The naïve intuitive statistician: a naïve sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals

The perspective of the na?ve intuitive statistician is outlined and applied to explain overconfidence when people produce intuitive confidence intervals and why this format leads to more overconfidence than other formally equivalent formats. The na?ve sampling model implies that people accurately describe the sample information they have but are na?ve in the sense that they uncritically take sample properties as estimates of population properties. A review demonstrates that the na?ve sampling model accounts for the robust and important findings in previous research as well as provides novel predictions that are confirmed, including a way to minimize the overconfidence with interval production. The authors discuss the na?ve sampling model as a representative of models inspired by the na?ve intuitive statistician.     

The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children's explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N=24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant "explanation advantage" for children's reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Qualitative differences between naïve and scientific theories of evolution

Philosophers of biology have long argued that Darwin's theory of evolution was qualitatively different from all earlier theories of evolution. Whereas Darwin's predecessors and contemporaries explained adaptation as the transformation of a species' "essence," Darwin explained adaptation as the selective propagation of randomly occurring mutations within a population. The present study explored the possibility of a parallel between early "transformational" theories of evolution and modern na?ve theories. Forty-two high school and college students and three evolutionary biologists were tested on their understanding of six evolutionary phenomena: variation, inheritance, adaptation, domestication, speciation, and extinction. As predicted, a plurality of participants demonstrated transformational reasoning inconsistent with natural selection. Correlational analyses revealed that participants who demonstrated transformational reasoning were as internally consistent as participants who demonstrated an understanding of natural selection, with the exception of one group of participants who appeared to have assimilated two heuristics--"survival of the fittest" and "acquired traits are not inherited"--into an otherwise transformational framework. These findings suggest that the widespread and early-developing tendency to essentialize biological kinds precludes students from conceptualizing species as populations of individuals differentially affected by the environment.     

Individual differences in the responses of naïve rhesus monkeys to snakes

The authors demonstrated individual differences in inhibited behavior and withdrawal responses of laboratory-born rhesus monkeys when initially exposed to a snake. Most monkeys displayed a small significant increase in their behavioral inhibition in the presence of a snake. A few monkeys had marked responses, and some actively withdrew. Although the responses of the most extreme laboratory-born monkeys were comparable to feral-born monkeys, the responses of the laboratory-born monkeys rapidly habituated. The individual differences in the responses of na?ve monkeys likely reflect a continuum from orienting to wariness to fear. A neurobiological model is presented that addresses potential mechanisms underlying these individual differences, their relation to fear, and how they may predispose to phobia development.     

Deceptiveness on the PAI: a study of naïve faking with psychiatric inpatients

In this study, we sought to explore the diagnostic accuracy of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991) Validity scales (Negative Impression Management [NIM] and Positive Impression Management [PIM]) and indexes (Malingering index, Defensiveness index [DEF]; Morey, 1993, 1996; Cashel Discriminant Function; Cashel, Rogers, Sewell, & Martin-Cannici, 1995; and Rogers Discriminant Function [RDF]; Rogers, Sewell, Morey, & Ustad, 1996) to identify differences in profiles completed by psychiatric inpatients under standardized instructions (Time 1) and after random assignment (Time 2) to a fake good (n=21), fake bad (n=20), or retest (n=21) scenario. Repeated measures analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction effect. Whereas the retest group did not show any significant changes on the PAI variables from Time 1 to Time 2, both faking groups showed changes in expected directions. Discriminant function analyses revealed that NIM, RDF, and lower scores on DEF best differentiated between the faking bad and retest groups. PIM was the only nonredundant significant score discriminating the faking good and retest groups. Cutoffs for these scales and indexes established in prior research were supported using diagnostic efficiency statistics. Results suggest that NIM and RDF in faking bad scenarios and PIM in faking good scenarios are most sensitive to unsophisticated attempts to dissimulate by inpatient psychiatric patients.     

Taking a naïve other's perspective to debias the hindsight bias: Did it backfire?

Hindsight bias is a phenomenon that occurs when outcome knowledge interferes with the ability to accurately recall judgments made in a previous, naïve state. Also known as the “knew it all along” bias, we aimed to diminish the bias by having individuals take the perspective of a naïve other, as a way of encouraging acceptance that they had, in fact, not known it all along. Adult participants were given blurry-to-clear images incrementally until they were able to identify the object and were then re-presented with the same sequence of images and asked to make a judgment about when they had identified the item correctly the first time. They were also asked to judge when they thought a naïve peer (Experiments 1 and 2), or a naïve child (Experiment 2) could identify the objects. Results showed a robust hindsight bias in all perspectives, and sporadic success at eliminating the bias. When taking the perspective of a naïve peer, there were failures and successes; when taking the perspective of a naïve child, there was an ultra-debiasing, or a reverse hindsight bias. However, did the manipulation backfire? We conclude that while the manipulation of thinking like a naïve child may have eliminated the bias, participants seemed to use an “adults know best” rule rather than accepting past naivete for themselves.     

The contribution of the cingulate cortex: treating depressive symptoms in first-episode drug naïve schizophrenia

BackgroundOur previous study has shown the cingulate cortex abnormalities in first-episode drug naïve (FEDN) schizophrenia patients with comorbid depressive symptoms. However, it remains largely unknown whether antipsychotics may induce morphometric change in cingulate cortex and its relationship with depressive symptoms. The purpose of this study was to further clarify the important role of cingulate cortex in the treatment on depressive symptoms in FEDN schizophrenia patients.MethodIn this study, 42 FEDN schizophrenia patients were assigned into depressed patients group (DP, n = 24) and non-depressed patients group (NDP, n = 18) measured by the 24-item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAMD). Clinical assessments and anatomical images were obtained from all patients before and after 12-week treatment with risperidone.ResultsAlthough risperidone alleviated psychotic symptoms in all patients, depressive symptoms were decreased only in DP. Significant group by time interaction effects were found in the right rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) and other subcortical regions in the left hemisphere. After risperidone treatment, the right rACC were increased in DP. Further, the increasing volume of right rACC was negatively associated with improvement in depressive symptoms.ConclusionThese findings suggested that the abnormality of the rACC is the typical characteristics in schizophrenia with depressive symptoms. It's likely key region contributing to the neural mechanisms underlying the effects of risperidone treatment on depressive symptoms in schizophrenia.     

Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Intentionality

Philosophia - This paper argues for the conjunctive thesis of naïve realism and phenomenal intentionalism about perceptual experiences. Naïve realism holds that the phenomenology of...     

Naïve Comprehension and Contracting Implications

In his paper [6], Greg Restall conjectured that a logic supports a naïve comprehension scheme if and only if it is robustly contraction free, that is, if and only if no contracting connective is definable in terms of the primitive connectives of the logic. In this paper, we present infinitely many counterexamples to Restall's conjecture, in the form of purely implicational logics which are robustly contraction free, but which trivialize naïve comprehension.     

Naïve realism about unconscious perception

Synthese - Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious...     

A possible role of naïve impetus in Michotte's "launching effect": Evidence from representational momentum

In Michotte's (1946/1963) launching effect paradigm, a moving launcher contacts a stationary target, and then the launcher becomes stationary and the target begins to move. In the experiments reported here, observers were presented with modifications of a launching effect display, and displacement in memory for targets was measured. Faster launcher velocities resulted in larger displacements for moving targets, and the effect of launcher velocity was larger with faster target velocities. Launcher velocity did not influence displacement of targets that remained stationary after contact. Increases in the distance travelled by moving targets after contact from the launcher resulted in smaller displacements. Displacement appeared to result from an expectation that impetus would be imparted from the launcher rather than from contact between the launcher and the target. Displacement patterns were consistent with naïve impetus theory and with the hypothesis that observers believed impetus from the launcher was imparted to the target and dissipated with subsequent target motion.     

Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience

I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented. I will defend a view according to which in non-perceptual experience one is presented with mere universals, while in perceptual experience one is presented with the instantiation of a universal by a particular. This is to adopt disjunctivism about the objects of experience, about that which is apparently present in experience.     

Optical recording of odor-evoked responses in the olfactory brain of the naïve and aversively trained terrestrial snails

Regular spontaneous oscillations were recorded both electro- and optophysiologically using a voltage-sensitive absorption dye in the olfactory part of the brain (procerebral lobe of the cerebral ganglia) of the gastropod mollusk Helix lucorum. Odor application caused transient changes in procerebral oscillations, and an odor-evoked potential was recorded in the procerebrum (PC). The wave of evoked potential originated near the place of olfactory nerve entrance into the PC and propagated via the procerebral neuropile toward the cell body layer. The spread of the odor-evoked potential corresponded roughly to the neuropile area, whereas the spontaneous oscillations were recorded in the cell body layer of the PC and were not observed in the neuropile. Evoked potential did not produce additional events intercalated into the ongoing spontaneous oscillations. Changes in parameters of spontaneous oscillations to the repeated presentations of the same odor were variable. To estimate the role of spontaneous oscillations in odor encoding, we trained the snail to avoid cineole, using paired presentations of cineole and electric shock. Elaboration of conditioned aversion to cineole applications resulted in distinct pairing-specific changes in behavior of the snails and procerebral activity. Responses to odor (cineole) applications were not different in amplitude or frequency of spontaneous oscillations in control and trained snails, whereas ratio of amplitudes of the same oscillation wave in proximal and distal regions of the procerebrum was significantly different in control and aversively trained snails, reflecting changes in neural firing in certain areas of the olfactory lobe.     

Naïve realism: a simple approach

Naïve realism is often characterized, by its proponents and detractors alike, as the view that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience is for her to stand in a simple two-place acquaintance relation toward an object. However, two of the leading defenders of naïve realism, John Campbell and Bill Brewer, have thought it necessary to complicate this picture, claiming that a third relatum is needed to account for various possible differences between distinct visual experiences of the same object (for example, differences that result from changes in the object’s spatial orientation relative to the subject, or from changes in the intensity with which the subject focuses her attention on the object). This, I argue, is a mistake. Once it is acknowledged that a subject’s visual experience acquaints her with more than just a single object, all of the relevant facts can be explained from within the simpler naïve realist framework.

     

Mental models or methodological artefacts? Adults' naïve responses to a test of children's conceptions of the earth

Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) claim that children's drawings and answers to questions show that they have naïve, theory‐like ‘mental models’ of the earth; for example, they believe it to be flat, or hollow with people inside. However, recent studies that have used different methods have found little or no evidence of these misconceptions. The contrasting accounts, and possible reasons for the inconsistent findings, were tested by giving adults (N=484) either the original task (designed for 5‐year olds) or a new version in which the same drawing instructions and questions were rephrased and clarified. Many adults' responses to the original version were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings and answers. The new version elicited substantially fewer non‐scientific responses. These findings indicate that even adults find the original instructions and questions ambiguous and confusing, and that this is the principal reason for their non‐scientific drawings and answers. Since children must find the task even more confusing than adults, this explanation very probably applies to many of their non‐scientific responses, too, and therefore accounts for the discrepant findings of previous research. ‘Naïve’ responses result largely from misinterpretation of Vosniadou and Brewer's apparently simple task, rather than from mental models of the earth.     

Naïve realism and capturing the “wisdom of dyads”

Two studies provided evidence for the role of naïve realism in the failure of individuals to give adequate weight to peer input, and explored two strategies for reducing the impact of this inferential bias. Study 1 demonstrated that dyad members see their own estimates as more “objective” than those of their partners and that this difference in perceived objectivity predicts the degree of underweighting. Compelling participants to assess their own versus their partners' objectivity prior to revising estimates decreased underweighting, an effect that was mediated by differences in perceived objectivity. Study 2 showed that the increase in accuracy that results from requiring dyad members to offer joint estimates via discussion is largely retained in subsequent individual estimates. Both studies showed that underweighting is greater when dyad members disagree on the issue about which they are making consensus estimates—a finding that further supports a “naïve realism” interpretation of the phenomenon.     

Adding possibilities can reduce the Gambler's Fallacy: A naïve-probability paradox

This paper reports a novel paradox of intuitive probabilistic reasoning detected in naïve reasoners’ responses in two separate experiments where we manipulated the number of sets (or possibilities) of the problem keeping constant the probability of the critical set. Experiment 1 showed that the incidence of the Gambler's Fallacy (GF) was reduced when the number of sets was increased. In Experiment 2, a reduction of the GF also occurred but, more importantly, the percentage of correct responses of the participants increased when three sets of possibilities instead of two were used. Therefore, both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that an increase in the extensional complexity of a problem can, under certain circumstances, lead to facilitation. These results support the importance of the extensional features in solving chance problems and are consistent with the model theory of reasoning.     

Naïve deontics: a theory of meaning, representation, and reasoning

Deontic assertions concern what one ought to do, may do, and ought not to do. This paper proposes a theory of their meanings and of how these meanings are represented in mental models. The meanings of deontic assertions refer to sets of permissible and impermissible states. An experiment corroborated the ability of individuals to list these states. The most salient were those corresponding to the mental models of the assertions. When individuals reason, they rely on mental models, which do not make all states explicit. The theory predicts the most frequent conclusions drawn from deontic premises. It also predicts the occurrence of illusory inferences from assertions of permission, i.e., inferences that seem highly plausible but that are in fact invalid. Assertions of prohibitions, according to the theory, should reduce the illusions. Further experiments corroborated these predictions.