How the mind works

by Steven Pinker, W.W. Norton & Co., 1997. $29.95 (xii+660 pages) ISBN 0 393 04535 8.     

Homelessness in the mind

In this article, I am going to present several related, themes, based on data gathered from years of consulting to homelessness services, particularly staff and management working in the voluntary sector, who are responsible for the teams that deliver care to some of the most vulnerable and challenging individuals in society. The three concepts that I will put forward are as follows: firstly, the idea that there is a fundamental human concern, or state, regarding homelessness. What I will refer to as 'homelessness in the mind'. I will consider this from psychoanalytic and systems-psychodynamic viewpoints and explore the idea of an internalised homeless state and the structures which attempt to contain it. Second, is an almost universal hatred and repulsion of this state and a need for its expulsion and relocation, in phantasy, into individuals and services associated with the homeless population. Next, I will link the concept of homelessness in the mind with Bion’s idea of sophisticated/specialised basic assumption groups; groups, budded off from mainstream society to contain specific psychological aspects of the population. I will suggest that the associated psychological stressors and pressures of homelessness, and ‘homelessness in the mind’ and its subdivisions, dependency and shame, relate to aggressive and violent elements associated with the inability to correctly process, engage with, or contain, specific internal states related to homelessness. Throughout, I will refer to my practice as an organisational consultant, and my experience of working with managers and teams who work with the homeless population.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

Catching a glimpse of working memory: top-down capture as a tool for measuring the content of the mind

This article outlines a methodology for probing working memory (WM) content in high-level cognitive tasks (e.g., decision making, problem solving, and memory retrieval) by capitalizing on attentional and oculomotor biases evidenced in top-down capture paradigms. This method would be of great use, as it could measure the information resident in WM at any point in a task and, hence, track information use over time as tasks dynamically evolve. Above and beyond providing a measure of information occupancy in WM, such a method would benefit from sensitivity to the specific activation levels of individual items in WM. This article additionally forwards a novel fusion of standard free recall and visual search paradigms in an effort to assess the sensitivity of eye movements in top-down capture, on which this new measurement technique relies, to item-specific memory activation (ISMA). The results demonstrate eye movement sensitivity to ISMA in some, but not all, cases.     

Mathematical Explanation and Epistemology: Please Mind the Gap

This paper draws together two strands in the debate over the existence of mathematical objects. The first strand concerns the notion of extra‐mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts, in part, by facts about mathematical objects. The second strand concerns the access problem for platonism: the problem of how to account for knowledge of mathematical objects. I argue for the following conditional: if there are extra‐mathematical explanations, then the core thesis of the access problem is false. This has implications for nominalists and platonists alike. Platonists can make a case for epistemic access to mathematical objects by providing evidence in favour of the existence of extra‐mathematical explanations. Nominalists, by contrast, can use the access problem to cast doubt on the idea that mathematical objects play a substantive role in scientific explanation. 1     

The chimpanzee mind: in search of the evolutionary roots of the human mind

One advantage of living in a social group is the opportunity to use information provided by other individuals. Social information can be based on cues provided by a conspecific or even by a heterospecific individual (e.g., gaze direction, vocalizations, pointing gestures). Although the use of human gaze and gestures has been extensively studied in primates, and is increasingly studied in other mammals, there is no documentation of birds using these cues in a cooperative context. In this study, we tested the ability of three African gray parrots to use different human cues (pointing and/or gazing) in an object-choice task. We found that one subject spontaneously used the most salient pointing gesture (looking and steady pointing with hand at about 20 cm from the baited box). The two others were also able to use this cue after 15 trials. None of the parrots spontaneously used the steady gaze cues (combined head and eye orientation), but one learned to do so effectively after only 15 trials when the distance between the head and the baited box was about 1 m. However, none of the parrots were able to use the momentary pointing nor the distal pointing and gazing cues. These results are discussed in terms of sensitivity to joint attention as a prerequisite to understand pointing gestures as it is to the referential use of labels.     

Evolution of the creative mind

Creative thinking is one of several remarkable capabilities evolved to advanced levels in the human species. Recently a model of the Darwinian evolution of creative thinking has been proposed. The principal tenets of the model are summarized in the present paper. Creative thinking is modeled as a relinkage of connections among mental representations, or among the components of these representations, accompanied at times by the appearance of new components that subsequently participate in the relinking process. Relinking occurs in relationship to a system of causative and motivational connections between the individual, the innate regularities of their cognitive development, and group behavior. This system of connections is termed the gene‐culture heterarchy. Approaches to creative thinking via the gene‐culture heterarchy allow predictions to be made about the mechanism of relinking and how it is affected by genetic and cultural factors. The predictions are based on the methods of sociobiology and evolutionary theory. The implications of this approach to creativity research are briefly reviewed.     

Attention in the predictive mind

It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it cannot accommodate. We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is ‘all the brain ever does’.     

Searle on rediscovering the mind

John R. Searle,The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 270 pp. $22.50. I would like to thank my colleagues Bernard Dauenhauer and Beth Preston for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.     

Pragmatism and the predictive mind

Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide.     

Peering into the opaque mind

Abstract

Carolyn Saarni’s pioneering research showed that young children learn how to hide their feelings—to conceal disappointment with a smile or to conceal amusement with a neutral expression. By 6 years of age, children understand the implications of such concealment. They can distinguish between: (i) an individual’s true but hidden emotion; (ii) the emotion that the individual overtly expresses; and (iii) the emotion that other people might mistakenly attribute to the individual. Effectively, young children grasp that the mind is opaque. Its contents can remain hidden from others. We examine two issues raised by this important conceptual insight. First, we ask how it emerges in young children—what experiences lead them to acknowledge the mind’s opacity? Second, in light of Saarni’s emphasis on the impact of cultural beliefs and practices, we discuss anthropological evidence that in certain cultures the mind’s opacity is regarded as a social desideratum so that enquiries into, or speculations about, a person’s private mental states are regarded as inappropriate. We consider the understanding of hidden emotion that children will acquire if they grow up in such a culture. We propose—paradoxically—that they will readily differentiate between what is actually felt and what is overtly expressed. We conclude by reviewing recent cross-cultural evidence lending initial support to that prediction.     

Functional integration and the mind

Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions.     

Spatial metaphors of the mind

A case in which the author began to understand her patient as "collapsing the space between them," rather than as continuing only to free associate, is the occasion for a contemplation of the way psychoanalytic theory effects a transition between what is inner, or lived, and outer, or experienced. Metaphor is seen as the agent of this transition. The author discusses metaphor in relation to the case described, while also examining spatial metaphors of mind in classical analysis and in Kleinian theory. It is suggested that both may be integrated in a third metaphorical-spatial construct, Green's analytic space.