Is a naturalistic theory of communication possible?

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the relationship between language and communication. I discuss Chomsky’s position on this topic. Chomsky claims that if it is possible to construct a scientific theory of the language faculty, there is no possibility to construct a scientific theory of communication because in communication human intentionality is involved. This position is contrasted by philosophers of language considering that communication is to be studied as a form of rational action. I maintain that both these positions are not supported by the evidence coming from developmental research. Taking a cognitive point of view I contend that a communicative faculty can be defined that develops since infancy to adulthood, which has features independent of language and action. Different steps in the development of the communicative ability are linked to a parallel development of the theory of mind. I then argue in favor of a distinction between collective action and communication considering that while collective action is common to human and nonhuman primates, communication is typically human.     

Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.     

Is there a general factor of preference for complexity?

It has been assumed that preferences for different aspects of complexity in visual patterns are intercorrelated. Evidence purporting to demonstrate this was examined and found to be inconclusive. The preferences of 111 Ss using three sets of patterns showed no correlation between preference for asymmetry, for multiplicity, and for heterogeneity of elements.     

More of a Cause?

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away.     

Is there an evolutionary advantage of schizophrenia?

Schizophrenia is a universal disorder with strongly genetic aetiology. A constant prevalence rate, universally, in the face of reduced fecundity leads to the argument here that an evolutionary advantage exists, but not solely for schizophrenia. Possible areas of advantage are examined and it is argued that schizophrenia exists as a costly trade-off, in the evolution of Homo sapiens, as a by-product of a yet unknown uniquely human quality. The reason it has stayed in existence is due to a combination of advantages bestowed upon the kin, the group and, to a lesser extent, individuals who suffer from the disorder; these all contribute a different type of advantage, each of which alone would not be sufficient. Further, the evidence for the other advantages alone lack the rigour of evidence seen in the by-product theories, which provide as yet unparalleled comprehensive evolutionary evidence.     

Is there a general task switching ability?

Participants were tested on two analogous task switching paradigms involving Shape/Size tasks and Vertical/Horizontal tasks, respectively, and three measures of psychometric intelligence, tapping fluid, crystallized and perceptual speed abilities. The paradigms produced similar patterns of group mean reaction times (RTs) and the vast majority of the participants showed switching cost (switch RT minus repeat RT), mixing cost (repeat RT minus single-task RT) and congruency effects. The shared intra-individual variance across paradigms and with psychometric intelligence served as criteria for general ability. Structural equations modeling indicated that switching cost with ample preparation ("residual cost") and mixing cost met these criteria. However, switching cost with little preparation and congruency effects were predominantly paradigm specific.     

Is emotional intelligence an advantage? An exploration of the impact of emotional and general intelligence on individual performance

Emotional intelligence is an increasingly popular consulting tool. According to popular opinion and work-place testimonials, emotional intelligence increases performance and productivity; however, there has been a general lack of independent, systematic analysis substantiating that claim. The authors investigated whether emotional intelligence would account for increases in individual cognitive-based performance over and above the level attributable to traditional general intelligence. The authors measured emotional intelligence with the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, & D. R. Caruso, 1997). As measured by the MEIS, overall emotional intelligence is a composite of the 3 distinct emotional reasoning abilities: perceiving, understanding, and regulating emotions (J. D. Mayer & P. Salovey, 1997). Although further psychometric analysis of the MEIS is warranted, the authors found that overall emotional intelligence, emotional perception, and emotional regulation uniquely explained individual cognitive-based performance over and beyond the level attributable to general intelligence.     

Is David Lykken's theory of crime likely?

Lykken proposed a model of antisocial behaviour based on the criminal's temperamental difficulties. Personality traits stressed by this model are impulsivity, fearlessness, and sensation seeking. The present study compares one sample taken from the general population with a sample of prison inmates on these traits. The results indicate that prison inmates score higher than the general population on sensation seeking and fearlessness, whereas their scores on impulsivity are lower. Some implications are discussed.     

Location in negotiation: Is there a home field advantage?

Although location is considered to play an important role in negotiation potentially favoring one side over the other, little research has examined whether negotiating on one’s home field indeed confers an advantage to the resident party. We tested this possibility by experimentally manipulating participants’ occupancy status (resident versus neutral versus visitor). Across three studies, we find that residents of an office space outperform the visiting party in a distributive negotiation. In addition, our results suggest that this performance discrepancy between residents and visitors may be due to both a resident advantage (residents outperforming a neutral party) and a visitor disadvantage (visitors performing worse than a neutral party). Finally, our findings reveal that confidence partially mediates the effects of occupancy status on negotiation performance and demonstrate that an intervention designed to boost visitor confidence can help overcome the home field advantage. Implications of these results for theory and practice are discussed.     

How general is general slowing? Evidence from the lexical domain

Three analyses are reported that are based on data from 19 studies using lexical tasks and a reduced version of the Hale, Myerson, and Wagstaff (1987) nonlexical data set. The results of Analysis 1 revealed that a linear function with a slope of approximately 1.5 described the relationship between the lexical decision latencies of older (65-75 years) and younger (19-29 years) adults. The results of Analysis 2, based on response latencies from 6 lexical tasks other than lexical decision, revealed a virtually identical linear relationship. In Analysis 3, it was found that performance on nonlexical tasks spanning the same range of task difficulty was described by a significantly steeper regression line with a slope of approximately 2.0. These findings suggest that although general cognitive slowing is observed in both domains, the degree of slowing is significantly greater in the nonlexical domain than in the lexical domain. In addition, these analyses demonstrate how the meta-analytic approach may be used to determine the limits to the external validity of experimental findings.     

Developing intelligence: Is a comprehensive theory possible?

This introduction first outlines the main issues and questions about mind and intelligence that need to be dealt with by disciplines such as differential, developmental, and cognitive, psychology. It then summarizes the major findings of the target article, the main points raised by the commentators, and the main points of the rejoinder. It ends up with a set of questions to be followed by future research.     

When Is More Better?

Abstract— We examine three determinants of the relationship between the magnitude of a stimulus and a person's subjective "value" of that stimulus: the process by which value is assessed (either by feeling or by calculation), the evaluability of the relevant magnitude variable (whether the desirability of a given level of that variable can be evaluated independently), and the mode of evaluation (whether stimuli are encountered and evaluated jointly or separately). Reliance on feeling, lack of evaluability, and separate evaluation lead to insensitivity to magnitude. An analysis invoking these factors provides a novel account for why people typically become less sensitive to changes in the magnitude of a stimulus as magnitude increases.     

Does Han Fei have a conception of justice?

Han Fei’s political theory is widely characterized as eschewing any connection with morality; so, can he have any conception of justice? In this paper, I accept the interpretation of Han Fei jettisoning any moral commitment, but I argue that he gives heed to an understanding of justice. This conception of justice arises naturally from the ordinary human sentiment of resentment for wrongs done and becomes a moral staple in the consciousness of ordinary people. Such a conception of justice has these features: all and only the guilty receive punishment, and the punishments are in some sense proportionate to the crime. Since disregarding this popular conception of justice results in resentment and political instability, Han Fei, without any moral commitment to it, accepts the popular conception of justice on prudential and consequentialist grounds.     

Is there a mutual relationship between opposite attentional biases underlying anxiety?

Current models that account for attentional processes in anxiety have proposed that high-trait anxious individuals are characterized by a hypervigilant-avoidant pattern of attentional biases to threat. We adopted a laboratory conditioning procedure to induce concomitant hypervigilance and avoidance to threat, emphasizing a putative relationship between lower-level reactive and upper-level controlled attentional mechanisms as the core account of attentional processes involved in the development and maintenance of anxiety. Eighty high- and low-trait anxious participants underwent Pavlovian conditioning to a human face. Eye tracking was used to monitor attentional changes to the conditioned stimulus (CS+) face and the neutral stimulus (CS-) face, presented at 200, 500, and 800 ms durations. The high-anxious participants developed the expected attentional bias toward the CS+ at 200 ms presentation time and attentional avoidance at 500 and 800 ms durations. Hypervigilance to aversive stimuli at 200 ms and later avoidance to the same stimuli at 500 and 800 ms were associated with higher levels of galvanic skin conductance to the CS+. The low-anxious individuals developed the opposite attentional pattern with an initial tendency to orient attention away from the aversive stimuli in the 200 ms condition and to orient attention toward aversive stimuli in the remaining time. The differential modulation between hypervigilance and avoidance elicited in the two groups by the conditioning procedure suggests that vulnerability to anxiety is characterized by a latent relationship between diverse attentional mechanisms. Within this relationship, hypervigilance and avoidance to threat operate at different stages of information processing suggesting fuzzy boundaries between early reactive and later-strategic processing of threat.     

Alexithymia in the interpersonal domain: A general deficit of empathy?

Alexithymia and empathy have been related but very little is known on shared variance between their respective affective and cognitive dimensions. We examined this question with correlations, as well as both exploratory and confirmatory analyses, and controlled for anxiety and depression. The responses of 645 young adults to self-report questionnaires of alexithymia (TAS-20), empathy (IRI), anxiety (STAI-T) and depression (BDI-13) were examined. We observed associations between the proposed cognitive components of alexithymia (externally-oriented thinking) and that of empathy (perspective taking, fantasy) as well as empathic concern, which were insensitive to anxiety or depression. In contrast, associations between the proposed affective components of alexithymia (difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings) and empathy (personal distress) were largely due to shared covariance with anxiety. A model encompassing an affective and a cognitive (including empathic concern) latent factors emerged, even after controlling for dysphoric affects. These findings suggest specific associations between cognitive and affective components of both constructs that were dissimilarly affected by anxiety and depression. The allocation of empathic concern to the cognitive factor is also discussed.