The timeliness and timelessness of the 'archaic': analytical psychology, 'primordial' thought, synchronicity

In 1930 Jung gave a lecture entitled 'Archaic Man' to the Lesezirkel in Hottingen. Following recent work on this text by two commentators, this article uses their interpretations as a springboard for a complementary reading, which emphasizes the fundamental significance of this paper as bridging the earlier and later stages in the development of analytical psychology, and examines closely the opposition between 'archaic'-'modern' in Jung's paper; indeed, in his work as a whole. In contrast to Lévy-Bruhl, Jung rejects the label of 'mysticism' as applied to the 'primitive' point of view, and his anti-mystical stance can be explained in terms of his dialectical conception of the relationship between Self and World. On this account, the subject and the object--the psyche and the external world--are more closely (inter)related than conventional (modern) epistemology and ontology generally believe. This conception of the relation between the subjective and the objective foreshadows his later, and controversial, concept of synchronicity, which is, Jung insists, a way of apprehending the world in terms of its meaning. Concluding with a survey of the status of the 'primordial' in some other texts by Jung, this article aims to foster further debate on one of Jung's most complex and fascinating texts.     

Divine timelessness and personhood

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

A complete minimal logic of the propositional contents of thought

Our purpose is to formulate a complete logic of propositions that takes into account the fact that propositions are both senses provided with truth values and contents of conceptual thoughts. In our formalization, propositions are more complex entities than simple functions from possible worlds into truth values. They have a structure of constituents (a content) in addition to truth conditions. The formalization is adequate for the purposes of the logic of speech acts. It imposes a stronger criterion of propositional identity than strict equivalence. Two propositions P and Q are identical if and only if, for any illocutionary force F, it is not possible to perform with success a speech act of the form F(P) without also performing with success a speech act of the form F(Q). Unlike hyperintensional logic, our logic of propositions is compatible with the classical Boolean laws of propositional identity such as the symmetry and the associativity of conjunction and the reduction of double negation.Presented byJan Zygmunt     

The gravity of unwanted thoughts: Asymmetric priming effects in thought suppression

An unwanted thought appears to be cued easily by reminders in the environment but often the thought itself seems to cue nothing more than the desire to eliminate it from consciousness. This unusual asymmetry in the way unwanted thoughts are linked to other thoughts was the focus of the present research. Participants who were asked to suppress a thought or to concentrate on it completed a task assessing the influence of priming on reaction time (RT) for word/non-word judgments. Results revealed that suppression under cognitive load produced asymmetric priming: Priming with the associate of a suppressed word speeded RT for the suppressed word, but priming with a suppressed word did not speed RT for associated words. These findings suggest that thought suppression induces an unusual form of cognitive accessibility in which movement of activation toward the suppressed thought from associates is facilitated but movement of activation away from the suppressed thought to associates is undermined.     

Disturbances of the sense of time with special reference to the experience of timelessness

Disturbances of the experience of time are examined, with emphasis on the effects of the vicissitudes of the sense of self, affect, unconscious fantasies, and ideas concerning death. The manifest experience is interpreted as a derivative of unconscious, conflict-laden fantasies. Disturbances of the experience of time may be regarded as specific types of affective states, pleasurable or unpleasurable, the quality of the experience being determined by the nature of the underlying unconscious ideational content. Two experiences of timelessness are analyzed, in which the sense of timelessness was determined by the wish to extend time indefinitely. Many elements have been condensed into this basic wish which, as in a dream, was momentarily experienced as already realized.     

Immunity,thought insertion,and the first-person concept

Philosophical Studies - In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that...     

(A)Temporal dialectic: creative conversations between timelessness/time and transference

The intimate relationship between timelessness, time, and transference is generative in its clinical impact on analysis. A tendency to define and represent timelessness and time as opposing structures, antithetical in aim, can obscure the fertility and complexity of their relationship. The creative and transformative power of an (a)temporal dialectic is proposed whose engagement with transference destroys and creates new paradigms of human experience, presenting analyst and analysand with fresh ways of thinking and being. A brief history of timelessness and time in psychoanalysis follows their intertwined developmental path and their import in transference-countertransference experience.     

Hannah Arendt,evil and the eradication of thought

Evil deeds may be committed intentionally or out of madness, but it is those who follow orders that present us with the most complex moral, philosophical and psychological questions. In writing about the banality of evil, Hannah Arendt argues that “in granting pardon, it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven; in rootless evil there is no person left whom one could ever forgive.” Arendt postulates that “being a person” necessarily entails the acts of memory and thought. This paper explores Arendt’s ideas on memory and thought and how these processes can become subverted in the service of a higher order. Clinical material illustrates Whitmer’s idea of dissociation as an “impairment of subjectivity” as distinct from Freud’s view of dissociation as a form of repression. This shift in theoretical perspective sheds new light on our understanding of the totalitarian state of mind, i.e. of the mind of a “nobody”, and the conditions within which evil is committed.     

Language, thought, and real nouns

We test the claim that acquiring a mass-count language, like English, causes speakers to think differently about entities in the world, relative to speakers of classifier languages like Japanese. We use three tasks to assess this claim: object-substance rating, quantity judgment, and word extension. Using the first two tasks, we present evidence that learning mass-count syntax has little effect on the interpretation of familiar nouns between Japanese and English, and that speakers of these languages do not divide up referents differently along an individuation continuum, as claimed in some previous reports [Gentner, D., & Boroditsky, L. (2001). Individuation, relativity, and early word learning. In M. Bowerman, & S. Levinson (Eds.), Language acquisition and conceptual development (pp. 215-256). Cambridge University Press]. Instead, we argue that previous cross-linguistic differences [Imai, M., & Gentner, D. (1997). A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition, 62, 169-200] are attributable to “lexical statistics” [Gleitman, L., & Papafragou, A. (2005). Language and thought. In K. Holyoak, & R. Morrison (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 633-661). Cambridge University Press]. Speakers of English are more likely to think that a novel ambiguous expression like “the blicket” refers to a kind of object (relative to speakers of Japanese) because speakers of English are likely to assume that “blicket” is a count noun rather than a mass noun, based on the relative frequency of each kind of word in English. This is confirmed by testing Mandarin-English bilinguals with a word extension task. We find that bilinguals tested in English with mass-count ambiguous syntax extend novel words like English monolinguals (and assume that a word like “blicket” refers to a kind of object). In contrast, bilinguals tested in Mandarin are significantly more likely to extend novel words by material. Thus, online lexical statistics, rather than non-linguistic thought, mediate cross-linguistic differences in word extension. We suggest that speakers of Mandarin, English, and Japanese draw on a universal set of lexical meanings, and that mass-count syntax allows speakers of English to select among these meanings.     

God, Chaos, and the Quantum Dice

A recent noninterventionist account of divine agency has been proposed that marries the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics to the instability of chaos theory. On this account, God is able to bring about observable effects in the macroscopic world by determining the outcome of quantum events. When this determination occurs in the presence of chaos, the ability to influence large systems is multiplied. This paper argues that, although the proposal is highly intuitive, current research in dynamics shows that it is far less plausible than previously thought. Chaos coupled to quantum mechanics proves to be a shaky foundation for models of divine agency.     

Quantum mechanics, interference, and the brain

In this paper we discuss the use of quantum mechanics to model psychological experiments, starting by sharply contrasting the need of these models to use quantum mechanical nonlocality instead of contextuality. We argue that contextuality, in the form of quantum interference, is the only relevant quantum feature used. Nonlocality does not play a role in those models. Since contextuality is also present in classical models, we propose that classical systems be used to reproduce the quantum models used. We also discuss how classical interference in the brain may lead to contextual processes, and what neural mechanisms may account for it.     

Knowledge,learning, and freedom from thought

This paper discusses the acquisition of knowledge by one generation from another, and the problems inherent in the process. The difficulties are seen as falling into three areas: (i) the difficulty of understanding the knowledge itself; (ii) the difficulty that a fact or a theory becomes an internal object subject to all the vicissitudes of object relations; and (iii) the difficulty of finding a training method that will enable the learner to assimilate knowledge and use it judiciously rather than to swallow it in an uncomprehending way. Examples are drawn from the history of ideas in general, and from the author's experience of therapeutic communities, particularly the Cassel Hospital. The danger of allowing a body of knowledge to become, in its passage from one person to another, a mere set of never-to-be-questioned beliefs is illustrated. The common frailties of both trainers and trainees are discussed and methods suggested for understanding and overcoming them.