How physicalists can avoid reductionism

Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.(2) His conclusion on multiple realizability is much stronger than his reasoning warrants.(3) In discussing supervenience, he is wrong to assume that the only approach to explaining why physical truths determine all the truths must be via psychophysical laws.(4) His general argument rests on a mistaken assumption that the only alternative to psychophysical identity theses is to accept supervenient causal relations.     

Reducing reductionism: on a putative proof for Extreme Haecceitism

Nathan Salmon, in his paper Trans-World Identification and Stipulation (1996) purports to give a proof for the claim that facts concerning trans-world identity cannot be conceptually reduced to general facts. He calls this claim ‘Extreme Haecceitism.’ I argue that his proof is fallacious. However, I also contend that the analysis and ultimate rejection of his proof clarifies the fundamental issues that are at stake in the debate between the reductionist and haecceitist solutions to the problem of trans-world identity. These issues hinge on the ability of modal logic and possible worlds semantics to draw a hard and fast distinction between the logic and the metaphysics of modal logic. I shall claim that the considerations in this paper call into question the viability of such a distinction.

Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust

According to anti‐reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection.     

Models of reduction and categories of reductionism

A classification of models of reduction into three categories — theory reductionism, explanatory reductionism, and constitutive reductionism — is presented. It is shown that this classification helps clarify the relations between various explications of reduction that have been offered in the past, especially if a distinction is maintained between the various epistemological and ontological issues that arise. A relatively new model of explanatory reduction, one that emphasizes that reduction is the explanation of a whole in terms of its parts is also presented in detail. Finally, the classification is used to clarify the debate over reductionism in molecular biology. It is argued there that while no model from the category of theory reduction might be applicable in that case, models of explanatory reduction might yet capture the structure of the relevant explanations.Thanks are due to David Hull, Michael Martin, Ken Schaffner, Abner Shimony and William Wimsatt for many valuable discussions of these issues and for comments and criticism of an earlier version of this paper. This paper was partly written during the tenure of a grant from the Boston University Graduate School.     

Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.     

Resisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle

Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.     

A clarification of Multisystem-Multimethod assessment: reductionism versus wholism

A clarification and response to a critique of the Multisystem-Multimethod (MS-MM) family assessment is provided in this paper. This approach consists of a logic for integrating family assessment, systems thinking, and clinical interventions. In contrast to the wholistic, or systemic, focus of MS-MM family assessment, the critique of these procedures recommends a more reductionistic approach that contradicts basic elements of systems theory. The critique advocates the isolation and measurement of a few family phenomena, whereas MS-MM assessment recognizes the interdependence among the levels of organization and components of family systems.     

Beyond reductionism: The emerging holistic paradigm in education

Abstract

Modern educational theory and practice are grounded in an objectivistic, reductionistic world view, particularly a “natural science” conception of human development. Holistic education is a radically non‐reductionistic approach based upon a person‐centered, ecological, global and spiritual world view. As such, the holistic paradigm is an alternative not only to the scientistic reductionism of the modern age, but also to the intellectual reductionism of postmodern thought. Holistic education is a humanistic as well as spiritual critique of the dominant culture.