物质文化,文化物质

我并非全神贯注于编纂词典 ,以致于忘记了语词是大地之女 ,事物是天堂之子。语言只是科学的工具 ,而文字则只是思想的符号。塞谬尔·约翰逊《英语辞典》     

Monism and Material Constitution

Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate this approach in terms of modal analyses of material constitution, but argue that ultimately it fails. The monist must instead accept a deflationary, symmetrical use of ‘materially constitutes’. We argue that this is a serious cost for her approach.     

Teaching Religion and Material Culture

Abstract. Because religions discipline and interpret bodies; create and define sacred spaces; generate, adore and study images in all media; regulate the intake of food; structure temporal experience; and in general interpenetrate and are permeated by the cultural landscapes in which they exist, religious studies must engage material religion and religious materiality. We encounter bodily realities of other religions and cultures through our own disciplined bodies, which are both necessary and problematic for those encounters. This article connects theoretical and practical resources needed to help students discover the stuff of religion – flesh and blood, bread and wine, songs and sound, knives and body parts, movement and music, human bodies, time, space, cosmograms composed of and composing the bodies of the religious – uncovering the materiality of religion, existing underneath, alongside, without, and amidst religious textuality and verbal ideation.     

Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals

This paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that consideration of general indicative conditionals, e.g., sentences like If a donkey brays it is beaten , provides a powerful argument that a pure material implication analysis of indicative if p, q is correct. In the second part I argue, opposing writers like Jackson, that a Gricean style theory of pragmatics can explain the manifest assertability conditions of if p, q in terms of its conventional content – assumed to be merely ( p ⊃ q ) – and the conversational implicature contents which utterance of if p, q may gain in certain contexts. I also defend the pragmatic approach against a recent objection by Edgington that appeal to pragmatics cannot explain what we are inclined to say about the believability conditions, as opposed to the assertability conditions, of indicative if p, q.     

Material Aid and Social Attraction1

Aid programs can be used as an antidote to social conflict. Under certain conditions, however, they may create hostility. In this experiment subjects representing six hypothetical countries (1) either received or did not receive material aid from a seventh nation and (2) had a high or low level of material need. Attraction for the aid-giver decreased markedly when aid was denied, but increased very little when it was granted. When subjects were high in material needs, the denial of aid produced maximal antagonism. However, when aid was received, high need did not enhance attraction to the donor. The implications of these findings for an exchange theory of attraction and for aid giving are discussed.     

Mind,Mortality and Material Being

Many religiously minded materialist philosophers have attempted to understand the doctrine of the survival of death from within a physicalist approach. Their goal is not to show the doctrine false, but to explain how it can be true. One such approach has been developed by Peter van Inwagen. After explaining what I call the duplication objection, I present van Inwagen’s proposal and show how a proponent might attempt to solve the problem of duplication. I argue that the very features of the view that aid the proponent in responding to the duplication objection entails the possibility of an impossible state of affairs—that two distinct persons can at the same time be identical with the same bundle of material simples. The religiously minded materialist is caught between the horns of a dilemma. One’s view regarding human persons must be robust enough to account for personal identity over time, and so not fall to the duplication objection. At the same time, the view must not entail the possibility of two persons temporarily having complete coincident existence.     

Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem

It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.     

The origin and mission of Material Religion

Beginning its sixth year of publication, Material Religion is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to gather the best work from around the world engaged in materializing the study of religions. The editors welcome original scholarship on any religion and from any period in human history that treats material objects and practices as primary evidence and engages in critical reflection on the cultural construction of materiality. In this article the editors reflect on the formation and format of the journal, the force and direction of its articles and other features, the question of what constitutes the material culture of religion, and finally the role of materiality in the current study of religions. Along the way, the editors consider new theories and concerns that have been taken up in the journal's pages and address the range of disciplines and interests that are represented in the different departments of the journal.     

Material Objects,Constitution, and Mysterianism

It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “only derivatively material” (2003, 211). In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there may be metaphysical contexts in which mysterianism can be accepted with equanimity, I further argue, the question of the materiality of quotidian objects is not one of them.     

Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts

In his seminal work Moral Notions, Julius Kovesi presents a novel account of concept formation. At the heart of this account is a distinction between what he terms the material element and the formal element of concepts. This paper elucidates his distinction in detail and contrasts it with other distinctions such as form-matter, universal-particular, genus-difference, necessary-sufficient, and open texture-closed texture. We situate Kovesi’s distinction within his general philosophical method, outlining his views on concept formation in general and explain how his theory of concept formation is applied in moral philosophy.     

Conditional Reasoning with Realistic Material

Four experiments are reported which investigated the types of truth tables that people associate with conditional sentences and the kinds of inferences that they will draw from them. The present studies differed from most previous ones in using different types of content in the conditionals, for example promises and warnings. It was found that the type of content had a strong and consistent effect on both truth tables and inferences. It is suggested that this is because in real life conditionals make probabilistic assertions, and that the strength of the probabilistic link is determined by the situation in which the conditional occurs. The implications of these findings for current theories of reasoning are considered and it is concluded that none of them is entirely satisfactory. It is suggested that more linguistically based theories may prove more successful.     

Interobjectivity and Interactivity: Material Objects and Discourse in Class

In classroom teaching, material objects like the blackboard play an important role. Yet qualitative research on education has largely ignored this material dimension of education and focused on interaction and discourse. Both dimensions are, however, closely related to each other. Material objects are embedded in classroom discourse and are transformed into knowledge objects by speech acts, and in turn structure discussions and constitute a point of reference for school lessons. Drawing on ethnographic research on classroom lessons in mathematics and science classes in German high schools, we propose a perspective that recognizes both the materiality of teaching and its interactive dimension.     

菩提达摩石碑碑文并参考资料

日本学者小岛岱山先生有关河南熊耳山菩提达摩石碑的新发现,是1999年夏天赴中国调查的重要收获。关于此碑文的发现小岛先生在日本的佛教报纸《中外日报》（1999年9月11日）上,发表了关于在熊耳山的署名武帝撰达摩碑文的文章,日本的《朝日新闻》（1999年9月10日朝刊）也作了报道,并附其师、著名中国佛教研究学者镰田茂雄先生的评论：“关于达摩石碑,从文献上虽可知道一些,可是找到了真正的原石原碑,则是大发现。字体问题以及考古学上属于什么时代的作品尚须调查,不过可以说这是禅宗史研究的一级资料发现”,指出了小岛发现的意义。小岛岱山先生之所以希望此文发表在本刊上,一则本资料是在中国发现的,再则希望引起中国同行的注意,一同从事研究。