The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.     

Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale

One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.     

Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization

Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain. It is not altogether impossible that such a state will be found... . But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. (Putnam 1967/1975, p. 436)

The belief that mental states are multiply realized is now nearly universal among philosophers, as is the belief that this fact decisively refutes the identity theory. I argue that the empirical support for multiple realization does not justify the confidence that has been placed in it. In order for multiple realization of mental states to be an objection to the identity theory, the neurological differences among pains, for example, must be such as to guarantee that they are of distinct neurological kinds. But the phenomena traditionally cited do not provide evidence of that sort of variation. In particular, examples of neural plasticity do not provide such evidence.     

The consequences of pain: The social and physical pain overlap on psychological responses

Current theories suggest that social and physical pain overlap in their neurological and physiological outcomes. We investigated how social and physical pain overlap in their psychological responses by testing the hypothesis that both social and physical pain would thwart satisfaction on four human needs, worsen mood, and increase desire to aggress. In Experiment 1, recalling an experience of social or physical pain produced overlapping effects in the form of thwarted self‐esteem and control needs and increased negative affect and desire to aggress. In Experiment 2, we induced social (Cyberball ostracism) or physical pain (cold pressor) within the laboratory session, and found that both pain types produced feelings of being ignored and excluded, and thwarted belonging, self‐esteem, control, and meaningful existence. Our results provide further support to pain overlap theories and indicate that social and physical pain cause common psychological consequences, resulting in new ways to understand and manage pain. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fish traps and rabbit snares: Zhuangzi on judgement,truth and knowledge

We argue that the common attribution to Zhuangzi of both perspectivalism or relativism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other is fundamentally mistaken. While granting that it is reasonable to construe Zhuangzi as offering a perspectiva! position on judgement, we argue that Zhuangzi's perspectivalism does not commit him to a relativist position on truth or to scepticism about human knowledge. Rather, we maintain that Zhuangzi's attacks on the concepts of truth and knowledge are better seen as his articulation of a species of epistemological nihilism which rejects, as ultimately meaningless, the concepts of truth, reality, and knowledge.     

Effects of anger suppression on pain severity and pain behaviors among chronic pain patients: evaluation of an ironic process model

OBJECTIVE: Evidence for links between anger inhibition or suppression and chronic pain severity is based mostly on studies with correlation designs. Following from ironic process theory, we proposed that attempts to suppress angry thoughts during provocation would increase subsequent pain intensity among chronic low back pain (CLBP) patients, and do so through paradoxically enhanced accessibility of anger. DESIGN: CLBP patients (N = 58) were assigned to suppression and nonsuppression conditions while performing a computer maze task with a harassing confederate. A structured pain behavior task (SPBT) followed. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Self-reported anger, anxiety, and sadness following maze task. Self-reported pain severity and number of observed pain behaviors during SPBT. RESULTS: Patients told to suppress during provocation: (a) reported greater anger following the maze task, reported greater pain intensity during the SPBT, and exhibited more pain behaviors than patients not suppressing; (b) postmaze anger levels significantly mediated group differences on pain behaviors. CONCLUSION: Attempts by CLBP patients to suppress anger may aggravate pain related to their clinical condition through ironically increased feelings of anger.     

Multiple realization and methodological pluralism

Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to deal with questions concerned with multiple realization and neural plasticity. Beginning with Broca’s case for localization and the nineteenth century discussion of “reorganization,” and returning to more recent evidence for neural plasticity, I argue that, in the end, there is substantial support for multiple realization in cognitive systems; I further argue that this is wholly consistent with a recognition of methodological pluralism in cognitive science.     

Fish cognition: a primate's eye view

We provide selected examples from the fish literature of phenomena found in fish that are currently being examined in discussions of cognitive abilities and evolution of neocortex size in primates. In the context of social intelligence, we looked at living in individualised groups and corresponding social strategies, social learning and tradition, and co-operative hunting. Regarding environmental intelligence, we searched for examples concerning special foraging skills, tool use, cognitive maps, memory, anti-predator behaviour, and the manipulation of the environment. Most phenomena of interest for primatologists are found in fish as well. We therefore conclude that more detailed studies on decision rules and mechanisms are necessary to test for differences between the cognitive abilities of primates and other taxa. Cognitive research can benefit from future fish studies in three ways: first, as fish are highly variable in their ecology, they can be used to determine the specific ecological factors that select for the evolution of specific cognitive abilities. Second, for the same reason they can be used to investigate the link between cognitive abilities and the enlargement of specific brain areas. Third, decision rules used by fish could be used as 'null-hypotheses' for primatologists looking at how monkeys might make their decisions. Finally, we propose a variety of fish species that we think are most promising as study objects. Accepted after revision: 6 September 2001 Electronic Publication     

Alone but feeling no pain: Effects of social exclusion on physical pain tolerance and pain threshold, affective forecasting, and interpersonal empathy

Prior findings of emotional numbness (rather than distress) among socially excluded persons led the authors to investigate whether exclusion causes a far-reaching insensitivity to both physical and emotional pain. Experiments 1-4 showed that receiving an ostensibly diagnostic forecast of a lonesome future life reduced sensitivity to physical pain, as indicated by both (higher) thresholds and tolerance. Exclusion also caused emotional insensitivity, as indicated by reductions in affective forecasting of joy or woe over a future football outcome (Experiment 3), as well as lesser empathizing with another person's suffering from either romantic breakup (Experiment 4) or a broken leg (Experiment 5). The insensitivities to pain and emotion were highly intercorrelated.     

Taking realization seriously: no cure for epiphobia

The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called non-reductive physicalism because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and, despite their irreducibility, their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of realization has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind until a couple of years ago authors like Carl Gillett, Derk Pereboom, or Sydney Shoemaker proposed accounts according to which realization is understood against the background of the so-called ‘causal theory of properties’. At least partially, the hope was to solve the problem of mental causation, in particular the kind of causal exclusion reasoning made famous by Jaegwon Kim, in a way acceptable to non-reductive physicalists. The paper asks whether a proper explication of the realization relation can indeed help explain how physically realized mental properties can be causally efficacious in the causally closed physical world and argues for a negative answer: it is important for the non-reductive physicalist to understand what exactly the realization relation amounts to, but it does not solve the problem of mental causation.     

Social construction: big-G grounding,small-g realization

The goal of this paper is to make headway on a metaphysics of social construction. In recent work (forthcoming), I’ve argued that social construction should be understood in terms of metaphysical grounding. However, I agree with grounding skeptics like Wilson (Inquiry 1–45, 2014) that bare claims about what grounds what are insufficient for capturing, with fine enough grain, metaphysical dependence structures. To that end, I develop a view on which the social construction of human social kinds (e.g., race) is a kind of realization relation. Social kinds, I argue, are multiply realizable kinds. I depart from the Wilson by further arguing that an appeal to grounding is not otiose when it comes to social construction. Social construction, I claim, belongs to the “big-G” Grounding genus, but it is the specific “small-g” relation of realization at work in cases of human kind social construction.     

Agency and pain: An exploration

The notion of agency has become particularly prominent in social‐science writing. This article identifies some of the weaknesses in the ways it has been employed in contemporary anthropology. It criticises the assumptions of self‐empowerment, responsibility, and constructivism that are held to be essential to moral agency in much of that usage. Present‐day conceptions of agency in this literature introduce—whether intentionally or not—a triumphalist vision of history. Drawing on recent neuro‐physiological research, religious history and ethnography, it focuses on pain in order to think about agency in other than triumphalist terms. Triumphalist versions of agency, the article argues, are not only inherently questionable, they also distract our attention away from the need to understand how different traditions articulate the idea of living sanely in a world that is inevitably painful.     

Pain intensity and pain unpleasantness in triathletes: A study examining their associations with pain catastrophizing and pain expectations

ObjectiveTriathletes represent a growing and unique population of individuals willing to endure significant mental and physical stress to practice the sport they love. However, little is known about the pain experienced while training for and competing in a triathlon and how psychological factors influence this experience. This study will assess pain experienced by triathletes in training and competition, and investigate the association between pain catastrophizing and pain expectations with triathlon pain intensity and pain unpleasantness.DesignIn this observational study, a sample of 261 triathletes completed two online surveys before and after participating in a triathlon.ResultsModerate levels of pain intensity and pain unpleasantness were reported during training and competition. Pain catastrophizing was positively associated with expected and actual triathlon pain unpleasantness, but not with pain intensity. Expected pain intensity was also significantly associated with pain intensity experienced while competing, whereas expected pain unpleasantness was significantly related to both triathlon pain intensity and unpleasantness. Finally, regression analysis revealed pain catastrophizing and pain expectations to be unique predictors of triathlon pain intensity and pain unpleasantness.ConclusionThis study highlights the important role of psychological factors in triathletes' experience of pain and could eventually help tailor interventions aimed at improving the practice of triathlon.     

Studies on pain and analgesia

The Psychological Record -     

Merleau-Ponty on human development and the retrospective realization of potential

In this essay, I propose that human development is the emergence of something significantly new out of a past situation that does not hold that novel achievement as a determinate potential except retrospectively. Development, in other words, might best be understood as a “realization” in the sense of a making-real of some new form of being that had no prior place in reality, that was not programmed in advance, but that once realized can have its roots traced back to determinate conditions and potentials in its own past. This amounts to a rethinking of the nature of developmental potential as retrospectively determined. But it also involves a reconception of the locus of such potential: I argue that developmental potential must be understood as located in the human-organism-in-its-situation, rather than simply in the human organism. I take my bearings from phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and I make my case by elucidating three different forms of human development described by Merleau-Ponty: intellectual realizations of insight; the realization of a new perceptual-motor skill; and a child’s realization of a new lived way of making sense of the interpersonal world.     

The effect of pain and the anticipation of pain on temporal perception: A role for attention and arousal

The overestimation of the duration of fear-inducing stimuli relative to neutral stimuli is a robust finding within the temporal perception literature. Whilst this effect is consistently reported with auditory and visual stimuli, there has been little examination of whether it can be replicated using painful stimulation. The aim of the current study was, therefore, to explore how pain and the anticipation of pain affected perceived duration of time. A modified verbal estimation paradigm was developed in which participants estimated the duration of shapes previously conditioned to be associated with pain, compared to those not associated with pain. Duration estimates were significantly longer on trials in which pain was received or anticipated than on control trials. Slope and intercept analysis revealed that the anticipation of pain resulted in steeper slopes and greater intercept values than for control trials. The results suggest that increased arousal and attention, when anticipating and experiencing pain, result in longer perceived durations. The results are discussed in relation to internal clock theory and neurocognitive models of time perception.