The fundamental laws of physics can tell the truth

Nancy Cartwright's arguments in favour of phenomenological laws and against fundamental ones are discussed. Her criticisms of the standard covering‐law account are extended using Vyacheslav Stjopin's analysis of the structure of fundamental theories. It is argued that Cartwright's thesis (that the laws of physics lie) is too radical to accept. A model of theory change is presented which demonstrates how the fundamental laws of physics can, in fact, be confronted with experience.     

The social epidemiologic concept of fundamental cause

The goal of research in social epidemiology is not simply conceptual clarification or theoretical understanding, but more importantly it is to contribute to, and enhance the health of populations (and so, too, the people who constitute those populations). Undoubtedly, understanding how various individual risk factors such as smoking and obesity affect the health of people does contribute to this goal. However, what is distinctive of much on-going work in social epidemiology is the view that analyses making use of individual-level variables is not enough. In the spirit of Durkheim and Weber, S. Leonard Syme makes this point by writing that just “as bad water and food may be harmful to our health, unhealthful forces in our society may be detrimental to our capacity to make choices and to form opinions” conducive to health and well-being. Advocates of upstream (distal) causes of adverse health outcomes propose to identify the most important of these “unhealthful forces” as the fundamental causes of adverse health outcomes. However, without a clear, theoretically precise and well-grounded understanding of the characteristics of fundamental causes, there is little hope in applying the statistical tools of the health sciences to hypotheses about fundamental causes, their outcomes, and policies intended to enhance the health of populations. This paper begins the process of characterizing the social epidemiological concept of fundamental cause in a theoretically respectable and robust way.

The missing fundamental in vowel height perception

Traunmüller (1981) suggested that the tonotopic distance between the first formant (F ₁) and the fundamental frequency (F ₀) is a major determinant of perceived vowel height. In the present study, subjects identified a vowel-height continuum ranging in formant pattern from /?/ to /ε/, at fiveF ₀ values. IncreasingF ₀ led to an increased probability of /I/ responses (i.e., the phoneme boundary shifted toward the /ε/ end of the continuum). Various conditions of filtering out the lower harmonics of the stimuli caused only marginal shifts of the phoneme boundary. The experiments provide evidence against interpretations of Traunmüller’s (1981) results that claim that vowel height is determined by the distance betweenF ₁ and the lowest harmonic that is present in the basilar membrane excitation pattern.     

The missing fundamental phenomenon in temporal vision

Subjective flicker rates were measured for compound waveforms consisting of five harmonics without a fundamental component. It was found that observers perceived a rate at the fundamental frequency, although energy at this frequency was not included in the signals. In auditory pitch sensation this is called the missing fundamental phenomenon, and an analogous finding is known to occur in spatial vision. Moreover, observers perceived the flicker rates at the fundamental frequency even in the random-phase conditions, in which the period of the fundamental component is unclear in the real waveforms. The results indicate that the perceived flicker rates are not detected from the temporal waveforms per se. One possible mechanism for extracting such a periodicity in the signal is an autocorrelation function to the real temporal waveforms. Received: 18 October 1999 / Accepted: 28 January 2000     

The fundamental attribution error in detecting deception: the boy-who-cried-wolf effect

Most people are unable to detect accurately when others are lying. Many explanations for this inability have been suggested but the cognitive heuristics involved in lie detection have received little attention. The present study offers evidence from two experiments, based on two different groups of observers, judging two different kinds of lies, presented in two different testing situations, that the fundamental attribution error significantly undermines the ability to detect honesty and deception accurately. Trait judgments of trustworthiness were highly correlated with state judgments of truthfulness, leading, as predicted, to positive correlations with honest detection accuracy and negative correlations with deception detection accuracy. More accurate lie detectors were significantly more likely than less accurate lie detectors to separate state and trait judgments of honesty. The effect of other biases, such as the halo effect and the truthfulness bias, also are examined. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

The fundamental need to belong: on the distinction between growth and deficit-reduction orientations

The need for belongingness (the universal need to form and maintain positive, stable interpersonal relationships) has led to much research over the past decade. Although such a need is universal, some qualitative differences exist in its orientation. Specifically, two belongingness need orientations are proposed: a growth orientation (a belongingness need directed toward interpersonal actualization) and a deficit-reduction orientation (a belongingness need directed toward interpersonal deficit reduction or repair). It is hypothesized that a deficit-reduction orientation to the need to belong is associated with lower levels of intrapersonal and interpersonal psychological functioning compared to a growth orientation. The results of a series of four studies supported the proposed hypotheses. Implications of the proposed model for future research on the need to belong are discussed.     

The fundamental importance of simple operational definitions of introspection and empathy

Instead of asking why psychoanalysis has lost its central position in mental health, one might marvel at its longevity when considering that psychoanalysts have not attained agreement about basic methods for observing unconscious mentation, either their own or that of others. Ambiguity abounds regarding the operations involved in, and the usefulness of, introspection, and even more so of empathy. Simple operational definitions of introspection and empathy are proposed in this article, definitions that are sufficiently abstract to transcend particular theories of mental organization (e.g., ego psychology, object relations, and self psychology) and concrete enough to be practicable.     

The effects of smoking on the speaking fundamental frequency of adult women

The present study sought to investigate the effects of smoking on the speaking fundamental frequency of adult women. The results indicated that, in the reading condition, fundamental frequency for the smokers was significantly lower than fundamental frequency for the nonsmokers. Eighty-seven percent of the smokers examined by an otolaryngologist exhibited some abnormality in appearance of the vocal folds. The results also suggest that menopause may contribute to a lowering of the speaking fundamental frequency of adult women.     

The fundamental rule: a study of current usage

Members of the editorial boards of the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, and Psychoanalytic Inquiry, plus selected analysts from Canada, France, and England, were asked how they presented the fundamental rule to their analysands and what considerations led to their choice of initial guidelines. Forty-nine of eight-three analysts responded to the survey. The respondents described diversity in phrasing of the fundamental rule, the time in analysis when the guidelines are given, and the reasons for the practice they follow. The method each chose appears to reflect the differing conceptions analysts have of the analytic process. Two major trends emerged: either our respondents emphasized delineating a work or functional framework or contract, or they emphasized establishing an attitude or spirit of cooperation, mutuality and work sharing. In each group respondents differed as to whether they favored minimal or more lengthy instructions. They also differed as to whether they followed a consistent approach or one tailored to the needs of the individual analysand. A source of tension lay in an inclination either to remain in the tradition set by Freud or to experiment with different phrasings and timings. The authors give their reasons for choosing to give explicit instructions, requesting associational material beyond thoughts and feelings, and describing resistance as inevitable and a potential source of insight.     

Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error1

A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick—an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is where the initial worry finally sticks—quasi-realism tells me that I can't be fundamentally wrong about morality, though others can.     

The categorical and the hypothetical: a critique of some fundamental assumptions of standard semantics

The hypothetical notion of consequence is normally understood as the transmission of a categorical notion from premisses to conclusion. In model-theoretic semantics this categorical notion is ??truth??, in standard proof-theoretic semantics it is ??canonical provability??. Three underlying dogmas, (I) the priority of the categorical over the hypothetical, (II) the transmission view of consequence, and (III) the identification of consequence and correctness of inference are criticized from an alternative view of proof-theoretic semantics. It is argued that consequence is a basic semantical concept which is directly governed by elementary reasoning principles such as definitional closure and definitional reflection, and not reduced to a categorical concept. This understanding of consequence allows in particular to deal with non-wellfounded phenomena as they arise from circular definitions.