TWINNING, INORGANIC REPLACEMENT, AND THE ORGANISM VIEW

In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism.     

SUBJECTIVITY, JUDGMENT, AND THE BASING RELATIONSHIP

Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits.     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.     

Prophetic criticism,incarnational optimism: On recovering the late Kierkegaard

Actually the revolution is much closer than we think. The last band of free thinkers (Feuerbach and all related to him) has attacked or tackled the matter far more clearly than formerly, for if you look more closely, you will see that they actually have taken upon themselves the task of defending Christianity against contemporary Christians. The point is that established Christendom is demoralized, in the profoundest sense all respect for Christianity's existential commitments has been lost … Now Feuerbach is saying: No, wait a minute—if you are going to be allowed to go on living as you are living, then you also have to admit that you are not Christians … it is wrong of established Christendom to say that Feuerbach is attacking Christianity; it is not true, he is attacking the Christians by demonstrating that their lives do not correspond to the teachings of Christianity … What Christianity needs for certain is traitors … (JP 6523)     

Put Yourself at the Helm: Charting New Territory,Correcting Course,and Weathering the Storm of Career Trajectories

What bearing have you set you set your sights on? How do you navigate the ever-changing swells and winds of our professional landscape? Are you feeling a nebulous desire for change, that your career is not going in the direction you were expecting, worry about lack of future opportunities, or even a deep dissatisfaction in your current position? You are not alone. The formation of the Committee on Advanced Training for Certified Genetic Counselors (CATCGC) was partly in response to such sentiments, expressed within a vibrant dialogue amongst members of the genetic counseling community. The CATCGC sought to understand how genetic counselors chart courses for their careers by conducting a Decision Points exercise during a pre-conference symposium (PCS) at the 2014 NSGC Annual Education Conference. Participants were asked to identify a decision point at which they were most satisfied with their careers and one at which they were least satisfied and to describe the situation, their personal goals and intentions, any actions they took, and the outcomes. Qualitative analysis in the constructivist tradition was conducted on participants’ responses and facilitators’ notes from the PCS to explore what personal meanings were made of the decision points; twelve themes related to Career High Points, Low Points, and how genetic counselors made career transitions were identified. Using a constructivist framework, themes are presented in the context of the authors’ personal experiences, and the authors’ share their reflections on these data. We wrote this article to offer you a window into your peers’ experiences - the good, the bad, and the ugly - hoping to encourage and challenge you to reflect deeply, no matter where you are on your career journey.     

Presentism,truthmakers and distributional properties

Presentists face a challenge from truthmaker theory: if you hold that the only existing objects are presently existing objects and, moreover, you agree that truth supervenes on being, then you will be hard pressed to identify some existent on which a given true but traceless claim about the past supervenes. Cameron (Philos Books 49:292–301, 2008, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, In: D Zimmerman (ed), 2011) aims to meet this challenge by appeal to distributional properties. So, to give a simple example, the truth that you were once a child supervenes on you presently instantiating the property of being initially a child and then an adult, a property distributed over time. I argue that a presentist ought to deny that distributional properties can serve as truthmakers.     

I Think,Therefore I Persist

Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2?+?2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2?+?2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal and the screen in front of you is blank. Then at some point an image of a peach is flashed on the screen. The image isn't up there for long. In fact, it's only on the screen for what seems like an instant—just long enough for you to see it. These two scenarios are a bit mundane. But, as I will show, reflection on them can yield significant results concerning the nature of persons and their persistence through time. First I will show that thought and perception have temporal constraints whereby your thinking or perceiving in the above scenarios implies that you exist through a temporally extended interval. Then I will argue that this allows us to rule out several prominent theories of personal identity.     

New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives,Consistency, and Quantifiers*

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: “kiss me and hug me” is the conjunction of “kiss me” with “hug me”. This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, I argue. “If you love me, kiss me”, a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent (“you love me”) with an imperative consequent (“kiss me”); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three‐valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic.     

Parity,prospects, and predominance

Philosophical Studies - Let’s say that you regard two things as on a par when you don’t prefer one to other and aren’t indifferent between them. What does rationality require of...     

Boundaries,journals and counselling psychology: Stephen Palmer interviews Kasia Szymanska

You have just retired from editing Counselling Psychology Review, the in-house journal of the British Psychological Society, Division of Counselling Psychology. It seems an appropriate moment to interview you for Counselling Psychology Quarterly. In this interview I want to focus on a topic I know you are interested in, client-therapist boundary issues, and your experience editing the journal. But I'd like to start off at a slight tangent. What encouraged you to go into counselling psychology as a profession?     

Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument

The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider’s argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley’s argument rests on the same premise as Sider’s argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibility of simples. Once you stick it all together, you get an absurd consequence. I then survey the possible lessons we could draw from this, arguing that whichever one you take yields an interesting result.     

Epistemic closure,assumptions and topics of inquiry

According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic closure is an intuitive principle, but at times, it does not seem that we know by implication. In response to this puzzle, the literature has been mostly polarized between those who are willing to do away with epistemic closure and those who think we cannot live without it. But there is a third way. Here I formulate a restricted version of the principle of epistemic closure. In the standard version, the principle can range over any proposition; in the restricted version, it can only range over those propositions that are within the limits of a given epistemic inquiry and that do not constitute the underlying assumptions of the inquiry. If we adopt the restricted version, I argue, we can preserve the advantages associated with closure, while at the same time avoiding the puzzle I’ve described. My discussion also yields an insight into the nature of knowledge. I argue that knowledge is best understood as a topic-restricted notion, and that such a conception is a natural one given our limited cognitive resources.     

Knowledge,certainty, and assertion

Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it's true? Or should you make an assertion only if you're certain it's true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge than to certainty. In multiple scenarios, people were much more willing to allow assertability and certainty to come apart than to allow assertability and knowledge to come apart.     

Hey stud: Race, sex, and sports

This article is an examination of how the intersection of sport and race plays out in the sexualization of the sporting role of African American male athletes. Further, the article is an examination of the multiple roles the media, sport, and race play as these impact the public persona of African American male athletes in high-profile sports. The article concludes with a number of recommendations for ending the negative images of African American male athletes. To the white public, we are athletes, rappers, preachers, singers—and precious little else. We are also robberts, rapists, mentally deficient and sexually well endowed. —Ellis Cose, The Envy of the World: On Being a Black Man in America (2002; New York: Washington Square Press, 3–4) First of all, let me say good after ... good late afternoon. Because of the HIV virus I have attained, I will have to announce my retirement from the Lakers today. I just want to make clear, first of all, that I do not have the AIDS disease, because I know a lot of you want to know that, but the HIV virus. My wife is fine, she’s negative, so no problem with her. I plan on going on, living for a long time, bugging you guys like I always have. So you’ll see me around. I plan on being with the Lakers and the league—hopefully [Commissioner] David [Stern] will have me for a while—and going on with my life. I guess now I get to enjoy some of the other sides of living—that [were missed] because of the season and the long practices and so on. I just want to say that I’m going to miss playing. And I will now become a spokesman for the HIV virus because I want people, young people, to realize they can practice safe sex. And, you know, sometimes you’re a little naive about it and you think it could never happen to you. You only thought it could happen to, you know, other people and so on and on. And it has happened. —Magic Johnson—Press Conference at L.A. Lakers Compound Washington Post, November 9, 1991     

Face Management,Question Wording,and Social Desirability1

Five experiments were conducted to examine the impact of question wording manipulations derived from face management theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987) on responses to survey questions. In general, it was expected that questions phrased so as to allow the respondent to maintain face while answering in a socially undesirable manner would result in lower rates of socially desirable responding than would control questions. The results strongly supported this hypothesis for questions regarding socially desirable knowledge (e.g., Are you familiar with NAFTA?), but not for questions about socially desirable behavior (e.g., Did you vote?). The results were partially supportive for questions about socially undesirable behaviors (e.g., Have you ever shoplifted?).     

Akrasia,instincts and revealed preferences

Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes’ and Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you’re unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based on the indifference principle. Later you learn how the game works and discover that the odds dictate you assign the very same credences. Examples like this show that if you initially have noreason to believe H, then intuitively E can give you reason to believe H even though Pr(H|E) ≤ Pr(H). I show that without the principle, the objections to dogmatism fail.     

THE ABSENT AUTHOR: MAURICE BLANCHOT AND INSPIRATION

But when you are handed over, do not worry about how to speak or what to say; what you are to say will be given to you when the time comes, because it is not you who will be speaking; the Spirit of your Father will be speaking in you (Matt 10:19-20).     

Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons

According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation–because the only morally non-arbitrary one–involves treating an action's lightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks the argument from discernment and argues against its conclusion.     

Disagreement,the Independence Thesis,and the Value of Repeated Reasoning

The problem of peer disagreement is to explain how you should respond when you and a peer have the same evidence bearing on some proposition $P$ and are equally competent epistemic agents, yet have reached opposite conclusions about $P$. According to Christensen's Independence Thesis, in assessing the effect of your peer's disagreement, you must not rely on the reasoning behind your initial belief. I note that ‘the reasoning behind your initial belief’ can be given either a token or type reading. I argue that the type reading is false, but the token reading is extremely weak.     

The Enkratic Requirement

Abstract: Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons.