A test of the minimum principle requires a perceptual coding system

The minimum principle states that a perceiver will see the simplest possible interpretation of a pattern. Some theorists of human perception take this principle as a core explanatory concept. Others, especially Rock and Hochberg, hold the view that a perceptual minimum principle is untenable. Rock presents a great number of demonstrations which, in his opinion, rule out the minimum principle. Hochberg states that 'impossible' figures especially present a difficulty for this principle. It is argued here that, in order to test the minimum principle, a method is needed to describe interpretations of patterns in such a way that they can be ordered according to simplicity. To achieve this, Leeuwenberg's coding system was used. The analyses reported here of the patterns which Rock produces as evidence against the principle show that, contrary to Rock's claim, the way these patterns are preferentially perceived provides strong support for the minimum principle. Next, it is demonstrated that interpreting certain patterns as 'impossible' figures is not incompatible with the principle. Finally, it is argued that a test of the minimum principle is necessarily conflated with two other hypotheses, one concerning the metric of simplicity and one concerning the task conception of the experimental subjects.     

Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle

An important suggestion of objective Bayesians is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties: the principle of indifference. No one has previously determined whether the maximum entropy principle is better able to solve Bertrand's chord paradox than the principle of indifference. In this paper I show that it is not. Additionally, the course of the analysis brings to light a new paradox, a revenge paradox of the chords, that is unique to the maximum entropy principle.     

好意原则的局限性

Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the principle of charity is an applicable principle in the limited scope. It is neither the case that every linguistic interpretation is in nature radical nor that the principle of charity is the primary and fundamental principle for all linguistic interpretation as Davidson believes.      

On an Insufficient Argument Against Sufficient Reason

In one of its versions, the principle of sufficient reason maintains that every true proposition has a sufficient reason for its truth. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued against the principle on the ground that there are propositions such as the conjunction of all truths that are 'too big' to have a sufficient reason. The task of this article is to show that such maximal propositions pose no threat to the principle. According to what is perhaps the most 'popular' version of the principle to sufficient reason (PSR), every true proposition has a sufficient reason why it is true. Peter van Inwagen formulates the principle as follows: 'for every truth, for everything that is so, there is a sufficient reason for its being true or being so.' Like many contemporary philosophers, however, he rejects the principle. My purpose here is to show that the main philosophical argument against PSR rests on a mistaken assumption. There is also a 'scientific' argument against PSR that turns on considerations of quantum indeterminacy; but that argument lies beyond the scope of this discussion.     

The moral significance of the genetic relation

Our ordinary moral attitudes give a prominent place to the principle that each person ought specially to care for any child who is his or her genetic offspring. From this principle of genetic-parental responsibility and other plausible premises, we can derive the principle that each person has the right to control the genetic use of his or her own genes. But there are competing principles of parental responsibility that require consideration. Principles of nurture are among the important competitors. Also, the view that a woman has the right to control her own body for reproductive purposes may be based on a principle that denies the genetic-parental principle. An analysis is developed of the relations that constitute the criteria for the various possible principles of parental responsibility. Causality, temporality, spatiality, and resemblance are considered. The genetic relation is not any one of these relations, but it includes some of them. The justification of any principle of parental responsibility requires a detailed consideration of the principle from the viewpoint of a deontological or consequentialist moral theory. This examination is beyond the scope of this paper, but consideration is given to some issues and problems of justification, and difficult or unusual cases are discussed. There remain, then, complexities that require further study.     

Charity Implies Meta-Charity

The principle of charity says that all agents are rational. The principle of meta-charity says that all agents believe all agents are rational. My thesis is that the arguments which are used to support charity also support meta-charity. Meta-charity implies meta-meta-charity. By recursion, the principle of charity implies that it is common knowledge. But there appears to be intelligent, well-informed disagreement with the principle of charity. So if the entailment thesis holds, opponents of the principle of charity have a new objection to the principle. Defenders of the principle of charity must either refute the entailment thesis or accept much stronger consequences than they expected.
"As I am, so I see."—Ralph Waldo Emerson     

The minimum principle and visual pattern completion

Summary The minimum principle states that a perceiver will see the simplest possible interpretation of a pattern. Some theorists of human perception take this principle as a core-explanatory concept. Others hold the view that a perceptual minimum principle is untenable. In two recent extensive surveys of the relevant literature a more differentiated position is taken: the minimum principle is not renounced in a definite way. In the research reported here, an intuitively appealing specification of a minimum principle is tested. An experiment on visual pattern completion was performed in which patterns were presented to subjects who traced the contours of the shapes they saw. It was predicted that there would be a preference for interpretations that describe a pattern as a set of separate shapes with minimal information load as computed by Leeuwenberg's coding language. However, only half of the responses given by the subjects were predicted by this specification of a minimum principle. It was further demonstrated that locally complex interpretations of junctions of contour elements are easily made, but not in order to attain globally minimal interpretations.     

A new formulation of the Principle of Indifference

The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.     

Examining the suitability of the principle of subsidiarity for bioethics

The political and social principle of subsidiarity can be useful as a general principle of bioethics. The principle states that only those decisions and tasks that cannot be effectively decided upon or performed by a supported or subsidized lower level authority ought to be relegated to a more central or higher authority. The concept of subsidiarity has been embedded tacitly in Western political thought for two millennia, but it has been articulated expressly only in the twentieth century. The principle has unique strengths: it is the only principle that addresses the issue of locus of decision making; it is strongly linked to human dignity, democracy, and solidarity; and it can assist in reaching agreements on the common good. There are also potential drawbacks that need to be taken into account when developing rules and guidelines for the principle's application in bioethics. The principle is particularly helpful in public health ethics, but it is also of use in the ethics of personal care and human research ethics.     

Is the status principle beyond salvation? toward redeeming an unpopular theory of hell

In this paper I examine a recent objection to the retributive punishment theory of hell, specifically that the theory entails something obviously false: that it is possible to commit an infinite sin. I defend the moral principle behind one account of infinite sin, a principle referred to as the Status Principle (that other things being equal the higher the status of the offended the party, the more serious the sin). I show that recent objections to this principle are far from conclusive, and that the principle is more plausible than perhaps initially thought.     

Knowledge,reasoning, and deliberation

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge.     

Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment

We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow when two principles seem to conflict. But what do we discern when we make such judgments—that is, what makes such judgments correct? The obvious answer is that they are made correct by whatever makes other moral judgments correct. However, that cannot be right, for a principle can be inconsistent with morality yet still apply in a particular way to a given case. If the principle is inconsistent with morality, then morality cannot be what we discern when we judge whether and how that principle applies to a given case. I offer an alternative account of what makes such judgments correct.     

Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology

The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the issue of facts). Then I will show that the right truthmaker principle that vindicates facts is superior to the modified truthmaker principle that Lewis has proposed. This will lead into the topic of being and existence. It turns out that truthmaking and facts are plausible, well suited for one another, and very coherent with a plausible conception of being.     

SELF‐OWNERSHIP AND THE STATE: A DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE

Libertarians often invoke the principle of self‐ownership to discredit distributive interventions authorized by the more‐than‐minimal state. But if one takes a democratic approach to the justification of ownership claims, including claims of ownership over oneself, the validity of the self‐ownership principle is theoretically inseparable from the normative justification of the state. Since the idea of the state is essential to the very assertion (not just the positive enforcement) of the principle of self‐ownership, invoking the principle to discredit a distribution of ownership authorized by the state commits libertarians also to weakening that principle's validity. Put differently, appealing to the self‐ownership principle to circumscribe the state's power to distribute property is problematic when the state is necessary to assert the validity of that principle. This is because anytime the self‐ownership principle is used to undermine a state‐based distribution of property it is also implicitly eroding the ground for asserting its own validity. 1     

Axiomatic justifications of the utility principle: A formal investigation

It is argued that existing axiomatic theories of utility do not provide the utility principle or the principle of maximising expected utility with a formal justification. It is also argued that these theories only put mild constraints on a decision-maker in a decision-context. Finally, it is argued that the prospects are not particularly bright for finding formal non-circular arguments for the utility principle that do not rely on the law of large numbers.     

On Wright's Argument against Deflationism

I consider Crispin Wright's much discussed 'inflationary' argument against deflationism about truth. I identify a principle apparently involved in it, which I call Wright's principle, and present Wright's argument with the following dilemma. If Wright's principle is sound, the deflationist has a straightforward rejoinder to Wright's argument. If Wright's principle is unsound, the central part of Wright's argument, concerned with how 'true' commutes with the negation operator, is rendered superfluous. I conclude that Wright's argument is either a straightforward failure or completely otiose.     

The Aspect‐Perception Passages: A Critical Investigation of Köhler's Isomorphism Principle1

In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect‐perception passages is to critically evaluate a specific hypothesis. The target hypothesis in these passages is the Gestalt psychologist Köhler's “isomorphism principle.” According to this principle, there are neural correlates of conscious perceptual experience, and these neural correlates determine the content of our perceptual experiences. Wittgenstein's argument against the isomorphism principle comprises two steps. First, he diffuses the substantiveness of the principle by undermining an important assumption that underpins this principle, namely, that there is a unitary concept of seeing. Next, Wittgenstein argues that some forms of aspect‐perception involve recognitional capacities, the exercise of which is normatively constrained. The normative nature of aspect‐perceiving plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein's rejection of the isomorphism principle. Aside from the clear exegetical benefits gained from identifying the target hypothesis in the aspect‐perception passages as the isomorphism principle, construing the remarks in the way suggested here is also philosophically interesting in its own right: it shows Wittgenstein engaging directly in the mind–body problem, construed as the problem of intentionality.     

Indeterminacy in the social sciences

It is maintained that a principle of indeterminacy exists in the social sciences which bears some resemblance to the Heisenberg principle in the realm of physics. In the social sciences, however, the principle is grounded not on physical interference, but on the capacity of human beings to alter their behavior on the basis of changing conceptions of their social condition, and so the contention of writers like Nagel ‘that no distinct principle of explanation is involved’ must be rejected. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the causes of social indeterminacy, which suggests that the phenomenon is ineradicable.     

The wastefulness principle. A burden-sharing principle for climate change

The prominent burden-sharing principles in the emerging literature of the political theory of climate change fail to sufficiently tackle the task they set out to solve. This paper sets out properties that an alternative principle should aim to meet. Based on these properties, it develops a consequentialist moral principle – the wastefulness principle. This principle holds that it is wrong to waste a shared, scarce resource. The paper argues that this principle can be used to solve the question of who should bear the burdens of anthropogenic climate change in a more suitable way than existing principles. After developing the wastefulness principle, this paper discusses in a non-exhaustive manner how it can be employed in the real world, which challenges it might meet, and how additional principles might solve them.     

Interpreting Surrogate Consent using Counterfactuals

Philosophers such as Dan Brock believe that surrogates who make health care decisions on behalf of previously competent patients, in the absence of an advance directive, should make these decisions based upon a substituted judgment principle. Brock favours substituted judgment over a best interests standard. However, Edward Wierenga claims that the substituted judgment principle ought to be abandoned in favour of a best interests standard, because of an inherent problem with the substituted judgment principle. Wierenga's version of the substituted judgment principle and his counterexample to the principle's successful interpretation of valid surrogate consent is presented. A new version of what is meant by the substituted judgment principle is advanced. The new version is not beset with the problems Wierenga initially ascribed to the substituted judgment principle.