老子之道的虚空特征与本体性之新探

"道"是老子哲学体系中的核心。"道"以"虚空"或"无"的形态存在,"虚空"或"无"是物质的潜在状态。"道"是混成之物,所以"道"是具有精妙的内部结构特性的,它是人类尚未完全认识的物质存在的高级形态。宇宙万物是"道"创生与演化的结果,而且在演化的过程中,"道"的作用是"无为而无不为"的。在研究宇宙的本体(或本源)问题上,没有其它的概念可以替代它、超越它。"道"是具有至上性的。     

Beyond Stages of Change: Multi-Determinant Continuum Models of Action Readiness and Menu-Based Interventions

The merits of modelling action readiness as a series of stages is discussed, focusing on the Health Action Process Approach (HAPA) which postulates a motivational stage (for non‐intenders) and a volitional stage (for intenders). The HAPA helpfully clarifies that the relationship between self‐efficacy and action may be different for inexperienced intenders and experienced actors. This model also usefully distinguishes between different types of planning undertaken by intenders and it is suggested that further specification of planning tasks could explain why some intenders act while others do not. Despite the advantages of the HAPA, it is argued that the distinction between intenders and non‐intenders is fuzzy and unstable and that demarcation of the stage boundary is arbitrary. A multi‐determinant, multi‐goal continuum approach is recommended. Such modelling recognises graded discontinuities throughout the development of action readiness from attitude formation to behaviour change maintenance. It is argued that menu‐based interventions designed to deliver different messages and materials to people with different action‐readiness deficits may be more cost effective than stage‐tailored interventions. On discute de l’intérêt qu’il y a de modéliser la préparation à l’action en une série de stades à partir de l’Approche des Processus d’Action en faveur de la Santé (HAPA) qui pose l’existence d’une phase motivationnelle (pour ceux qui n’ont pas l’intention d’agir) et d’une phase volitionnelle (pour ceux qui l’ont). L’HAPA met utilement en évidence que la relation entre l’auto‐efficience et l’action peut différer selon que l’on a affaire à un acteur expérimenté ou à une personne sans expérience qui pense agir. Ce modèle fait aussi une distinction utile entre les différentes sortes de planification qui s’offrent à ceux qui ont l’intention d’agir et laisse entendre qu’un approfondissement de la planification des tâches pourrait expliquer pourquoi certains passent à l’action et d’autres pas. En dépit de l’intérêt de l’HAPA, on peut penser que la distinction entre l’intention et l’absence d’intention est floue et instable et que le découpage en stades est arbitraire. On recommande une approche retenant un continuum à déterminants et à buts multiples. Cette modélisation reconnaît l’existence de discontinuités échelonnées tout au long du développement de la préparation à l’action depuis la formation de l’attitude jusqu’au changement effectif du comportement. On défend l’idée que les interventions à la carte conçues pour procurer différents messages et fournitures aux gens qui présentent différentes carences de préparation à l’action peuvent être plus rentables que les interventions basées sur les stades.     

Richard Wagner and the Birth of The Birth of Tragedy 1

Abstract

Nietzsche writes that the ‘real task’ of The Birth of Tragedy is to ‘solve the puzzle of Wagner’s relation to Greek tragedy’. The ‘puzzle’, I suggest, is the intermingling in his art and writings of earlier socialist optimism with later Schopenhauerian pessimism. According to the former the function of the ‘rebirth of Greek tragedy’ in the ‘collective artwork’ is to ‘collect’, and so create, community. According to the second the function of the artwork is to intimate a realm ‘beyond’ this world of pain and death. The audacity of The Birth is that it attempts to show that Wagner can have his cake and eat it: the ‘Dionysian’, musical, element provides a ‘metaphysical comfort’, while the ‘Apollonian’, verbal, element draws a ‘veil of oblivion’ over the metaphysical, thereby allowing the artwork to solidify community. Contrary to the standard Anglophone view, this perspective on The Birth shows that Nietzsche’s intimate association with Wagner during the period of its creation lies at the heart of its philosophical content.     

Capitalism and the Banality of Desire

ABSTRACT

This paper elaborates on Todd McGowan’s perspicacious, psychoanalytic explanation of capitalism’s resilience, due to its formidable ideological insinuation into the banal micro-desires of consumers. I outline his contention that capitalism’s false promise of future satisfaction is subverted by the psychical change indicated by Freud’s re-evaluation of the desire/satisfaction relationship. This is elaborated on via Lacan’s claim, somewhat underplayed in McGowan’s reflections, that desire is essentially narcissistic. Lacan’s claim raises the stakes of capitalism’s psychic appeal, but also indicates how Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a point of intervention. I briefly point to the consistency between Lacan’s conception of the actualized subject and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s articulation of desire in terms of “the process” and the complex metaphor of “desiring machines”. I finally turn to ?i?ek’s conception of the developing world as “the place of rupture” and a major fault line internal to capitalism that threatens to disrupt its operation.     

A Q methodological study of rebelliousness

Through the use of the notion of rebelliousness, the argument is raised and developed that conventional social psychological research tends to downplay investigation of intangible, ‘fuzzy’ issues in favour of the study of more clearly operationalizable constructs. The thesis is developed that slippery social categories should concern us both for their own sake (because social knowing is fuzzy) and because they require of investigation analytics that have a sensitivity to the social and historical circumstances which impinge upon psychological processes. A Q methodological study into construals of rebelliousness is reported, which reveals eight interpretable factors explicated as ‘the ambivalent rebel’, ‘the antirebel’, ‘rejecting rebelliousness: the free thinker’, ‘rebellion as social change’, ‘shockable and anti-confrontational’, ‘positive support for the rebel’, ‘rebel with a cause’ and ‘strong-willed confrontational rebel’.     

Against the Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science

This paper discusses the tenets of the politics of postmodern philosophy of science. At issue are Rouse’s version of naturalism and his reading of Quine’s distinction between the indeterminacy of translation and the underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence. I argue that the postmodern approach to science’s research practices as patterns of interaction within the world is not in line with the naturalistic account Rouse aims at. I focus also on Rouse’s readings of Heidegger’s existential conception of science and Kuhn’s concept of normal science. Finally, a strategy of defending science’s cognitive distinctiveness in terms of hermeneutic philosophy is suggested as an alternative to the postmodern philosophy of science.     

Mathematics and the Mystical in the Thought of Simone Weil

On Simone Weil’s “Pythagorean” view, mathematics has a mystical significance. In this paper, the nature of this significance and the coherence of Weil’s view are explored. To sharpen the discussion, consideration is given to both Rush Rhees’ criticism of Weil and Vance Morgan’s rebuttal of Rhees. It is argued here that while Morgan underestimates the force of Rhees’ criticism, Rhees’ take on Weil is, nevertheless, flawed for two reasons. First, Rhees fails to engage adequately with either the assumptions underlying Weil’s religious conception of philosophy or its dialectical method. Second, Rhees’ reading of Weil reflects an anti-Platonist conception of mathematics his justification of which is unsound and whose influence impedes recognition of the coherence of Weil’s position.     

Heidegger’s Destruktion of Theology: ‘Primordial Faith’ and ‘Recognition’ of the Messiah

Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious life offers important insights by engaging Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, where he distinguishes ‘Paul the Pharisee’ from ‘Paul the Christian’ in order to explicate the nature of faith in contrast to systematic theology. Neither certitude in God’s existence is primordial to Christian faith, according to Heidegger, nor is rabbinic nor theological disputation concerning God’s existence or God’s nature. Instead, what is essential to Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious life are: (1) faith as lived experience and (2) recognition of ‘the Christ’ (ho christos/ha ma?ía?). This ‘recognition’, however, requires phenomenological clarification and not philosophy of religion as traditionally construed.     

Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find support in the idealism of Hegel. I begin by first explaining what philosophical naturalism amounts to. I then move on to show, using Finn Spicer’s and Alison Stone’s understandings of philosophical naturalism, how there is a stronger form of philosophical naturalism but also how there is a weaker form as well. Having established the distinction between stronger and weaker variants of philosophical naturalism, I discuss Sebastian Gardner’s recent objections to treating absolute idealism as a genuinely naturalist position. I argue that Gardner is incorrect to claim that absolute idealism is not a genuinely naturalist position on both historical and interpretive grounds, where to do so I bring in features of Hegel’s idealism to show that Hegel was committed to liberal naturalism. In the next section of the paper, I address Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for liberal naturalism. To counter this claim, I offer an Hegelian diagnosis of Neta’s charge and argue that Neta’s concern about the possibility of liberal naturalism is illegitimately motivated.     

Time/History,Self-disclosure and Anticipation: Pannenberg,Heidegger and the Question of Metaphysics

This essay examines Wolfhart Pannenberg’s defense of metaphysics’ foundational importance for philosophy and theology. Among all the modern philosophers whose claims Pannenberg challenges, Martin Heidegger’s discourse against Western metaphysics receives the major portion of criticism. The first thing one concludes from this criticism is an affirmation of a wide intellectual gap that separates Pannenberg’s thought from Heidegger’s, as if each stands at the very opposite corner of the other’s school of thought. The questions this essay tackles are: is this seemingly irreconcilable difference between Pannenberg and Heidegger fully justifiable? What if there is a reading of Panneberg’s and Heidegger’s view of metaphysics that can reveal deeper similarities between the two thinkers than the first reading of Pannenberg’s criticism of Heidegger allows us to see? It then answers these questions by showing that both thinkers actually share a common emphasis on the concepts of ‘time/history’, ‘self-disclosure’ and ‘anticipation’, and their reliance on these notions reveals that Heidegger’s and Pannenberg’s approaches to the phenomenon of understanding and to metaphysical ontology are not fully contradictory but rather hold noticeable hermeneutical similarities.     

儿童对生物目的指向性的认知发展

目的指向性是生物的基本特征,是区分生物和非生物的重要指标。学前儿童能否根据目的指向性来区分生物与非生物,主要有3种观点：能区分、不能区分、认为学前儿童只能理解动物具有目的指向性,但不能理解植物的目的指向性。该文分层综述了学前儿童对生物包括人、动物和植物目的指向性的认知及学前儿童对不熟悉物体目的指向性的归因研究,并提出了需要进一步探讨的问题。     

专家医生的知识结构及诊断推理方式

医学专长研究中“中间者效应”的发现,引发了研究者对专家医生知识结构的探讨。在“知识打包”的基础上,医生的临床知识以“疾病脚本”的方式组织起来。随着临床经验的增加,专家医生积累了丰富的疾病脚本。在临床诊断中,他们无需对病人所有的体征和症状进行仔细地和系统地分析,而是通过非分析性的推理方式——“模式识别”或“样例识别”便可自动激活与之匹配的疾病脚本,据此对病人做出迅速而准确的诊断。医学专长的本质就在于专家医生以“疾病脚本”的方式组织起来的知识结构。“适应性专长”代表了未来医学专长研究的新方向     

The problem of empty names and Russellian Plenitude

‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that stem from those differences.     

中国神话中的具身心理学思想探索

西方“具身认知”心理学与赋存在中国文化里的以“天人合一”为核心的“体知”心理学思想息息相通, 而中国文化又有其独异于西方文化的“身体”智慧。文化的源头实为神话。追根溯源, 本文主要从具身认知的视阈中将中西方神话中“身体”的角色两相比照, 首先从本体论维度以现象学诠释的方法来描述神话的身体母体是如何生成的, 并以天地开辟神话、万物肇始神话和人类起源神话为例揭示中国“身体”的本体论特色—— 一元论; 其次再从空间维度以概念隐喻的理论来剖析神话的身体现象学场域是如何延展的, 并从物我同一角度、天人交感角度和人神相通角度来彰显中国“身体”的空间维度特色——气论; 最后再从时间维度以社会建构理论来解构神话的身体是如何在时间场域中流变的; 并从社会、文化和历史三个层面来表达中国“身体”的时间维度特色——易论。通过从中国神话故事中挖掘中国传统文化中独有的“具身智慧”, 以期为建立中国人自己的科学心理学起抛砖引玉之用。     

The seventh servant: The implications of a truth drive in Bions theory of 'O'

Drawing upon Bion's published works on the subjects of truth, dreaming, alpha‐function and transformations in ‘O’, the author independently postulates that there exists a ‘truth instinctual drive’ that subserves a truth principle, the latter of which is associated with the reality principle. Further, he suggests, following Bion's postulation, that ‘alpha‐function’ and dreaming/phantasying constitute unconscious thinking processes and that they mediate the activity of this ‘truth drive’ (quest, pulsion), which the author hypothesizes constitutes another aspect of a larger entity that also includes the epistemophilic component drive. It purportedly seeks and transmits as well as includes what Bion (1965, pp. 147‐9) calls ‘O’, the ‘Absolute Truth, Ultimate Reality, O’ (also associated with infi nity, noumena or things‐in‐themselves, and ‘godhead’) (1970, p. 26). It is further hypothesized that the truth drive functions in collaboration with an ‘unconscious consciousness’ that is associated with the faculty of ‘attention’, which is also known as ‘intuition’. It is responsive to internal psychical reality and constitutes Bion's ‘seventh servant’. O, the ultimate landscape of psychoanalysis, has many dimensions, but the one that seems to interest Bion is that of the emotional experience of the analysand's and the analyst's ‘evolving O’ respectively (1970, p. 52) during the analytic session. The author thus hypothesizes that a sense of truth presents itself to the subject as a quest for truth which has the quality and force of an instinctual drive and constitutes the counterpart to the epistemophilic drive. This ‘truth quest’ or ‘drive’ is hypothesized to be the source of the generation of the emotional truth of one's ongoing experiences, both conscious and unconscious. It is proposed that emotions are beacons of truth in regard to the acceptance of reality. The concepts of an emotional truth drive and a truth principle would help us understand why analysands are able to accept analysts’ interpretations that favor the operation of the reality principle over the pleasure principle—because of what is postulated as their overriding adaptive need for truth. Ultimately, it would seem that Bion's legacy of truth aims at integrating fi nite man with infi nite man.     

Levinas and Shinran: the power of the other

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I compare the idea of ‘substitution’, central to the later work of Emmanuel Levinas, to the idea of jinen hōni, or ‘natural acts’, proposed by Shinran Shōnin. For Levinas, ‘substitution’ meant the acceptance of responsibility for the suffering of the Other that one hasn’t caused, giving oneself up to ‘persecution’ and ‘accusation’ of the Other in absolute passivity. For Shinran, a similar passivity is implied by the unability of the ‘I’ to act in order to liberate itself from its conditioned existence, a result which can be achieved by giving up one’s own agency in favour of the Other. For both thinkers, ethical selfhood is thus attainable only by forsaking of one’s worldly ego, described in remarkably similar terms, even though their understanding of alterity itself is radically different.     

The problems of consciousness and content in theories of perception

The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s Sensorimotor Theory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidence from empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidates their theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory of vision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’s and Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutually conflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions for psychological theories of perception.     

The Big Test of Corroboration

This paper presents a new ‘discontinuous’ view of Popper’s theory of corroboration, where theories cease to have corroboration values when new severe tests are devised which have not yet been performed, on the basis of a passage from The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Through subsequent analysis and discussion, a novel problem for Popper’s account of corroboration, which holds also for the standard (‘continuous’) view, emerges. This is the problem of the Big Test: that the severest test of any hypothesis is actually to perform all possible tests (when ‘possible’ is suitably interpreted). But this means that Popper’s demand for ‘the severest tests’ amounts simply to a demand for ‘all possible tests’. The paper closes by considering how this bears on accommodation vs. prediction, with respect to corroboration.