Self-reflection and feelings of self-worth: When Rosenberg meets Heisenberg

The more people think about their attitude toward some issue, the stronger their attitude becomes. The present research examined whether this strengthening effect also applies to self-evaluative attitudes. In four studies, we had some participants complete a self-evaluation measure before rating their momentary feelings of self-worth (Studies 1, 2, and 4) or implicit self-feelings (Study 3). In all four studies, evaluative self-reflection led low self-esteem participants to feel worse about themselves and high self-esteem participants to feel better about themselves. We did not find this self-esteem polarization effect when more general emotions of happiness and sadness were measured (Study 2) or when participants reflected on non-evaluative aspects of themselves (Study 4). These findings suggest that evaluative self-reflection has different consequences for low self-esteem people than for high self-esteem people, and that order effects in personality research may represent actual changes in self-feelings rather than methodological confounds.     

Quantum holism: nonseparability as common ground

Quantum mechanics seems to portray nature as nonseparable, in the sense that it allows spatiotemporally separated entities to have states that cannot be fully specified without reference to each other. This is often said to implicate some form of “holism.” We aim to clarify what this means, and why this seems plausible. Our core idea is that the best explanation for nonseparability is a “common ground” explanation (modeled after common cause explanations), which casts nonseparable entities in a holistic light, as scattered reflections of a more unified underlying reality.

     

When grandiose meets vulnerable: narcissism and well-being in the organizational context

ABSTRACT

Objective

In this article, we explore the implications of vulnerable narcissism in an organizational context, particularly with regard to work-related well-being and leader–follower interactions. We tested whether employees’ vulnerable narcissism affects their work engagement and emotional exhaustion. Furthermore, we examined whether leaders’ grandiose narcissism impacts such as working relationships. We used job demands-resources theory in order to derive our hypotheses at the intra- and inter-individual level. Method: Multi-level analyses in a sample of 235 followers in 71 teams confirmed some of our hypotheses. Results: We demonstrate that vulnerable narcissism is positively related to followers’ emotional exhaustion and negatively related to work engagement. Moreover, leaders’ grandiose narcissism exacerbates the negative relationship between followers’ vulnerable narcissism and their work engagement. Conclusions: Our results indicate that the various facets of narcissism play an important role in an organizational context and suggest that vulnerable narcissism in particular, which has been largely neglected in previous research, is an important determinant of work-related well-being. Further, we form a holistic understanding of the leadership process by emphasizing the interaction between leaders’ and followers’ personalities, adding to the leadership literature by integrating leader and follower characteristics.     

Empathy a common ground

Though empathy remains a central concept in psychoanalysis, attempts to explain the operations and functions in the empathic process have been as divergent as the various meanings associated with the term itself. Any explanation of the mechanism of empathy must include how we have access to the inner experience of others or account for the link between the empathizer and the inner state of the object.

In this paper, the authors review different models (Freud, 1921; Kohut, 1959; Basch, 1983, 1988; Buie, 1981; Schafer, 1968; Klein, 1946, 1963) of empathic understanding and note that while these models rely on imitation, identification, merger, projection, or inference as the basis of empathic understanding, each implies only an indirect understanding of the states of others. The authors propose a two‐phase model of empathy that differs from those models reviewed in that their position assumes that the perception of emotion in the other is immediately accessible through isomorphic psychological and physical processes that often result in an experience of resonance of the same emotion inthe self (Beebe, 1990). According to this view, the empathic process consists of an initial perceptual phase that generates affective resonance and a second phase in which complex cognitive‐affective operations contribute to the construction of meaning. We posit that empathic understanding affords the observer direct access to certain qualities of the other's experience. The model borrows from Wolfgang Köhler's (1947) concept of isomorphism and Rudolph Arnheim's (1949) theory of the perception of expression.

Evidence for this model is presented from experimental psychology. A discussion of a case from an earlier paper on empathy by Beres and Arlow (1974) illustrates how the operations underlying empathy contribute to understanding a patient in a clinical setting. Finally, we conclude the paper with a brief discussion of some of the clinical implications of this model.     

When authoritarianism meets religion: Sacrificing others in the name of abstract deontology

Authoritarianism is a stable construct in terms of individual differences (social attitudes based on personality and values), but its manifestations and behavioral outcomes may depend on contextual factors. In the present experiment, we investigated whether authoritarianism is sensitive to religious influences in predicting rigid morality. Specifically, we investigated whether authoritarians, after supraliminal religious priming, would show, in hypothetical moral dilemmas, preference for impersonal societal norms even at the detriment of interpersonal, care‐based prosociality toward proximal persons and acquaintances in need. The results confirmed the expectations, with a small effect size for the religious priming × authoritarianism interaction. In addition, these results were specific to participants' authoritarianism and not to their individual religiosity. The interaction between authoritarian dispositions and religious ideas may constitute a powerful combination leading to behaviors that are detrimental for the well‐being and the life of others, even proximal people, in the name of abstract deontology. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Realismbei Frege: Reply to Burge

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading. In Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this trend. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought him — that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a response to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithful than Burge's to Frege's texts.     

Frege: two theses,two senses

One particular topic in the literature on Frege's conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege's thought. In (2) I discuss the main attempts to resolve the conflict between Frege's two contradictory claims, showing what is wrong with some of them. In (3), I analyse where, in Frege'ps writings and discussions on sense identity, one can find grounds for two different conceptions of sense. In (4) I show how the two contradictory theses held by Frege are connected with different concerns, compelling Frege to a constant oscillation in terminology. In (5) I summarize two further reasons that prevented Frege from making the distinction between two conceptions of sense clear: (i) the antipsychologism problem and (ii) the overlap of traditions in German literature contemporary to Frege about the concept of value. I conclude with a hint for a reconstruction of the Fregean notion of ‘thought’ which resolves the contradiction between his two theses.     

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.     

Misremembering a common object: When left is not right

Three experiments were carried out to investigate peoples memory for British coins. Two principal issues were studied. First, it has previously been shown that memory for U.S. pennies and other coins is surprisingly imperfect. How do other countries compare? It turned out that recall of the design of British pennies was, if anything, worse even than that of U.S. pennies. The situation was no better for a larger coin with an unusual shape. It is suggested that individual features are poorly remembered if they have low levels of meaningfulness, redundancy, identifiability, and discriminativeness. Second, in addition to this generally weak level of remembering, an instance of systematic misremembering was consistently observed. The Queens portrait always faces to the right on British coins. Yet in all three experiments, the proportion of participants who recalled that the portrait faces to the right was so low (overall, 19%) that it was significantly less than even the 50% baseline to be expected from people in a state of complete ignorance. It follows that the participants were not in a state of complete ignorance. Rather, they relied-upon extraneous knowledge of either a general or a specific nature (bias and schemahypotheses, respectively), whose importation into this domain was in fact invalid. The resulting belief that coin portraits face left was not right.     

When less is heard than meets the ear: Change deafness in a telephone conversation

During a conversation, we hear the sound of the talker as well as the intended message. Traditional models of speech perception posit that acoustic details of a talker's voice are not encoded with the message whereas more recent models propose that talker identity is automatically encoded. When shadowing speech, listeners often fail to detect a change in talker identity. The present study was designed to investigate whether talker changes would be detected when listeners are actively engaged in a normal conversation, and visual information about the speaker is absent. Participants were called on the phone, and during the conversation the experimenter was surreptitiously replaced by another talker. Participants rarely noticed the change. However, when explicitly monitoring for a change, detection increased. Voice memory tests suggested that participants remembered only coarse information about both voices, rather than fine details. This suggests that although listeners are capable of change detection, voice information is not continuously monitored at a fine-grain level of acoustic representation during natural conversation and is not automatically encoded. Conversational expectations may shape the way we direct attention to voice characteristics and perceive differences in voice.     

When less is heard than meets the ear: change deafness in a telephone conversation

During a conversation, we hear the sound of the talker as well as the intended message. Traditional models of speech perception posit that acoustic details of a talker's voice are not encoded with the message whereas more recent models propose that talker identity is automatically encoded. When shadowing speech, listeners often fail to detect a change in talker identity. The present study was designed to investigate whether talker changes would be detected when listeners are actively engaged in a normal conversation, and visual information about the speaker is absent. Participants were called on the phone, and during the conversation the experimenter was surreptitiously replaced by another talker. Participants rarely noticed the change. However, when explicitly monitoring for a change, detection increased. Voice memory tests suggested that participants remembered only coarse information about both voices, rather than fine details. This suggests that although listeners are capable of change detection, voice information is not continuously monitored at a fine-grain level of acoustic representation during natural conversation and is not automatically encoded. Conversational expectations may shape the way we direct attention to voice characteristics and perceive differences in voice.