How intention to retrieve a memory and expectation that a memory will come to mind influence the retrieval of autobiographical memories

While involuntary memories are retrieved with no intention and are usually unexpected (when one is not waiting for a memory to arise), voluntary memories are intended and expected (when one is searching and waiting for a memory to arise). The present study aimed to investigate the effects of retrieval intentionality (i.e. wanting to retrieve a memory) and monitoring processes (i.e. waiting for a memory to appear) during autobiographical memory retrieval. In addition, we introduced two novel laboratory conditions that have not been used in previous research on voluntary memories: in the first, participants were asked to report anything they could think of in response to each cue word; in the second, they could skip a word if nothing came to mind. These novel manipulations allowed us to differentiate between voluntary memories retrieved in response to experimenter-generated cues (when participants were forced to provide a memory or a thought for each cue) and self-selected cues (when participants were free to not answer a cue if they found it too difficult). We found that highly accessible memories were mostly experienced when retrieval was involuntary and unexpected, while memories with low accessibility were accessed through intentional retrieval and monitoring processes. Response times for memories recalled in the experimenter-generated cue conditions were longer compared to the self-selected cue conditions. This novel finding shows that experimenter-generated recall favours memories with low accessibility; it further supports the idea that, in a substantial number of trials, voluntary memories are directly rather than effortfully retrieved. The idea that the driving force behind differences between involuntary and voluntary memories is not the intention per se is further discussed.     

What is the Accordion Effect?

In "Action and Responsibility,' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is supposed by Feinberg to be, on differences between Feinberg's understanding of this idea and that of Donald Davidson, and on the interaction between Feinberg's discussion of the accordion effect and his critique of the voluntary intervention principle.     

Episodic remembering creates access to involuntary conscious memory: Demonstrating involuntary recall on a voluntary recall task

The idea that involuntary memory retrieval might occur during voluntary memory retrieval can be traced back to Ebbinghaus (1885/1964). However, methodological challenges have stood in the way of testing this idea. Recent diary studies of naturally occurring involuntary memories have provided insights into how this idea could be tested (Berntsen, 1998; Mace, 2005b, 2006). These studies have shown that the contents of an involuntary memory sometimes trigger additional involuntary memories, a process called chaining. It was hypothesised that chaining should also occur on autobiographical memory tasks, and this was tested in the present study by asking participants in an autobiographical memory task to report the presence of involuntary memories while they were performing the task. The results showed that involuntary memories did occur when participants were recalling the past. The results also showed involuntary memories dissociating from voluntary memories on two independent measures, thereby enhancing the credibility of the results.     

Episodic remembering creates access to involuntary conscious memory: demonstrating involuntary recall on a voluntary recall task

The idea that involuntary memory retrieval might occur during voluntary memory retrieval can be traced back to Ebbinghaus (1885/1964). However, methodological challenges have stood in the way of testing this idea. Recent diary studies of naturally occurring involuntary memories have provided insights into how this idea could be tested (Berntsen, 1998; Mace, 2005b, 2006). These studies have shown that the contents of an involuntary memory sometimes trigger additional involuntary memories, a process called chaining. It was hypothesised that chaining should also occur on autobiographical memory tasks, and this was tested in the present study by asking participants in an autobiographical memory task to report the presence of involuntary memories while they were performing the task. The results showed that involuntary memories did occur when participants were recalling the past. The results also showed involuntary memories dissociating from voluntary memories on two independent measures, thereby enhancing the credibility of the results.     

An investigation into the client at the heart of therapy

This paper reports on an exploration of the experience of the client at the heart of therapy. A grounded theory analysis of clients' experiences of therapy provided through a voluntary sector counselling service was undertaken, and generated four main categories: permission, engagement, transparency and restructuring. The results of the study are presented in a way that hopefully retains much of the richness of what people have reported about their experience of counselling. The findings of the study are discussed in terms of the idea that counselling can provide a setting where people can have common therapeutic requirements met.     

Against Doxastic Compatibilism

William Alston has argued that the so‐called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible for our beliefs if we lack control over them? Several philosophers have argued that the idea that we bear responsibility for our beliefs can be saved, because absence of voluntary control over our beliefs is perfectly compatible with having obligations to hold particular beliefs. With others, I call this view ‘doxastic compatibilism’. It comes in two varieties. On the first variety, doxastic obligations do not require any kind of doxastic control whatsoever. I argue that this variety of doxastic compatibilism fails because it confuses doxastic responsibility with other closely related phenomena. On the second variety, doxastic obligations do not require voluntary doxastic control, but only compatibilist doxastic control (roughly, reason‐responsiveness) and we do in fact have such control. I grant that we have such control, but also argue that having such control is insufficient for bearing doxastic responsibility. The plausibility of the examples put forward by doxastic compatibilists in support of the claim that it is sufficient for doxastic responsibility derives from the fact that in these examples, the subjects have control over factors that influence what they believe rather than control over those beliefs themselves.     

Interaction of Afferent and Efferent Signals Underlying Joint Position Sense

A model of joint position sense is considered based on the concept that central motor commands are adequately expressed in terms of shifts of the so-called invariant length-tension characteristics for agonist and antagonist muscles. The main points of this concept are discussed to clarify them and to prevent misunderstanding. The basic idea of the model is that the efferent copy of the central motor commands plays the role of a reference frame for evaluation of afferent proprioceptive discharges. An experiment with reproduction of constrained movements was performed in order to investigate the influence of voluntary flexor or extensor muscle tension on position sense in the elbow joint. The results demonstrate adequate perception of joint position on the background of voluntary muscle tension and thus are quite consistent with the model. The role of afferent and efferent signals in position sense is discussed with special reference to views expressed recently by different authors. The interrelation between position sense and sense of effort is considered, based on a concept of senso-motor space.     

Finding the right touch: extending the right-touch regulation approach to the accreditation of voluntary registers

ABSTRACT

What is ‘right-touch regulation’? In this article we explain why the Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care (the Authority) has focussed much of its policy work in recent times on seeking an answer to this question, and why it wants to know. We explain why the Authority's predecessor body, the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, felt there was a need to define the concept of ‘right-touch regulation’ and explore the policy environment from which it emerged, linking the idea to existing regulatory principles. We then go on to discuss how the government's policy of establishing an accreditation scheme for voluntary registers – a task which has been given to the Authority – will fit with the right-touch regulation approach.     

Education for Computers

The computer engineers who refer to the education of computers do not have a definite idea of education and do not bother to justify the fuzzy ones to which they allude. Hence, they logically cannot specify the features a computer must have in order to be educable. This paper puts forth a non-standard, but not arbitrary, concept of education that determines such traits. The proposed concept is derived from the idea of education embedded in modern standard-English discourse. Because the standard concept entails that an educable entity must be capable of consciousness and voluntary action, it cannot apply to computers. If, therefore, one is to have an idea of educable computers, one must drop the feature of consciousness and omit or modify that of voluntariness. The advanced concept leaves out consciousness, alters the ordinary notion of voluntariness, but keeps in tact the other criteria of the standard idea. Thereby, it provides continuity between those who talk about education in modern ordinary English and those who talk about it in the world of artificial intelligence.     

Interaction of afferent and efferent signals underlying joint position sense: empirical and theoretical approaches

A model of joint position sense is considered based on the concept that central motor commands are adequately expressed in terms of shifts of the so-called invariant length-tension characteristics for agonist and antagonist muscles. The main points of this concept are discussed to clarify them and to prevent misunderstanding. The basic idea of the model is that the efferent copy of the central motor commands plays the role of a reference frame for evaluation of afferent proprioceptive discharges. An experiment with reproduction of constrained movements was performed in order to investigate the influence of voluntary flexor or extensor muscle tension on position sense in the elbow joint. The results demonstrate adequate perception of joint position on the background of voluntary muscle tension and thus are quite consistent with the model. The role of afferent and efferent signals in position sense is discussed with special reference to views expressed recently by different authors. The interrelation between position sense and sense of effort is considered, based on a concept of senso-motor space.     

When moving without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects

The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants made temporal judgements concerning a key press and a tone, while they learned to consider themselves as the cause of the effect or not. Results showed that implied self-causation (vs. no implied self-causation) increased temporal binding. Since intrinsic motor cues of movement were absent, these results suggest that sensory evidence about the key press caused binding in retrospect and in line with the participant's sense of being an agent.     

From outcome prediction to action selection: developmental change in the role of action–effect bindings

Ideomotor theory considers bidirectional action–effect associations to be the fundamental building blocks for intentional action. The present study employed a novel pupillometric and oculomotor paradigm to study developmental changes in the role of action‐effects in the acquisition of voluntary action. Our findings suggest that both 7‐ and 12‐month‐olds (and adults) can use acquired action–effect bindings to predict action outcomes but only 12‐month‐olds (and adults) showed evidence for employing action‐effects to select actions. This dissociation supports the idea that infants acquire action–effect knowledge before they have developed the cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform intentional actions.     

Homelessness in the mind

In this article, I am going to present several related, themes, based on data gathered from years of consulting to homelessness services, particularly staff and management working in the voluntary sector, who are responsible for the teams that deliver care to some of the most vulnerable and challenging individuals in society. The three concepts that I will put forward are as follows: firstly, the idea that there is a fundamental human concern, or state, regarding homelessness. What I will refer to as 'homelessness in the mind'. I will consider this from psychoanalytic and systems-psychodynamic viewpoints and explore the idea of an internalised homeless state and the structures which attempt to contain it. Second, is an almost universal hatred and repulsion of this state and a need for its expulsion and relocation, in phantasy, into individuals and services associated with the homeless population. Next, I will link the concept of homelessness in the mind with Bion’s idea of sophisticated/specialised basic assumption groups; groups, budded off from mainstream society to contain specific psychological aspects of the population. I will suggest that the associated psychological stressors and pressures of homelessness, and ‘homelessness in the mind’ and its subdivisions, dependency and shame, relate to aggressive and violent elements associated with the inability to correctly process, engage with, or contain, specific internal states related to homelessness. Throughout, I will refer to my practice as an organisational consultant, and my experience of working with managers and teams who work with the homeless population.     

Forced Migrants or Voluntary Exiles: Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria in Turkey

Turkey has been experiencing various types of migration flows since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Migration of ethnic Turks of Bulgaria in 1989 is one of the important immigration waves in size and in nature as well. More than 350,000 Bulgarian Turks refusing to assimilation policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) fled to Turkey in 1989. Behind this triggering political reason, there were deeper sources of this migration, such as economic, social, institutional and cultural exclusion/inclusion problems in Bulgaria. Furthermore, most of the Turks of Bulgaria kept the idea of migrating to their “imagined motherland’ someday. The same migrants have been experiencing integration/exclusion problems where they settled in Turkey, too. This paper attempts to open a conceptual debate by using concepts of ‘mixed migration”, ‘accidental diaspora’ and ‘voluntary exiles’ to overcome the ‘forced and voluntary’ dichotomy in this literature, rather than analysing all the dimensions in detail. Hence, the multiple dimensions of this migration will be tried to be understood via the perceptions of migrants.     

Priming autobiographical memories: How recalling the past may affect everyday forms of autobiographical remembering

This study investigated the idea that when one recalls past episodes, that the content of those memories will activate additional episodic memories with like content, and such memories will then have the potential of surfacing in subsequent acts of involuntary and voluntary recall. We tested the episodic content priming hypothesis in two experiments. In Experiment 1, priming group participants first recalled memories about specific activities or events and then they were subsequently engaged in a word-cue voluntary autobiographical memory task. The results showed that priming group participants produced more episodic memories involving the primed content on this task than control participants occupied in the same task. In Experiment 2, episodic content priming was further tested on a measure of involuntary autobiographical memory (i.e., the vigilance task). The results on this task also revealed support for the episodic content priming hypothesis, including after a delay of 24 h.     

Intentional binding as a marker of agency across the lifespan

The feeling of control over actions and their external effects is known as Sense of Agency (SoAg). People usually have a distinctive SoAg for events caused by their own actions. However, if the agent is a child or an older person, this feeling of being responsible for the consequences of an action may differ from what an adult would feel. The idea would be that children and elderly may have a reduced SoAg since their frontal lobes are developing or have started to loose their efficiency. The aim of this study was to elucidate whether the SoAg changes across lifespan, using the Intentional Binding (i.e., the temporal attraction between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence) as implicit measure. Data show that children and elderly are characterized by a reduced SoAg as compared to adults. These findings provide a fundamental step in the characterization of SoAg dynamics throughout individuals’ lifetime.     

Planning not to do something: Does intending not to do something activate associated sensory consequences?

The present fMRI study investigated the central assumptions of ideomotor theory that actions become associated with their sensory consequences. Furthermore, we tested whether sensory effects can also become associated with the voluntary omission of an action. In a training phase, participants had to decide between executing an action and not executing it. Both decisions were followed by a specific effect tone. In the test phase, the participants had to carry out actions without hearing the effect tone. They either had to decide whether to execute an action or not or were instructed to execute an action or not. Our results reveal an increased activity in the auditory cortex elicited by responses that formerly elicited a tone—namely, self-chosen actions and self-chosen nonactions. Moreover, we found binding effects for stimulus-cued actions, but not for stimulus-cued nonactions. These findings support ideomotor theory by showing that a link exists between actions and their effects. Furthermore, our data demonstrate on a neural level that effect tones can become associated with intentionally not acting, therewith supporting the idea of a binding between the voluntary omission of an action and its effects in the environment.     

Fichte's Voluntarism

Abstract: In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's ‘voluntarist’ thesis, the idea—on Darwall's reading—that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non‐voluntarily. He in turn defends a ‘presuppositional’ thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4–5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1–3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6–8).     

Voluntary exercise ameliorates cognitive deficits in morphine dependent rats: the role of hippocampal brain-derived neurotrophic factor

Chronic exposure to opiates impairs spatial learning and memory. Given the well-known beneficial effects of voluntary exercise on cognitive functions, we investigated whether voluntary exercise would ameliorate the cognitive deficits that are induced by morphine dependence. If an effect of exercise was observed, we aimed to investigate the possible role of hippocampal brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) in the exercise-induced enhancement of learning and memory in morphine-dependent rats. The rats were injected with bi-daily doses (10mg/kg, at 12h intervals) of morphine over a period of 10 days of voluntary exercise. Following these injections, a water maze task was performed twice a day for five consecutive days, followed by a probe trial 2 days later. A specific BDNF inhibitor (TrkB-IgG chimera) was used to block the hippocampal BDNF action during the 10 days of voluntary exercise. We found that voluntary exercise blocked the ability of chronic morphine to impair spatial memory retention. A blockade of the BDNF action blunted the exercise-induced improvement of spatial memory in the dependent rats. Moreover, the voluntary exercise diminished the severity of the rats' dependency on morphine. This study demonstrates that voluntary exercise ameliorates, via a TrkB-mediated mechanism, the cognitive deficits that are induced by chronic morphine. Thus, voluntary exercise might be a potential method to ameliorate some of the deleterious behavioral consequences of the abuse of morphine and other opiates.     

The concept of free will: philosophy, neuroscience and the law

Various philosophical definitions of free will are first considered. The compatibilist definition, which says simply that acts are freely willed if they are not subject to constraints, is identified as much used in the legal system and essentially impervious to scientific investigation. A middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, which requires that freely willed acts be consciously initiated, is shown to be relevant to the idea of mens rea and in the author's view not actually incompatible in principle with a fully scientific worldview. Only the strong libertarian definition, which requires that freely willed acts have no physical antecedents whatsoever, makes the existence of free will very hard to swallow scientifically. However, with regard to the middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, three different lines of scientific experimental evidence are then described, which suggest that, in fact, consciousness is not the real cause of much of what is generally considered as voluntary behavior. Many voluntary actions are initiated preconsciously, with consciousness kept informed only after the neural events leading to the act have begun. It is suggested that a reasonable way of integrating these experimental findings with the idea that persons do have a somewhat more than compatibilist version of free will is to acknowledge explicitly that a person is a mixture of conscious and unconscious components. In this scenario, the mind in mens rea would have to be judged guilty if it contained either conscious or unconscious intentions to perform the guilty act.