Alexithymia and the reflexive self: Implications of congruence theory for treatment of the emotionally impaired

Abstract

This paper attempts to articulate a so far neglected dimension of congruence theory, the reflexive self to self transaction. My claim is that self reflexivity is a tacit but fundamental assumption behind Carl Rogers’ formulations of the relationship—what he refers to as “congruence” or “incongruence"—between experience and its symbolization in awareness. Gendlin's elaboration of the congruence theory in terms of “experiencing” and “inward sensing” has made clear and explicit the important role self reflexivity plays in the relationship between symbols and “unformed emotional experience.” A case vignette of Focusing is used to demonstrate the relevance of self reflexivity to our understanding of verbal expression of emotions, and by extension, to our understanding and treatment of alexithymia and related conditions of emotional impairments.     

On this,that, and the other: Nonegocentrism in very young children

The development of comprehension and production of spatial deictic terms “this/that”, “here/there”, “my/your”, and “in front of/behind” was investigated in the context of a hide-and-seek game. The first three contrasts are produced according to the speaker's perspective, so comprehension requires a nonegocentric viewpoint. The contrast “in front of/behind” is produced relative to the hearer, i.e., production is nonegocentric. The subjects were 39 children, rangin in age from 2.5–4.5 years, and 18 college undergraduates. The 2.5-year-old children were best at those contrasts which do not require a shift in perspective. The 3- and 4-year-old children were adept at switching to the speaker's perspective for comprehension of the terms requiring this shift, i.e., were nonegocentric. Four-year-olds were also capable of nonegocentric production of “in front of/behind”.     

A Humean objection to Plantinga’s Quantitative Free Will Defense

Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity (1974) contains a largely neglected argument for the claim that the proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is logically consistent with “the vast amount and variety of evil the universe actually contains” (not to be confused with Plantinga’s famous “Free Will Defense,” which seeks to show that this same proposition is logically consistent with “some evil”). In this paper I explicate this argument, and argue that it assumes that there is more moral good than evil in the cosmos. I consider two arguments in favour of this assumption, proposed by William King and Plantinga respectively, and argue that they are flawed. I then consider a sceptical objection to the assumption due to David Hume, and argue that this objection is at least prima facie plausible.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

Position of code and code for position: From isomorphism to a sensorimotor account of space perception

The paper starts with a discussion of the assumption that positions of the outer world are coded by the anatomical locations of firing neurons within retinotopic maps (“coding position by position”). This “code position theory” explains space perception by some kind of structural isomorphism since it implies that the perceptual space is based on a spatial structure within the brain. The axiom of structural isomorphism is rejected. Subsequently, a sensorimotor account of space perception is outlined according to which the spatial structure of the outer world is coded by the temporal structure of cortical processing. The basis is that action changes the perceiver's relationship to the outer world and, therefore, changes the representation of the outer world coded by the sensory responses of the brain. According to this view the code for position is not a spatial but a temporal structure resulting from action (“coding position by action”). The sensorimotor account offers a possible solution to the binding problem. The paper ends with some remarks on the possible origin and function of retinotopic representations.     

The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colors

Color experience is structured. Some “unique” colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as “pure,” or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as “binary colors.” According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue that colors are not properties of surfaces and that color experiences are neural processes without environmental counterparts. We reconsider the argument both in terms of its logic and in the light of recent models in vision science which point at environment-involving patterns that may be at the basis of the unique/binary structure of color experience. We conclude that, in the light of internal and external problems which arise for it, the argument from structure fails.     

Toward an African American Genogram

This article addresses the inadequacy of the standard genogram for African American families because of its underlying assumption that “family” is strictly a biological entity. The author suggests that this assumption is not culturally valid for African American families who have a long history of defining “family” as a kinship based on biological and functional ties. Using this conceptualization, an African American genogram is proposed.     

Perceptual completion in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and pigeons (Columba livia)

In a two-dimensional drawing, when the narrow edge of a bar appears to touch the edge of a large rectangle, humans overestimate the length of the bar (Kanizsa, 1979). Kanizsa has suggested that this illusion occurs because humans perceive the bar as continuing behind the rectangle and complete the “occluded” portion of the bar. Rhesus monkeys and pigeons were trained to classify black target bars with a variety of lengths as “long” or “short.” In training, the bar was always located at the same distance from a gray box. After learning this discrimination, the subjects were tested on novel stimuli, in which the bar was located at three new locations. Monkeys showed a consistent response bias for “long” when the bar touched the box, but pigeons did not. Monkeys appear to have completed the “occluded” part like humans, whereas pigeons failed to do so. Because this procedure does not require animals to complete the “occluded” part with any particular form, their failure suggests that pigeons do not even perceive the target bar as continuing behind the “occluding” figure. The failure of pigeons may be due to difficulty in perceiving depth from two-dimensional drawings.     

Learning as Leaving Home: Fear,Empathy, and Hospitality in the Theology and Religion Classroom

The article is a response to this journal's call for papers on metaphors for teaching, and also draws from a previous publication in which Kent Eilers developed a methodology for teaching global theologies. In this methodology, the ultimate goal was the development of “hermeneutical dispositions of empathy, hospitality, and receptivity toward culturally diverse voices” (2014, 165). This article considers the goals of Eilers' methodology, and others like his, and how it is that the metaphors of “leaving home” and “communal imagination” highlight the importance of the ambient and interpersonal features of a classroom and their effect on the attainment of the above goals. In so doing, it extends the conversation beyond content and methodology in teaching theology and religion into the realms of philosophy of education, as well as the fields of moral and values education. It is contended that the metaphors informed by these areas of study facilitate the attainment of such goals, and similar ones, by demonstrating that the cultivation of an ambience of care, trust, and compassion within the classroom constitutes an essential foundation for learning in which students “leave home” and cultivate “communal imagination.” The article finishes with practical suggestions for educators in theology and religion.     

Growing interreligious and intercultural competence in the classroom

Building on various models for intercultural and interreligious competence (IC/IR competence), this essay argues that classroom learning about religious and cultural diversity will engage students' “sociological imaginations” and lead to increased IC/IR competence. The current strategy for increasing intercultural competence (attitude, skills and knowledge, to be developed in that order) does not reflect best practices for educating about social difference. Instead, knowledge acquisition about other cultures and religions is the “front line” task for increasing alterity competence, and the liberal arts classroom can represent a “safe space” for learning about cultural and religious differences in a depersonalized, sociological manner. Supporting this argument are self‐assessments of IC/IR competence collected from primarily European and white American students enrolled in “Religions of the World” or “Intercultural Communications,” allowing an analysis of IC/IR competence in light of the two distinct disciplines and contributing valuable data toward a broader theory of IC/IR pedagogy.     

Hospitable Kinship in Theological Education: Cross‐Cultural Perspectives on Teaching and Learning as Gift Exchange

Abstract. Using an autobiographical approach for pedagogical reflection, the author raises questions about how to include “hospitable kinship” and “gift exchange” in teaching and learning. Her experience with a Zimbabwean community circle of hospitable kinship has prompted her to consider how this method of community formation might be employed in classroom situations. Definitions for hospitable kinship and gift exchange are woven throughout the narrative. Attention to the role of the teacher as host is provided as well. The essay prompts readers to turn their attention toward specific strategies that will aid in the formation of classroom community.     

On “Naturalistic” Family Research

Much is made of the desirability of “naturalistic” research on the family. Indeed, experimental research is often rejected for not being “naturalistic.” The purpose of the present article is to draw out and to examine some of the assumptions underlying such a position. The assumptions behind criteria such as “real,”“relevant,” and “typical” for research topics and settings are held to be questionable, not least because they are inconsistent with a communicational, context-oriented approach to the family. Alternative assumptions more consistent with this approach are described.     

Being In Front Is Good—But Where Is In Front? Preferences for Spatial Referencing Affect Evaluation

Speakers of English frequently associate location in space with valence, as in moving up and down the “social ladder.” If such an association also holds for the sagittal axis, an object “in front of” another object would be evaluated more positively than the one “behind.” Yet how people conceptualize relative locations depends on which frame of reference (FoR) they adopt—and hence on cross-linguistically diverging preferences. What is conceptualized as “in front” in one variant of the relative FoR (e.g., translation) is “behind” under another variant (reflection), and vice versa. Do such diverging conceptualizations of an object's location also lead to diverging evaluations? In two studies employing an implicit association test, we demonstrate, first, that speakers of German, Chinese, and Japanese indeed evaluate the object “in front of” another object more positively than the one “behind.” Second, and crucially, the reversal of which object is conceptualized as “in front” involves a corresponding reversal of valence, suggesting an impact of linguistically imparted FoR preferences on evaluative processes.     

Forum: Teaching With,Against, and To Faith

These three articles deal with the issue of faith in the classroom – whether one should teach “to,” “for,” or “against” faith. While their institutional settings and experiences are different, the authors all contend that more serious reflection needs to be given to the matter of how religious commitment plays out in our diverse pedagogical settings. The initial article by Carolyn Medine surveys the current climate regarding student spirituality in the classroom, the broader governmental concerns, and, the tensions that inform the choices available to a professor. Todd Penner's essay analyzes faith‐as‐ideology in the undergraduate classroom, and Marjorie Lehman's contribution analyzes how the issue manifests differently in Jewish Studies.     

Creative potential and the sociometric status of children

The social adaptation problems of highly creative children were first discussed by Torrance (1961a, 1961b), but there is still no clear consensus as to whether or not creative children suffer from social rejection. The social status of these children in classroom groups deserves attention because of the educational and developmental importance of sociometric position. The present study utilized a multivariate approach to sociometric status (exploratory principal‐components analysis). The principal components were subjected to cluster analysis, which produced a clear sociometric taxonomy, comprising “neglected,”; “popular,”; “academic,”; and “rejected”; groups. Most of the highly creative children were in the neglected group. Further exploration using path analysis demonstrated that the child's self‐perceived social distance from other group members represents an intervening variable which is related to creative potential and is negatively associated with popularity in classroom groups.     

Most Common Teacher Characteristics Related to Intentionality in Student Spiritual Formation

Teachers have the important commission of guiding students in their spiritual formation, which is the process through which an individual accepts Jesus Christ as Savior and continually becomes more like Him. Given this task, Christian teachers are able to be intentional within classroom management, through instruction, and by modeling. Teachers from 50 schools within the Southeast Region of the Association of Christian Schools International (ACSI) were asked to complete a survey regarding intentional practices for student spiritual formation. With a Likert scale, a rating system, and open-ended questions, a triangulation method was used to find the most common characteristics related to spiritual formation intentionality. The characteristics found to be most common included “exhibiting a Christ-like attitude”, “creating a classroom climate that promotes spiritual growth”, and “being intentional in the spiritual disciplines”. By being intentional in these areas, the teacher is able to be that agent that fosters and guides student spiritual formation.     

The interaction of cognitive styles and classroom environment in determining first-graders' behavior

This study investigates the importance of two “person” variables, reflection impulsivity and divergent thinking, and one “situation” variable, the classroom climate of first-grade classrooms, for the classroom adaptation of first-graders. Three types of classrooms differing in classroom climate were selected: open, intermediate, and traditional. Subjects were the children (n = 189) in these classrooms. Classroom adaptation variables included self concept, school attendance, and teacher ratings of classroom behavior, overall academic rank, and personal preference. Both main effect and interactional relationships between “person” and “situation” variables and classroom adaptation were hypothesized. Classroom environment was found to affect degree of classroom disturbance manifested by the children with students in open classrooms exhibiting most and students in the intermediate classrooms exhibiting least. Boys in the open classrooms had higher achievement anxiety and lower teacher preference ratings than boys in traditional or intermediate classrooms. Reflective children obtained higher ratings as self-reliant learners and, for boys, reflection was related to low classroom disturbance and high achievement anxiety. Interactional relationships between classroom environment and reflection-impulsivity were also found for boys. Divergent thinking was not related to classroom adjustment for boys. Girls high in divergent thinking were higher in school involvement and achievement anxiety and more preferred by teachers.     

Trust,Distrust, and Security: An Untrustworthy Immigrant in a Trusting Community

In security studies, there is an unquestioned assumption of a linear link between trust and security. However, such an assumption neglects complex identity dynamics that can be involved in trust‐building discourses for engendering security. There needs to be greater examination into what is meant by trust, and upon what, and whom, and how the politics of identity works in social trust building and how states can influence this process. This article contributes to the literature on trust, security, and identity in International Relations (IR) by making a case for a conceptual focus on the formation of particularized distrust towards “the other” as a corollary to trust and security of “the self.” It is argued that in the construction of a political community where security is associated with trust, particularized distrust can also be promoted through institutional discourses—strengthening the “trusting we” by constructing “the other” who can challenge social trust and feelings of security associated with it. The argument is illustrated through critically examining a state‐level narrative in Norway in relation to “the other,” that is, the immigrant. Through this illustrative example, mutual constitutiveness of trust and distrust in a self/other discursive construction will be shown.     

On truth and reference in postmodern science

Abstract:

If the defenders of typical postmodem accounts of science (and their less extreme social-constructivist partners) are at one end of the scale in current philosophy of science, who shall we place at the other end? Old-style metaphysical realists? Neo-neo-positivists? … Are the choices concerning realist issues as simple as being centered around either, on the one hand, whether it is the way reality is “constructed” in accordance with some contingent language game that determines scientific “truth”; or, on the other hand, whether it is the way things are in an independent reality that makes our theories true or false? If, in terms of realism, “strong” implies “metaphysical” in the traditional sense, and “weak” implies “non-absolutist” or “non-unique”, what - if anything - could realism after Rorty’s shattering of the mirror of nature still entail? In accordance with my position as a model-theoretic realist, I shall show in this article the relevance of the assumption of an independent reality for postmodern (philosophy of) science - against Lyotard’s dismissal of the necessity of this assumption for science which he interprets as a non-privileged game among many others. I shall imply that science is neither the “child” of positivist philosophy who has outgrown her mother, freeing herself from metaphysics and epistemology, nor is science, at the other end of the scale, foundationless and up for grabs.