Can a communitarian concept of African personhood be both relational and gender-neutral?

This paper explores the relationship between the African communitarian conception of personhood and gender. Defenders of this conception of personhood generally hold that an individual is defined in reference to the community, or that personhood is something that is acquired in community. Such characterisations often ignore the role, if any, that gender plays in that conception of personhood. Our aim in this paper is to critically explore the relationship between the two. In doing this we advance a number of claims. First, we point out that the supposed gender-neutrality of the African communitarian idea of personhood is a more general feature of African philosophy that, for instance, evinces a general lack of attention to issues of gender violence and discrimination. Second, we briefly survey the literature on the communitarian idea of personhood in African thought, in particular the views of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwasi Wiredu. Our aim is to demonstrate our hypothesis that this idea of personhood is often construed as a gender-neutral concept. Third, we argue that the relational and community-based nature of the communitarian idea of personhood indicates that it is in fact a gendered notion. We conclude that the assumed gender-neutrality is in conflict with the gendered nature of the communitarian idea of personhood. Fourth, we explore a probable objection to our claim that the communitarian idea of personhood is gendered and therefore vulnerable to gender inequality, by examining Ifi Amadiume's position that the notion of gender in traditional African cultures was fluid and indicated complementarity rather than inequality between the sexes. We argue that Amadiume's case is not convincing.     

Women’s anger, epistemic personhood, and self-respect: an application of Lehrer’s work on self-trust

I argue in this paper that the work of Keith Lehrer, especially in his book Self-Trust has applications to feminist ethics; specifically care ethics, which has become the leading form of normative sentimentalist ethics. I extend Lehrer??s ideas concerning reason and justification of belief beyond what he says by applying the notion of evaluation central to his account of acceptance to the need for evaluation of emotions. The inability to evaluate and attain justification of one??s emotions is an epistemic failure that leads one not to act on one??s own aspirations and desires and treat those desires as if they did not exist. I argue that this is a common condition among women in patriarchal societies because patriarchy can cause women to believe that they are not worthy of their trust concerning what they accept, specifically acceptance of their anger over their own mistreatment. As a result, many women are unable to realize the self-protective role of their anger. All of this reflects a lack of what I shall call epistemic personhood, a concept based on Lehrer??s theory concerning the keystone role of self-trust in the epistemic arch of rationality, justification and knowledge. Lastly, I use this concept of epistemic personhood to develop a care ethical account of self-respect that counters the Kantian account.     

On Simmel’s conception of philosophy

Over the past few decades, the work of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) has again become of interest. Its reception, however, has been fairly one-sided and selective, mostly because Simmel’s philosophy has been bypassed in favor of his sociological contributions. This article examines Simmel’s explicit reflections on the nature of philosophy. Simmel defines philosophy through three aspects which, according to him, are common to all philosophical schools. First, philosophical reasoning implies the effort to think without preconditions. Second, Simmel maintains that in contrast to other sciences, only philosophy is oriented toward constructing a general view of the world. Third, Simmel claims that philosophical work worthy of the name creates a sphere of a typical way of being in relation to world, a third sphere that is between the personal and the objective. According to Simmel, what has made philosophy’s eminent figures great is that they have advanced a type of thinking and developed it into a particularly interesting form, and this type can still correspond with the way we experience the world. It is significant that these three aspects through which Simmel defines philosophical activity emphasize the forms of questioning, not the contents or objects of thought. Still, he thinks that an interaction with concrete examples is always required in order to make philosophy a meaningful activity. This stance is reflected in the wide variety of topics studied by Simmel himself. In his last works Simmel began to emphasize another aspect of philosophy, its nature as a living movement of thought related to fundamental human limitedness: just as life itself ceaselessly reaches beyond its present form, so philosophy constantly strives to overcome the preconditions of thinking.

Kant’s conception of proper science

Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status.     

Soames’s new conception of propositions

In this paper, I argue that, when it comes to explaining what can be described as “representational” properties of propositions, Soames’s new conception of propositions—on which the proposition that Seattle is sunny is the act of predicating the property being sunny of Seattle and to entertain that proposition is to perform that act—does not have an advantage over traditional ones.     

Ludwig Feuerbach’s conception of the religious alienation of man and Mikhail Bakunin’s philosophy of negation

In this paper we attempt to prove that it was Ludwig Feuerbach’s anthropology that influenced Bakunin’s philosophical path. Following his example Bakunin turned against religion which manipulates, as Hegelianism does, the only priority human being has—another human being. Although Feuerbach’s philosophy did not involve social problems present at Bakunin’s works, we would like to show that it was Feuerbach himself who laid foundation for them and that Bakunin’s criticism of the state was the natural consequence of Feuerbach’s struggle for the individual. Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin proved that Feuerbach’s attempts to rise anthropology to the rank of theology are not sufficient to free the individual from the power of abstractions as in his opinion it is not only God (religion) that should be overthrown but also the state.     

Sexism, Vocational Goals, and Motivation as Predictors of Men’s and Women’s Career Choice

In the present study we analyzed the impact of vocational goals, sexist attitudes toward women, and motivation on career choice, in a sample of 448 Spanish college students (65.2% women and 34.1% men). Although we found some similarities between men and women in terms of their motivational orientations (extrinsic vs. intrinsic) and vocational goals, men’s extrinsic motivations appear to differ depending on the college major. We also found differences in sexist attitudes toward women by gender and chosen major: both male and female students enrolled in technical majors reported the most sexist attitudes (both hostile and benevolent). These findings underline the importance of taking sexist attitudes toward women into account in attempts to explain gender differences in career choice, something which has been largely overlooked in the research to date.     

Role as Norm,Role and Norm: Homer’s Hero,Hesiod’s Just City,and Plato’s Kallipolis

Role as Norm, Role and Norm: Homer’s Hero, Hesiod’s Just City, and Plato’s Kallipolis     

Young children’s developing conception of knowledge and ignorance: work in progress

When do children acquire an understanding of knowledge and ignorance? We analyzed the early development of children’s spontaneous references to knowing and not knowing and conclude that 2-year-olds talk explicitly and cogently about their own knowledge as well as that of an interlocutor. Two-year-olds also admit their own ignorance. Moreover, consistent with their realization that an informant may know what they do not, 2-year-olds ask many information-seeking questions. Finally, we discuss children’s receptivity and skepticism, especially toward the counterintuitive claims of an adult. We conclude that children’s conception of knowledge and ignorance begins early but undergoes protracted refinement.     

Children’s conception of heroes,villains, the self,and others in China: A developmental study

ABSTRACT

Children learn about good and bad people from storybooks and cultural representations of heroes and villains. To probe their ideas about good and bad people, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, 8-year-olds in China proved able to conceptualize goodness and badness in a graded rather than a dichotomous fashion. They located heroes at the upper end of a vertical scale, villains at the lower end, and ordinary children in between. In Experiment 2, a wider age range of children evaluated five figures (a hero; a villain; the self; a best friend; and an ordinary child). Children again showed a non-dichotomous scaling. They positioned the hero at the upper end and the villain at the lower end. In the intervening space, children positioned a best friend above the self and the self above an ordinary child. With age, children’s differentiation between the self and an ordinary child decreased.     

Petition and contemplation in Maimonides’ conception of prayer

Maimonides’ statements on prayer pose considerable challenges to interpreters who seek to find his work a unified and coherent philosophy of religion. It is especially difficult to see how his advocacy of a silent meditation that follows intellectual comprehension of divine matters can be harmonized with his thoroughly ritualized approach to the daily supplicatory prayer of Jewish liturgy. Yet, it is the purpose of the following pages to outline an interpretation of Maimonides’ philosophy of religion according to which supplicatory prayer and intellectual meditation are not disparate spiritual phenomena, but complementary dimensions of a distinctive form of ethical‐intellectual worship.     

Parental Dysphoria and Children’s Adjustment: Marital Conflict Styles,Children’s Emotional Security,and Parenting as Mediators of Risk

Dimensions of martial conflict, children's emotional security regarding interparental conflict, and parenting style were examined as mediators between parental dysphoria and child adjustment. A community sample of 262 children, ages 8–16, participated with their parents. Behavioral observations were made of parents’ interactions during marital conflict resolution tasks, which children later observed to assess their emotional security. Questionnaires assessed parents’ dysphoria, parenting, and children's adjustment. Structural equation modeling indicated that parental dysphoria was linked with child adjustment through specific and distinct mediating family processes, including marital conflict and parenting. Children's emotional security in the context of particular marital conflict styles also mediated relations between parental dysphoria and child adjustment problems, with similar pathways found for mothers and fathers. These pathways remained significant even after significant parenting contributions were considered.     

Kant’s,Hegel’s and Cousin’s Perceptions of China and Non-European Cultures: Racialism,Historicism and Universalism,and the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to discuss some assumptions of comparative philosophy by providing a critical analysis of Hegel’s perception of China and other non-European cultures in relation to Kant’s anthropological works. The main assumption of comparative philosophy is that the temporal-cognitive distance between Plato and Diderot is irrelevant compared to the geographic-cultural distance between Plato and Confucius or Diderot and Dai Zhen. This paper will demonstrate that this culturalist assumption is also a legacy of Hegel’s history of philosophy, whose anthropological basis and historicist framework needs to be deconstructed. Finally, this paper will make reference to Victor Cousin, the French philosopher who introduced German philosophy in France, to show how this thinker’s adaptation of Hegel’s history of philosophy allows us to propose a more inclusive conception of the value of non-European cultures’ intellectual productions and to elaborate, on this basis, a radically non-culturalist framework for comparative philosophy.     

Nietzsche as ‘Europe’s Buddha’ and ‘Asia’s Superman’

Nietzsche represents in an interesting way the well-worn Western approach to Asian philosophical and religious thinking: initial excitement, then neglect by appropriation, and swift rejection when found to be incompatible with one’s own tradition, whose roots are inexorably traced back to the ‘ancient’ Greeks. Yet, Nietzsche’s philosophical critique and methods - such as ‘perspectivism’ - offer an instructive route through which to better understand another tradition even if the sole purpose of this exercise is to perceive one’s own limitations through the eyes of the other: a self-destruktion of sorts. To help correct this shortcoming and begin the long overdue task of even-handed dialogue - or contemporary comparative philosophy - we will be served well by looking at Nietzsche’s mistakes, which in turn informed the tragic critic of the West of the last century, Martin Heidegger. We may learn here not to cast others in one’s own troubled image; and not to reverse cultural icons: Europe’s Superman, and Asia’s Buddha.

Frequency of occurrence as a psychophysical continuum: Weber’s fraction,Ekman’s fraction,range effects,and the phi-gamma hypothesis

Using the continuum of frequency of occurrence of words in English, it was found that: (1) errors in judgment are distributed lognormally rather than normally, and therefore the standard method of calculating Weber’s fraction underestimates its definition, (2) Weber’s fraction has an extremely large value of 3.3, (3)Ekman’s fraction equals 1.81, not .03 as with sensory continua, and (4)the logarithm of the dynamic range times Stevens’ law exponent equals 3.83, not 1.53 as with sensory continua. The last two results favor Teghtsoonian’s underlying sensory scale interpretation over Poulton’s range effects interpretation of the range-exponent relation.     

Everyday material engagement: supporting self and personhood in people with Alzheimer’s disease

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Threats to the self and personhood of people with ADRD include the disturbing images of Alzheimer’s disease as the death before death, culturally...