Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization

In this paper, I argue for a view largely favorable to the Thirder view: when Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Monday, her credence in the coin’s landing heads is less than 1/2. Let’s call this “the Lesser view.” For my argument, I (i) criticize Strict Conditionalization as the rule for changing de se credences; (ii) develop a new rule; and (iii) defend it by Gaifman’s Expert Principle. Finally, I defend the Lesser view by making use of this new rule.     

Simultaneous belief updates via successive Jeffrey conditionalization

This paper discusses simultaneous belief updates. I argue here that modeling such belief updates using the Principle of Minimum Information can be regarded as applying Jeffrey conditionalization successively, and so that, contrary to what many probabilists have thought, the simultaneous belief updates can be successfully modeled by means of Jeffrey conditionalization.     

Take a risk or proceed with caution: Prevention motivation moderates responses to near-loss events

A persistently pressing issue identified in the decision-making literature is that people not only fail to recognize the risks entailed in a near-loss event but also subsequently engage in further risk-taking. We contend in this paper that prevention motivation critically regulates decision-makers' responses to a near-loss. Across three studies, we found that high prevention-focused individuals perceive greater risks in a near-loss event and are subsequently less likely to take risks, compared with low prevention-focused individuals. This finding highlights the significance of applying a motivational perspective to studying decision-making and risk.     

Correction to: Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization

Philosophical Studies -     

Discounting and conditionalization

When people are asked to judge the strengths of two potential causes of an effect, they often demonstrate discounting--devaluing the strength of a target cause when it is judged in the presence of a strong (relative to a weak) alternative cause. Devaluing the target cause sometimes results from conditionalization--holding alternative causes constant while evaluating the target cause. Yet discounting not attributable to conditionalization also occurs. We sought to dissociate conditionalization and discounting (beyond that accounted for by conditionalization) by having subjects perform either a spatial or a verbal working memory task while learning a causal relation. Conditionalization was disrupted by the verbal task but not the spatial task; however, discounting was disrupted by the spatial task but not the verbal task. Conditionalization and discounting are therefore cognitively dissociable processes in human causal inference.     

Conditional reasoning and conditionalization

In solving conditional reasoning problems, reasoners are assumed to compute the probability of the conclusion, conditionalizing first on the categorical premise, giving the knowledge-based component, and conditionalizing then on the conditional-statement premise, from which the assumption-based component is derived. Because reasoners find it difficult to compute the second-step conditionalization except when the conditional-statement premise is found to be related to the result of the first-step conditionalization as for modus ponens or, possibly, for modus tollens, the knowledge-based component generally dominates reasoning performance. After representing all the possible cases in which conditional-argument forms may appear, this approach was found to be consistent with the results from the 3 experiments reported in this study, whereas 2 alternative hypotheses account for only some of the results.     

Self-location is no problem for conditionalization

How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs.     

Reflection and conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla

Rescorla explores the relation between Reflection, Conditionalization, and Dutch book arguments in the presence of a weakened concept of sure loss and weakened conditions of self-transparency for doxastic agents. The literature about Reflection and about Dutch Book arguments, though overlapping, are distinct, and its history illuminates the import of Rescorla's investigation. With examples from a previous debate in the 70s and results about Reflection and Conditionalization in the 80s, I propose a way of seeing the epistemic enterprise in the light of practical requirements to be met by demands for synchronic coherence and probability updating policies. This includes a defense of principles rejected by Rescorla, while allowing for the value of his results in the borderland between theories of cognition and formal epistemology.     

On the proper formulation of conditionalization

Synthese - Conditionalization is a norm that governs the rational reallocation of credence. I distinguish between factive and non-factive formulations of Conditionalization. Factive formulations...     

The sociology of the sacred: A conversation with Jeffrey Alexander

Over the past 20 years, Jeffrey C. Alexander has been a leading social theorist and a pioneer of the ‘strong program’ in cultural sociology, which emphasises the significance of cultural structures of meaning for social life. Following an introductory overview of his work, this article records a public conversation with Alexander about the role and significance of the concept of the sacred in his sociological work. Issues addressed in this conversation include situating Alexander's interest in the sacred in his intellectual biography (including his significant intellectual influences), the mistrust of the concept of the sacred within the wider sociological community, the universality of cultural structures of sacred meaning, the limitations of sociological analysis focused on sacred meaning and methodological approaches to the study of the sacred.     

Interpret with caution: multicollinearity in multiple regression of cognitive data

Shibihara and Kondo in 2002 reported a reanalysis of the 1997 Kanji picture-naming data of Yamazaki, Ellis, Morrison, and Lambon-Ralph in which independent variables were highly correlated. Their addition of the variable visual familiarity altered the previously reported pattern of results, indicating that visual familiarity, but not age of acquisition, was important in predicting Kanji naming speed. The present paper argues that caution should be taken when drawing conclusions from multiple regression analyses in which the independent variables are so highly correlated, as such multicollinearity can lead to unreliable output.     

Jeffrey Meets Kolmogorov

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Jeffrey conditionalization is a rule for updating degrees of belief in light of uncertain evidence. It is usually assumed that the partitions involved in Jeffrey...     

Cross-sex comparisons: A word of caution

A cross-sex difference on one variable is often hypothesized to be related to a gender difference on a second variable. However, caution should be exercised in making such comparative hypotheses. We gathered the expected and actual examination grades for 168 female and 163 male college students. As in prior research, males had higher expectancies than females (p<.05). But analysis of the intrasex regression equations indicated that the relationship of expectancies to performance was different for women than it was for men. Thus, a cross-sex difference in expectancies did not correspond to a parallel difference in grades. This finding highlights the potential hazards of making certain cross-sex comparisons, and we argue for more caution in their application.     

Comments on Richard Jeffrey

In this commentary, after first summarizing the three major theses of Jeffrey's paper ‘Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program’, and sketching out what I take to be his central argument, I criticize Jeffrey on two grounds. The first is that he has failed to explain why his version of Bayesianism provides us with better theories upon which to make decisions; the second is that he has offered a theory about decision-making that by-passes the important question: How can we make more rational decisions?