两种道德自我调节机制下的道德行为

道德自我调节指个体根据道德自我, 从事(不从事)道德行为和不道德行为。道德自我分为状态道德自我(道德自我知觉)和特质道德自我(道德认同)。道德自我调节的负反馈机制, 指个体依据道德自我知觉, 保持道德行为的波动性, 它包含道德许可效应和道德清洁效应; 正反馈机制, 指个体依据道德认同, 保持道德行为的一致性。解释水平理论整合了正负反馈机制, 两种道德行为。未来研究需探讨公我、个体差异对道德自我调节机制的影响。     

道德失调的自我调节策略

个体因为自己或内群体成员的不道德行为而面临道德失调,为了维持积极的道德自我形象,不得不采取一系列道德自我调节策略以减少道德失调。在道德决策阶段,通过道德许可来缓冲预期的道德失调。在行为评价和责任归因阶段,通过道德规范的动机性遗忘来避免道德觉察,也可以通过道德切换、去道德化、道德推脱等认知策略将不道德行为合理化。在反馈调节阶段,通过道德补偿、道德清洗等行为策略以恢复道德自我形象或通过道德掩饰来避免道德形象损失。最后探讨了道德自我调节过程的系统性、灵活性特点及其不利后果,并提出了未来可能的研究方向。     

道德情绪:探寻道德与创造力关系的新视角

先前有关道德与创造力的关系研究多关注道德的认知与行为差异对创造力产生的影响, 但研究结果却存在较大的分歧。为此, 研究从道德情绪的视角, 对二者的关系进行了系统地梳理, 发现道德情绪存在: 以情绪效价调节创造性认知; 激发道德动机, 中介人格与创造力的关系; 引发自我觉察, 促进顿悟与创造性成就的产生; 提升心理资本, 影响不同创造力特性的表达等, 多种影响个体创造力的路径。这表明, 与道德认知和行为相比, 道德情绪不仅能更加全面准确地体现出个体实际的道德活动、促进符合道德标准的创造力产生; 还为人们解释道德与创造力的关系提供了多样的路径与可能。未来需继续加深对道德情绪及其内在机制的理解、通过系统性地选取创造性任务, 明确道德情绪、道德与创造力之间的关系, 寻找道德培养与创造力激发的新模式。     

A social cognitive explanation of situational and individual effects on moral sensitivity

Models of moral decision making describe the process as beginning with the recognition of moral content in the decision environment. This recognition ability, or moral sensitivity, represents a key input to moral decision making. Adopting a social cognitive perspective, this paper studies the degree to which moral sensitivity is explained in terms of moral schema activation. In a single experiment, two situational factors (moral content priming and issue moral intensity) and two individual characteristics (moral identity and need for cognition) are tested for their effects on moral sensitivity. Results support the social cognitive explanation of moral sensitivity. The moral schema's propensity for activation, development, and accessibility significantly influence the ability to recognize moral issues in the decision environment.     

论道德语言在道德思维中的地位和作用

道德语言是道德思维的主要工具,其在道德思维中具有重要作用。一是对道德思维主体、道德思维对象、道德思维过程的作用：对主体而言,它提供了道德思维的动力、意义和标准;对对象而言,具有概括与抽象作用;对过程而言,它使概念得以形成,使判断和推理成为可能,并对道德思维的结果进行表述。二是对个体道德思维形成的作用：记忆贮存道德信息,形成特定心理结构,进行导向和定向。三是在道德劝服、道德态度改变和道德价值澄清中也具有重要作用。     

The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: an empirical examination of the moral individual

Recognizing limitations in classic cognitive moral development theory, several scholars have drawn from theories of identity to suggest that moral behavior results from both moral judgments and moral identity. The authors conducted 2 survey-based studies with more than 500 students and managers to test this argument. Results demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgments both independently influenced moral behavior. In addition, in situations in which social consensus regarding the moral behavior was not high, moral judgments and moral identity interacted to shape moral behavior. This interaction effect indicated that those who viewed themselves as moral individuals pursued the most extreme alternatives (e.g., never cheating, regularly cheating)--a finding that affirms the motivational power of a moral identity. The authors conclude by considering the implications of this research for both theory and practice.     

关于幼儿对损人行为的道德判断及有关情绪预期的初步研究

以幼儿易于理解的有关享用财物的小故事,对４、５、６岁儿童作个别随访,综合考察其已获得的道德知识和道德认知的特点,以及相关情绪预期的情况。结果表明：１．幼儿已经获得了有关社会道德的最初步的知识,并能运用这些日常概念水平的知识对行为作道德判断,其道德认知已出现关心他人利益的成分,自我中心主义不突出;２．幼儿假设自己作为损人者的情绪预期与对故事中损人者的情绪预期之间存在明显差异,道德认知与道德情感脱节的现象在前者未有明显表现,却在后者中显现出来。     

道德动机动态系统理论：一种道德发展的新科尔伯格取向

在科尔伯格道德认知发展阶段理论、动态系统理论和自我决定理论基础上,Kaplan提出了道德动机的动态系统理论,把道德动机界定为认知和情绪成分自我组织和自我调节的动态发展过程。该理论有其特定的提出背景、基本观点和主要内容,并且具有一定的实证证据支持。未来研究应着力解决道德认知与情绪的关系、环境因素的影响、横断研究与纵向研究的结合以及研究工具的完善等问题。     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

何以应对道德自我威胁?道德记忆偏差的视角

人们会做出一些不道德的事情,这可能对他们积极的道德自我概念构成威胁。为了应对这种道德自我威胁,人们会表现出道德记忆偏差,即遗忘威胁道德自我的不道德事件或信息。近年来,研究者基于自传体记忆范式、游戏范式、代入范式和自我参照范式,为道德记忆偏差现象提供了证据支持。研究还进一步表明,这种道德记忆偏差可能出于应对道德自我威胁的需要,即人们希望通过有选择地遗忘来维护积极的道德自我概念。 值得注意的是,道德记忆偏差现象存在一些不一致的发现。未来研究应该寻求可能的调节变量,以整合现有不一致的发现,揭示人们使用道德记忆偏差应对道德自我威胁的情境或个体差异。此外,根据道德自我威胁的解释,道德记忆偏差的存在可能需要一定条件。人们做出有意不道德行为时,应该能够意识到自身行为有违道德标准、体验到道德自我威胁,进而表现出道德记忆偏差;但是人们在做出无意不道德行为时,可能不会体验到道德自我威胁,也就不会表现出道德记忆偏差。人们做出不太严重的不道德行为时,道德记忆偏差能够帮助人们很好地应对道德自我威胁。但是人们在做出严重违反道德的行为时,道德记忆偏差可能不足以应对道德自我威胁,该偏差可能就不复存在。 道德记忆偏差与其他应对道德自我威胁策略之间可能存在一定的联系。一种可能性是,道德记忆偏差与这些策略之间是相关补充、共同发挥作用的。还有一种可能性是,其他策略可能为道德记忆偏差的出现提供了条件。人们在做出不道德行为后,可能会通过道德推脱和自我合理化等方式来降低其道德标准,改观其对该事件的评价,从而更容易地模糊不道德行为,表现出道德记忆偏差。除应对道德自我威胁外,道德记忆偏差还存在其他可能的解释。道德记忆偏差可能源自人们的印象管理动机,即人们可能为了维护在他人面前的道德形象而表现出道德记忆偏差。道德记忆偏差还可能发生在记忆加工的不同阶段,比如该现象可能发生在编码阶段,即人们对道德事件的编码加工多于不道德事件;储存阶段,即人们可能受到积极自我图式的影响而对不道德事件产生遗忘;也可能在提取阶段,即人们可能会主动地抑制对不道德事件的提取。未来研究应关注道德记忆偏差存在条件,并在研究广度上扩展其研究范畴,在研究深度上揭示其认知机制,并探究与其他应对道德自我威胁策略的关系。     

Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism

Proponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an “assertive” version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti‐realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral abolitionism. Second, it develops novel criticisms of assertive moral abolitionism and offers nonassertive moral abolitionism in response. Third, it discusses how various metaethical views might respond to nonassertive moral abolitionism. Its basic claim is that nonassertive moral abolitionism provides superior therapeutic benefits over assertive moral abolitionism and other conserving and reforming approaches to moral discourse.     

The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first‐order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action's specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle.     

Role of Moral Identity and Moral Courage Characteristics in Adolescents’ Tendencies to Be a Moral Rebel

Extending prior research on the characteristics potentially associated with adolescents’ tendencies to be a moral rebel, the present study found that adolescents themselves, their peers, and their teachers agreed on adolescents’ tendencies to (a) possess a moral identity, (b) possess moral courage characteristics, and (c) be a moral rebel. Although moral identity (when considered independently and in combination with the moral courage characteristics) did not consistently predict the tendency to be a moral rebel, all indices of the adolescents’ moral courage characteristics positively predicted the tendency to be a moral rebel.     

大学生道德人格特点的初步研究

结合道德心理学研究的新进展,采用问卷法,以803名大学生为被试,对大学生道德人格特点进行了研究。结果表明：（1）大学生道德人格的性别差异显著,大学女生的总分和与人为善因素分数显著高于大学男生,而大学男生的不道德性因素分数和刚正无私因素分数显著高于大学女生。（2）大学生道德人格总分的年级差异不显著,而在具体因素上差异显著：大三学生的与人为善分数明显高于大一和大四学生。（3）大学生道德人格与道德行为的相关极为显著,大学生道德人格是道德行为的有效预测源。     

道德“沾光”效应：道德评价对道德自我知觉及道德行为的影响

人们喜欢关注道德事件并表达自己的立场。以往研究发现回忆自己(而非他人)的道德行为能影响个体的道德自我知觉和道德行为。本研究关注参与道德评价是否会对个体的道德自我和道德行为产生影响。2个研究共同发现：(1)存在道德“沾光”效应：评价支持他人的道德事件,或反对他人的不道德事件,能提升个体的道德自我知觉;(2)道德评价通过提升道德自我知觉,进一步增加个体的道德行为。     

Moral prototypes and moral behavior: Specific effects on emotional precursors of moral behavior and on moral behavior by the activation of moral prototypes

The present studies investigated the extent to which three basic moral prototypes, “just,” “brave”, and “caring”, are related to moral, prosocial behavior. In five studies, we tested (a) whether people would associate three basic types of moral behavior (helping behavior, moral courage, and heroism) with three moral prototypes, and (b) whether specific emotional precursors of moral behavior and moral behavior itself could be promoted by activating the respective moral prototype. As expected, Studies 1–3 revealed that people associated helping behavior with the caring prototype, moral courage with the just prototype, and heroism with the brave prototype. Studies 4 and 5 showed that the activation of the three prototypes differentially influenced emotional precursors of the three types of moral behavior (Study 4) as well as actual moral behavior (Study 5). Thus, the five studies revealed that people associate different moral behaviors with different moral prototypes and that a certain moral behavior can be activated by the priming of the related prototype. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral self and moral emotion expectancies as predictors of anti- and prosocial behaviour in adolescence: A case for mediation?

Previous research has linked (im)moral behaviour with both moral emotion expectancies and the self-importance of moral values, indicating that these two factors influence moral decision making and action. Disentangling the relationship between moral emotion expectancies and self-importance of moral values as predictors of adolescents' anti- and prosocial behaviour was the primary goal of this research. Two hundred five participants (mean age = 14.83 years) completed a semi-structured interview assessing moral emotion expectancies in hypothetical situations and a written questionnaire measuring self-reported prosocial and antisocial behaviour and the self-importance of moral values. Moral emotion expectancies were found to mediate the relationship between the self-importance of moral values and self-reported levels of antisocial behaviour. When predicting levels of prosocial engagement, however, scores of moral value self-importance were the primary variable associated with prosocial behaviour whereas moral emotion expectancies were not involved in this relationship. In addition, a moderating effect of age was found when predicting antisocial behaviour by moral emotion expectancies. Overall, the study confirms and significantly extends previous research on the relationship between adolescents' moral self, moral emotion expectancies and anti- versus prosocial behaviour.     

论道德内化的心理机制及其特征

所谓道德内化,是指个体在后天的社会生活和实践中,经过一定方式的社会学习,接受社会的道德教化,将社会的道德原则、规范和要求转化为其自身的道德需要,形成其自身稳定的道德人格特质和道德行为反应模式的过程。道德内化的心理机制是道德主体的自我意识,它一般由“由我是什么”、“我应当成为什么”和“我必须成为什么”三个逻辑环节组成。道德内化具有他律性和自律性相统一、平衡性和失衡性相统一、共同性和差异性相统一、阶段性和整体性相统一等特点。     

家庭功能对青少年道德推脱的影响:责任心与道德认同的作用

用总体家庭功能量表、青少年人格五因素问卷、道德认同问卷和道德推脱问卷对1013名青少年进行调查。结果表明:(1)家庭功能对青少年道德推脱具有显著的负向预测作用;(2)在家庭功能对青少年道德推脱的负向预测关系中,责任心起部分中介作用;(3)家庭功能通过责任心对道德推脱的间接影响随着道德认同水平的增加而减弱。     

Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.