Emotion,the bodily,and the cognitive

In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking at evidence from neuroscience and social psychology, as well as thought experiments and theoretical arguments, I conclude that it is necessary to acknowledge both that emotions have intentional content and that they involve somatic agitation. I also point out some of the more promising directions for future research in this area.     

Copernicus,the orbs,and the equant

I argue that Copernicus accepted the reality of celestial spheres on the grounds that the equant problem is unintelligible except as a problem about real spheres. The same considerations point to a number of generally unnoticed liabilities of Copernican astronomy, especially gaps between the spheres, and the failure of some spheres to obey the principle that their natural motion is to rotate. These difficulties may be additional reasons for Copernicus's reluctance to publish, and also stand in the way of strict realism as applied to De Revolutionibus, although a realistic astronomy may be envisioned as a goal for Copernicus's research program.     

The good,the bad,and the trivial

Dreadful and dreaded outcomes are sometimes brought about via the accumulation of individually trivial effects. Think about inching toward terrible health or toward an environmental disaster. In some such cases, the outcome is seen as unacceptable but is still gradually realized via an extended sequence of moves each of which is trivial in terms of its impact on the health or environment of those involved. Cases of this sort are not only practically challenging, they are theoretically challenging as well. For, they raise puzzling complications concerning the assessment of conduct. In particular, given cases of this sort, we seem forced to conclude that, sometimes, each current doing in an extended sequence of moves can be correctly assessed as permissible (relative to a certain set of concerns) even though the sequence foreseeably leads to an outcome that is unacceptable (relative to that same set of concerns) and even though acceptable outcomes are available. And this seems paradoxical. I argue that this (apparent) puzzle glosses over complications associated with action individuation and units of agency. Reflection on these complications makes it clear that in cases of the sort that have given rise to the puzzle, there is an accurate way of seeing what is being done at various particular moments that clearly brings out the tight connection between a current doing and non-trivial damage that is to be expected (and is indeed bound to occur if the doing is completed without a hitch).     

The good, the bad, and the aggregate

To evaluate progress and focus goals, scientific disciplines need to identify relations that are robust across many situations. One approach is the literature review, which characterizes generality across studies. Some writers (e.g., Baron & Derenne, 2000) claim that quantitative literature reviews, but not narrative reviews, violate the methodological precepts of behavior analysis by pooling data from nonidentical studies. We argue that it is impossible to assess generality without varying the context in which relationships are studied. Properly chosen data-aggregation strategies can reveal which behavior-environment relations are general and which are procedure dependent. Within behavior analysis, reluctance to conduct quantitative reviews may reflect unsupported assumptions about the consequences of aggregating data across studies. Whether specific data-aggregation techniques help or harm a research program is an empirical issue that cannot be resolved by unstructured discussion. Some examples of how aggregation has been used in identifying behavior-environment relations are examined.     

The skeptic,the content externalist,and the theist

Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by this result, since even those philosophers who do not endorse the anti-skeptical strategy must either reject the possibility of a creationist god or admit that their thesis does not hold a priori for minds in general.     

Modern Philosophy,the Subject,and the God of the Bible

In my paper, I undertake to show that the God of the Bible is the subject of modern philosophy, i.e., that philosophy is biblical and that the Bible is philosophical. Central to the argument of my paper is an analysis of the fundamental difference between the philosophy of Aristotle (consistent with Socrates and Plato), as based on the law of contradiction and thus on the contradictory opposition between necessity and existence, and the philosophy of, in particular, Spinoza and Kant, as based on the transcendental logic of the necessary relationship of thought and existence. Thus, I argue that the ontological argument (proving the existence of God) demonstrates the necessary existence of the thinking subject and of the subject thought, at once human and divine. In short, metaphysics is practical reason, the practice of doing unto others what you want others to do unto you, and reason is metaphysical practice, the practice of proving that there is one thing that you, a subject, cannot think without it necessarily existing, and that is the other subject (the neighbor/God).     

Trust,Belief, and the Second-Personal

Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust.     

Evolution, Sociobiology, and the Atonement

This essay views Christian doctrines of the atonement in the light of evolution and sociobiology. It argues that most of the doctrines are false because they use a false premise, the historicity of Adam and the Fall. However, two doctrines are not false on those grounds: Abelard's idea that Jesus' life is an example and Athanasius' concept that the atonement changes human nature. Employing evolution's and sociobiology's concepts of the egocentric and ethnocentric nature of humanity and the synergy between genes and environments to produce a "nature," this essay shows that these two doctrines can be amalgamated to make sense of the atonement in the late twentieth century.     

Opacity,Transparency, and the Paradox of the Accessibility Requirement

Key issues in epistemology for the most part have to do with epistemic values such as justification, truth, and knowledge—that is, values related to the epistemic status of our propositional attitudes, mental events, and states. However, another important issue that is worth examining is the extent to which a subject is in a position to evaluate the strength of her epistemic position. In this paper, I wish to emphasize two properties of our mental states that play a decisive part in that respect: their opacity and transparency. In the following, I will assume that a mental state is opaque whenever it presents itself with no underlying reason, whereas states that are supported by apparent reasons are transparent. One main argument that I will defend is that even when the opacity and transparency of our mental states are not reliable cues, still they remain highly informative. Notably, I draw some implications relative to the externalist/internalist debate in epistemology. I examine the claim that only mental states that are justified are well grounded or justification conferring and the idea that often stands behind, that is, that only states whose reasons are accessible are justified—namely, the Accessibility Requirement. I also examine the source of a recent debate in epistemology: the epistemic status of our intuitive states, as these are perfect instances of opaque mental states. I conclude that intuitive states in some respect are less misleading than states that are supported by apparent reasons.     

Moral affect: the good, the bad, and the ugly

The relations among 3 moral affective personality characteristics--shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and empathic responsiveness--were examined in 4 independent studies of undergraduates. Results indicate that shame and guilt are distinct affective experiences that have important and quite different implications in the interpersonal realm. There was a substantial positive correlation between shame-proneness and guilt-proneness. Nonetheless, as predicted, other-oriented empathic responsiveness was negatively related to proneness to shame but positively correlated with proneness to guilt. In contrast, an index of more self-oriented personal distress was positively linked to shame-proneness. Taken together, these results add a new dimension to the ugliness of shame but suggest that guilt may not be that bad after all, at least in the interpersonal domain.     

The Piano, the Animus, and the Colonial Experience

Focused principally on an analysis of Ada, the mute heroine of Jane Campion's The Piano , this article shows how post–Jungian animus theory illuminates that character's mysterious personality. In particular, Ann Ulanov's thoughts about animus development are connected with Demaris Wehr's observations concerning the internalization of social oppression in an argument that shows how, notwithstanding she is a woman, Ada is a product of colonial oppression. Her mythological antecedents are also considered, and are particularly marked in that she resembles the handless maiden in Marie–Louise von Franz's analysis of that fairy tale. In this context Ada's ultimate renunciation of her husband is symbolically reinforced by the developing personality of her daughter Flora. The changes in both characters can be seen as implying not only the rebirth of Ada's psyche but also the emergence of a new psychological readiness to throw off the colonial mantle.     

Homosexuality,the Halacha,and the helping professions

The position of Jewish writings on homosexuality is the topic of inquiry. Overt homosexuality, child homosexuality, and lesbianism are examined in the light of Jewish Halacha (law). Though Talmudic writings view homosexuality with severe disapproval, a sprrit of tolerance and compassion is also voiced in them. It is suggested here that Jewish law placed overt homosexuality in the category of illness to evoke compassion for it Halachic insights also suggest that homosexualities be viewed differentially. Activities involving minors and lesbians are not given equal weight in the realm of retribution. There are efforts to obviate social stigma. Prevention and rehabilitation are given major concern. To conclude the article, the role of the Jewish religious practitioner and his responsibilities vis-à-vis the homosexual client are given a brief examination.     

Jungian Psychology, the Body, and the Future

Impressive reaffirmation of Jung's archetypal hypothesis has come from developments in behavioural biology (Tinbergen 1951; Cosmides 1985), psycholinguistics (Chomsky 1965), structural anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1967), developmental psychology (Bowlby 1969), dream research (Jouvet 1975). neuroscience (MacLean 1976), sociobiology (Wilson 1978), and evolutionary psychiatry (Gardner 1988; Gilbert 1989). A close correspondence exists between Jungian theories of dreaming in human beings and modern biological theories of dreaming in animals. A paradigm shift is under way in the direction of a growing cross-disciplinary awareness that all human sciences are about archetypal manifestations and that these apply as much to the body as to the mind. Jungian psychology must keep abreast of these developments if it is not to be sidelined and superseded by less humane therapeutic philosophies.     

Jung,the Wilderness,and the Call of the Wild

The publication of The Red Book reiterates how deeply connected to nature Jung was and how this connection emerged through his encounter with the spirit of the depths. This article reviews some of Jung's writings in regard to nature and suggests that the energy related to the earth that Jung expresses in The Red Book was continued in his ongoing work on his tower at Bolllingen. The author also reviews his own search for a deeper connection to nature and an understanding of his own ancestry. Reviewing the emergence of the value of wilderness in North America and the call to reclaim the wild, he considers the life of Englishman Archie Belaney, who took on the identity of a Native American, Grey Owl, and became one of Canada's first leading environmentalists.     

Folk-Psychology,Psychopathology, and the Unconscious

Abstract

There is a ‘philosophers’ assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science.     

Migration,Integration, and the City

Given that cities are now bearing the brunt of migration and integration, it might seem that we should shift our normative focus away from the state towards the city. This is the suggestion of Avner de Shalit’s (2018) Cities and Integration: Political and Moral Dilemmas in the New Era of Migration. In this article, we suggest that this move is not so straightforward. Other levels, including the global, the state, and the neighbourhood, on top of the city, are also impacted by migration and so also have claims for normative priority, which need to be addressed. And even if the city is responsible for integration, we argue that de Shalit’s promotion of Amsterdam’s ‘Milkshake Model’ – a form of respect and appreciation of difference – is, despite its clear initial appeal, not an ideal for accommodating diversity.     

Indicatives,Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent

It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals (e.g., “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive conditionals (e.g., “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances toward the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of the antecedent: for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating whether the stances project—remain constant—when embedded under operators like negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances—neutrality about the antecedent in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives—are conveyed by conversational implicatures.     

The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity

This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted grammaticality judgments, and that the extremity of familiarity ratings predicted confidence. Familiarity was further shown to predict judgments in the absence of confidence, hence contributing to above-chance guessing. Experiment 2 found that confidence developed as participants refined their knowledge of the distribution of familiarity and that differences in familiarity could be exploited prior to confidence developing. Experiment 3 found that familiarity was consciously exploited to make grammaticality judgments including those made without confidence and that familiarity could in some instances influence participants' grammaticality judgments apparently without their awareness. All 3 experiments found that knowledge distinct from familiarity was derived only under deliberate learning conditions. The results provide decisive evidence that familiarity is the essential source of knowledge in artificial grammar learning while also supporting a dual-process model of implicit and explicit learning.