The impossibility of incommensurable values

Many recent attacks on consequentialism and several defenses of pluralism have relied on arguments for the incommensurability of value. Such arguments have, generally, turned on empirical appeals to aspects of our everyday experience of value conflict. My intention, largely, is to bypass these arguments and turn instead to a discussion of the conceptual apparatus needed to make the claim that values are incommensurable. After delineating what it would mean for values to be incommensurable, I give an a priori argument that such is impossible. It is widely accepted that value is conceptually tied to desire. I argue that, more specifically, it is proportional to merited desire strength. This connection gives one a metric of all value if there is any such thing. This metric entails that value is a complete ordering over all states of affairs, or, in other words, that value is commensurable.     

Reasons and impossibility

In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to do what she cannot do. I discuss a number of objections to this view, in particular two: (1) The objection that if there were reasons to do what one cannot do, many of those would be ‘crazy reasons’, and (2) the worry that if there were such reasons, then agents would have reasons to engage in futile deliberations and tryings. I develop an explanation of ‘crazy reasons’ that shows that not all reasons to do the impossible are crazy and only those that are need to be filtered out, and, regarding the second objecting, I show that the reasons for trying as well as for taking the means to doing something—instrumental reasons in a broad sense—are different from the reasons for performing the action in the first place. They are affected by impossibility, and we can explain why that is so. The view I argue for is that a person may have a reason to do what she cannot do, but she does not have a reason to try to do so or to take means to realizing the impossible.     

The principle of procreative beneficence and its implications for genetic engineering

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - Molecular genetic engineering technologies such as CRISPR/Cas9 have made the accurate and safe genetic engineering of human embryos possible. Further advances...     

The elusive concept of the psychoanalytic process

Although the term psychoanalytic process is frequently used, there is no consensual definition of its meaning. Some authors use it to designate a recognizable set of experiences within psychoanalysis. Others, a majority, use it as a synonym for the entire psychoanalytic experience, describing in detail what analysts do to achieve their goals. A range of views may be found between these extremes. A distinction is drawn here between the structure and content of the psychoanalytic process, which is regarded as a specific, definable entity--a red thread--within the psychoanalytic treatment experience as a whole, consisting of a microprocess and a macroprocess. The former is predominantly an amalgam of the patient's and the analyst's highly subjective experiences and entanglements, while the latter is predominantly an amalgam of the infantile and childhood origin of the patient's difficulties, as well as the analyst's conception of these difficulties based on a preferred theory. These ideas are used to formulate a definition of the psychoanalytic process based on clinical experience and are traced here primarily through lessons learned from a patient, Mr. K, over the course of a long and arduous analysis.     

Bradley and the impossibility of absolute truth

Bradley thought that there is a connexion between the theory of reality and the theory of truth. The theory of reality to which he subscribed, Monism, rules out a correspondence theory of truth, he thought, since it denies the existence of a plurality of facts, or things, in virtue of correspondence to which a judgment could be true. But though he rejects the correspondence theory he insists on the independence of truth from belief, wish and hope. For him the test of truth is coherence, which has two aspects, system and comprehensiveness. However, he does not think that this test yields ‘absolute’ truth. This, he maintains, for at least three different reasons, is unobtainable. Judgments can only be partially true. However, since there are degrees of truth, some judgments are closer to the truth than others, even though none are, or could be, unconditionally true.     

On the alleged impossibility of coherence

If coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property. We point to various ways in which the advocates of a coherence theory of justification may attempt to divert the threat of these results.     

Assent and permission rejoinder

We share Roberts and Buckloh's (this issue) concern about issues of assent and permission in research with children and agree that our research cannot conclude legitimately that (a) researchers failed to obtain permission/assent, (b) children were put at risk, or (c) failure to report permission/assent procedures was, in any way, unethical. We never made these conclusions. Rather, we argue that publishing assent and permission would enhance compliance with ethical standards, sensitize researchers and readers to its importance, and shift publishing priorities in an appropriate direction.