Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied,Embedded Mind?*

Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new‐wave body‐centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal‐partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than ever before). The present paper displays the tension, scouts the space of possible responses, and ends by attempting to specify what the body actually needs to be, given its complex role in these recent debates.     

Events, Sortals, and the Mind–Body Problem

In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about objectidentity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal.     

A Review of “Mind to Mind: Infant Research,Neuroscience, and Psychoanalysis”

Abstract

This article examines current research pertaining to the relationship between a mother and her children, and how this relationship may affect sibling interactions. Issues such as temperament, gender, and the age gap between children are also explored to ascertain their impact on the sibling relationship.

The displacement of the first-born child and the ensuing sense of loss and anger he may experience as a result of this is explored. The mother's second pregnancy is also discussed in regard to the impact of unresolved issues relating to her own sibling relations. The mother's interactions with each child, her role as a model for identification, and marital relations are discussed in light of their impact on sibling relations.

The evolution of a positive attachment between siblings is explored. Rivalrous behavior between siblings is also discussed, particularly in association to the mother's treatment of her own children and the manner in which the mother deals with her own aggression.     

Xiong Shili on the Nature,the Mind and the Origin of Badness as Evidenced in Ming Xin Pian 明心篇 (Explaining the Mind )

The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian明心篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.     

Judgement in Leibniz’s Conception of the Mind: Predication,Affirmation, and Denial

Topoi - The aim of the paper is to illuminate some core aspects of Leibniz’s conception of judgement and its place in his conception of the mind. In particular, the paper argues for three...     

Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception be Unconscious?

Recently, a new movement has arisen in the philosophy of perception: one that views perception as a natural kind. Strangely, this movement has neglected the extensive work in philosophy of science on natural kinds. The present paper remedies this. I start by isolating a widespread and influential assumption, which is that we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for perception. I show that this assumption is radically at odds with current philosophy of science work on natural kinds. I then develop an alternative, new view of perception. This new view takes as its starting point the dominant position on kinds in the life sciences: the homeostatic property cluster account. I show that, if you accept this view, then all of the putative cases of unconscious perception are more plausibly seen as cases where it is indeterminate whether the mental episode in question is an instance of perception.     

Does Counseling Need the Mind?

In this article, the author argues that the language used in counseling practice is largely a common sense language using mentalistic words. Basic mentalistic assumptions and challenges to those assumptions are outlined. The practical consequences of retaining or discarding mentalism in counseling are discussed. The author concludes that mentalistic language persists in counseling practice because it offers a useful vocabulary, but that the counseling field could benefit from adopting a path similar to that used in the cognitive sciences.     

Patrolling the Mind’s Boundaries

Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extrabodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person’s overall system of beliefs. Environmental states, however, fail to satisfy this central feature of the functional role of belief, and hence fail to be genuine mental states.

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Mind the Gaps: Are Conclusions About Mindfulness Entirely Conclusive?

Mindfulness has emerged as an important construct in the mental health field. Although evidence suggests benefits, it also appears that excitement over the clinical applications of mindfulness has largely suspended concentrated efforts to clarify fundamental elements of the construct. This article explores conceptual confusion and contrasts primary mindfulness‐based techniques before investigating attrition factors, adverse effects of mindfulness practices, and populations contraindicated for mindfulness‐based techniques. Implications for practice are provided.     

“Mind the gaps”: An empirical approach to engineering ethics, 1997–2001

A survey on ethical issues in engineering was administered over a five-year period to Stanford engineering students and practicing engineers. Analysis of its results strongly suggests that important disconnects exist between the education of engineering students regarding ethical issues in engineering on the one hand, and the realities of contemporary engineering practice on the other. Two noteworthy consequences of these gaps are that the views of engineering students differ substantially over what makes an issue an ethical issue, while practicing engineers exhibit significant disagreement over what is the most important non-technical aspect of being a responsible engineering professional in contemporary society. These divergences impede the recognition of ethical issues and of specific moral responsibilities of engineers in concrete professional practice. It is argued that the use of suitably refined and probing surveys of engineering students and practicing engineers about ethical issues in engineering is an important although neglected empirical approach to the study of engineering ethics. Such an approach can enhance the prevailing case study method and combat over-tidy theoretical-analytical approaches to the subject. When a train arrives at a station in the London Underground, a public announcement cautions passengers to “mind the gap”, i.e. heed the space between the station platform and the carriage while entering or exiting. An early draft of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Ethics in Engineering and Computer Science, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, March 21–23, 1999.     

Toward an Evolution of Mind: Implications for the Faithful?

Ever since its inception, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection has challenged assumptions about the nature of humankind and human institutions. It did not escape the notice of Darwin, sympathetic allies, or hostile contemporaries that his theory had profound implications for ethics and theology. In this paper I review some current sociobiological hypotheses about the mind that are based on the theory that the human mind is primarily a social tool. Many researchers now believe that both complex human within-group cooperation and between-group competition are the anvils that may have shaped the modules of the mind. Given this evolutionary theory of the mind, the Darwinian challenge to theism, ethics, and faith is now being relaunched with a vengeance. However, I suggest that modern physics, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science all seem to fit nicely into the atheistic and phenomenological niche defined by Buddhism.     

Cognitive Spread: Under What Conditions Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body?

The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) contend that arguments for EMH commit a ‘coupling constitution fallacy’. We deny that the master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But we think that there is an important question lurking behind A&A's allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from Haugeland, we contend that the system must exhibit a distinctive sort of semantic activity, semantic activity that the system as a whole takes responsibility for.     

How Does the Body Get Into the Mind?

In this article, we propose that gestures play an important role in the connection between sensorimotor experience and language. Gestures may be the link between bodily experience and verbal expression that advocates of embodied cognition have postulated. In a developmental sequence of communicative action, gestures, which are initially similar to action sequences, substantially shorten and represent actions in metonymic form. In another process, action sequences are based on kinesthetic schemata that themselves find their metaphoric expression in language. Again, gestures enact kinesthetic schemata that are correlated with verbal expressions. Examples from a large database are used to illustrate the various processes by means of which language arises when students conduct school science investigations.     

In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism,detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.     

Conversations in the Gap Between Mind and Soul: Grammatical Reflections ‘In (the) Place(s) of Thinking'

In December 2013, the Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture sponsored a conference to celebrate the life and work of James Hillman. My article is an open letter to a colleague and friend that continues conversations we had over the years on the issue of the language of psychology and the logos of soul (ψυχολογ?α). In my letter, I suggest to James that psychology has a monumental problem in its addiction to nouns and, alongside him, I explore the possibility that the soul's speech is a verb the moods, tenses, and voices of which configure psychological life and its style of discourse in ways that offer an alternative to the dominant scientific paradigm and the mode of discourse in psychology today. This letter in memory of James compliments the article I wrote in memory of my mentor, friend, and colleague, J. H. van den Berg, that appeared in these pages last year. Over a period of 35 years, each has been a companion for me in the dialogue between phenomenology and depth psychology.     

Some Eighteenth Century Contributions to the Mind–Body Problem (Wolff, Taurellus, Knutzen, Bülfiger and the Pre-Critical Kant)

This work speaks about very special solution of the mind–body problem. This solution based on the so-called Principle of Co-existence stands out as one of the most interesting attempts at solving the mind–body problem. It states that substances can only exert a mutual influence on one another if they have something in common. This does not have to be a common property but rather, a binding relationship. Thus, substances co-exist when they remain bound by a common relationship, for instance, to an external subject. The Principle of Co-existence played an extremely important role in Kant’s philosophy, not only since it provided a framework for solving the mind–body problem, but since it captured the very basis of its existence. The Principle found also reflection in the works of Kant’s successors, such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel or Feuerbach. It had significant—though often hidden—repercussions on later philosophy of mind. The notion of force and the principle of its operation became key concepts in resolving the mind–body problem. As a result, philosophy of mind concentrated on the search for a principle explaining the occurrence of two complementary types of phenomena. This established a tradition which, to a greater or lesser extent, has survived to our day.     

Complexity and the Mind–Nature Divide

Descartes's distinction between res cogitans and res extensa is a paradigmatic concept on which Western thought has been grounded. The reductionist and objectivistic approach of modern science draws its fundamental premise from it. This dualism has also instigated a view of human as separate from nature. The complexity approach in its most radical form questions many of these assumptions, asserting that the subjective and objective dimensions are involved in a relation of mutual determination and dependence. This article argues that if the dualistic metaphysics is replaced by a vision emphasizing this mutual dependence, a new way of interacting with nature may also be fostered.