Goodness, Values, Reasons

Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.     

Saints, heroes, sages, and villains

This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I??ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral goodness is more multi-faceted. My title is intended to capture that multi-facetedness: the essay examines saintliness, heroism, and sagacity. The variety of our common-sense moral ideals underscores the inadequacy of any one account of moral admirableness, and I hope to illuminate the distinct roles these ideals play in our everyday understanding of goodness. Along the way, I give an account of what makes actions heroic, of whether such actions are supererogatory, and of what, if anything, is wrong with moral deference. At the close of the essay, I begin to explore the flipside of these ideals: villainy.     

Effects of partial symmetry, exposure time, and backward masking on judged goodness and reproduction of visual patterns

Six experiments investigated the effects of partial symmetry in visual patterns on judgement of pattern goodness, immediate memory, and learning. In Experiments 1—III pattern goodness ratings were substantially inter-correlated among a self-paced test condition and two conditions producing moderate to severe stimulus degradation (brief tachistoscopic exposure, and backward masking): the less the partial symmetry in a pattern, the lower was the judged goodness of the pattern. In Experiments IV and V immediate reproduction of patterns was observed respectively following exposures of 5-5000 ms, and backward masking. Correct reproduction improved with degree of partial symmetry. Concordant results were found in a free recall learning task (Experiment VI). Correlations between goodness and learning and memory performance for discrete patterns were always substantial. The results strongly suggest that pattern goodness can be appraised reliably and accurately with information processing times too short to permit pattern encoding in short-term visual memory. Evaluation of pattern goodness must therefore rest upon early (precategorical) processing of symmetry features.     

Symmetropy,an entropy-like measure of visual symmetry

A new objective measure of symmetry for single patterns, called symmetropy, is developed on two bases, the two-dimensional discrete Walsh transform of a pattern and the entropy concept in information theory. It is extended to a more general measure, called the symmetropy vector. In order to test the predictive power of the symmetropy vector, multiple regression analyses of judged pattern goodness and of judged pattern complexity were carried out. The analyses show that the symmetropy vector predicts pattern goodness and pattern complexity, as well as the amount of symmetry in a pattern. They also suggest that pattern goodness is a concept based on the holistic properties of a pattern, while pattern complexity (or simplicity) is a concept based on both holistic and partial properties of a pattern.     

Symmetry, repetition, and figural goodness: an investigation of the weight of evidence theory

Considerable evidence has accumulated on the superiority of symmetry over repetition in the study of figural goodness. The Weight of Evidence theory of figural goodness (WoE) provides a mathematically rigorous, elegant, and testable account of how factors like symmetry and repetition affect figural goodness. In this study we investigate implications of the WoE approach. More specifically, we examine (1) embedded patterns versus simple elements, (2) the number of elements in a pattern, and (3) long-range dependencies within a pattern. Data from two experiments illustrate cases in which figures made of simple repetitions have higher figural goodness than some kinds of symmetrical patterns; thus, the generality of the symmetry over repetition phenomenon is questioned. We discuss our results with respect to WoE and suggest ways to further develop the theory.     

Complexity,response competition,and preference

In an attempt to resolve disagreements about the events underlying repeated exposure to a stimulus and the affective consequences of these events, two experiments examined psychological complexity and response competition (two measures of the uncertainty produced by a stimulus) as related to each other and to liking and goodness of meaning ratings of Chinese characterlike stimuli. In Experiment 1, 60 undergraduates' mean latency of first free association to the stimuli (response competition) increased as a perfect monotonic function of the number of lines constituting them (psychological complexity). In Experiment 2, ratings of liking by 40 undergraduates were highest for stimuli associated with an intermediate level of uncertainty (psychological complexity and response competition). Thus it was speculated that a moderate number of stimulus exposures (reducing uncertainty to an intermediate level) is preferable to an indefinitely large number of exposures (reducing uncertainty to a minimal level). The finding of no relationship between rated goodness of stimulus meaning and uncertainty was judged to be consistent with Stang's (1974) hypothesis that characteristically observed increases in rated goodness with increasing stimulus exposures (decreasing uncertainty) are a result of subject intuitions rather than an effect of decreasing uncertainty.     

Absolute Goodness,Wonder and the Evildoer

Raimond Gaita affirms absolute goodness as the only thing with the power to keep fully among us the worst kind of evildoer. At issue in this goodness is a wonder that he ties to joy. Yet Gaita does not, perhaps cannot, imagine this power with respect to the evildoer concretely enough for it to move us in the way his account requires. An aspect of his writings that resists the emphasis on a joyous wonder may assist our thinking about the relation to the evildoer.     

NATURAL GOODNESS,RIGHTNESS, AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF REASON: REPLY TO ARROYO,CUMMISKEY, MOLAND,AND BIRD‐POLLAN

Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good previously described. In response to Moland, I explain why I think Hegelian worries about the supposed emptiness of the Kantian self do not apply to my account. And in response to both Moland and Bird‐Pollan, I argue that, contrary to the view of some Hegelians, the intersubjective normativity of reason is not something developed through actual social relations; rather, it is something essential to an individual's relations with himself or herself.     

Christ,the Karamazovs,and Compensational Theodicies

This article draws from Ivan Karamazov a two‐fold challenge to the goodness of God: that no one can forgive the infliction of suffering upon the innocent and that, even when forgiven, this suffering costs more than any good brought out of it. It then looks to Alyosha for a response to these challenges, suggesting that Christ can forgive because of the cross and that his doing so puts the innocent to a choice: either to join their suffering to his – and so maintain God's goodness – or to lose their innocence. This response helps supply another defect of theodicies that appeal to the compensatory goods that God brings out of innocent suffering, namely that it seems to make some kind of salvation necessary and not gratuitous. For here all innocent suffering is joined to the cross and so part of the economy of redemption, not something prior to redemption that renders it necessary.     

On the Tedium of the Good

It seems to be a phenomenon of contemporary life that we consider goodness embarrassing and rather dull. In contrast, the activities and inner lives of villains are deemed more complex and fascinating than those of good people. This paper attempts to understand the conception of goodness that underlies this phenomenon, and I suggest that informing it is the combination of two ideas, in tension with each other: firstly, a distorted understanding of the ancient conception of full virtue as the absence of all inner conflict; and secondly, the intuition that real goodness is only apparent and generated in inner conflict. In response, I offer an alternative picture of goodness as an ongoing, active and progressive relation to value, and conclude that in order to render goodness attractive again we need more adequate portraits of goodness from both philosophy and art.     

Predicting which words get recalled: Measures of free recall,availability, goodness,emotionality, and pronunciability for 925 nouns

To investigate the properties that make a word easy to recall, we added to existing norms for 925 nouns measures of availability, goodness, emotionality, pronunciability, and probability of recall in multiple-trial free recall. Availability, imagery, and emotionality were found to be the best predictors of which words were recalled. This result, which is stable across recall data collected in three separate laboratories, argues for the importance of availability as a predictor of recall and questions the role of the correlated variables of word frequency and meaningfulness. Consistent with earlier work on a smaller sample of words, six factors describe the numerous properties of words studied by psychologists. The six factors are composed of variables based on orthography, imagery and meaning, word frequency, recall, emotionality, and goodness.     

Agents,objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes

The paper examines the place of power in the action theories of Francisco Suarez and Thomas Hobbes. Power is the capacity to produce or determine outcomes. Two cases of power are examined. The first is freedom or the power of agents to determine for themselves what they do. The second is motivation, which involves a power to which agents are subject, and by which they are moved to pursue a goal. Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations, uses Aristotelian causation to model these two forms of power. Freedom is efficient causation, but in a special form that I explain as involving something that ordinary causation does not – the contingent determination of outcomes. Motivating power is final causation, which Suarez characterizes as the power of a goal or end to move us to attain it through its goodness or desirability. Suarez regards these two forms of power as consistent – we can be moved by the goodness of a goal freely to determine for ourselves that we act in order to attain it. Hobbes denied the existence of all forms of power beyond ordinary causation, the power of one motion in matter to determine another. So he denied the very existence both of freedom and of any form of motivating power beyond the ordinary causal power of desires as materially based psychological states to produce actions. The goodness itself of a goal never moves us, whether to desire the goal in the first place or to act in order to attain it. The paper examines Hobbes’s arguments and their consequence – establishing the foundations for Hume’s scepticism about practical reason.     

God’s moral goodness and supererogation

What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, Alston cannot help himself to supererogation as a solution to the content of God’s moral goodness. If God has no moral obligations and does not perform supererogatory acts, Lombardi suggests that God’s goodness may be explicated through concentrating on God’s benevolence, but he does not develop this theme. I propose that Alston’s idea of divine supererogation without obligation is sustainable, but that a reshaping of the concept of supererogation is required; one in which love, rather than benevolence, plays an important part. If the love associated with supererogation is characterised in a certain way, I suggest this adds a new angle to the understanding of divine goodness.     

Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness,Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature

The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority-of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism.     

Intimations of The Good: Iris Murdoch, Richard Swinburne and the Promise of Theism

Perhaps no one in the English speaking world has carried on a philosophical defence of theism like Richard Swinburne. Yet in all of Swinburne's work there is little use of a long-standing view in the Christian tradition that God is good, and that his goodness is interchangeable with his being. While Swinburne does little with the idea of goodness, Iris Murdoch proposes an anti-theistic view that insists on the Good without God. My argument is that both Swinburne's indifference to the notion of the good and Murdoch's 'Good without God' take away from the promise of theism. I suggest an Augustinian alternative that insists on the equation of God and the Good without falling into the problems inherent in both Swinburne and Murdoch's views.     

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness

Something is good insofar as it achieves its end, so says a neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. Powers/dispositions are paradigm cases of entities that have an end, so say many metaphysicians. A question therefore arises, namely, can one account for neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of an ontology of powers? This is what I shall begin to explore in this paper. I will first provide a brief explication of both neo-Aristotelian goodness and the metaphysics of powers, before turning to investigate whether one can give an account of neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of powers. I will suggest that the answer to this question is yes.

     

Subjectivism and Relational Good

In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to the subject who holds the attitude). The analysis should be attractive to those already within the subjectivist camp. One of its appeals is that it is a special case of a general subjectivist approach to values, thus showing that subjectivism provides the resources to analyse relational values.     

G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.     

What's Gained from Depression? A Proposal on Theodicy and Epinosic Gains

Abstract: Many depression-sufferers testify to experiences of goodness that arise from their depression, or ‘goodness because of depression’. These realities often inspire efforts to reconcile suffering and divine benevolence. Yet some sufferers who experience ‘goodness because of depression’ reject theodical thinking and therefore seek other frameworks for reflection on their suffering and its accompanying goods. This essay draws from psychology's notion of epinosic gains to propose an analogous framework that aids sufferers in discussing and interpreting instances of ‘goodness because of depression’ apart from theodical justifications. While the proposed framework is grounded in first-person reflections on depression and is articulated in relation to another Christian framework for depression from Tasia Scrutton, this constructive proposal has the potential to serve theological reflection on a wider range of suffering beyond depression.