A one year follow-up of relaxation response meditation as a treatment for irritable bowel syndrome

Ten of thirteen original participants with Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) participated in a one year follow-up study to determine whether the effects of Relaxation Response Meditation (RRM) on IBS symptom reduction were maintained over the long-term. From pre-treatment to one-year follow-up, significant reductions were noted for the symptoms of abdominal pain (p = 0.017), diarrhea (p = 0.045), flatulence (p = 0.030), and bloating (p = 0.018). When we examined changes from the original three month follow-up point to the one year follow-up, we noted significant additional reductions in pain (p = 0.03) and bloating (p = 0.04), which tended to be the most distressing symptoms of IBS. It appears that: (1) continued use of meditation is particularly effective in reducing the symptoms of pain and bloating; and (2) RRM is a beneficial treatment for IBS in the both short- and the long-term.     

Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism

Philosophical Studies - According to a version of Infallibilism, if one knows that p, then one’s evidence for p entails p. In her Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge (2018, OUP), Jessica...     

Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

ABSTRACT

We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.     

Replication and p Intervals: p Values Predict the Future Only Vaguely, but Confidence Intervals Do Much Better

ABSTRACT— Replication is fundamental to science, so statistical analysis should give information about replication. Because p values dominate statistical analysis in psychology, it is important to ask what p says about replication. The answer to this question is "Surprisingly little." In one simulation of 25 repetitions of a typical experiment, p varied from <.001 to .76, thus illustrating that p is a very unreliable measure. This article shows that, if an initial experiment results in two-tailed p = .05, there is an 80% chance the one-tailed p value from a replication will fall in the interval (.00008, .44), a 10% chance that p < .00008, and fully a 10% chance that p > .44. Remarkably, the interval—termed a p interval —is this wide however large the sample size. p is so unreliable and gives such dramatically vague information that it is a poor basis for inference. Confidence intervals, however, give much better information about replication. Researchers should minimize the role of p by using confidence intervals and model-fitting techniques and by adopting meta-analytic thinking.     

Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle

According to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the credential of the evidence, and therefore it doesn't always entitle one to ignore it. I also explain in what kind of cases and to what degree such knowledge allows one to ignore evidence. Hopefully, through the discussion, we can not only understand better where the dogmatism puzzle goes wrong, but also understand better in what sense rational believers should rely on their evidence and when they can ignore it.     

Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission

We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of testimonial transmission must know that p in order to pass this knowledge to a hearer. The weaker thesis is that at least the first speaker must know that p in order for any hearer in the chain to come to know that p via testimony. I argue that both theses are false, and hence testimony, unlike memory, can be a generative source of knowledge.     

对塔斯基“真”理论的批评与重建

塔斯基首先提出关于真之定义的T模式即:"p"是真的,当且仅当,p。随后他又用X取代T模式中的"p",并且用"满足"来定义"真"。本文一方面根据"内容恰当性"要求,提出另一种模式T′即:"p"是真的,当且仅当,p是存在的;用以补充T模式,并完善塔斯基的语言层次论。另一方面根据"形式正确性"要求,指出塔斯基对T模式的这两项修改都是多余的。     

Conditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals.

Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed.     

Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a normative reason to believe that p. The primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate that that style of answer cannot be right, because we must conceive of believing for a normative reason as constitutively involving a kind of rationality-involving relation that can be instantiated at all only if there is a known fact on the scene, which the agent treats as a normative reason. A secondary objective, achieved along the way, is to demonstrate that in their Prime Time (for the Basing Relation) Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan do not succeed in undermining the factoring picture in general, only a simple-minded version of it.

     

Phenomenal transparency in achromatic checkerboards.

The study explored the luminance relations that determine the occurrence of achromatic transparency in phenomenal surfaces on complex backgrounds. Let the luminances of the left and right parts of a transparent surface on a bipartite background and those of the left and right parts of the bipartite background be p and q and m and n, respectively. Metelli proposed that this surface looks transparent when the rule p < q if m < n (or p > q if m > n) is satisfied, and Masin and Fukuda that it looks transparent when the inclusion rule is satisfied, that is, when p epsilon (m, q) or q epsilon (p, n). These rules also apply to achromatic checkerboards formed by one checkerboard enclosed in another checkerboard. This study shows that only the inclusion rule correctly predicted the occurrence of transparency in these checkerboards.     

Estimating Success in Predicting a Variable with Nominal Measurement Using Other Variables with Nominal Measurements

In this article we are concerned with the situation where one is estimating the outcome of a variable Y, with nominal measurement, on the basis of the outcomes of several predictor variables, X 1, X 2, ..., X r, each with nominal measurement. We assume that we have a random sample from the population. Here we are interested in estimating p, the probability of successfully predicting a new Y from the population, given the X measurements for this new observation. We begin by proposing an estimator, p_a, which is the success rate in predicting Y from the current sample. We show that this estimator is always biased upwards. We then propose a second estimator, p_b, which divides the original sample into two groups, a holdout group and a training group, in order to estimate p. We show that procedures such as these are always biased downwards, no matter how we divide the original sample into the two groups. Because one of these estimators tends to overestimate p while the other tends to underestimate p, we propose as a heuristic solution to use the mean of these two estimators, p_c, as an estimator for p. We then perform several simulation studies to compare the three estimators with respect to both bias and MSE. These simulations seem to confirm that $ p c is a better estimator than either of the other two.     

FOUNDATIONALLY JUSTIFIED PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN

Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to its antecedent the requirement that the subject have a recognitional capacity with respect to the given property.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

Hypothesis testing and theory evaluation at the boundaries: surprising insights from Bayes's theorem

Because the probability of obtaining an experimental finding given that the null hypothesis is true [p(F\H0)] is not the same as the probability that the null hypothesis is true given a finding [p(H0\F)], calculating the former probability does not justify conclusions about the latter one. As the standard null-hypothesis significance-testing procedure does just that, it is logically invalid (J. Cohen, 1994). Theoretically, Bayes's theorem yields p(H0\F), but in practice, researchers rarely know the correct values for 2 of the variables in the theorem. Nevertheless, by considering a wide range of possible values for the unknown variables, it is possible to calculate a range of theoretical values for p(H0\F) and to draw conclusions about both hypothesis testing and theory evaluation.     

The people's communes and the Paris commune

It is not surprising that Chinese Communists took the Paris Commune as one of their models and the writings of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on this subject as one of their main theoretical inspirations. More interesting, however, is the fact that one can show that the Chinese Communist leadership has continually suffered from not being quite certain what the Paris Commune really means — either in theory or in practice.     

Introspection and inference

In this paper I develop the idea that, by answering the question whether p, you can answer the question whether you believe that p. In particular, I argue that judging that p is a fallible yet basic guide to whether one believes that p. I go on to defend my view from an important skeptical challenge, according to which my view would make it too easy to reject skeptical hypotheses about our access to our minds. I close by responding to the opposing view on which our beliefs themselves constitute our only source of first-person access to our beliefs.     

A further note on freeman's measure of association

This note extends and elaborates Hubert's attempt to provide an interpretation of Freeman's measure of association,. The measure is used in a a contingency table when observations are ordered on one variable and unordered on the other. No attempt is made explore the distribution of.     

Stressful life events and impulsiveness in failed suicide

The relationship of recent stressful life events with impulsiveness in triggering suicide attempts and how impulsiveness changes from one suicide attempt to another is unclear. This study used structured-interview tools and standardized measurements to examine the relationship between life stress and impulsiveness in a sample of patients who required hospitalization for a medically serious suicide attempt. After controlling for potentially confounding variables, the number of disrupted interpersonal relationships in the preceding year was a significant predictor of the impulsiveness of the suicide attempt, with three or more losses (but not other life stresses) associated with less impulsive attempts (T = 2.4, p = .02). Female gender (T = -1.98, p = .05) and lifetime DMS-III-R diagnoses (T = -2.45, p = .02) were significantly associated with more impulsive attempts. In 55 patients with at least two suicide attempts, impulsiveness, lethal intent, and communication of intent were significantly greater for the present compared to the prior attempt (p = 0.000). Certain stressful life events, gender, and total lifetime DSM-III-R diagnoses are associated with impulsiveness of failed suicide attempts; yet, impulsiveness is not necessarily consistent from one suicide attempt to another. This evidence supports and amplifies a stress-diathesis model of suicide behavior. Accordingly, efforts to increase personal resilience in individuals who have "failed suicide" may be more effective at preventing suicide morbidity than simple stress-reduction measures alone.     

Bi-hemispheric anodal transcranial direct current stimulation worsens taekwondo-related performance

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) is a neuromodulatory technique that has been used as an ergogenic aid in exercise/sports performance. However, little is known about its effects on highly-trained subjects, as athletes. The present study aimed to verify the effects of bi-hemispheric anodal tDCS (a-tDCS) on the performance of taekwondo athletes. Additionally, we investigated the persistence of the effects of the a-tDCS one hour after it. Nineteen Taekwondo athletes received active or sham bi-hemispheric a-tDCS over the primary motor cortex (M1). a-tDCS was delivered at 1.5 mA for 15 min. Athletes performed Countermovement Jumps (CMJ) and the Frequency Speed of Kick Test (FSKT) immediately (Mo1) and one hour after stimulation (Mo2). The athletes also reported their session-rating of perceived exertion (session-RPE). The total number of kicks (TK) was higher in sham than in the active a-tDCS condition (p < 0.01). In addition, TK was higher at Mo2 than at Mo1 (p < 0.05). Similarly, the session-RPE was higher in the a-tDCS condition (p < 0.05) and was greater one-hour post-stimulation (p < 0.01). No differences were found for CMJ performance (p > 0.05). Thus, bi-hemispheric a-tDCS worsens performance of taekwondo athletes, and the effect remains present even 1 h after the stimulation.