What is special about indexical attitudes?

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.     

Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.     

What’s so Transparent about Transparency?

Representationalists often use intuitions about the transparency ofexperience to defend their view that qualitative content isrepresentational content. According to these intuitions, wecannot attend to our experience except by attending to theobject of that experience. Although the transparency intuitionappears to be widely shared, even among non-representationalists,in this paper I suggest that there are two ambiguities inherent indiscussions of transparency. One concerns the strength of thetransparency intuition, while the other concerns its scope. Oncewe bring these two ambiguities to the surface, we can see that therepresentationalists claim that experience is transparent turnsout to be considerably more controversial than ordinarily supposed.While the phenomenological data may support some kind of experientialtransparency, I argue that it does not support the kind of transparencyneeded for representationalism.     

Hitting ability and perception of object’s size: evidence for a negative relation

We examined the relation between motor performance and perception of object’s size in near space. The general task was to repeatedly hit a target by means of pointing movements and to estimate target’s size. In contrast to the results of previous studies, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 revealed a negative relation between action ability and perceived target size: Participants who hit the target relatively often and whose motor variability was relatively low judged targets to be smaller than did participants whose motor performance was relatively poor. In Experiment 3, the size judgments were made in the presence of the target before, as well as after, pointing movements. The target was judged as smaller when it was easy, rather than difficult, to hit before as well as after the movement. Altogether, these results indicate that under certain conditions, an increased action ability reduces the apparent size of the actions’ target objects.     

What’s philosophically interesting about engineering ethics?

What makes a subject philosophically interesting is hard-to-resolve confusion about fundamental concepts. Engineering ethics suffers from at least three such fundamental confusions. First, there is confusion about what the “ethics” in engineering ethics is (ordinary morality, philosophical ethics, special standards, or something else?) Second, there is confusion about what the profession of engineering is (a function, discipline, occupation, kind of organization, or something else?) Third, there is confusion about what the discipline of engineering is. These fundamental confusions in engineering ethics connect with philosophically interesting work in moral theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of science. Work in these areas may help with the philosophical problems of engineering ethics. But, equally important, work in engineering ethics may help with the philosophical problems in these others fields.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

What is Philosophical about Kant’s Anthropology?

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is fundamentally about the sphere of civilization, and, with this, a particular kind of philosophical self-understanding. By civilization, Kant means to indicate the process by which human beings transform their inner natures based on pragmatic or prudential considerations born of our living together. Civilization is what we do to ourselves in order to get along with others with whom we share the earth. In the Anthropology, what we come to understand about ourselves is the possibility of transforming our inner natures based on our will.     

What’s in a Dao?: Ontology and Semiotics in Laozi and Zhuangzi

The present essay examines the conflicting ontological assumptions that one can find behind the word dao in the texts of the Laozi and Zhuangzi and argues that the relative indifference to these texts toward whether or not dao has an ontic reality should not be considered a flaw of early Daoism. Rather, the historical process by which the term dao collects various possible ontological implications can be thought of as a philosophical stance in its own right. That is, if the terms which one is obliged to use in discussing the immaterial necessarily hide, at least as much as they explain, the nature of Being, then it is a reasonable response to decline to ground one??s ethics in an ontology, and that while the resulting philosophy may not qualify as a fully-adumbrated system, this does not diminish its potential usefulness.     

What Parents and Children Say When Talking about Children’s Gratitude: A Thematic Analysis

Journal of Child and Family Studies - Parent-child conversations are a widely recognized socializing mechanism, linked to children’s developing moral agency, empathy, and emotional...     

Coping with Family Conflict: What’s Helpful and What’s Not for Low-income Adolescents

Family conflict is exacerbated by poverty-related stress and is detrimental to adolescent mental health. Adolescent coping with family conflict has the potential to buffer or exacerbate the negative effects of family conflict on internalizing symptoms. We examined coping with family conflict among 82 low-income adolescents (53.7% female, mean age = 13.5 years at Time 1, SD = 1.98; range 11–18), and their primary caregivers (95% female, mean age = 34.9 years, SD = 7.45). Adolescents were 25.9% Caucasian, 28.4% African American, 38.3% Hispanic, and 7.4% Other (Multi-racial, Native American, or Asian). Results show that family conflict is more strongly associated with internalizing symptoms for adolescents under high levels of poverty-related stress. Regression analyses indicate that secondary control coping moderates the effects of family conflict on internalizing symptoms. In addition, analyses reveal that disengagement coping exacerbates symptoms across time for both adolescent girls and boys. Regression analyses also suggest that primary control coping is helpful for coping with family conflict, but only for girls. Results highlight the importance of examining coping concurrently and across time as well as including moderating effects of gender. Intervention efforts targeting low-income adolescents should incorporate the instruction of secondary control strategies for coping with family conflict.     

Acquisition of a unique cue in positive and negative patterning?

Forty college students received a classical differential conditioning procedure involving both positive and negative patterning, each of these being associated with a different pair of stimuli. In positive patterning, elemental stimuli, A and B, were presented without an unconditioned stimulus while their compound, AB, was paired with electric shock. In negative patterning, elemental stimuli, C and D, were paired with shock while their compound, CD, remained unpaired. Thirty of these subjects then received a negative patterning transfer test on new stimuli, while ten subjects received a positive patterning transfer test. First interval response (FIR) and second interval response (SIR) were measured. During initial acquisition, positive patterning occurred in both dependent measures, but negative patterning was present only in the SIR. The transfer tests showed almost significant transfer of positive patterning in FIR and SIR. Negative patterning showed significant transfer neither in FIR nor SIR. It was concluded that, although elementary models of conditioning can explain positive patterning on the basis of summation of excitation from the elements to the compound, the occurrence of negative patterning in the SIR and the almost significant transfer of positive patterning in FIR and SIR appear to require the additional assumption of a unique cue.     

What’s in a Purse? Maybe a Woman’s Reputation

Does a woman’s reputation suffer when others discover condoms in her possession? Fifty-two male and female predominantly white undergraduates from a small, private, Catholic university in the northeast USA examined the contents of a purse to formulate an impression of its owner. Unflattering inferences were drawn about the character of the target when her purse contained condoms. A follow-up study with 55 comparable participants confirmed that these inferences were indeed uncomplimentary. The results are discussed in terms of the multi-dimensional price women pay when assuming responsibility for their sexual health.     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

‘What’s so special about HIV and AIDS?5: Stresses and strains for clients and counsellors

The issues of supervision relating to counselling people who have been diagnosed as having HIV and AIDS are discussed. Against the background of the stigmatisation of this group of clients by society, the impact of these issues upon the client and the counsellor is addressed. Using a case-history as illustration, the conflicts and losses arising at different stages are explored. These have important implications for the need for supervision to facilitate the changes necessary in coping with clients' and counsellors' feelings regarding a terminal illness, death and dying, and the containment of anxiety. The process within supervision of enabling the counsellor to deal with their countertrans-ference, hopelessness and sense of loss is examined. Through this, the counsellor is enabled to allow a balanced view to be reached within the therapeutic relationship.     

What’s “inattentional” about inattentional blindness?

In a recent commentary, Memmert critiqued claims that attentional misdirection is directly analogous to inattentional blindness (IB) and cautioned against assuming too close a similarity between the two phenomena. One important difference highlighted in his analysis is that most lab-based inductions of IB rely on the taxing of attention through a demanding primary task, whereas attentional misdirection typically involves simply the orchestration of spatial attention. The present commentary argues that, rather than reflecting a complete dissociation between IB and attentional misdirection, this difference highlights potential grounds for delineating mechanistically distinct forms of IB: spatial inattentional blindness, which stems from the covert misallocation of spatial attention, and central inattentional blindness, which stems from disruption or preoccupation of perceptual mechanisms that interface with higher-level processes such as working memory. Recognition of such distinctions can help situate theoretical understanding of IB more firmly within the context of the broader attention literature.     

Adults’ implicit associations to infant positive and negative acoustic cues: Moderation by empathy and gender

In this study a novel auditory version of the Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT-A) was developed to investigate (a) the valence of adults’ associations to infant cries and laughs, (b) moderation of implicit associations by gender and empathy, and (c) the robustness of implicit associations controlling for auditory sensitivity. Eighty adults (50% females) were administered two SC-IAT-As, the Empathy Quotient, and the Weinstein Noise Sensitivity Scale. Adults showed positive implicit associations to infant laugh and negative ones to infant cry; only the implicit associations with the infant laugh were negatively related to empathy scores, and no gender differences were observed. Finally, implicit associations to infant cry were affected by noise sensitivity. The SC-IAT-A is useful to evaluate the valence of implicit reactions to infant auditory cues and could provide fresh insights into understanding processes that regulate the quality of adult–infant relationships.     

Some psychological effects associated with positive and negative thinking about stressful event outcomes: was Pollyanna right?

This study investigated psychological effects associated with tendencies to focus one's thinking on positive versus negative outcomes of concluded stressful events, called respectively, positive and negative thinking. Four questions were addressed: (a) whether positive and negative thinking benefit or reduce psychological well-being, (b) whether these effects are transitory or enduring, (c) whether they are limited to thoughts about an event's impact on oneself or generalize to thoughts about an event's external consequences, and (d) whether tendencies to think positively or negatively about prior stressors influence psychological vulnerability to the impact of future ones. College students completed an event-outcome appraisal questionnaire designed to make salient positive and negative thoughts about the outcomes of recent stressful events. Subjects' well-being was then assessed both immediately after the salience manipulation and again 8 weeks later. Positive thinking increased the well-being that subjects reported immediately after their thoughts were assessed, but was unrelated to the well-being they reported after an 8-week delay. This suggests that although thinking positively about past event outcomes may temporarily lead to perceptions of increased well-being while the thoughts are salient, it has no enduring influence. In contrast, negative thinking was associated with lower reported well-being not only when the thoughts were salient but after a delay as well. Psychological effects associated with both types of thinking were due mostly to self-relevant thoughts rather than to externally relevant ones. Negative thinking about prior stressor outcomes appeared to increase vulnerability to the impact of later ones on several aspects of well-being. Overall, results for negative thinking are consistent with evidence reported after an 8-week delay. This suggests that although thinking positively effects that persist over time. However, positive thinking does not seem to have beneficial effects that continue once these thoughts are no longer salient.     

On ‘Stabilising’ medical mechanisms, truth-makers and epistemic causality: a critique to Williamson and Russo’s approach

In this paper I offer an anti-Humean critique to Williamson and Russo’s approach to medical mechanisms. I focus on one of the specific claims made by Williamson and Russo, namely the claim that micro-structural ‘mechanisms’ provide evidence for the stability across populations of causal relationships ascertained at the (macro-) level of (test) populations. This claim is grounded in the epistemic account of causality developed by Williamson, an account which—while not relying exclusively on mechanistic evidence for justifying causal judgements—appeals nevertheless to mechanisms, and rejects their anti-Humean interpretation in terms of capacities, powers, potencies, etc. By using (and expanding on) Cartwright’s basic critique against Humean mechanisms, I suggest that, in order to move beyond the level of plausibility, Williamson and Russo’s position is in need of a clarification as to the occurent reading of the components, functioning and interferences of mechanisms. Relatedly, as concerns Williamson’s epistemic account of causation, I argue that this account is in need of a more straightforward answer as to what truth-makers its causal claims should have.