Why are therapists indifferent to research?

In counselling and psychotherapy there is a serious research—practice gap. Why should research on the therapeutic process have such little impact? Five related factors are considered: (i) epistemology—reliance on experiential/personal knowledge; (ii) preciousness—reliance on nonaxiomatic truths; (iii) lack of theoretical rigour—looseness with which constructs are construed; (iv) non-Popperian logic—tendency to work within a theory and defend it; and (v) personalisation of theory—evaluation seen as criticism. The result is a proliferation of therapies rather than a refinement of therapy.     

Feeling like a good psychotherapist — Or a bad one: Critical incidents in psychotherapists' experiences

What makes a therapist feel competent or incompetent in a session, a concept related to the good — or bad — hour, is an implication of what the therapist believes is good therapy and therefore is trying to do — or believes is bad and therefore tries to avoid doing. In an attempt to infer covert processes in therapists, twenty-seven psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapists furnished written accounts of sessions when they had felt like good — or bad — therapists. Accounts were analysed and interpreted to uncover the varieties of good and bad experiences and their grounds. Resistance and countertransference were found to be critical phenomena. When the therapist was able to cope with such complications, good feelings were generated, and when he was unable, bad ones — provided he became aware of this inability. If not, the therapist acted out patient-specific or unspecific countertransference feelings in ways that made him feel like a good therapist.     

Minima sensibilia: Against the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience

In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal phenomena—such as continuous motion and change—appears to be ubiquitous. How is it that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which combine together—in a sense which would need to be specified—to give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. Several authors have recently proposed dynamic snapshot models of temporal experience—such as Prosser and Arstila, building upon Le Poidevin—according to which, perceptual experience has no temporal content of a non‐zero extent. I argue that there is an absence of motivation for such a view; I develop and defend the claim that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non‐zero temporal extent as such.     

Kant on the Ontological Argument

The article examines Kant's various criticisms of the broadly Cartesian ontological argument as they are developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued that each of these criticisms is effective against its intended target, and that these targets include—in addition to Descartes himself—Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. It is argued that Kant's most famous criticism—the charge that being is not a real predicate—is directed exclusively against Leibniz. Kant's argument for this thesis—the argument proceeding from his example of a hundred thalers—although it may seem to beg the question, in fact succeeds against Leibniz. It does so because the charge of begging the question can be rebutted if one makes certain Leibnizian assumptions.     

Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.     

Item-specific effects in recognition failure: Reasons for rejection of the Tulving-Wiseman function

The present paper addresses the problems of whether recognition failure of recallable words is a function of both recognition and recall, and whether recognition failure is restricted to a small and specifiable subset of study items. A meta-analysis of the Nilsson—Gardiner database (Nilsson & Gardiner, 1993) showed that recognition given recall was positively correlated with recognition and negatively correlated with recall. Two new experiments are reported, the first one using 48 word pairs for which recognition failure was found in previous studies. An item analysis of the data demonstrated that recognition failure occurred primarily with noun—adjective pairs. The second experiment compared Norwegian—American and American—Norwegian name pairs. Wide deviation from the Tulving—Wiseman function (Tulving & Wiseman, 1975) was observed for the latter condition. In both conditions, recognition failure occurred with only the items for which the beginnings of names shared three or more letters. It is concluded that recognition failure occurs when there exists a relationship between the members of an A—B pair that is independent of their pairing in the study context. The Tulving—Wiseman function is the result of collapsing across items in the analysis of previous studies.     

Behavior analysis and neuroscience: Complementary disciplines

Behavior analysis and neuroscience are disciplines in their own right but are united in that both are subfields of a common overarching field—biology. What most fundamentally unites these disciplines is a shared commitment to selectionism, the Darwinian mode of explanation. In selectionism, the order and complexity observed in nature are seen as the cumulative products of selection processes acting over time on a population of variants—favoring some and disfavoring others—with the affected variants contributing to the population on which future selections operate. In the case of behavior analysis, the central selection process is selection by reinforcement; in neuroscience it is natural selection. The two selection processes are inter‐related in that selection by reinforcement is itself the product of natural selection. The present paper illustrates the complementary nature of behavior analysis and neuroscience through considering their joint contributions to three central problem areas: reinforcement—including conditioned reinforcement, stimulus control—including equivalence classes, and memory—including reminding and remembering.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence

This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification has rather unwelcome consequences—formally resembling the Sorites paradox—as soon as it is iterated and combined with a natural Bayesian perspective on probabilistic inferences. We conclude that strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism should be abandoned. Positively, we provide a rough sketch for a graded formal coherence notion, according to which infinite regresses of epistemic justification will often have more than a minimal degree of coherence.     

It's not you,it's them: Social influences on trust propensity and trust dynamics

Scholars agree that trust primarily has two bases: trustworthiness—the extent to which a trustee is competent, honest, and has goodwill toward the trustor—and trust propensity—a stable trait reflecting the trustor's generalized belief that others can be trusted. Due to this trait characterization, the literature has largely reached a consensus that trust propensity is only an important base of trust in the earliest stage of a relationship—before information on trustworthiness has been gathered. Additionally, the trait conceptualization of trust propensity inhibits it from being modeled as an explanatory mechanism. Drawing on accessibility theory, a theory of trait activation, we argue that trust propensity has state‐like characteristics that are “activated” by the daily treatment an employee receives from coworkers. Our model highlights that the social context—predominantly ignored in prior trust research because of its lack of relevance to dyadic perceptions of trustworthiness—can have a substantial impact on dyadic trust. Across two multisource experience sampling methodology studies, we provide evidence that state trust propensity transmits the effects of citizenship and deviance received to trust in a focal coworker, whether that focal coworker is a source of that treatment or not. We also address how general levels of workplace unfairness—a between‐person construct—influence these dynamics. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these within‐person dynamics for fostering trust within organizations.     

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.     

Facebook as a Site for Inter-religious Encounters: A Case Study from Finland

The aim of this article is to analyse the social networking site Facebook as a possible platform for inter-religious dialogue. Building on a case study—an attack on a Buddhist temple in Turku, Finland, and the consequent interaction that took place online immediately following the attack—the article investigates the strengths and limitations of social networking sites such as Facebook for encountering and connecting with religious others. The ethnographic material—consisting of both Internet material and interviews with concerned parties—is discussed in close connection with current research on religion, social media, and discussions online. Themes that are highlighted include stereotypes and superficiality as assumed aspects of online conversations, the role of power in dialogue—both offline and online, and symbolic communicative actions and social networking sites.     

When Self-Blame Is Rational and Appropriate: The Limited Utility of Socratic Questioning in the Context of Moral Injury: Commentary on Wachen et al. (2016)

In this commentary, we argue that a generally sound therapeutic technique—Socratic questioning—is ill-suited to address a common variant of combat-related emotional and psychological distress. Specifically, moral injury is a term used to describe a syndrome of shame, self-handicapping, anger, and demoralization that occurs when deeply held beliefs and expectations about moral and ethical conduct are transgressed. Importantly, moral injury can and often does result from instances of intentional perpetration. We contend that challenging the accuracy of self-blame in such cases is conceptually problematic and potentially harmful. Such an approach is based on a questionable premise—i.e., that self-blame and resulting guilt are inherently illogical or inaccurate. Though this is often the case, it is not invariably so. We briefly describe an alternate approach—Adaptive Disclosure—that allows for accurate and legitimate self-blame when warranted but also promotes the possibilities of self-forgiveness, compassion, and moral reparation.     

Constructing a theory of the triple typology: Some (second) thoughts on nomothetic and idiographic approaches to personality

Our fundamental scientific task is to convert observations of particular persons behaving in particular ways in particular situations into assertions that certain kinds of persons will behave in certain kinds of ways in certain kinds of situations, that is, to construct triple typologies or equivalence classes—of persons, of behaviors, and of situations—and to fashion theories of personality that relate these equivalence classes to one another. It is argued that the different approaches to the study of personality are distinguished from one another not by whether they are idiographic or nomothetic but by the strategies they employ for constructing—or ignoring—each of these three types of equivalence classes. The likely attributes of a successful interactional theory of personality—one that would embrace the entire triple typology—are proposed and discussed.     

Piktorielle Repräsentationen als unterbestimmte räumliche Modelle

Central for the discussion about the pros and cons of pictorial representations is the indeterminacy problem. Whereas propositional representations can be underdetermined, it is a widespread opinion that pictorial representations are completely determined and committed to details. In contrast to this view, which is held — for example by Dennett, Pylyshyn and Iorger — in the present paper a variable system of commitments is proposed: Users of pictorial representations have alternatives with respect to interpretations and commitments since there are implicit annotations to these representations. The annotations refer to axiomatized geometric systems, which — from a cognitive point of view — can be seen as systems of commitments.     

The force and the content of judgment

This essay explores what it means to reject Frege's distinction of force and content: the rejection completes Frege's anti‐psychologism as it leaves no space for a psychological concept of judgment distinct from the logical concept, which is the concern of no empirical science, but of logic. It emerges that logic, as the science of judgement, is — not a metaphysics of judgement, but — metaphysics. And it emerges that the opposition of subject to subject — the elementary nexus of thinker to thinker in dialogue — is contained within the logical concept of judgment.     

KNOWLEDGE HAPPENS: WHY ZAGZEBSKI HAS NOT SOLVED THE MENO PROBLEM

I argue that Linda Zagzebski's proposed solution to the Meno Problem faces serious challenges. The Meno Problem, roughly, is how to explain the value that knowledge, as such, has over mere true belief. Her proposed solution is that believings—when thought of more like actions—can have value in virtue of their motivations. This meshes nicely with her theory that knowledge is, essentially, virtuously motivated true belief. Her solution fails because it entails that, necessarily, all knowledge is motivated in a way that resembles the motivation of actions. Crucially, Zagzebski says the value derived from motivation comes from certain laudable feelings—like love of truth (she is explicit that love is a feeling). But there are possible cases of knowledge—probably some of which are actual—in which subjects do not or cannot experience these feelings.     

Galton and the birth of differential psychology and eugenics: Social,political, and economic forces

The social, political, and economic forces operative in nineteenth century Britain are briefly described. This permits tracing the birth of both the scientific study of individual differences and the field of eugenics to the infrastructure of society at that time. The distinction is made between the normative doctrine of individualism and the factual study of individual differences. It is argued that democratic—liberal—capitalistic—individualism, in part, conditioned the beginning of differential psychology and eugenics. In this process, Galton's liberal views concerning individual freedom and opportunity for full development became transformed into their dialectic—totalitarian—collectivism—a vision of an ideal state which did not come into being. It is paradoxically concluded that those same social forces which helped bring about the birth of differential psychology and the entailing eugenics ideology prevented the latter from being accepted and implemented.     

The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and,More Generally,of Conceptual Analysis)

It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision‐making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual‐analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings.