Five-year-old children's difficulty with false belief when the sought entity is a person

A total of 153 children (excluding those who erred on control questions), mainly 5 and 7 years of age, participated in two experiments that involved tests of false belief. In the task, the sought entity was first at Location 1 and then, unknown to the searching protagonist, it moved to Location 2. In Experiment 1, performance was well below ceiling in 5-year-olds when the sought entity was a person, and this contrasted with a task in which the sought entity was a physical object. Performance was especially inaccurate when the sought person moved of his or her own volition rather than when the sought person was requested to move by a third party. Interestingly, 5-year-olds were more likely to nominate Location 1 when asked where the searching protagonist would look first than when asked what he or she would do next. In Experiment 2, however, 5-year-olds also tended to nominate Location 1 following a question that included the word "first" even in a test of true belief--a patently incorrect response. Altogether, the results suggest that 5-year-old children have considerable difficulty with a test of false belief when the sought entity is a person acting under his or her own volition. This suggests that 5-year-olds' handle on states of belief is surprisingly fragile in this kind of task.     

Implicit understanding of belief

Implicit understanding of false belief was investigated by monitoring where children look in anticipation of a protagonist reappearing, when the protagonist mistakenly thinks that his desired object is in a different place from the place where it really is. This implicit measure of understanding was contrasted with children's explicit answers to the experimenter's question about where the protagonist would look for the object. Children from 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months erroneously looked at the object's real location, which they gave for their answer. From 2 years 11 months to 4 years 5 months, about 90% of the children looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the object was.In sharp contrast, only about 45% of the children in this age span gave that location as their explicit answer to the experimenter's question. These results are explained in terms of a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about that fact.     

Theory of mind finds its Piagetian perspective: why alternative naming comes with understanding belief

In the last of a series of experiments 48 3–5-year old children were tested on an alternative naming game with “synonyms,” e.g., if puppet calls the depicted item a “rabbit” the child has to call it a “bunny,” or the child has to judge puppet’s performance when roles are reversed. The game was also played with categories (rabbit–animal), name/colour (rabbit–black), colour/colour (black–white), and part/part (head–tail). The younger children (≤3.5 years) had severe problems with “synonyms” and categories (alternative names for the items, <10% correct), but not with names and colours, only colours, or only parts (>80% correct). Children’s increasing success with age on the alternative names tasks was closely paralleled (.53≤r≤.72) by their mastery of the false belief task in which they had to predict that a mistaken story character would look for a desired object in the wrong location. For explaining the synchrony between alternative naming and understanding false belief we draw on the Piagetian idea that children come to represent perspective at some point in their development. To apply this idea to the alternative naming game we draw on the philosophical discussion about sortals (terms that specify what sort of object something is) creating perspective differences.     

From synonyms to homonyms: exploring the role of metarepresentation in language understanding

Doherty and Perner (Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: just two words for the same thing? Cognitive Development, 13 (1998), 279–305) report that children’s understanding of synonyms and false belief is dependent on an understanding of the representational mind. Experiment 1 extends this finding by examining children’s understanding of homonyms. Children aged 3 and 4 years were asked to judge whether a puppet correctly selected the second member of a homonym pair. Performance on this task was strongly associated with performance on the false belief task even after chronological and verbal mental age had been accounted for. Experiment 2 incorporated two new tasks: a synonyms task and an adjectives task. Understanding of synonyms and homonyms significantly predicted performance on the false belief task. However, once chronological age was accounted for, only performance on the homonyms task did so. The difficulty experienced on the homonyms task was not due to a reluctance to acknowledge that the puppet can point to a different picture when the the same word label is used twice. Children had no difficulty on the adjectives task when the puppet had to point to a different picture described using the same adjective. The suggestion that the understanding of synonyms, homonyms and false belief are related by a common insight into the representational mind is therefore not supported.     

Age-related changes in children's use of external representations.

This study explored children's use of external representations. Experiment 1 focused on representations of self: Self-recognition was assessed by a mark test as a function of age (3 vs. 4 years), delay (5 s vs. 3 min), and media (photographs vs. drawings). Four-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds; children performed better with photographs than drawings; and there was no effect of delay. In Experiment 2, 3- and 4-year-olds used a delayed video image to locate a sticker on themselves (self task) or a stuffed animal (other task). The 2 tasks were positively correlated with age and vocabulary partialed out. Experiment 3 used a search task to assess whether children have particular difficulty using external representations that conflict with their expectations: 3- and 4-year-olds were informed of an object's location verbally or through video: on half of the trials, this information conflicted with children's initial belief. Three-year-olds performed worse than 4-year-olds on conflict trials, indicating that assessments of self and other understanding may reflect children's ability to reason about conflicting external representations.     

Understanding inference as a source of knowledge: children's ability to evaluate the certainty of deduction, perception, and guessing

Three experiments investigated children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Children observed a puppet make a statement about the color of one of two hidden toys after the puppet (a) looked directly at the toy (looking), (b) looked at the other toy (inference), or (c) looked at neither toy (guessing). Most 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds did not rate the puppet as being more certain of the toy's color after the puppet looked directly at it or inferred its color than they did after the puppet guessed its color. Most 8 and 9-year-olds distinguished inference and looking from guessing. The tendency to explain the puppet's knowledge by referring to inference increased with age. Children who referred to inference in their explanations were more likely to judge deductive inference as more certain than guessing.     

Reliability and generalizability of an acted-out false belief task in 3-year-olds

The current study tested the reliability and generalizability of a narrative act-out false belief task held to reveal Theory of Mind (ToM) competence at 3 years of age, before children pass verbal standard false belief tasks (the “Duplo task”; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013, Psychological Science). We conducted the task across two labs with methodologically improved matched control conditions. Further, we administered an analogue intensionality version to assess the scope of ToM competence in the Duplo task. 72 3-year-olds participated in a Duplo change-of-location task, a Duplo intensionality task, and half of them in a matched verbal standard change-of-location task, receiving either false belief or matched true belief scenarios. Children performed at chance in the false belief Duplo location change and intensionality tasks as well as in the standard false belief task. There were no differences to the standard task, and performance correlated across all three false belief tasks, revealing a rather unified competence and no task advantage. In the true belief conditions of both Duplo tasks, children performed at ceiling and significantly different from the false belief conditions, while they were at chance in the true belief condition of the standard task. The latter indicates that a pragmatic advantage of the Duplo task compared to the standard task holds only for the true belief scenarios. Our study shows that the Duplo task measures the same ToM competence as the standard task and rejects a notion of earlier false belief understanding on the group level in 3-year-old children.     

Children's understanding of inferential knowledge

The understanding of inference as a source of knowledge for 4- and 6-year-old children was investigated. Children and a puppet were shown 2 toys of different colors. The toys were hidden in separate plastic cans. After the puppet looked into 1 of the cans, 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, usually judged that the puppet knew the color of the toy in the other can as well. The finding that 6-year-olds attributed inferential knowledge to another observer is interpreted as evidence that children begin to understand the role of cognitive processes in knowledge acquisition around the age of 6 years.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

How language relates to belief,desire, and emotion understanding

Two experiments examined syntax and semantics as correlates of theory-of-mind (ToM). In Experiment 1 children’s language was examined at 3 years of age in relation to ToM at 3, 3.5, 4, and 5.5 years. Semantics predicted unique variance in later belief understanding but not desire understanding. Syntax did not explain unique variance in belief or desire. In Experiment 2 two measures of syntax and a measure of semantics were used with 65 3–5-year-olds. The syntax measures tested children’s understanding of word order and embedded clauses. They were related to false belief, but contrary to some predictions, were also related to emotion recognition. Performance on language control tasks with low syntactic demands correlated equally well with false belief. In both experiments performance on the syntax and semantics tasks was highly inter-correlated. We argue that ToM is related to general language ability rather than syntax or semantics per se.     

Narrative access and production in preschoolers' false belief reasoning

False belief tests seem to show the apparent acquisition at around age 4 of an ability to understand the representational status of mind. In this article, preschoolers' performance on a false belief task was manipulated in terms of their grasp of its narrative base. Five experiments are reported in which 3-year-olds were helped to become familiar with the events that comprise the false belief procedure by going through a picture book version of the task, before being asked to judge the protagonist's mental state. In Experiment 1, children who had failed a traditional task succeeded if they narrated the book version back to the experimenter, particularly if they were fluent in their story recall. Experiment 2 showed that this success occurred either if the child recited the story or if she or he was taken through each page twice in succession. Experiment 3 combined the most effective procedures with a younger group of children (mean age 3;3) and revealed 95% success as long as they could recall the prerequisite events. Experiments 4 and 5 probed possible limiting conditions for success by inserting an extra episode in the story and changing the format of the test question. The results suggest that the structure of 3-year-olds' event memories is central to their poor performance in the traditional false belief task—a clear grasp of the false belief “narrative” is necessary for successful performance. When they are given the opportunity to link discrete events into a coherent narrative, they have no problem demonstrating an understanding of others' minds—being able to recount the narrative is sufficient for successful performance.     

Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm

Recently, several studies have claimed that soon after their first birthday infants understand others’ false beliefs. However, some have questioned these findings based on criticisms of the looking-time paradigms used. Here we report a new paradigm to test false belief understanding in infants using a more active behavioral response: helping. Specifically, the task was for infants to help an adult achieve his goal - but to determine that goal infants had to take into account what the adult believed (i.e., whether or not he falsely believed there was a toy inside a box). Results showed that by 18 months of age infants successfully took into account the adult’s belief in the process of attempting to determine his goal. Results for 16-month-olds were in the same direction but less clear. These results represent by far the youngest age of false belief understanding in a task with an active behavioral measure.     

Children's understanding of teaching: the role of knowledge and belief

The relation between preschoolers’ concept of teaching and theory of mind was explored to determine if there is a developmental change in understanding how teaching depends on knowledge and belief. The study tested whether 3- to 6-year-olds thought the awareness of a knowledge difference is necessary for teaching. The 3- and 4-year-olds understood teaching stories with clear knowledge differences and could correctly use that information to specify the teacher and learner. The 5- and 6-year-olds, who performed well on a standard false belief task, further understood that it was the teacher's belief about the knowledge difference that would actually govern teaching. The conceptual link to teaching suggests that theory of mind is critical for understanding other forms of knowledge acquisition besides perceptual access.     

Why Do Young Children Look so Smart and Older Children Look so Dumb on True Belief Control Tasks? An Investigation of Pragmatic Performance Factors

ABSTRACT

When do children acquire a meta-representational Theory of Mind? False Belief (FB) tasks have become the litmus test to answer this question. In such tasks, subjects must ascribe a non-veridical belief to another agent and predict/explain her actions accordingly. Empirically, children pass explicit verbal versions of FB tasks from around age 4. The standard interpretation of this finding is that children at this age have acquired a solid capacity for meta-representation. New research with true belief (TB) control tasks, however, presents a puzzling phenomenon: While 3-year-olds pass these tasks but fail FB tasks, children from age 4 begin to show the reverse performance (passing FB but failing TB). Competence deficit accounts claim that these findings jeopardize the standard interpretation; they show that children may use simple heuristics rather than true meta-representation and that the original FB findings may thus have been false positives. Pragmatic performance limitation accounts, in contrast, claim that these findings do not document any conceptual limitations, but merely reflect children’s confusion in light of the task pragmatics. In the present study, the two accounts were tested against each other in seven experiments with 4- to 7-year-old children. Pragmatic tasks factors of TB tests were systematically modified. Results show that children’s difficulty with TB tasks indeed disappeared after some such modifications. This clearly speaks against competence limitation accounts and corroborates the standard interpretation of FB and related Theory of Mind tasks.     

Children's working understanding of knowledge sources: Confidence in knowledge gained from testimony

In three experiments, children aged between 3 and 5 years (N = 38, 52, 94; mean ages 3–7 to 5–2) indicated their confidence in their knowledge of the identity of a hidden toy. With the exception of some 3-year-olds, children revealed working understanding of their knowledge source by showing high confidence when they had seen or felt the toy, and lower confidence when they had been told its identity by an apparently well-informed speaker. Correct explicit source reports were not necessary for children to show relative uncertainty when the speaker subsequently doubted the adequacy of his access to the toy. After a 2-min delay, 3–4-year-olds, unlike 4–5-year-olds, failed to see the implications of the speaker's doubt about his access.     

Early understanding of perception as a source of knowledge

Two studies investigated preschool children's ability to infer another person's knowledge or ignorance on the basis of that person's recent perceptual experience. In Experiment 1 children were questioned about their own and a puppet's knowledge of a hidden object's color and about their own and the puppet's ability to see the hidden object. Three- and 4-year-olds attributed knowledge and perceptual experience to the person (either themselves or the puppet) who had viewed the hidden object, but not to the person who did not view it. Experiment 2 further investigated 3-year-olds understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. Children were asked to indicate which of two puppets, one who had viewed a hidden object and one who had not, would be able to tell them the object's color. Children chose the correct puppet more often than would be predicted by chance. The results of these experiments suggest that understanding of perception as a source of knowledge is present by the age of 3 years.     

Language and false belief in Korean-speaking and English-speaking children

The link between language and false belief (FB) understanding has been the focus of considerable debate regarding which language component (semantics, general language, or complementation) is necessary for FB development. We examined the relative roles of complementation and receptive vocabulary in FB development in Korean-speaking and English-speaking children. FB understanding, memory for complements involving the verbs think, say and want, and receptive vocabulary were measured at three time points in 59 Korean-speaking children and 72 English-speaking children. A multi-level growth model indicated that the development of receptive vocabulary and separately the development of think understanding uniquely predicted the development of FB understanding. Neither say nor want was associated with FB understanding. The same pattern was found for Korean- and English-speaking children. The results provide evidence for the role of general language in FB understanding and against the unique role of sentential complementation.     

Charting the development of representational skills: When do children know that maps can lead and mislead?

This study was conducted to test Perner's (1991) hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the false belief task because they cannot metarepresent (represent a representation's sense and reference). Preschoolers made and interpreted symbolic maps, and were tested on their understanding of the implications of following an incorrect map (false belief test). Young 3-year-olds showed some ability to make and use maps but performed poorly on the false belief tests. Children were more likely to use an incorrect map to predict behavior if the represented object was missing instead of in a wrong location. Many children were also able to predict that someone who used an incorrect map would not “find” the object. These results contradict Perner's hypothesis and suggest that representational skills develop gradually rather than appearing in a radical conceptual shift at age 4.     

Contexts of a person's prior intentions facilitate observational learning in 2.5-year-old children

We examined whether contexts suggesting an actor's prior intentions facilitate observational learning in 2.5-year-olds. In Experiment 1, children observed an experimenter handle one box before proceeding to open a second box. In two prior intention conditions, children either watched the experimenter extract a toy from the first box or saw that the box had already been opened. In two no prior intention conditions, children watched the demonstration with only the second box or paired with irrelevant actions upon the first box. Children successfully opened the second box more often in the two prior intention conditions than in the two no prior intention conditions. Experiment 2 investigated stimulus generalization as another explanation for these results. A functionally different trap-tube task served as the pre-demonstration apparatus. Before watching the experimenter open the box, children either saw her extract a toy from the tube with a stick or observed the toy accidentally fall from the opening. In both cases, children opened the box at similar high rates. We discuss children's use of others’ prior intentions or observable outcomes in observational learning.     

THE CREDIBLE SHRINKING ROOM:

Abstract— Becoming a proficient symbol user is a universal developmental last in the first years of life, but delecting and mentally representing symbolic relations can be quite challenging for young children To test the extent to which symbolic reasoning per se is problematic, we compared the performance of 2-year-olds in symbolic and nonsymbolic versions of a search task. The children had to use their knowledge of the location of a toy hidden in a room to draw an inference about where to find a miniature toy in a scale model of the room (and vice versa) Children in the nonsymbolic condition believed a shrinking machine had caused the room to become the model They were much more successful than children in the symbolic condition, for whom the model served as a symbol of the room The symbol understanding and use.