What do epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other?

Epistemic logic is a multi-faceted theory aimed at targeting notions such as knowledge, belief, information, awareness, memory and other propositional attitudes, by means of logical and semantical tools. These concepts ought to be in the spotlight of cognitive science too, but the two have not yet seriously been explored in cooperation. In this paper, it is shown that a number of possibilities is opened up by attempting to answer the question of what epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other. Among the proposed answers are: (i) new quantified versions of multi-agent epistemic logic capture locutions involving object identification, giving rise to applications in representing knowledge in multi-agent systems and parallel processing. (ii) The framework of game-theoretic semantics for the ensuing logics enjoys increased cognitive plausibility as the true semantics for epistemic notions. (iii) Several recent findings in cognitive neuroscience pertaining to the notions of awareness and explicit versus implicit processing contribute to logical studies. These three connections are explored here from both logical and cognitive perspectives. Reflecting neuroscientific research, new extensions of epistemic logic are defined, increasing formal understanding of unconscious and unaware information processing in the brain, and making the formalism thus amenable to knowledge representation in multi-agent configurations.     

What do we owe co-nationals and non-nationals? why the liberal nationalist account fails and how we can do better

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled.     

Children's response to community violence: What do we know?

This article presents a framework for understanding the developmental significance of violence-related trauma in the lives of young children. It emphasizes the importance of the distinction between acute and chronic trauma. Acute trauma is more readily dealt with through “psychological first aid” and a “therapy of reassurance.” Chronic trauma requires a more systematic reconstruction of the child's “social map” of the world. The socioeconomic and demographic correlates of violent trauma predict an accumulation of risk factors in the child's life that compounds the problem of developmental disability. The problem community violence poses for the child must be understood in the larger context of greater risk for family disruption (including less than secure attachment) as well as domestic violence, poverty, and minority group status. The increasing incidence and prevalence of community violence poses a major challenge to the mental health of children.     

Why are we good at detecting cheaters? A reply to Fodor

It is argued that the recent criticism by Fodor (Cognition 75 (2000) 29) of "cheater detection" in the Wason selection task is based upon a false presumption about what the task entails. Fodor compares two different ways of presenting the task, rather than two different task domains (social and non-social). Consequently, the conclusion that the selection task can tell us nothing about either the architecture or the history of cognition is invalid. Fodor's explanation of the Wason selection task is examined experimentally and compared to predictions derived from social contract theory (Cognition 31 (1989) 187). It is concluded that, although Fodor's variant of the Wason selection task improves performance, this improvement is independent of the task domain and is insufficient to account for the "cheater detection" effect.     

What do we know about how best to assess counsellor competence?

Issues of assessment of counsellor competence are becoming increasingly important as counselling becomes more professionalized and recognizable as a distinct profession. There is, however, a lack of systematic research into competence assessment in this field. The existing literature is discussed in terms of the issues involved in employing different sources of assessment, such as trainers, tutors, managers, supervisors, external assessors, clients, self and peers. Techniques of assessment are reviewed, including questionnaires, video and audiotapes, role play, examinations, learning diaries and computer simulations. Some suggestions are offered for increasing the validity of assessment judgements.     

What to do? Upgrade!

The contents of what we transmit in colleges and universities as philosophic traditions need upgrading. But so do the methods of transmission.     

A closer look at ability emotional intelligence (EI): What are its component parts,and how do they relate to each other?

In this review, we focus on two key questions about the nature of emotional intelligence (EI). First, we consider what the different parts of EI might be, suggesting a taxonomy that builds on the well‐known hierarchical four‐branch model to include six narrow abilities (emotion perception, emotion expression, emotion attention regulation, emotion understanding, emotion regulation of self, and emotion regulation of others). Second, we review evidence for the interrelations between these six narrow abilities. The interrelationships of the EI narrow abilities are a key criterion for viewing EI as a kind of intelligence, rather than a typical way of behaving. Our review concludes that the six narrow abilities comprising EI are all positively interrelated—the component parts of EI converge to form a whole. In addition, the level of interrelationships shows that emotion expression and emotion perception are clearly separate, with weaker evidence for the separation between emotion regulation of self versus emotion regulation of others. Using the older research tradition of emotion recognition (which predates EI), we present a detailed overview of the relationship between emotion perception and other narrow abilities of EI. We conclude that the narrow facets of EI converge with each other, providing one form of evidence to support the validity of EI as a type of intelligence.     

What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler

Tamar Gendler argues that, for those living in a society in which race is a salient sociological feature, it is impossible to be fully rational: members of such a society must either fail to encode relevant information containing race, or suffer epistemic costs by being implicitly racist. However, I argue that, although Gendler calls attention to a pitfall worthy of study, she fails to conclusively demonstrate that there are epistemic (or cognitive) costs of being racist. Gendler offers three supporting phenomena. First, implicit racists expend cognitive energy repressing their implicit biases. I reply, citing Ellen Bialystok’s research, that constant use of executive functioning can be beneficial. Second, Gendler argues that awareness of a negative stereotype of one’s own race with regard to a given task negatively affects one’s performance of that task. This phenomenon, I argue, demonstrates that those against whom the stigma is directed suffer costs, but it fails to demonstrate that the stigmatizers suffer cognitively. Finally, Gendler argues that racists are less competent when recognizing faces of other races than when recognizing faces of their own race because, in the first instance, they encode the race of the face (taking up cognitive space that could have been used to encode fine-grained distinctions), whereas in the second instance they encode no race. I argue that in-group/out-group categorization rather than racism is the cognitive cost. I conclude that Gendler has failed to demonstrate that there are cognitive costs associated with being a racist.     

What do we know about psycholinguistic effects?

Identifying clear and unequivocal psycholinguistic effects for lexical retrieval tasks has been the aim of a significant proportion of recent research activity. Debates have erupted concerning the existence or otherwise of particular effects on particular lexical tasks. Here, it is suggested that the reason for these debates is that researchers exercise choice in what variables they consider in their analysis. It is further illustrated that methods that have been employed for comparing the size of these effects between tasks can only lead to inconclusive results. It is suggested that psycholinguistic data may be better analysed using structural equation modelling methodologies. An example of such an approach is presented.     

What do we learn in psychoanalytic training?

Can one define the aims of psychoanalytic training that most analysts would agree upon? For more than a decade the EPF Working Party ‘End of Training Evaluation Project (ETEP)’ has worked on this issue. Summarizing results of this work the author describes a set of basic elements every developing analyst should have learned or internalized during his training. His assertion is that most analysts notwithstanding their theoretical orientation could agree upon these necessary requirements for a successful ending of psychoanalytic training. These elements are demonstrated in the ability to understand the emotional demand of a patient in every session and the often ensuing emotional storm, to appreciate and deeply understand the value of free association, to preserve a neutral stance, to think in terms of transference and countertransference, and to think conceptually about what is happening and what one is doing in the session.     

What do we know about psycholinguistic effects?

Identifying clear and unequivocal psycholinguistic effects for lexical retrieval tasks has been the aim of a significant proportion of recent research activity. Debates have erupted concerning the existence or otherwise of particular effects on particular lexical tasks. Here, it is suggested that the reason for these debates is that researchers exercise choice in what variables they consider in their analysis. It is further illustrated that methods that have been employed for comparing the size of these effects between tasks can only lead to inconclusive results. It is suggested that psycholinguistic data may be better analysed using structural equation modelling methodologies. An example of such an approach is presented.     

What are we doing to the earth's climate and what are we going to do about it?

Climatic considerations are critical if our planet is to survive. The environment, and in particular the atmosphere, is particularly sensitive to man. The time has come to act in favor of that which gives us life. This is why, in a field which knows no boundaries, only an international strategy can be effective.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.