Communicative functions of directional verbal probabilities: Speaker’s choice,listener’s inference,and reference points

Verbal probabilities have directional communicative functions, and most can be categorized as positive (e.g., “it is likely”) or negative (e.g., “it is doubtful”). We examined the communicative functions of verbal probabilities based on the reference point hypothesis According to this hypothesis, listeners are sensitive to and can infer a speaker’s reference points based on the speaker’s selected directionality. In four experiments (two of which examined speakers’ choice of directionality and two of which examined listeners’ inferences about a speaker’s reference point), we found that listeners could make inferences about speakers’ reference points based on the stated directionality of verbal probability. Thus, the directionality of verbal probabilities serves the communicative function of conveying information about a speaker’s reference point.     

Speaker’s Intentions,Ambiguous Demonstrations,and Relativist Semantics for Demonstratives

Philosophia - In this paper, I do four things. First, I argue that Recanati’s recent argument for intentionalist semantics for demonstratives is erroneous. I do this partly by suggesting that...     

Aristotle’s dilemma

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to use an elegant short argument to attack Plato’s doctrine of the good, which argument equally appears to attack Aristotle’s own doctrine of the good. I consider these two questions: First: Why does Aristotle reverse the judgment of Socrates/Plato on the issue: Which is better – things that are (only) good in themselves, or things that are both good in themselves and good for their consequences? Second: Why does Aristotle attack Plato’s doctrine that the Form of the Good is the chief good, with an argument that appears to threaten his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good? I think the answers to these two questions are related. The elegant short argument in question I call “Aristotle’s Fast Argument.”After apologizing for criticizing views held by friends of his, Aristotle deploys the Fast Argument as a clincher to cap off his refutation of Plato’s view that the Form of the Good is the chief good: “And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself’, if in man himself and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will there be a difference in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day.” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1096 a34–b4). I explore this sketchily presented Fast Argument. I consider why Aristotle may think it is valid and why he does not seem to realize that, on readings that make it effective against Plato’s view, his Fast Argument also seems to apply to his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good. This is what I will call “Aristotle’s Dilemma.” If the Fast Argument is interpreted too narrowly, its point about the whiteness of a white thing being independent of its duration will not apply to the goodness of the Form of the Good. If it is interpreted broadly enough to undermine the claim of the Form of the Good to be the chief good, it will equally undermine that claim for eudaimonia. Finally, I discuss some of the things Plato and Aristotle say about the chief good, and comparable things Immanuel Kant says about the good will. I draw some speculative conclusions that focus on the importance for Aristotle of the goodness of the chief good not being at risk.     

Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists

Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn. We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.     

A dilemma for wolterstorff’s theistic grounding of human dignity and rights

In a number of recent works, Nicholas Wolterstorff defends the claim that human rights inhere in the dignity of every human. He further contends that the explanation of this dignity cannot be found in the intrinsic features of humans; rather, the only plausible explanation for human dignity is that it is bestowed upon humans by God’s love. In this paper, I argue that Wolterstorff’s theory concerning the ground of human dignity falls prey to something quite similar to the classic Euthyphro dilemma: either God must love every existing human in a dignity-bestowing manner or he need not, and either option is problematic. If the former, then whatever it is about humans that ensures God’s love can reasonably be thought to be the independent source of human dignity and/or rights, thereby leaving us without cause to appeal to God’s love for the explanation of this dignity. If the latter, the implication is that moral statements which appear to be necessarily true are only contingently so. Wolterstorff’s theory will thus require substantial modification, or else abandonment.     

Scylla and Charybdis: the purist’s dilemma

This paper explores the view that, on Mumford’s account of the purist, to the degree that the purist adopts an aesthetic perspective, he or she doesn’t watch the sport in question, and to the degree that he or she does watch the sport, there is a loss of aesthetic appreciation. The idea that spectators oscillate between partisanship and purism means that the purist is unable to avoid either the Scylla of not actually watching the sport, or the Charybdis of loss of aesthetic appreciation at any given point. Ultimately there seems to be both a sport-shaped hole and an aesthetic-shaped hole in Mumford’s account of the purist. It is argued that oscillation is incapable of dealing with the problem precisely because it is disjunctive in nature and entails the spectator either watching sport from an aesthetic perspective or from a partisan perspective at any given time. An alternative conception of the aesthetic is considered that offers one way of dissolving the purist’s dilemma.     

Object manipulability affects children’s and adults’ conceptual processing

Research on kinds of concepts indicates that children use perceptual and functional information differently to form natural and artifact concepts. Beyond object domain, object manipulability appears to be a decisive factor in adult conceptual processing. Thus, the effect of object manipulability on conceptual processing was tested in 5- and 7-year-olds and adults using a picture matching task. Reaction times for identifying conceptual relations on the basis of perceptual similarity (e.g., jacket-coat) and contextual/functional information (e.g., jacket-hanger) were analyzed according to object manipulability and domain. Both children and adults were faster to identify contextual/functional relations for manipulable than for nonmanipulable objects. Conversely, they were faster to identify perceptual similarity relations for nonmanipulable than for manipulable objects, particularly for natural concepts. Results reveal an early distinction between concepts of manipulable and nonmanipulable objects. Implications for further research on concept formation and for embodied views of concepts are discussed.     

Conventions,morals and strategy: Greta’s dilemma and the incarceration game

Synthese - I articulate the question of the value of common knowledge, or the question of why common knowledge is preferred to mere widespread knowledge. I argue that common knowledge often enjoys...     

The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma

Synthese - Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists...     

Narrative responsibility and moral dilemma: A case study of a family’s decision about a brain-dead daughter

A brain death case is presented and reinterpreted using the narrative approach. In the case, two Japanese parents face a dilemma about whether to respect their daughter’s desire to donate organs even though, for them, it would mean literally killing their daughter. We argue that the ethical dilemma occurred because the parents were confronted with two conflicting narratives to which they felt a “narrative responsibility,” namely, the responsibility that drives us to tell, retell, and coauthor the (often unfinished) narratives of loved ones. We suggest that moral dilemmas arise not only from conflicts between moral justifications but also from conflicts between narratives and human relationships.     

Relative performance and implicit incentives in the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma

This paper illustrates how the payoff matrices of the single group Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) differentially reinforce cooperation when participants care about relative performance. Examples of particular payoff patterns and thought experiments using a computational simulation demonstrate that withholding cooperation is not always the dominant strategy in the IPD. In the intergroup structure, three conditions differentially reinforce cooperation. When competing groups have equal numbers of cooperators, withholding cooperation is always the dominant strategy just as in the single group structure. In contrast, when one group has more cooperators than the other group, cooperation by its members can dominate withholding cooperation by members of the other group. Thus, the relative advantage of one group over another increases the payoff for cooperation in some configurations of the IPD over the payoff in the PD. Relative payoff is thus an untheorized variable motivating cooperation in the IPD.     

Incommensurability,incomparability, and God’s choice of a world

Anselmian theism holds that there necessarily exists a being, God, who is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. This being is also understood to be the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this role is generally understood as follows: God surveys the array of possible worlds, and in his wisdom selects exactly one for actualization, based on its axiological properties. In this paper, I discuss an under-appreciated challenge for this account of the Anselmian God’s selection of a world. In particular, I urge that there are failures of comparability between various possible worlds, and I argue that, given certain assumptions, these failures threaten the rationality of God’s choice of a world. To the extent that rationality is deemed necessary for unsurpassability, this result also challenges the core Anselmian notion that God is an unsurpassable being.     

Plato’s Error and a Mean Field Formula for Convex Mosaics

Axiomathes - Plato claimed that the regular solids are the building blocks of all matter. His views, commonly referred to as the geometric atomistic model, had enormous impact on human thought...     

Thomason’s Paradox for Belief,and Two Consequence Relations

Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain ‘natural assumptions’, then it implies that the subject is inconsistent if the beliefs include arithmetic. I challenge the result by insisting that the motivation for Thomason’s principle (ii), via Moore’s Paradox, leads to a more complex representation, in which stating the facts and expressing one’s beliefs are treated differently. Certain logical connections among expressions of assent, and between expression and statement, are a matter of consequence on pain of pragmatic incoherence, not consequence on pain of classical logical inconsistency. But while this salvages the possibility that a modification of the above sort of representation could be adequate, Thomason’s devastating conclusion returns if the scientist identifies himself as the subject of that representation, even when paying heed to the requirement of pragmatic coherence of the sort highlighted by Moore’s Paradox.     

Children’s spirituality and inclusion: strengthening a child’s spirit with community,resilience and joy

The vision of inclusion speaks to the minds, hearts and spirits of children with disabilities. A meaningful inclusive atmosphere exists when children with and without disabilities are physically engaged and interact with one another as a community in a variety of activities. Spirituality for children with disabilities within an inclusive early childhood classroom requires an education that is intellectual, emotional, social, moral and spiritual. In this type of environment, children with disabilities and peers can flourish in a warm and welcoming community. This paper contributes to the literature and asserts the importance of the ‘forgotten’ dimension of early childhood special education. Learning strategies to inform teachers and parents for establishing an inclusive welcoming classroom for children with disabilities are offered by exploring a spiritual curriculum emphasising holistic education with peers through strengths-based projects, small group work and peer-mediated interventions for supporting the interests of each child and developing the capacity to develop resilience and joy.     

Spatial term apprehension with a reference object’s rotation in three-dimensional space

It has been reported that the overall shapes of spatial categorical patterns of projective spatial terms such as above and below are not influenced by the rotation of a reference object on a two-dimensional (2D) upright plane. However, is this also true in three-dimensional (3D) space? This study shows the dynamic aspects of the apprehension of projective spatial terms in 3D space by detailing how the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front influences the apprehension of projective spatial terms on a level plane by mapping their spatial categorical patterns. The experiment was designed to examine how spatial categorical patterns on a level plane changed with the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front in 3D computer graphics space. We manipulated the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front at three levels (0°, 90°, and 180° rotations) and examined how such manipulation changed the overall spatial categorical patterns of four basic Japanese projective spatial terms: mae, ushiro, hidari, and migi (similar to in front of, behind, to the left of, and to the right of in English, respectively). The results show that spatial term apprehension was affected by the rotation of the reference object in 3D space. In particular, rotation influenced the mae–ushiro and hidari–migi systems differently. The results also imply that our understanding of projective spatial terms on a level plane in 3D space is affected dynamically by visual information from 3D cues.     

‘Bricolage’: reclaiming a conceptual tool

This article provides the genealogy of bricolage and underscores the modifications it has undergone within the sociologies of culture and religion. It draws on the study of three new religious movements that teach unconventional versions of Hinduism and kabbalah, to show that the current understanding of bricolage in the studies of popular culture and religion over-estimates its eclectic and personal nature and neglects its sociocultural logics. It tends to take for granted the availability of cultural resources used in bricolage, and finally it fails to understand the social significance of individualism, overlooking the ways in which norms and power could be expressed through culture in the contemporary world. This article suggests that it would be best reclaiming bricolage's original meaning, prompting questions about the contexts that make certain elements available, social patterns that may organise bricolage, who ‘bricole’, what for, who is empowered, from what and by using whose tradition.     

Fales’s Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason

Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales’s defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being a good reason, and that his conception of direct apprehension faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. In addition, I argue that his expansive conception of inference is unfounded.