Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage.     

Time and Space

Book Information Time and Space. By Barry Dainton. Acumen. Chesham. 2001. Pp. xiv + 386. Paperback, US$22.95.     

Diachronic and synchronic unity

There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a time that make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. The source of these crucial differences is the phenomenon of the ‘continuity of consciousness’. I argue that accounts of unity over time have to provide an account of this continuity, and that there is no phenomenon analogous to continuity in the case of unity at a time. Attention to the continuity of consciousness reveals crucial structural differences between the two varieties of unity. These structural differences make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. I show that the problems faced by Dainton’s and Tye’s accounts in the light of the structural differences make their accounts of unity appear far less appealing than they might initially have looked. I conclude by noting that, in the light of the important differences between the two varieties of unity, it is a mistake to attempt to model accounts of unity over time on accounts of unity at a time.     

Crossing the bridge: the first-person and time

Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally-figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary.     

The Continuity of Consciousness

Abstract: In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought that some of the brain processes underlying consciousness do not exhibit continuity. I argue that these problems can be solved by distinguishing between three possible bearers of the property of ‘continuity’—(1) the State of Consciousness, (2) the Stream of Experience, and (3) what is represented by experience—and two different senses of ‘continuity’—‘strict’ and ‘extreme’ continuity. I conclude by providing a positive account of the continuity of consciousness, according to which the State of Consciousness exhibits ‘strict’ continuity, and the Stream of Experience exhibits ‘extreme’ continuity.     

Split identity: intransitive judgments of the identity of objects

Identity is a transitive relation, according to all standard accounts. Necessarily, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. However, people sometimes say that two objects, x and z, are the same as a third, y, even when x and z have different properties (thus, x = y and y = z, but x ≠ z). In the present experiments, participants read stories about an iceberg that breaks into two icebergs, one to the east and the other to the west. Many participants (32–54%, in baseline conditions across experiments) decided that both successors were the original iceberg, despite the different spatial locations of the successors. Experiment 1 shows that this tendency is not due to participants failing to understand both to mean both are simultaneously the original. Similarly, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the tendency is not solely due to their interpreting the question to be about properties of the icebergs rather than about the icebergs themselves. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest, instead, that participants may understand Which is the original? to mean Which, in its own right, is entitled to be the original? Emphasizing entitlement increases the number of seemingly intransitive responses, whereas emphasizing the formal properties of identity decreases them.     

Personal identity is social identity

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The question of the identity or persistence of the self through time may be interesting for philosophers, but it is hardly a burning question for most...     

Assessing multiple facets of gender identity: the gender identity questionnaire.

314 men and 451 women participated in a study to assess the reliability and validity of the multifaceted Gender Identity Questionnaire. Reliability coefficients of the (sub)scales varied between .67 and .80; content, criterion, and construct validity were satisfactory.     

Reversing the Levi identity

The AGM (Alchourrón-GÄrdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that arenot closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that onefirst adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an intuitively plausible way of revising one's beliefs. Since it typically involves the temporary acceptance of an inconsistent set of beliefs, it can only be used in belief representations that distinguish between different inconsistent sets of belief.     

Adolescent identity formation: a Swedish study of identity status using the EOM-EIS-II

The aim of this study was to examine ego identity status among Swedish adolescents using the EOM-EIS-II. Identity status scores and distributions were examined for 222 (108 female, 114 male) Swedish high school students. Identity status differences were found between genders. There was a greater likelihood of female adolescents being categorized as moratoriums than were males, and there was a greater likelihood of males being categorized as diffusions than were females. Statistically significant differences were found between genders on the following subscales: moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion. No statistically significant differences were found between females and males on the identity achievement subscale. To achieve a preliminary construct validation of the results from the EOM-EIS-II, four of the 222 participants were also assessed using Marcia's identity status interview. A fairly good accordance between the interview assessment of identity status and the EOM-EIS-II assessment were found. Interview results showed differences between the interviewers on each subscale (IA, M, F, and D). The same differences were detected on three of four subscales when assessing these individuals' identity statuses using the EOM-EIS-II.     

Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity

Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declaredistinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is notjust an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims,seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their wordssecure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to beidentical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resultinginterpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things cannever be identical – that allows us to understand the real point ofsuch statements. This view also offers a new solution to Fege's puzzleof the informativeness of identity statements.     

Narrative identity,practical identity and ethical subjectivity

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.     

Divided groups need leadership: A study of the effectiveness of collective identity,dual identity,and intergroup relational identity rhetoric

Reducing intergroup conflict is a significant leadership challenge. Leaders can alleviate conflict by promoting a collective, dual, or intergroup relational identity, but they should avoid provoking subgroup identity distinctiveness threat. Drawing on intergroup leadership theory, we conducted an experiment (N = 184) examining evaluations of a leader who promoted a dual, collective, or intergroup relational identity under low or high subgroup identity distinctiveness threat. We hypothesized that identity distinctiveness threat would improve evaluations of a leader promoting an intergroup relational identity, and worsen evaluations of a leader promoting a collective identity. Although a leader promoting a dual identity is typically preferred to one promoting a collective identity, we expected a leader promoting dual identity to receive worse evaluations than a leader promoting an intergroup relational identity. These hypotheses were supported, providing additional support for intergroup leadership theory and demonstrating the utility of employing intergroup relational identity rhetoric.