Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

The question of the other in French phenomenology

I would like to show how with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, we have to do with three different ways of understanding the experience of the other. For Sartre it is a visual experience, the experience of being looked at by the other, so that the experience of the other is understood as a confrontation; for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the other necessarily implies coexistence and what he calls “intercorporeality,” so that for him the other is never to be found in front, but instead beside me, in reciprocity with me; for Levinas, the experience of the other is the experience of a non-reciprocity, of an assymetrical relation, because the experience of the other is for him an ethical and not an ontological experience, and because this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other : the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas.     

Own and Others' Prior Experiences Influence Children's Imitation of Causal Acts

Young children learn from others' examples, and they do so selectively. We examine whether the efficacy of prior experiences influences children's imitation. Thirty-six-month-olds had initial experience on a causal learning task either by performing the task themselves or by watching an adult perform it. The nature of the experience was manipulated such that the actor had either an easy or a difficult experience completing the task. Next, a second adult demonstrated an innovative technique for completing it. Children who had a difficult first-person experience, and those who had witnessed another person having difficulty, were significantly more likely to adopt and imitate the adult's innovation than those who had or witnessed an easy experience. Children who observed another were also more likely to imitate than were those who had the initial experience themselves. Imitation is influenced by prior experience, both when it is obtained through one's own hands-on motor manipulation and when it derives from observing the acts of others.     

Embodied Experience in Educational Practice and Research

The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty??s theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty??s analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty??s own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience.     

No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership

The Abhidharma Buddhist revisionary metaphysics aims to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks a self. The first part of the paper claims that the Abhidharma ‘no-self’ view can be plausibly interpreted as a no-ownership view, according to which there is no locus or subject of experience and thus no owner of mental or bodily awarenesses. On this interpretation of the no-self view, the Abhidharma Buddhist metaphysicians are committed to denying the ownership of experiences, and thereby apparently obliged to explain our purported experience of ownership. My experiences seemingly come with the sense that I am the one who is undergoing this experience. But is there a really an experience of ownership—namely, an experience of being a subject that underlies our sense of ownership? I argue that there is nothing that it is like to be an owner of experiences, in the sense that there is no experiential phenomenology associated with the ownership of experience. The second part of the paper argues that, since there is no experience of ownership, there is no onus on the Abhidharma philosopher to give an explanation of the sense of ownership.     

THE EXPERIENCE OF FEMINISM

For this Presidential Address, Fellows of Division 35 were surveyed by means of an open-ended questionnaire about their experience of feminism. The narrative data of a sample of the 51 replies received were analyzed using thematic analysis techniques adapted from an existential phenomenological method. Participants shared many themes, indicating that the experience of feminism can be defined through reports of its lived experience and that this experience changes over time.     

Perception, Causation, and Supervenience

What relation between an experience and a physical object makes the experience a perception of the object?¹ One common answer is that it is a certain kind of causal relation. The idea is that to perceive an object is just to undergo an experience appropriately caused by the object. This answer is incorrect. The reason is that perceiving an object does not supervene on the causal connection the object bears to the perceiver's experience. Whether or not a person perceives an object depends, in part, on conditions that could obtain or fail to obtain without variation in the causal processes (if any) by which the object causes the person's experience. In what follows, I explain and defend these claims.     

The influence of an interpolated experience upon recognition

It was demonstrated in a previous experiment that an experience interpolated between an original experience and its recall may bring about changes in the points of emphasis in the recall of the original experience. Moreover, details of the interpolated experience may be recalled as if they had formed part of the original experience. These results were taken to mean that two experiences of a related kind may become merged in memory into something akin to Bartlett's notion of an organized mass of past experiences. In the experiment here reported, the original experience was the hearing of a story, and the interpolated experience the seeing of a picture which illustrated part of the story. When in a recognition test subjects were asked to select from three alternatives (including the original) the one version which was “most like the original story,” a proportion of them preferred to the original story a version which differed from the original by including a number of details from the picture. Asked about details, all the subjects tended to place details from the picture in the story, even if they had not been mentioned there. The results of the two experiments are thought to show that irreversible changes are brought about in the memory of an experience by subsequent experiences of a related kind.     

Aha! Insight experience correlates with solution activation in the right hemisphere

In one experiment, we tested for an association between semantic activation in the right hemisphere (RH) and left hemisphere (LH) and the Aha! experience when people recognize solutions to insight-like problems. The compound remote associate problems used in this experiment sometimes evoke an Aha! experience and sometimes do not. On each trial, participants (N = 44) attempted to solve these problems and, after 7 sec, named a target word, made a solution decision, and rated their insight experience of recognizing the solution. As in prior studies, the participants demonstrated more solution priming for solutions presented to the left visual field-RH (lvf-RH) than for solutions presented to the right visual field-LH (rvf-LH). As was predicted, following unsolved problems the participants showed greater priming for solutions that they rated as evoking an insight experience on the subsequent solution decision than for solutions that did not evoke an insight experience. This association was stronger for solutions presented to the lvf-RH than for those presented to the rvf-LH. These results tie the subjective experience of insight to an objective measure-semantic priming-and suggest that people have an Aha! experience in part because they already had semantic activation that could lead them to recognize the solution quickly. We believe semantic activation in both hemispheres cooperatively contributes to problem solving, but weak solution activation that contributes to the Aha! experience is more likely to occur in the RH than in the LH.     

ATTRIBUTIONS FOR THE POORLY PERFORMING BLACKJACK DEALER: IN THE CARDS OR INABILITY?

This study examined the effects of task and supervisory experience on causal attributions and recommendations for corrective action following poor performance. One hundred twenty subjects employed in a casino reviewed an evaluation form describing the poor performance of a blackjack dealer in the casino. Subjects included first-and second-level supervisors with task and supervisory experience, dealers with task experience only, and employees with neither task nor supervisory experience. Subjects were told that the dealer being evaluated had 2, 6, or 12 months of task experience. Results indicate that task and supervisory experience did affect attributions to specific causal factors; however, the effects were not consistently in the predicted direction. Specifically, supervisors viewed lack of effort and poor supervision as more important and task difficulty as less important causes of poor performance than did dealers. Subjects without task experience viewed poor work conditions and task difficulty as stronger causes of poor performance than did dealers. Task experience of the ratee interacted with rater task experience such that dealers and controls differed in their attributions for employees with 12 months' experience but did not differ if the ratee had 2 or 6 months' experience. Causal attributions for an employee's poor performance were related to subsequent corrective recommendations.     

Early Experience Predicts Later Plasticity for Face Processing: Evidence for the Reactivation of Dormant Effects

ABSTRACT— Research has shown that experience acquired in infancy dramatically affects face-discrimination abilities. Yet much less is known about whether face processing retains any flexibility after the 1st year of life. Here, we show that early experience with an individual infant face can modulate the recognition performance of 3-year-old children and the perceptual processes they use to recognize infant faces ( Experiment 1 ). Similar experience acquired in adulthood does not produce measurable effects ( Experiment 2 ). We also show that the effects of early-acquired experience with an infant face become dormant during development in the absence of continued experience ( Experiment 3 ) and can be reactivated in adulthood by reexposure to the original experience ( Experiment 2 ). Overall, the results indicate that early experience can preserve the face-processing system from the loss of plasticity that would otherwise take place between childhood and adulthood.     

An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances

A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn’t compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by noting that the only plausible interpretation of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outline a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances.     

Clinical conversations between psychoanalysis and imaginative literature

A literary form created by an imaginative writer captures something of the way the author shapes emotional experience and psychologically engages with it. The manner in which experience is created and contained in an imaginative literary text has much in common with the way experience is generated and worked with in the psychoanalytic situation. The author describes a clinical experience in which there was a collapse of the analytic (imaginative) space. He then discusses how he made use of a "conversation" he created with a short story and his own analytic experience to restore his imaginative capacities and to resume psychological work with the patient.     

Associations Between Sexual Behavior, Sexual Attitudes, and Marital Horizons During Emerging Adulthood

Using a sample of 1,134 emerging adults, this study explores how the importance place on marriage, ideal marital timing, and criteria for marriage readiness varies by sexual experience. Sexual experience groups were created using cluster analysis techniques that incorporated both sexual behaviors and attitudes. Results from this study indicate that high rates of sexual experience were related to an increased personal belief that marriage is an important goal and a belief that being single holds more advantages over being married. Emerging adults with high rates of sexual experience were also more likely to believe that sexual experience and cohabitation are important criteria for marriage readiness.     

Conceptualizing the role of early experience: Lessons from the Minnesota longitudinal study

We draw upon data from a prospective, longitudinal study to evaluate the role of typically occurring variations in early experience on development from birth to adulthood. Such an evaluation is complex for both methodological and conceptual reasons. Methodological issues include the need to control for both later experience and potentially confounding third variables, such as IQ or temperament. Conceptual complexity derives from the fact that the effects of early experience can be both direct and indirect, can interact with other factors, and because whether an effect is found depends on what early experience and what outcomes are assessed. Even direct effects are probabilistic and are more in evidence with cumulative than with single measures. Often early experience has its effect indirectly by initiating a chain of events, by altering the organism in some way, and/or by promoting the impact of later experience. We provide examples where early experience is moderated and mediated by other factors and where it shows latent effects following developmental change. We illustrate developmental processes through which early experience has its effect and conclude that despite the complexity of development variations in early experience retain a vital place in the study of development.     

Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience

Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume. Careful consideration of mundane examples, like looking at a coin from an oblique angle, show that the low-level properties represented in experience do not necessarily figure in the sensory character of the experience. Furthermore, the sensible properties invoked when characterizing the sensory character of a perceptual experience are not necessarily included in the sensible properties represented in a perceptual experience. On this basis it is argued that perceptual experience has a disunified metaphysics, consisting in distinct sensory and cognitive components. The account is developed in relation to existing unified and disunified accounts, and discussed in terms of its implications for cognitive penetration, the reliability of introspection, the transparency of experience, and cognitive phenomenology.     

Flow Experience in Design Thinking and Practical Synergies with Lego Serious Play

The flow experience can be an important precursor to high levels of creativity and innovation. Prior work has identified and conceptualized the key elements of the flow experience in cocreative activities as individual flow corridor, individual flow feeling, and group flow. Surprisingly, the flow experience is underrepresented in theory and practice of design thinking. In this empirical study, the flow experience at the individual and group level was investigated in a 1-day design thinking exercise. The findings from partial least squares (PLS) modeling of 230 observations confirm previously untested conjectures that (a) the elements of individual and group flow experience were prevalent and highly correlated in the design thinking activities and (b) the nature of the design thinking task had an impact on the flow experience. Finally, results confirm that Lego Serious Play skills-building as a creative warm-up had a positive effect on 2 of the 3 flow experience elements: individual flow feeling and individual flow corridor.     

The Mediating Effect of Financial Motives in the Association between Entrepreneurial Experience and Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and subjective well-being. Using an original survey on subjective well-being, entrepreneurial experience, level of wealth (inferred from observed variables of income, cash, and assets), and personal attributes of 10,001 individuals in Japan, we examine the factors that mediate the association between entrepreneurial experience and subjective well-being. We measure entrepreneurial experience as an individual’s experience in funding, owning, and running a corporation. We consider the mediating effect of the level of wealth on subjective well-being because entrepreneurial well-being is associate with wealth derived from income, cash, and assets. Our results provide no significant evidence that individuals with entrepreneurial experience have higher subjective well-being. However, we find a positive indirect effect of entrepreneurial experience on subjective well-being through wealth and a negative indirect effect through debt. The findings of this study indicate the importance of considering the mediating effect of financial motives in entrepreneurial well-being.

     

Afterward: Making Meaning After a Frightening Near-Death Experience

The routes by which individuals attribute meaning to a near-death experience (NDE) appear to be similar, whether the experience was radiant or terrifying. This article explores three such avenues in relation to frightening experiences. I argue that resisting a terrifying NDE is likely to intensify fearfulness in an individual, and also that a similar effect occurs within society when this type of experience is resisted and misunderstood. The article concludes with an approach to synthesis and suggested techniques that may be useful in integrating the experience.     

What is Wrong with the Concept of Religious Experience?

After briefly mentioning the reason why the concept of religious experience has become a key to understanding Western and non-Western religious phenomena in current religious studies, this paper argues that the concept itself is insufficient to represent the religious phenomena of Islam, because to speak about 'an experience of God' in the context of Islam is misleading. This paper also argues that to consider mystical experience as well as the prophetic revelation that is wah?y within the boundaries of religious experience is confusing. Since the transmission process and contents of wah?y are extraordinary and miraculous, it should not be treated as an ordinary religious occurrence and therefore should not be considered as a personal religious experience.