Responsibility for believing

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible.     

On believing,saying and expressing

Examines the connections among believing, saying, and expressing in situations where the sentence used is a declarative sentence containing at least one proper name. Proposes a new way of understanding these connections. Develops an argument for the thesis that, although we typically believe the singular propositions expressed by our uses of name sentences, we rarely use such sentences because we believe those propositions.     

Intending,believing, and supposing at will

In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.     

Belief and believing

Conclusion This essay has been somewhat programmatic in quality but that is not accidental. It has tried to identify some elements, historical and philosophical, that might provide a context within which an adequate discussion of the concept of belief and its recent diverse employment might be measured. Not very much has been solved, but perhaps some issues have become clearer.     

Privileged access,externalism, and ways of believing

By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.     

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Philosophical Studies - It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe...     

Thanks,congratulations and publishing useful research

This editorial covers the types and styles of papers European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology publishes and an examination of how to make work and organizational psychology research more useful to society.     

Passion in group: thinking about loving,hating, and knowing

In his early work, Bion (1961) established the goal of learning about and getting beyond the basic assumptions to become a work group. Later, in his structural theory of affect, passion became a key concept. Passion describes the necessary and sufficient condition for a psychotherapy group to be a work group. Passion is an intersubjective process of bearing and utilizing one's most basic affects to reach self-conscious emotional awareness. Bion postulated three primary affects: loving, hating, and knowing (LHK). A clinical example illustrates how the therapist may represent, mentally organize, and mobilize the group's potential for passion by attending to the evolution of his or her own affects. Passion transcends transference-countertransference in that an optimal level of personal meaning from LHK is achieved and utilized in emotional participation.     

Fearing,not loving,the reflection: Narcissism,self-esteem,and self-discrepancy theory

This study used self-discrepancy theory to explore self-esteem and narcissism. College students (N = 450) completed measures of self-discrepancy, affect, self-esteem, and narcissism. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses found that self-discrepancies explained variance in self-esteem and narcissism beyond that explained by affect. Results also indicated that the actual-ideal and actual-undesired self-discrepancies predicted self-esteem, while the actual-undesired self-discrepancy was the only significant predictor of narcissism. This study provides evidence of incremental validity for self-discrepancies in measuring self-esteem and narcissism. It also suggests that narcissism is associated with an undesired, not an ideal, self-concept.     

Seeing is believing: Priors,trust, and base rate neglect

Kahneman and Tversky (1973) described an effect they called ‘insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes’, later dubbed base rate neglect, which describes people’s tendency to underweight prior information in favor of new data. As probability theory requires that prior probabilities be taken into account, via Bayes’ theorem, the fact that most people fail to do so has been taken as evidence of human irrationality and, by others, of a mismatch between our cognitive processes and the questions being asked (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). In contrast to both views, we suggest that simplistic Bayesian updating using base rates is not necessarily rational. To that end, we present experiments in which base rate neglect is often the right strategy, and show that people’s base rate usage varies systematically as a function of the extent to which the data that make up a base rate are perceived as trustworthy.