional system. In addition to decreasing attentional control, anxiety increases attention to threat-related stimuli. Adverse effects of anxiety on processing efficiency depend on two central executive functions involving attentional control: inhibition and shifting. However, anxiety may not impair performance effectiveness (quality of performance) when it leads to the use of compensatory strategies (e.g., enhanced effort; increased use of processing resources). Directions for future research are discussed.     

The cognitive control of emotion

The capacity to control emotion is important for human adaptation. Questions about the neural bases of emotion regulation have recently taken on new importance, as functional imaging studies in humans have permitted direct investigation of control strategies that draw upon higher cognitive processes difficult to study in nonhumans. Such studies have examined (1) controlling attention to, and (2) cognitively changing the meaning of, emotionally evocative stimuli. These two forms of emotion regulation depend upon interactions between prefrontal and cingulate control systems and cortical and subcortical emotion-generative systems. Taken together, the results suggest a functional architecture for the cognitive control of emotion that dovetails with findings from other human and nonhuman research on emotion.     

Reading disappearing text: cognitive control of eye movements

Participants read sentences containing high- or low-frequency target words under normal reading conditions or disappearing-text conditions (in which the word that was fixated disappeared after 60 ms). Even though the fixated word had disappeared after 60 ms, there was still a robust frequency effect wherein readers fixated longer on low-frequency words than on high-frequency words. Thus, the results are consistent with cognitive-control models of eye movement control and inconsistent with visual/oculomotor-control models. Although the uptake of visual information is clearly important for reading, it is the cognitive processes associated with understanding the fixated words that drive the eyes through the text.