Relating inter-individual differences in metacognitive performance on different perceptual tasks

Human behavior depends on the ability to effectively introspect about our performance. For simple perceptual decisions, this introspective or metacognitive ability varies substantially across individuals and is correlated with the structure of focal areas in prefrontal cortex. This raises the possibility that the ability to introspect about different perceptual decisions might be mediated by a common cognitive process. To test this hypothesis, we examined whether inter-individual differences in metacognitive ability were correlated across two different perceptual tasks where individuals made judgments about different and unrelated visual stimulus properties. We found that inter-individual differences were strongly correlated between the two tasks for metacognitive ability but not objective performance. Such stability of an individual’s metacognitive ability across different perceptual tasks indicates a general mechanism supporting metacognition independent of the specific task.     

Domain-specific and domain-general processes underlying metacognitive judgments

Metacognition and self-awareness are commonly assumed to operate as global capacities. However, there have been few attempts to test this assumption across multiple cognitive domains and metacognitive evaluations. Here, we assessed the covariance between “online” metacognitive processes, as measured by decision confidence judgments in the domains of perception and memory, and error awareness in the domain of attention to action. Previous research investigating metacognition across task domains have not matched stimulus characteristics across tasks raising the possibility that any differences in metacognitive accuracy may be influenced by local task properties. The current experiment measured metacognition in perceptual, memorial and attention tasks that were closely matched for stimulus characteristics. We found that metacognitive accuracy across the three tasks was dissociated suggesting that domain specific networks support an individual’s capacity for accurate metacognition. This finding was independent of objective performance, which was controlled using a staircase procedure. However, response times for metacognitive judgments and error awareness were associated suggesting that shared mechanisms determining how these meta-level evaluations unfold in time may underlie these different types of decision. In addition, the relationship between these laboratory measures of metacognition and reports of everyday functioning from participants and their significant others (informants) was investigated. We found that informant reports, but not self reports, predicted metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task and participants who underreported cognitive difficulties relative to their informants also showed poorer metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task. These results are discussed in the context of models of metacognitive regulation and neuropsychological evidence for dissociable metacognitive systems. The potential for the refinement of metacognitive assessment in clinical populations is also discussed.     

Retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

A growing body of research suggests that some non-human animals are capable of making accurate metacognitive judgments. In previous studies, non-human animals have made either retrospective or prospective judgments (about how they did on a test or how they will do on a test, respectively). These two types of judgments are dissociable in humans. The current study tested the abilities of two rhesus macaque monkeys to make both retrospective and prospective judgments about their performance on the same memory task. Both monkeys had been trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments. Both monkeys successfully demonstrated transfer of retrospective metacognitive judgments to the new memory task. Furthermore, both monkeys transferred their retrospective judgments to the prospective task (one, immediately, and one, following the elimination of a response bias). This study is the first to demonstrate both retrospective and prospective monitoring abilities in the same monkeys and on the same task, suggesting a greater level of flexibility in animals’ metacognitive monitoring abilities than has been reported previously.     

Fatigue, sleep loss, and confidence in judgment

Sixty-four adults participated in a study examining the accuracy of metacognitive judgments during 28 hr of sleep deprivation (SD) and continuous cognitive work. Three tasks were studied (perceptual comparison, general knowledge, and mental addition), collectively spanning a range of cognitive abilities and levels of susceptibility to SD. Subjective and objective measures of sleepiness confirmed the expected patterns of increasing fatigue with SD. Participants displayed differing levels of metacognitive abilities across tasks, but traditional indices of the confidence-accuracy relation (i.e., calibration, resolution, over- and underconfidence), as well as the accuracy of pre- and posttask estimates of performance, remained stable over the SD period. The findings suggest that people can accurately assess their own cognitive performance when deprived of 1 night of sleep and that this ability need not be based on subjective estimates of sleepiness. The implications and limitations of the study are discussed and directions for future research are proposed.     

认知操作背景下在线元认知调节能力的特征

利用认知任务为载体,对在线元认知调节特征进行研究,探讨了在线元认知调节的跨任务一致性和规则特异性。实验采用字母记忆与跟踪击键两种任务作为在线元认知调节的载体,通过逐步增加“提示线索”,观测个体在任务作业上的“成绩”（字母作业任务）或“成绩提高量”（跟踪击键任务）,以此作为评价在线元认知调节能力的指标。结果发现,随着认知任务中潜在规律线索数量的增加,被试能够通过在线元认知调节过程提高其认知作业水平;被试通过认知任务与追述报告分别反映的在线元认知调节水平具有一致性;在线元认知调节一方面具有跨任务情境的一致性,另一方面具有规则发现的差异性。因此,基于认知操作为背景的元认知评价方法能够较好地评估在线元认知调节能力     

Demonstrating and eliminating the aggregation effect in physical skill tasks

Confidence judgments can be elicited in multiple ways. One of these procedures is to provide confidence judgments regarding each of a number of cases (individual judgments). A second procedure is to provide confidence judgments about a set of items (an aggregate judgment). Much research has demonstrated an aggregation effect—that individual judgments are more confident than aggregate judgments—within the cognitive knowledge domain. However, this effect has not previously been investigated with physical performance skill tasks. In three experiments, participants gave individual and aggregate judgments regarding the number of successful tosses they would make in either a ring toss, ping‐pong toss, or basketball toss task. In keeping with the aggregation effect, individual judgments were more confident than were aggregate judgments of success. Additionally, we eliminated the aggregation effect in Experiments 2 and 3 by employing a case‐specific base rate manipulation. Consistent with previous research with cognitive tasks, these results suggest that individual confidence judgments for physical skill tasks are determined primarily by characteristics associated with the individual case to be judged, whereas aggregate confidence judgments are determined by a more general evaluation of one's ability in the domain. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills

Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.     

Predicting others’ knowledge: Knowledge estimation as cue utilization

Predicting what others know is vital to countless social and educational interactions. For example, the ability of teachers to accurately estimate what knowledge students have has been identified as a crucial component of effective teaching. I propose the knowledge estimation as cue-utilization framework, in which judges use a variety of available and salient metacognitive cues to estimate what others know. In three experiments, I tested three hypotheses of this framework: namely, that participants do not automatically ground estimates of others’ knowledge in their own knowledge, that judgment conditions shift how participants weight different cues, and that participants differentially weight cues based upon their diagnosticity. Predictions of others’ knowledge were dynamically generated by judges who weighed a variety of available and salient cues. Just as the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring of one’s own learning depends upon the conditions under which judgments of self are elicited, the bases and accuracy of metacognitive judgments for others depends upon the conditions under which they are elicited.     

Easy comes,easy goes? The link between learning and remembering and its exploitation in metacognition

The cue-utilization view in metacognition assumes that judgments of learning (JOLs) are based on inferences from mnemonic cues deriving from the online processing of items during learning. This view calls for a specification of the underlying heuristics, their validity in predicting memory performance, and the extent to which they are utilized. This study examines one such heuristic: easily learned, easily remembered (ELER). We first show that ease of learning, as indexed by self-paced study time and by the number of trials to acquisition, is indeed a valid cue for recall success. We then demonstrate that this correlation between learning and rememberingunderlies metacognitive predictions about the future recallability of different items. The results are discussed in terms of the idea that metacognitive judgments incorporate knowledge about the internal ecology of cognitive processes, much as the perception of the external world embodies knowledge about the ecological structure of the environment.     

Individual differences in metacognition: Evidence against a general metacognitive ability

Individual differences in metacognitive accuracy are generally thought to reflect differences in metacognitive ability. If so, memory monitoring performance should be consistent across different metacognitive tasks and show high test-retest reliability. Two experiments examined these possibilities, using four common metacognitive tasks: ease of learning judgments, feeling of knowing judgments, judgments of learning, and text comprehension monitoring. Alternate-forms correlations were computed for metacognitive accuracy (with a 1-week interval between tests). Although individual differences in memory and confidence were stable across both sessions and tasks, differences in metacognitive accuracy were not. These results pose considerable practical and theoretical challenges for metacognitive researchers.     

Age-related similarities and differences in monitoring spatial cognition

Spatial cognitive performance is impaired in later adulthood but it is unclear whether the metacognitive processes involved in monitoring spatial cognitive performance are also compromised. Inaccurate monitoring could affect whether people choose to engage in tasks that require spatial thinking and also the strategies they use in spatial domains such as navigation. The current experiment examined potential age differences in monitoring spatial cognitive performance in a variety of spatial domains including visual–spatial working memory, spatial orientation, spatial visualization, navigation, and place learning. Younger and older adults completed a 2D mental rotation test, 3D mental rotation test, paper folding test, spatial memory span test, two virtual navigation tasks, and a cognitive mapping test. Participants also made metacognitive judgments of performance (confidence judgments, judgments of learning, or navigation time estimates) on each trial for all spatial tasks. Preference for allocentric or egocentric navigation strategies was also measured. Overall, performance was poorer and confidence in performance was lower for older adults than younger adults. In most spatial domains, the absolute and relative accuracy of metacognitive judgments was equivalent for both age groups. However, age differences in monitoring accuracy (specifically relative accuracy) emerged in spatial tasks involving navigation. Confidence in navigating for a target location also mediated age differences in allocentric navigation strategy use. These findings suggest that with the possible exception of navigation monitoring, spatial cognition may be spared from age-related decline even though spatial cognition itself is impaired in older age.     

Metacognition and proofreading: the roles of aging,motivation, and interest

The current study examined younger and older adults’ error detection accuracy, prediction calibration, and postdiction calibration on a proofreading task, to determine if age-related differences would be present in this type of common error detection task. Participants were given text passages, and were first asked to predict the percentage of errors they would detect in the passage. They then read the passage and circled errors (which varied in complexity and locality), and made postdictions regarding their performance, before repeating this with another passage and answering a comprehension test of both passages. There were no age-related differences in error detection accuracy, text comprehension, or metacognitive calibration, though participants in both age groups were overconfident overall in their metacognitive judgments. Both groups gave similar ratings of motivation to complete the task. The older adults rated the passages as more interesting than younger adults did, although this level of interest did not appear to influence error-detection performance. The age equivalence in both proofreading ability and calibration suggests that the ability to proofread text passages and the associated metacognitive monitoring used in judging one’s own performance are maintained in aging. These age-related similarities persisted when younger adults completed the proofreading tasks on a computer screen, rather than with paper and pencil. The findings provide novel insights regarding the influence that cognitive aging may have on metacognitive accuracy and text processing in an everyday task.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).     

Knowing when to move on: cognitive and perceptual decisions in time

We investigated people's ability to decide how much time to spend on the task at hand. To make such decisions well, one must take into account, among other things, the cost of failing and how one's task performance changes as a function of time. We first investigated timing decisions when the underlying task was perceptual. Decisions were highly efficient and suggested that people can make good use of perceptual knowledge and abstract reward information. Previous studies have found that perceptual decisions are generally optimal, but that cognitive decisions are generally suboptimal--a perception-cognition gap. Does a similar gap exist for timing decisions? We compared timing decisions for a perceptual task with timing decisions for more cognitive tasks. Performance was highly similar across the tasks, which suggests that knowledge can be acquired, and used to make timing decisions, in an equally efficient way regardless of whether that knowledge is derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.     

SENTIMENT D'AUTO-EFFICACITÉ ET EXERCICE DES PROCESSUS D'AUTORÉGULATION CHEZ DES ÉTUDIANTS DE NIVEAU COLLÉGIAL*

This study examines the influence of self-efficacy on the self-regulatory mechanisms exercised during a verbal concept formation task. High or low-self-efficacy is experimentally induced among sixty four college students who subsequently have to solve, aloud, different problems of concept formation. Self-regulation was examined based on the utilization of the cognitive strategies required to solve the task, the monitoring strategies applied over the cognitive enterprise and the metacognitive experiences emerging along the resolution. Both groups exhibite similar cognitive strategies, yet some of their monitoring strategies and metacognitive experiences are affected by their self-efficacy judgments. The nature of self-efficacy should be considered when studying the relationship between metacognitive knowledge and self-regulation as applied during the task resolution.     

Metacognition in Humans and Animals

ABSTRACT— It has long been assumed that metacognition—thinking about one's own thoughts—is a uniquely human ability. Yet a decade of research suggests that, like humans, other animals can differentiate between what they know and what they do not know. They opt out of difficult trials; they avoid tests they are unlikely to answer correctly; and they make riskier "bets" when their memories are accurate than they do when their memories are inaccurate. These feats are simultaneously impressive and, by human standards, somewhat limited; new evidence suggests, however, that animals can generalize metacognitive judgments to new contexts and seek more information when they are unsure. Metacognition is intriguing, in part, because of parallels with self-reflection and conscious awareness. Consciousness appears to be consistent with, but not required by, the abilities animals have demonstrated thus far.     

Metacognitive monitoring and control processes in children with autism spectrum disorder: Diminished judgement of confidence accuracy

Metacognition consists of monitoring processes (the ability to accurately represent one’s own mental states) and control processes (the ability to control one’s cognitive processes effectively). Both processes play vital roles in self-regulated learning. However, currently it is unclear whether these processes are impaired in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). This study aimed to assess metacognition in thirty-two children with ASD, and 30 IQ-/age-matched neurotypical children, using a judgment of confidence task. It was found that children with ASD showed diminished accuracy in their judgments of confidence, indicating metacognitive monitoring impairments in ASD. Children with ASD also used monitoring to influence control processes significantly less than neurotypical children, despite little evidence of impairments in overall control ability.     

The Effects of Subject-Defined Categories on Judgmental Accuracy in Confidence Assessment Tasks

The accuracy of confidence judgments can be determined using measures of discrimination and calibration. The present paper utilizes a new assessment methodology that decomposes the confidence assessment task, allowing us to investigate discrimination and calibration skills in greater depth than has been done in previous studies. Researchers investigating the goodness of confidence judgments have typically grouped forecasters' assessments into experimenter-defined categories, generally in equal widths of .10. In the present research, subjects created their own categories and later assigned confidence judgments to the categories, separating the tasks of discriminating categories (discrimination) and assigning numbers to categories (calibration). Further, the typical assessment procedure assumes that subjects are able to discriminate equally across the confidence scale. Since subjects in the present study defined their own assessment categories, they could locate those categories at any point on the scale. A final issue of interest was whether subjects were able to determine accurately the number of categories into which they could discriminate. Sixty subjects performed 1 of 2 tasks, general knowledge or forecasting, in both relatively easy and relatively hard conditions. Results showed a trade-off in performance: Calibration generally became worse as the number of categories increased, while discrimination generally improved. Overall accuracy was not affected by the number of categories used. Further, subjects partitioned categories more at the high end of the scale. Finally, measures showed that subjects were not accurate in their beliefs about their own discrimination ability.     

Knowing who knows: Metacognitive and causal learning abilities guide infants’ selective social learning

Given the widespread interest in the development of children's selective social learning, there is mounting evidence suggesting that infants prefer to learn from competent informants (Poulin‐Dubois & Brosseau‐Liard, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2016, 25). However, little research has been dedicated to understanding how this selectivity develops. The present study investigated whether causal learning and precursor metacognitive abilities govern discriminant learning in a classic word‐learning paradigm. Infants were exposed to a speaker who accurately (reliable condition) or inaccurately (unreliable condition) labeled familiar objects and were subsequently tested on their ability to learn a novel word from the informant. The predictive power of causal learning skills and precursor metacognition (as measured through decision confidence) on infants' word learning was examined across both reliable and unreliable conditions. Results suggest that infants are more inclined to accept an unreliable speaker's testimony on a word learning task when they also lack confidence in their own knowledge on a task measuring their metacognitive ability. Additionally, when uncertain, infants draw on causal learning abilities to better learn the association between a label and a novel toy. This study is the first to shed light on the role of causal learning and precursor metacognitive judgments in infants' abilities to engage in selective trust.     

Behaviors speak louder than explicit reports: Implicit metacognition in 2.5‐year‐old children

Recent research has shown that children as young as age 3.5 show behavioral responses to uncertainty although they are not able to report it explicitly. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that some form of metacognition is already available to guide children's decisions before the age of 3. Two groups of 2.5‐ and 3.5‐year‐old children were asked to complete a forced‐choice perceptual identification test and to explicitly rate their confidence in each decision. Moreover, participants had the opportunity to ask for a cue to help them decide if their response was correct. Our results revealed that all children asked for a cue more often after an incorrect response than after a correct response in the forced‐choice identification test, indicating a good ability to implicitly introspect on the results of their cognitive operations. On the contrary, none of these children displayed metacognitive sensitivity when making explicit confidence judgments, consistent with previous evidence of later development of explicit metacognition. Critically, our findings suggest that implicit metacognition exists much earlier than typically assumed, as early as 2.5 years of age.