Know How to Transmit Knowledge?

Intellectualism about knowledge‐how is the view that practical knowledge is a species of propositional knowledge. I argue that this view is undermined by a difference in properties between knowledge‐how and both knowledge‐that and knowledge‐wh. More specifically, I argue that both knowledge‐that and knowledge‐wh are easily transmitted via testimony while knowledge‐how is not easily transmitted by testimony. This points to a crucial difference in states of knowledge. I also consider Jason Stanley's attempt to subsume knowledge‐how under an account of de se knowledge. I argue that there are crucial differences between de se knowledge and knowledge‐how. Thus, this paper advances both the discussion of intellectualism and the literature on the nature of de se knowledge.     

LIBERTY,NECESSITY AND CHANCE: HOBBES'S GENERAL THEORY OF EVENTS

Locke characterizes sensitive knowledge as knowledge of the existence of external objects present to the senses, and in terms of an ‘assurance’ that falls short of the certainty of intuition and demonstration. But it is unclear how this fits with his general definition of knowledge, as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and it is unclear how that assurance can amount to knowledge, rather than amounting to mere probability (which he contrasts with knowledge). Some contend that Locke does not regard sensitive knowledge as genuine knowledge, but only honourifically calls it knowledge. In contrast, I argue that Locke holds that sensitive knowledge is knowledge, though he takes the conditions for it to be very different from the conditions for intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. It is not the assurance alone which Locke thinks qualifies sensitive knowledge as such: it is also the fact that the assurance arises from the actual employment of the senses upon external objects, and the fact that the senses do not generally deceive us, which he thinks qualifies sensitive knowledge as genuine knowledge. That there is a (tacit) form of externalism in Locke's account of sensitive knowledge is the main thesis of this paper.     

隐性知识的具身机制、转化与管理

隐性知识是知识经济时代的发展关键,在多个学科的知识体系中占有重要位置。由于隐性知识有内隐表征、主观经验和情境性等多种跨层属性,导致管理学、体育学等学科面临隐性知识转化与管理的难题。隐性知识本质上是具身性的,身体经验与情境的互动为个体在知识系统中归纳与形成隐性知识提供了基础。隐性知识的提取与应用机制为组织对隐性知识的转化与管理提供了桥梁,而隐性知识的具身机制是其提取与应用的依据。本文将基于具身认知理论,结合多个学科的研究证据,对不同情境下的隐性知识提取与应用机制进行分析,旨在梳理出隐性知识的具身机制,并针对隐性知识的未来研究、转化与管理提出建议。     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

初一学生数学学习的学科领域知识表征特点

学科领域知识由学理内容知识、认知过程知识和问题条件知识组成。本研究以529名七年级学生为被试,测查学生在数学学习中的学科领域知识表征特点,结果发现:(1)三种类型知识表征存在显著差异,学理内容知识表征水平最高,问题条件知识表征水平最低;(2)学优生的学科领域知识表征水平显著高于中等生和学困生;(3)认知过程知识表征、问题条件知识表征水平与数学学业成绩显著相关;(4)学生对学理内容知识重要性评价最高,问题条件知识最低。     

儿童运动认知的朴素理论

主要介绍了关于运动的朴素理论中儿童具有的两类知识系统,一是儿童在日常运动中能够描述出来的朴素信念即外显的概念知识,另一是儿童和运动的物体发生相互作用时所具有的知识即内隐的知识,并进一步阐述了内隐知觉知识和外显概念知识之间具有不可渗透性,内隐运动知识和外显概念知识存在着分离,内隐运动知识可以通过运动表象的方式转化为外显概念知识。提出了有待进一步探讨的问题：错误信念是否具有任务特殊性,内隐知觉知识和内隐运动知识之间关系等     

Rethinking Knowledge

The view that the subject matter of epistemology is the concept of knowledge is faced with the problem that all attempts so far to define that concept are subject to counterexamples. As an alternative, this article argues that the subject matter of epistemology is knowledge itself rather than the concept of knowledge. Moreover, knowledge is not merely a state of mind but rather a certain kind of response to the environment that is essential for survival. In this perspective, the article outlines an answer to four basic questions about knowledge: What is the role of knowledge in human life? What is the relation between knowledge and reality? How is knowledge acquired? Is there any a priori knowledge?     

Testing for Independent Effects of Prosocial Knowledge and Technical Knowledge on Skill and Performance

This study extended previous research (Motowidlo, Borman, & Schmit, 1997) on antecedents of job performance by testing for independent effects of prosocial and technical knowledge in a sample of 208 medical students. Results show that prosocial knowledge is uncorrelated with technical knowledge and that it contributes incremental variance to clinical performance in Primary Care after accounting for technical knowledge and clinical skill. Findings indicate Agreeableness is an important correlate of prosocial knowledge but not of technical knowledge. Unexpectedly, cognitive ability is not significantly related to either kind of knowledge or clinical performance. These results reinforce the idea that knowledge is a primary determinant of performance and that one type of knowledge, prosocial, has roots in Agreeableness, whereas a different type of knowledge, technical, does not.     

Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge

I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that satisfaction of the justification condition on knowledge ineliminably requires a collective. Next, I show how features of contemporary science support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge in this sense. Finally, I consider implications of my proposal and defend it against objections.     

Skepticism,Contextualism, and Discrimination*

The skeptic says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that ‘knowledge” is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”, but that both hypotheses about “knowledge” have deeply anti‐skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.     

Can unconscious knowledge allow control in sequence learning?

This paper investigates the conscious status of both the knowledge that an item is legal (judgment knowledge) and the knowledge of why it is legal (structural knowledge) in sequence learning. We compared ability to control use of knowledge (Process Dissociation Procedure) with stated awareness of the knowledge (subjective measures) as measures of the conscious status of knowledge. Experiment 1 showed that when people could control use of judgment knowledge they were indeed conscious of having that knowledge according to their own statements. Yet Experiment 2 showed that people could exert such control over the use of judgment knowledge when claiming they had no structural knowledge: i.e. conscious judgment knowledge could be based on unconscious structural knowledge. Further implicit learning research should be clear over whether judgment or structural knowledge is claimed to be unconscious as the two dissociate in sequence learning.     

An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge

The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.     

The Effects of Real-World Knowledge on Text Processing Among Older Adults

In the present study, the effects of knowledge on text processing were investigated among older adults. Past research has shown that knowledge reduces processing time among older readers, however, this finding was based on schematic knowledge. Schematic knowledge is a highly prescribed knowledge that draws on commonly held general world knowledge. Domain knowledge, on the other hand, is specialized real-world knowledge within a particular area (e.g., chess, physics, cooking). Past research has shown that domain knowledge engages additional processing resources among younger adults. If this is true of the elderly, then this type of knowledge may pose a challenge to older adults. Regression analyses were used to investigate word-by-word reading time patterns among high- and low-knowledge older adults. Older high-knowledge readers did in fact increase resource allocation to texts that drew on domain knowledge and in turn showed higher levels of recall. These data suggest that knowledge promotes the productive allocation of processing resources among older adults, thus enabling them to take full advantage of knowledge.     

Know how to be Gettiered?

Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s influential article “Knowing How” argues that knowledge‐how is a species of knowledge‐that. One objection to their view is that knowledge‐how is significantly different than knowledge‐that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge‐how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge‐that and knowledge‐how.     

A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge

Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge‐how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so‐called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.     

IV—Knowledge of Meaning

The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub-sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it is to be contrasted with tacit knowledge which refers to an information-bearing state which, however, is not a genuine propositional attitude. ¹ I begin by defending the implicit knowledge conception of speakers' knowledge of the meanings of words from a challenge articulated by Evans and then go on the offensive against positions which attempt to replace the notion of implicit knowledge in semantic theory by that of tacit knowledge.     

知识差异和知识冲突对团队创新的影响

通过情景模拟实验比较了高低知识差异和有无知识冲突两个变量四个水平下的团队创新度。结果表明,知识差异和知识冲突存在着交互作用;当知识差异较小时,知识冲突对于团队创新度具有积极作用;当知识差异较大时,知识冲突所起的是一种震荡作用;当团队不存在知识冲突时,较高的知识差异对团队创新度具有积极作用;存在知识冲突时,高知识差异团队和低知识差异团队的创新度没有显著差异     

The influence of prior knowledge on the retrieval‐directed function of note taking in prior knowledge activation

Background. Prior knowledge activation facilitates learning. Note taking during prior knowledge activation (i.e., note taking directed at retrieving information from memory) might facilitate the activation process by enabling learners to build an external representation of their prior knowledge. However, taking notes might be less effective in supporting prior knowledge activation if available prior knowledge is limited. Aims. This study investigates the effects of the retrieval‐directed function of note taking depending on learners' level of prior knowledge. It is hypothesized that the effectiveness of note taking is influenced by the amount of prior knowledge learners already possess. Sample. Sixty‐one high school students participated in this study. A prior knowledge test was used to ascertain differences in level of prior knowledge and assign participants to a low or a high prior knowledge group. Method. A 2×2 factorial design was used to investigate the effects of note taking during prior knowledge activation (yes, no) depending on learners' level of prior knowledge (low, high) on mental effort, performance, and mental efficiency. Results. Note taking during prior knowledge activation lowered mental effort and increased mental efficiency for high prior knowledge learners. For low prior knowledge learners, note taking had the opposite effect on mental effort and mental efficiency. Conclusions. The effects of the retrieval‐directed function of note taking are influenced by learners' level of prior knowledge. Learners with high prior knowledge benefit from taking notes while activating prior knowledge, whereas note taking has no beneficial effects for learners with limited prior knowledge.     

On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge

The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly known by using a certain set of logical rules, the concept of implicit knowledge is definable on the basis of the concept of explicit knowledge. In any case, both implicit and explicit knowledge are typically characterized as factive, i.e. such that it is always the case that what is known is also true. The aim of the present paper is twofold: first, we will develop a dynamic system of explicit intersubjective knowledge that allows us to introduce the operator of implicit knowledge by definition; secondly, we will show that it is not possible to hold together the following two theses: (1) the concept of implicit knowledge is definable along the lines indicated above and (2) the concept of implicit knowledge is factive.     

Acquiring generic knowledge

Generic knowledge is knowledge about kinds of things. The existence of generic knowledge poses a difficult acquisition problem: how do we acquire knowledge about kinds of things if we have experience with only a limited number of examples of the kinds in question? The problem is exacerbated by the fact that we sometimes acquire generic knowledge on the basis of experience with only a single instance of the kind. In this review, it is argued that there is a formal system for common-sense conception that underlies the acquisition of an important class of generic knowledge. Generic knowledge acquired through the use of the formal system represents the stable knowledge we have about kinds of things. It complements, rather than replaces, the statistical and causal (mechanistic) knowledge acquired through the use of other learning mechanisms.