Basic psychological needs and school engagement: a focus on justice and agency

In this paper, we examine the relationship between basic psychological needs and student engagement in a population of Italian secondary school students. To measure the psychological needs, we have selected a set of indicators that, beyond the needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness, also include the need for justice, which is crucial in adolescence when the degree of sensitivity to the ways people behave in interpersonal interactions is well developed. To measure student engagement, we have considered the four-dimensional structure of the construct, which has added the factor of agentic engagement to the three conventional dimensions of emotional, behavioural and cognitive engagement. Participants were 640 secondary school Italian students aged 15–17. The results confirm that justice should be considered as an additional basic need in school settings, as it fosters intrinsic student motivation and engagement. Moreover, our findings provide evidence that agency is a dimension that enriches the construct of student engagement. In the conclusion, justice and agency are treated as constructs that deserve to be more deeply considered in future research into learning environments.     

Retributive justice, restorative justice, and forgiveness: An experimental psychophysiology analysis

This experiment assessed the emotional self-reports and physiology of justice outcomes and forgiveness responses to a common crime, using a three Justice (retributive, restorative, no justice) × 2 Forgiveness (forgiveness, none) repeated-measures design. Participants (27 males, 29 females) imagined their residence was burglarized, followed by six counterbalanced justice-forgiveness outcomes. Imagery of justice—especially restorative—and forgiveness each reduced unforgiving motivations and negative emotion (anger, fear), and increased prosocial and positive emotion (empathy, gratitude). Imagery of granting forgiveness (versus not) was associated with less heart rate reactivity and better recovery; less negative emotion expression at the brow (corrugator EMG); and less aroused expression at the eye (lower orbicularis oculi EMG when justice was absent). When forgiveness was not imagined, justice-physiology effects emerged: signs of cardiovascular stress (rate pressure products) were lower for retributive versus no justice; and sympathetic nervous system responding (skin conductance) was calmer for restorative versus retributive justice.     

Ethical issues in pediatric life-threatening illness: dilemmas of consent, assent, and communication

The treatment of life-threatening illnesses in childhood is replete with ethical issues and with clinical issues that have ethical implications. The central issues are those involved with a child's participation in the decision-making process and with communication of information about the illness and treatments to children. This article examines the questions of patient autonomy and of parental responsibility and prerogative in the context of pediatric oncology. Included in this examination of the ethical dimensions of pediatric life-threatening illness is a discussion of the many related aspects involved, including medical, cultural, psychosocial, legal, and developmental. A multidimensional approach that considers the ways in which these multiple aspects interact with one another, and which focuses on establishing a strong working alliance between the health care team and the pediatric patient's family, can help to avoid or resolve potential ethical and clinical conflicts.     

Self-consciousness,self-determination,and imagination in Kant

I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one's own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One's self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation.     

Medical decision-making and minors: issues of consent and assent

The physician-patient relationship has been described as an egalitarian partnership in which patients and physicians work together to make healthcare decisions. Although adults receive considerable encouragement to become active participants in medical decision-making, children and adolescents often have little voice in such decisions and are granted limited access to confidential medical care. After a brief discussion of legal perspectives on informed consent, the present review examines the developmental literature on children and adolescents' capacities to make medical decisions that are informed, voluntary, and rational. The purposes and benefits of assent are identified. Remaining questions of how to evaluate capacity and balance parental and minor autonomy are explored.     

Wanting, having, and needing: integrating motive disposition theory and self-determination theory

Four studies explored the motivational and experiential dynamics of psychological needs, applying both self-determination theory and motive disposition theory. In all 4 studies, motive dispositions toward achievement and affiliation ("wanting" particular experiences) predicted corresponding feelings of competence and relatedness ("having" those experiences). Competence and relatedness in turn predicted well-being, again indicating that these 2 experiences may really be "needed." Illuminating how wanting gets to having, in Studies 2 and 3, participants reported greater self-concordance for motive-congruent goals, which, in longitudinal Study 3, predicted greater attainment of those goals and thus enhanced well-being. Study 4 replicated selected earlier results using an implicit as well as an explicit motive disposition measure. Supporting the presumed universality of competence and relatedness needs, in no studies did motive dispositions moderate the effects of corresponding need-satisfaction on well-being. Discussion focuses on a "sequential process" model of psychological needs that views needs as both motives that instigate and outcomes that reward behavior.     

Dreams,agency, and judgement

Sosa (Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 79(2): 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects” (2005: p. 7). The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine” (2005: p. 7). According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions are not “real” insofar as they are all merely imagined beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions. This paper assesses the epistemic implications of Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming. Section 1 outlines and assesses the reasons Sosa gives for thinking that his imagination model of dreaming introduces a new dimension to debates about dream scepticism. Sosa argues that his imagination model of dreaming invites a more radical version of dream scepticism, and also makes available a novel and more powerful response to dream scepticism. Objections are raised to both of those claims. This leads to a challenge to Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming. This is the concern that Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming lacks the resources to accommodate the intuition that there is something illusory or misleading about one’s situation when one is dreaming, and as a result his account of dreams fails to accommodate the common intuition that there is a sceptical problem about dreaming but not about dreamless sleep. Section 2 of the paper elaborates a version of the imagination model of dreaming that can overcome that challenge. This version of the imagination model of dreaming goes beyond what Sosa explicitly commits to when he outlines his view of dreams, however, it exploits ideas that are integral to a key theme in Sosa’s recent writings on virtue reliabilism—namely his proposal that epistemic agency should be accorded a central place in that approach to knowledge, and his related proposal that agency is exercised in conscious judgement. An implication of this version of the imagination model of dreaming is that an elucidation of a connection between the wakeful condition and our capacity to exercise agency over our mental lives should be central to an account of the nature, and epistemic significance of, wakeful consciousness. The final section of the paper considers whether this version of the imagination model of dreaming has anything novel to contribute to debates about dream scepticism.

     

Empowerment,agency, and power

As ‘empowerment’ and ‘agency’ have received wider usage within development research and policy, ambiguities and variant meanings have proliferated. Amidst this conceptual drift, there has also been a tendency to assimilate the two concepts. This tendency is problematic in a number of ways. First, ‘agency’ has various meanings, and the weakest of these captures little of the concept of empowerment. Second, empowerment has a conceptual link with well-being that agency cannot have. Third, when empowerment is assimilated with expanded agency, that agency is not considered in a relational way: the focus is on how the agency of a group or individual becomes greater than it was, not on the degree to which their agency is dependent on or dominated by the agency of others. If ‘empowerment’ no longer refers to social relations, it loses its direct relevance to the transformation of those relations and, as some critics have claimed, it ceases to be a ‘transformative’ concept. After showing that there are cases of empowerment that cannot be captured by conceptions of empowerment that ‘take power out’, I draw upon the capability approach to propose relational conceptions of agency and empowerment that ‘bring power back in’.     

AIDS: ethics, justice and social policy

ABSTRACT Principles of justice and equality demand that HIV seropositive individuals and those with AIDS should not be discriminated against in any area of social provision. If social policy on AIDS is constructed in terms of reciprocal obligations, that is if obligations to the HIV seropositive individual and obligations of the HIV seropositive individual are given equal weight, the civil rights of HIV seropositive individuals may be secured and this may create a climate in which HIV seropositive individuals will more readily notify partners, and others at risk of infection, of their HIV status. It is conceivable that such a climate could facilitate greater control of the spread of HIV/AIDS.     

Elite athletes and retirement: Identity,choice, and agency

Retirement from elite sport can be highly distressing for athletes, and many report experiencing depression and anxiety in adjusting to this transition. In this article, a discursive psychological approach is employed to explore constructions of choice and identity around elite athletes’ retirements within Australian newsprint media. Within these accounts, three ‘types’ of retirements were identified: retirements occurring in relation to age, injury, or active choice. Retiring with individual agency and at an appropriate time was repeatedly privileged, whereas retiring in different ways was routinely problematised. In privileging particular ways of retiring, certain identity positions were made more accessible than others. Consequently, certain actions and choices are deemed appropriate (or not) for athletes, ultimately constraining decision‐making around retirement. The implications of such limited identity positions and choices are explored in relation to the psychological distress and clinical concerns that emerge among many athletes in the transition out of elite sport.