A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Inquisition

Disagreement space consists of all the commitments and understandings required for an utterance to take on its discourse function. These are virtual standpoints that can be called out for explicit argumentation. This paper shows how the Inquisition systematically controlled disagreement space, preventing some apparently important standpoints from ever being argued about, and requiring attention to others that may not have initially seemed relevant. This control of disagreement space constituted violation of the rules for critical discussion. The essay suggests that the idea of disagreement space be slightly enlarged, to show the distinctions among virtual, possible, and actual disagreement spaces. The Inquisition's extra-argumentative power is what permitted its specification of the possible disagreement space. The analysis suggests that pragma-dialectics may have application in the criticism and analysis of social institutions.     

Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance.     

Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism

Synthese - I argue that the skeptical force of a disagreement is mitigated to the extent that it is fundamental, where a fundamental disagreement is one that is driven by differences in epistemic...     

The Asymmetry Objection Rides Again: On the Nature and Significance of Justificatory Disagreement

Political liberalism offers perhaps the most developed and dominant account of justice and legitimacy in the face of disagreement among citizens. A prominent objection states that the view arbitrarily treats differently disagreement about the good, such as on what makes for a good life, and disagreement about justice. In the presence of reasonable disagreement about the good, political liberals argue that the state must be neutral, but they do not suggest a similar response given reasonable disagreement about what justice requires. A leading political liberal, Jonathan Quong, has recently offered a rebuttal to this asymmetry objection. His reply rests on an innovative distinction between justificatory and foundational disagreement. Quong claims that disagreements about justice in a well ordered society are justificatory while disagreements about the good are foundational, and suggests that this fact blocks the asymmetry objection. We assess Quong's solution and argue that it fails to justify legitimate state action on matters of justice but not the good. We conclude that the asymmetry objection continues to undermine political liberalism.     

Effect of group means on the probability of consensus

In this study, groups who could not reach a consensus were investigated using the group polarization paradigm. The purpose was to explore the conditions leading to intragroup disagreement and attitude change following disagreement among 269 participants. Analysis indicated that the probability of consensus was low when the group means differed from the grand mean of the entire sample. When small differences among group members were found, depolarization (reverse direction of polarization) followed disagreement. These results suggested the groups which deviated most from the population tendency were the most likely to cause within-group disagreement, while within-group variances determined the direction of attitude change following disagreement within the group.     

Reactance and the dynamics of disagreement: multiple paths from threatened freedom to resistance to persuasion

Many experiments show that threats to attitudinal freedom create reactance, but the underlying dynamics of reactance‐based disagreement have not received much attention. The present experiments identified two paths from threats to disagreement. In one path, threats to attitudinal freedom directly motivate disagreement; in the other, negative cognitive responses mediate the threat's effect on disagreement. Two experiments demonstrated the causes and consequences of each path from threat to persuasion. When a communicator threatened freedom at the beginning of the message, unfavorable cognitive responses (counterarguing, negative perceptions of the source's credibility) fully mediated the effect of threat on disagreement. When the threat appeared at the end of the message however, threat had a direct, unmediated effect on disagreement (Experiment 1). The two paths had different consequences for sleeper effects: disagreement rooted in negative cognitive responses persisted, whereas disagreement directly motivated by the threat declined when the threat was removed (Experiment 2). Implications for reactance and for threat‐based sleeper effects are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Couple disagreement: Inevitable and healthy? Belgian and Japanese conceptions

“Couples who argue together, stay together” is a popular English saying suggesting the necessity of disagreement for a healthy and stable romantic relationship. The present study explores whether Belgian and Japanese participants similarly view couple disagreement as a necessity, and whether conceptions of disagreement have implications for partners' ideas of how to deal with disagreement. We conducted four focus groups in each culture and analyzed them using thematic analysis. The findings suggested that Belgian participants thought that partners' needs unavoidably clash. They thus saw disagreement as inevitable. In contrast, Japanese participants thought of disagreement as avoidable. To avoid disagreement, they reported that they adjusted to and accepted the differences of their partner. Consistent with these respective conceptions of disagreement, Belgian participants highlighted the importance of addressing disagreement through open communication, while Japanese participants reported to frequently engage in indirect forms of communication such as mindreading. The differences in Belgian and Japanese conceptions of disagreement reflect different cultural notions of a healthy relationship, with Belgian partners valuing independence and Japanese emphasizing interdependence in the relationship. We discuss the implications of existing research on couple disagreement, which often starts from assumptions closer to the English saying and the Belgian conceptions of disagreement.     

Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms

This paper argues that Burley's theory of simple supposition is not as it has usually been presented. The prevailing view is that Burley and other authors agreed that simple supposition was in every case supposition for a universal, and that the disagreement over simple supposition between, say, Ockham and Burley was merely a disagreement over what a universal was (a piece of the ontology? a concept?), combined with a separate disagreement over what terms signify (the speaker's thoughts? the objects the thoughts are about?). In fact, however, Burley explicitly allows that some instances of simple supposition are for an individual, and that in certain cases personal supposition and simple supposition coincide. The present paper explores Burley's theory on this topic, and proposes a way of thinking about the metaphysics and the semantics that makes sense of what he says.     

Reason-Giving and the Natural Normativity of Argumentation

Topoi - Argument is a pervasive feature of human interaction, and in its natural contexts of occurrence, it is organized around the management of disagreement. Since disagreement can occur around...     

Effect of the destructive disagreement belief on satisfaction with one's closest friend

The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that, when imagining a serious disagreement with one's closest friend, verbalizing the irrational belief that disagreement is destructive would lead to greater relationship dissatisfaction than would verbalizing the rational belief that disagreement is not destructive. The author used two counter-demand-control conditions to test a second hypothesis that this effect would not be the result of demand characteristics. Undergraduates (119 women and 43 men) were randomly assigned to 1 of 5 conditions in a pretest-posttest design. In comparison with a control condition, posttest relationship dissatisfaction was significantly higher in the irrational condition and was lower, but not significantly so, in the rational condition. These results were not attributable to demand characteristics and suggested that this irrational belief increased relationship dissatisfaction.     

A graphical judgmental aid which summarizes obtained and chance reliability data and helps assess the believability of experimental effects

Interval by interval reliability has been criticized for "inflating" observer agreement when target behavior rates are very low or very high. Scored interval reliability and its converse, unscored interval reliability, however, vary as target behavior rates vary when observer disagreement rates are constant. These problems, along with the existence of "chance" values of each reliability which also vary as a function of response rate, may cause researchers and consumers difficulty in interpreting observer agreement measures. Because each of these reliabilities essentially compares observer disagreements to a different base, it is suggested that the disagreement rate itself be the first measure of agreement examined, and its magnitude relative to occurrence and to nonoccurrence agreements then be considered. This is easily done via a graphic presentation of the disagreement range as a bandwidth around reported rates of target behavior. Such a graphic presentation summarizes all the information collected during reliability assessments and permits visual determination of each of the three reliabilities. In addition, graphing the "chance" disagreement range around the bandwidth permits easy determination of whether or not true observer agreement has likely been demonstrated. Finally, the limits of the disagreement bandwidth help assess the believability of claimed experimental effects: those leaving no overlap between disagreement ranges are probably believable, others are not.     

Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement

This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic significance of disagreement (a topic over which there is some disagreement). After discussing this matter at some length, I conclude, tentatively, that inclusiveness under disagreement can have such epistemic costs. Still, I go on to argue, such costs by themselves would not rationalize substantial limitations on a broad policy of inclusiveness. Insofar as there are grounds for restricting how inclusive one should be in belief-formation, these grounds will not be epistemic, but instead will reflect the practical costs—the time, effort, and resource costs to the subject—of following such a policy.     

Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement

I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of moral disagreement, while also explaining why it can be rational to be relatively insensitive to such disagreements. I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.     

Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox

The problem of multi‐peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P₁ … P_n and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ～P₁ … ～P_n, respectively. However, the problem of multi‐peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so‐called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement about P. After some terminology is defined (§1), Peter van Inwagen's challenge to the steadfast view will be presented (§2). The preface paradox will then be presented and diagnosed (§3), and it will be argued that van Inwagen's challenge relies on the same principle that generates the preface paradox (§4). The reasonable response to multi‐peer disagreement will be discussed (§5), and an objection addressed (§6).     

Scientific Controversies and the Ethics of Arguing and Belief in the Face of Rational Disagreement

Our main aim is to discuss the topic of scientific controversies in the context of a recent issue that has been the centre of attention of many epistemologists though not of argumentation theorists or philosophers of science, namely the ethics of belief in face of rational disagreement. We think that the consideration of scientific examples may be of help in the epistemological debate on rational disagreement, making clear some of the deficiencies of the discussion as it has been produced until now. Another central claim of our paper is that the common view according to which beliefs (and changes of beliefs) may exhibit and commonly exhibit a deontic status can be clarified in the light of Brandom’s approach to normative pragmatics and the pragmatic theories of argumentation that also have a normative character (here our example is van Eemeren’s pragma-dialectics). Our article highlights the similarities between both projects, similarities that to our knowledge were not noticed before. Finally, an important point of the article is that we need to take contextual elements into account in order to develop an adequate theory of disagreement.     

Cognitive dissonance in groups: the consequences of disagreement

As L. Festinger (1957) argued, the social group is a source of cognitive dissonance as well as a vehicle for reducing it. That is, disagreement from others in a group generates dissonance, and subsequent movement toward group consensus reduces this negative tension. The authors conducted 3 studies to demonstrate group-induced dissonance. In the first, students in a group with others who ostensibly disagreed with them experienced greater dissonance discomfort than those in a group with others who agreed. Study 2 demonstrated that standard moderators of dissonance in past research--lack of choice and opportunity to self-affirm, similarly reduced dissonance discomfort generated by group disagreement. In Study 3, the dissonance induced by group disagreement was reduced through a variety of interpersonal strategies to achieve consensus, including persuading others, changing one's own position, and joining an attitudinally congenial group.     

Descartes and More on the infinity of the world

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement on the nature of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe.     

Possible disagreements and defeat

Conciliatory views about disagreement with one’s epistemic peers lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that often, when we know others disagree, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are. One might attempt to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic agents should be epistemically significant to the same degree as disagreement with actual agents, and that, since for any belief we have, it is possible that someone should disagree in the appropriate way, we ought to be much less sure of all of our beliefs than we typically are. In this paper, I identify what I take to be the main motivation for thinking that actual disagreement is epistemically significant and argue that it does not also motivate the epistemic significance of merely possible disagreement.     

Relativism and Faultless Disagreement

The argument from faultless disagreement employed by the relativist purports to show that contextualism falls short of explaining cases of faultless disagreement. The demonstration is intended to give credence to the relativist semantics of epistemic modality expressions. In this paper we present some cases showing that even though cases of faultless disagreement do reveal some intrinsic features of epistemic modality claims, they do not support the relativist semantics. The sophistication of faultless disagreement goes beyond what the relativist semantics can cope with. We also advance an epistemologically oriented proposal to account for faultless disagreement.     

Remembering stories together: Social contagion and the moderating influence of disagreements in conversations

Although remembering often occurs with conversations, the effects of its pragmatics on memory are rarely examined. We studied the effect of two pragmatic factors: (1) the presence of disagreeing and (2) the level of participation in the disagreement. In the present study, each participant read a slightly different version of four stories, thereby allowing for the possibility of social contagion through the conversation. They then jointly recounted the stories. We coded for the presence or absence of disagreements, and whether a participant contributed to the disagreement. Three factors mediated social contagion: (a) the presence or absence of an overt disagreement; (b) whether or not a member of a conversational remembering participated actively in a disagreement; and (c) how well participants remembered the original material. Both the pragmatics of conversations and quality of memory are important factors moderating social contagion.