Gamete donation and parental responsibility

Abstract Unlike surrogacy and cloning, reproduction via gamete donation is widely assumed to be morally unproblematic. Recently, a number of authors have argued that this assumption is mistaken: gamete donors, they claim, have parental responsibilities that they typically treat too lightly. In this paper I argue that the 'parental neglect' case against gamete donation fails. I begin by examining and rejecting the view that gamete donors have parental responsibilities; I claim that none of the current accounts of parenthood provides good reason for ascribing parenthood to gamete donors. I then argue that even if gamete donors do have parental responsibilities for 'their' children, it is not clear that they treat these responsibilities too lightly. I conclude the paper by examining the wider question of just what kind of responsibilities gamete donors might have towards the children that they have a role in creating.     

Processing idiomatic expressions: effects of semantic compositionality

Three experiments tested the main claims of the idiom decomposition hypothesis: People have clear intuitions on the semantic compositionality of idiomatic expressions, which determines the syntactic behavior of these expressions and how they are recognized. Experiment 1 showed that intuitions are clear only for a very restricted number of expressions, but for the majority of idioms, they are not consistent across speakers. Experiment 2 failed to support the claim that semantic compositionality influences the syntactic flexibility of idioms. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that idioms are more quickly recognized than their literal counterparts, regardless of compositionality and syntactic flexibility. All of the findings were at odds with the tenets of the idiom decomposition hypothesis. The theoretical implications of the results with respect to idiom processing and the notion of compositionality are discussed.     

Schizotypy and mental health amongst poets, visual artists, and mathematicians

Many researchers have found evidence of an association between creativity and the predisposition to mental illness. However, a number of questions remain unanswered. First, it is not clear whether healthy creatives have a milder loading on schizotypal traits than people who suffer serious psychopathology, or whether they have an equal loading, but other mediating characteristics. Second, most of the existing research has concentrated on artistic creativity, and the position of other creative domains is not yet clear. The present study compares schizotypy profiles using the O-LIFE inventory in a large sample of poets, artists, mathematicians, the general population, and psychiatric patients. Poets and artists have levels of unusual experiences that are higher than controls, and as high as schizophrenia patients. However, they are relatively low on the dimension of introvertive anhedonia. Mathematicians are lower than controls on unusual experiences. The results suggest that artistic creatives and psychiatric patients share a tendency to unusual ideas and experiences, but creative groups are distinguished by the absence of anhedonia and avolition. Moreover, different domains of creativity require different cognitive profiles, with poetry and art associated with divergent thinking, schizophrenia and affective disorder, and mathematics associated with convergent thinking and autism.     

Small samples do not cause greater accuracy--but clear data may cause small samples: comment on Fiedler and Kareev (2006)

Fiedler and Kareev (2006) have claimed that taking a small sample of information (as opposed to a large one) can, in certain specific situations, lead to greater accuracy--beyond that gained by avoiding fatigue or overload. Specifically, they have argued that the propensity of small samples to provide more extreme evidence is sufficient to create an accuracy advantage in situations of high caution and uncertainty. However, a close examination of Fiedler and Kareev's experimental results does not reveal any strong reason to conclude that small samples can cause greater accuracy. We argue that the negative correlation between sample size and accuracy that they reported (found only for the second half of Experiment 1) is also consistent with mental fatigue and that their data in general are consistent with the causal structure opposite to the one they suggest: Rather than small samples causing clear data, early clear data may cause participants to stop sampling. More importantly, Experiment 2 provides unequivocal evidence that large samples result in greater accuracy; Fiedler and Kareev only found a small sample advantage here when they artificially reduced the data set. Finally, we examine the model that Fiedler and Kareev used; they surmised that decision makers operate with a fixed threshold independent of sample size. We discuss evidence for an alternative (better performing) model that incorporates a dynamic threshold that lowers with sample size. We conclude that there is no evidence currently to suggest that humans benefit from taking a small sample, other than as a tactic for avoiding fatigue, overload, and/or opportunity cost-that is, there is no accuracy advantage inherent to small samples.     

Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals

In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn't have doneotherwise even if he could have'. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn't have done otherwise even if they couldhave. Using as a central case an argument ofSusan Hurley's, I point out that thecounterfactuals in question are both``interlegal' and ``indeterministic', and I raisedoubts about whether this special class ofcounterfactuals have clear truth conditions. Finally I suggest that acknowledging thesepoints leads to an appreciation of the realstrength of Frankfurt-style examples.     

Parenting cognitions and parent-child conflict: current issues and future directions

The chapters in this volume explore a number of important issues in parenting cognitions. It is clear that they have opened up several new areas for consideration. We have suggested yet another new direction for researchers interested in cognitions and conflict having to do with the identification of automatic styles of information processing and their separation from more considered approaches. We have come some way in the study of parenting cognitions since the early 1980s; we have some distance yet to go.     

Infected by evil

In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that we can be influenced by fictions in ways that matter morally, and some of the time we will be unaware that we have been so influenced. These arguments fall short of proving a clear causal link between fictions and specific changes in the audience, but they do reveal rather interesting and complex features of the moral psychology of fiction. In particular, they reveal that some Platonic worries about the dangers of art cannot be dismissed lightly.     

The effects of age-of-acquisition and frequency-of-occurrence in visual word recognition: Further evidence from the Dutch language

It has been claimed that the frequency effect in visual word naming is an artefact of age-of-acquisition: Words are named faster not because they are encountered more often in texts, but because they have been acquired earlier. In a series of experiments using immediate naming, lexical decision, and masked priming, we found that frequency had a clear effect in lexical tasks when age-of-acquisition is controlled for. At the same time, age-of-acquisition was a significant variable in all tasks, whereas imageability had no effect. These results corroborate findings previously reported in English and Dutch.     

How to Release Oneself from an Obligation: Good News for Duties to Oneself

In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.     

Recognition rights,mental health consumers and reconstructive cultural semantics

Introduction  

Those in mental health-related consumer movements have made clear their demands for humane treatment and basic civil rights, an end to stigma and discrimination, and a chance to participate in their own recovery. But theorizing about the politics of recognition, 'recognition rights' and epistemic justice, suggests that they also have a stake in the broad cultural meanings associated with conceptions of mental health and illness.     

Precision of imitation as a function of preschoolers' understanding of the goal of the demonstration

The authors argue that imitation is a flexible and adaptive learning mechanism in that children do not always reproduce all of the details they can from a demonstration. Instead, they vary their replications depending on their interpretation of the situation. Specifically, the authors propose that when children do not understand the overall reason for a model's behavior, they will be more likely to imitate precisely. By copying conservatively in these situations, children may have a good chance of reproducing the action of the model correctly. In contrast, when the reason for an action is clear, children will be more likely to deviate from the manners and flourishes of the model and use their own means to complete the action.     

Effect of role choice on vocational high school students

This study was an attempt to determine whether the role choice dimension of Holland's theory was applicable to vocational high school students. The results of the study indicate that students with a clear role choice have significantly higher mean achievement scores, are more satisfied with their training program and have a lower attrition rate than students with an unclear role choice. These results seem to suggest that school counselors should listen to what students say they want to do in their work role.     

The Heuristic and Motivational Value of Video Reinforcement

Four rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were tested on joystick-based computer tasks in which they could choose to be reinforced either with pellets-only or with pellets + video. A variety of videotapes were used to reinforce task performance. The monkeys significantly preferred to be rewarded with a pellet and 10 s of a blank screen than a pellet plus 10 s of videotape. When they did choose to see videotaped images, however, they were significantly more likely to view video of themselves than video of their roommate or of unfamiliar conspecifics. These data support earlier findings of individual differences in preference for video reinforcement, and have clear implications for the study of face-recognition and self-recognition by nonhuman primates.     

The Inaugural Address: Why There Couldn't Be Zombies

Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. (It is presupposed that all explicable physical events are explicable physically.) Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is 'No', but why. (I concede that systems superficially like human beings might exist and lack consciousness.)
My strategy has two prongs: a fairly brisk argument which demolishes the zombie idea; followed by an attempt to throw light on how something can qualify as a conscious perceiver. The argument to show that zombies are impossible exploits the point that in order to be able to detect our own 'qualia' we should have to be somehow sensitive to them; which the zombie idea rules out. The attempt to make clear why my zombie twin must be conscious exploits the idea that we have a reasonably clear grasp of a 'Basic Package' of psychological concepts.     

A note on the reliability of subjective judgment in discerning when the mouth is clear of salt taste stimuli

The ability of Ss to judge by taste when they had expectorated exogenous NaCl from the mouth was tested using 10 Ss. It was found that, after a 1-M salt mouthrinse, Ss judged its taste to have vanished while there were still residuals remaining in the mouth, which would have been detected by taste at preexperimental adaptation levels. This means that Ss are unable to judge for them selves when the mouth is clear of exogenous stimuli and that intertrial procedures requiring Ss to do this are suspect.     

The cognitive structure of social categories

Support for the prototype theory of categorization was found in a study of the structure of social categories. Though occupational terms such as DOCTOR are socially defined, they do not have the classical structure their clear definitional origins would predict. Conceptions of social categories are richer and more complex than those of physical object categories and subjects agree upon them. Comparison of various instructions for eliciting attributes of categories showed that whether subjects are asked to define a term, give characteristics, or describe ways they recognize members of categories, the attributes they list contribute to a prototype structure. These data provide evidence against the view that prototype structure is relevant only to an identification procedure and not to the core of concepts, as has been suggested.     

Do children with autism recognise surprise? A research note

Abstract

We take a fresh look at emotion recognition in autistic children, by testing their recognition of three different emotions (happy, sad, and surprise). The interest in selecting these is that whereas the first two are typical “simple” emotions (caused by situations), the third is typically a “cognitive” emotion (caused by beliefs). Because subjects with autism have clear difficulties in understanding beliefs, we predicted they would show more difficulty in recognising surprise. In contrast, as they have no difficulty in understanding situations as causes of emotion, we predicted they would not show deficits in recognising happy and sad. These predictions were borne out, in a comparison with a group of normal children and in a group of subjects with mental handicap. This result shows the importance of fine-grain analysis in emotion-recognition tasks, and is discussed in relation to affective and theory of mind models of autism.     

How Self‐Image and Compassionate Goals Shape Intrapsychic Experiences

Self‐image goals focus on constructing, maintaining, and defending desired public and private images of the self, whereas compassionate goals focus on being supportive and not harming others. We suggest that these goals shape construals of others in relation to the self, which in turn, shape affective experiences. We review research showing that when people have self‐image goals, they construe others as competitors, which leads to feeling uneasy with others (i.e., conflicted, confused, and fearful), and that when they have compassionate goals, they construe others as collaborators and have more constructive approaches to interpersonal problems, which leads to feeling at ease with others (i.e., peaceful, clear, and loving) and less upset with them. Thus, interpersonal goals shape construals of others, which in turn shape intrapsychic experiences of the world and of the self.     

Young children are intrinsically motivated to see others helped

Young children help other people, but it is not clear why. In the current study, we found that 2-year-old children's sympathetic arousal, as measured by relative changes in pupil dilation, is similar when they themselves help a person and when they see that person being helped by a third party (and sympathetic arousal in both cases is different from that when the person is not being helped at all). These results demonstrate that the intrinsic motivation for young children's helping behavior does not require that they perform the behavior themselves and thus "get credit" for it, but rather requires only that the other person be helped. Thus, from an early age, humans seem to have genuine concern for the welfare of others.     

Done wrong or said wrong? Young children understand the normative directions of fit of different speech acts

Young children use and comprehend different kinds of speech acts from the beginning of their communicative development. But it is not clear how they understand the conventional and normative structure of such speech acts. In particular, imperative speech acts have a world-to-word direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the world must change to fit the word. In contrast, assertive speech acts have a word-to-world direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the word must fit the world truly. In the current study, 3-year-olds understood this difference explicitly, as they directed their criticisms selectively to actors when they did not follow the imperatives of the speaker, but to speakers when they did not describe an actor’s actions correctly. Two-year-olds criticized appropriately in the case of imperatives, but showed a more ambiguous pattern in the case of assertions. These findings identify another domain in which children’s normative understanding of human activity emerges around the third year of life.